TPR hearing in New Mexico

2021See Farmers, Inc. v. Dal Mach. & Fabricating, Inc., 1990-NMSC-100 , ¶ 8, 111 N.M. 6 , 800 P.2d 1063 (explaining that we presume correctness on appeal, and the burden is on the appellant to clearly and affirmatively demonstrate district court error). {3} Mother also argues that CYFD failed to show that she would not alleviate the causes and conditions of neglect in the foreseeable future given that she testified at the TPR hearing that she was no longer angry and was ready to change. [MIO 7-9] Mother argues, without citing to the record proper, that evidence was adduced at trial that “at the be

2021See Farmers, Inc. v. Dal Mach. & Fabricating, Inc., 1990-NMSC-100 , ¶ 8, 111 N.M. 6 , 800 P.2d 1063 (explaining that we presume correctness on appeal, and the burden is on the appellant to clearly and affirmatively demonstrate district court error). {3} Mother also argues that CYFD failed to show that she would not alleviate the causes and conditions of neglect in the foreseeable future given that she testified at the TPR hearing that she was no longer angry and was ready to change. [MIO 7-9] Mother argues, without citing to the record proper, that evidence was adduced at trial that “at the be

2020Children, Youth & Families Department v. Patricia H., 2002-NMCA-061, ¶ 26 , 132 N.M. 299 , 47 P.3d 859 . [MIO 5] In Patricia H., however, this Court acknowledged that there was no bright line rule for the amount of time required prior to the filing of a TPR motion.

2020Children, Youth & Families Department v. Patricia H., 2002-NMCA-061, ¶ 26 , 132 N.M. 299 , 47 P.3d 859 . [MIO 5] In Patricia H., however, this Court acknowledged that there was no bright line rule for the amount of time required prior to the filing of a TPR motion.

2020See, e.g., State ex rel Children, Youth & Families Dep’t v. Brandy S., 2007-NMCA-135, ¶ 33 , 142 N.M. 705 , 168 P.3d 1129 (holding that the mother’s due process rights were not violated where she “had fair notice of the central issues that were to be litigated at the hearing[,]” she had the opportunity to present a defense, and the district court did not rely on evidence that was not properly established at the TPR hearing). {9} We acknowledge that the foster parents’ changed position on adopting Child was a significant development.

2020See, e.g., State ex rel Children, Youth & Families Dep’t v. Brandy S., 2007-NMCA-135, ¶ 33 , 142 N.M. 705 , 168 P.3d 1129 (holding that the mother’s due process rights were not violated where she “had fair notice of the central issues that were to be litigated at the hearing[,]” she had the opportunity to present a defense, and the district court did not rely on evidence that was not properly established at the TPR hearing). {9} We acknowledge that the foster parents’ changed position on adopting Child was a significant development.

2025Dep’t v. William M., 2007-NMCA-055, ¶ 66 , 141 N.M. 765 , 161 P.3d 262 (“[A]ny further delays in the [termination] proceedings threatened the welfare of . . . [Child], the [district] court was not obligated to wait indefinitely for [Mother] to resolve the issues that caused the abuse and neglect.” ); see also Vanessa C., 2000-NMCA-025, ¶ 29 (concluding that “[a]fter two years with limited or no long-term or sustained progress being made, we believe the [district] court could find that there was clear and convincing evidence that the causes and conditions of neglect would not change in the fore

2025Dep’t v. William M., 2007-NMCA-055, ¶ 66 , 141 N.M. 765 , 161 P.3d 262 (“[A]ny further delays in the [termination] proceedings threatened the welfare of . . . [Child], the [district] court was not obligated to wait indefinitely for [Mother] to resolve the issues that caused the abuse and neglect.” ); see also Vanessa C., 2000-NMCA-025, ¶ 29 (concluding that “[a]fter two years with limited or no long-term or sustained progress being made, we believe the [district] court could find that there was clear and convincing evidence that the causes and conditions of neglect would not change in the fore

2022See Maisie Y., 2021-NMCA-023, ¶ 19 (“[W]e hold that Section 32A- 14 4-29(I) dictates the grounds supporting termination of parental rights in ICWA cases, 15 including the determination that a child has been abused or neglected under Section 16 32A-4-28(B)(2), must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 17 {15} In this case, the district court properly found neglect by Father under Section 18 32A-4-2(G)(2) at the adjudicatory hearing, applying the clear and convincing 19 evidence standard of proof, and in contrast, made its finding of neglect at the TPR 6 1 hearing by evidence beyond a reasona

2022See Maisie Y., 2021-NMCA-023, ¶ 19 (“[W]e hold that Section 32A- 14 4-29(I) dictates the grounds supporting termination of parental rights in ICWA cases, 15 including the determination that a child has been abused or neglected under Section 16 32A-4-28(B)(2), must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 17 {15} In this case, the district court properly found neglect by Father under Section 18 32A-4-2(G)(2) at the adjudicatory hearing, applying the clear and convincing 19 evidence standard of proof, and in contrast, made its finding of neglect at the TPR 6 1 hearing by evidence beyond a reasona

2020See In re Termination of Parental Rights of Reuben & Elizabeth O. v. Dept. of Health Services, 1986-NMCA-031 , ¶ 36, 104 N.M. 644 , 725 P.2d 844 . (explaining that when “balancing the interests of the parents and children, the court is not required to place the children indefinitely in a legal holding pattern[,]” thus, forcing “the children to wait for the uncertain possibility that the natural parents, despite their persistent and long standing disregard of the children’s interest,” will instead “remedy past faults which may have rendered the children neglected.”). {10} We recognize, as did t

2020See In re Termination of Parental Rights of Reuben & Elizabeth O. v. Dept. of Health Services, 1986-NMCA-031 , ¶ 36, 104 N.M. 644 , 725 P.2d 844 . (explaining that when “balancing the interests of the parents and children, the court is not required to place the children indefinitely in a legal holding pattern[,]” thus, forcing “the children to wait for the uncertain possibility that the natural parents, despite their persistent and long standing disregard of the children’s interest,” will instead “remedy past faults which may have rendered the children neglected.”). {10} We recognize, as did t

2020Children, Youth & Families Dep’t v. Mafin M., 2003-NMSC-015, ¶ 17 , 133 N.M. 827 , 70 P.3d 1266 (stating “[t]he question of whether an individual is afforded due process is a question of law that we review de novo”). {21} Mother had a statutory basis for appointment of counsel during the TPR hearing.

2020Children, Youth & Families Dep’t v. Mafin M., 2003-NMSC-015, ¶ 17 , 133 N.M. 827 , 70 P.3d 1266 (stating “[t]he question of whether an individual is afforded due process is a question of law that we review de novo”). {21} Mother had a statutory basis for appointment of counsel during the TPR hearing.

2020Cf. Hector C., 2008-NMCA-079, ¶¶ 16-17 (holding that evidence from two years prior to TPR hearing was stale in light of the father’s “substantial changes” he made after being released from prison and evidence that he “participated willingly, voluntarily, and enthusiastically in all the programs that CYFD recommended”). {34} Mother also argues that CYFD failed to affirmatively prove that Mother could not change the conditions and causes of the abuse in the foreseeable future, instead transferring the burden to Mother to prove the converse.

2020Children, Youth and Families Department v. Hector C., 2008-NMCA-079, ¶ 15-16 , 144 N.M. 222 , 185 P.3d 1072 , to argue that evidence of recent compliance renders previous evidence stale for TPR purposes. [MIO 9] However, Hector C. involved a unique circumstance where “[the f]ather’s incarceration played an overwhelming and singular role in the termination proceedings.” Id. ¶ 21.

2020We reiterate that “what constitutes reasonable efforts may vary with a number of factors, such as the level of cooperation demonstrated by the parent and the recalcitrance of the problems that render the parent unable to provide adequate parenting.” Keon H., 2018-NMSC-033, ¶ 41 .

2020We reiterate that “what constitutes reasonable efforts may vary with a number of factors, such as the level of cooperation demonstrated by the parent and the recalcitrance of the problems that render the parent unable to provide adequate parenting.” Keon H., 2018-NMSC-033, ¶ 41 .

2004See LorenaR, 1999-NMCA-035, ¶25 , 126 N.M. 670 , 974 P.2d 164 (holding incarcerated parents have right to meaningful participation in TPR hearing). {35} Nonetheless, we are mindful that the TPR hearing is the final checkpoint for parental rights in these proceedings.

2004See LorenaR, 1999-NMCA-035, ¶25 , 126 N.M. 670 , 974 P.2d 164 (holding incarcerated parents have right to meaningful participation in TPR hearing). {35} Nonetheless, we are mindful that the TPR hearing is the final checkpoint for parental rights in these proceedings.

2007See In re Michael R.C., 1999-NMCA-036, ¶ 28 , 126 N.M. 760 , 975 P.2d 373 (questioning whether a district court could rely solely on facts gleaned from judicial review hearings in deciding to terminate parental rights at the summary judgment phase, but noting that the respondent would have an opportunity to be heard and present a defense at a full TPR hearing on remand). {30} Mother had ample notice that her failure to comply with her treatment plan could result in the termination of her parental rights.

2007See In re Michael R.C., 1999-NMCA-036, ¶ 28 , 126 N.M. 760 , 975 P.2d 373 (questioning whether a district court could rely solely on facts gleaned from judicial review hearings in deciding to terminate parental rights at the summary judgment phase, but noting that the respondent would have an opportunity to be heard and present a defense at a full TPR hearing on remand). {30} Mother had ample notice that her failure to comply with her treatment plan could result in the termination of her parental rights.

2007See In re Michael R.C., 1999-NMCA-036, ¶ 28 , 126 N.M. 760 , 975 P.2d 373 (questioning whether a district court could rely solely on facts gleaned from judicial review hearings in deciding to terminate parental rights at the summary judgment phase, but noting that the respondent would have an opportunity to be heard and present a defense at a full TPR hearing on remand). {30} Mother had ample notice that her failure to comply with her treatment plan could result in the termination of her parental rights.

2007See In re Michael R.C., 1999-NMCA-036, ¶ 28 , 126 N.M. 760 , 975 P.2d 373 (questioning whether a district court could rely solely on facts gleaned from judicial review hearings in deciding to terminate parental rights at the summary judgment phase, but noting that the respondent would have an opportunity to be heard and present a defense at a full TPR hearing on remand). {30} Mother had ample notice that her failure to comply with her treatment plan could result in the termination of her parental rights.

2020See Chris L. v Vanessa O., 2013-NMCA-107, ¶ 27 , 320 P.3d 16 (“Invited error occurs where a party has contributed, at least in part, to perceived shortcoming in a trial court’s ruling and as a result, the party should hardly be heard to complain about these shortcomings on appeal.” (alterations, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted)).

2020See Chris L. v Vanessa O., 2013-NMCA-107, ¶ 27 , 320 P.3d 16 (“Invited error occurs where a party has contributed, at least in part, to perceived shortcoming in a trial court’s ruling and as a result, the party should hardly be heard to complain about these shortcomings on appeal.” (alterations, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted)).

2020Co., 2014-NMCA-031, ¶ 28 , 320 P.3d 482 (“Where a party cites no authority to support an argument, we may assume no such authority exists.”); see also Corona v. Corona, 2014-NMCA-071, ¶ 28 , 329 P.3d 701 (“This Court has no duty to review an argument that is not adequately developed.”). {7} Additionally, we are unpersuaded by Father’s argument that the district court relied improperly on the “procedural history” without proper notice prior to terminating Father’s parental rights. [MIO 15] While the district court included in its order a recitation of the procedural of history of the case demon

2020Co., 2014-NMCA-031, ¶ 28 , 320 P.3d 482 (“Where a party cites no authority to support an argument, we may assume no such authority exists.”); see also Corona v. Corona, 2014-NMCA-071, ¶ 28 , 329 P.3d 701 (“This Court has no duty to review an argument that is not adequately developed.”). {7} Additionally, we are unpersuaded by Father’s argument that the district court relied improperly on the “procedural history” without proper notice prior to terminating Father’s parental rights. [MIO 15] While the district court included in its order a recitation of the procedural of history of the case demon

2019See In re Adoption of Doe, 1984-NMSC-024 , ¶ 2, 100 N.M. 764 , 676 P.2d 1329 (stating that where a party cites no authority to support an argument, we may assume no such authority exists). {16} To establish Mother’s noncompliance with the treatment plan and failure to address the causes and conditions of Child’s neglect at the TPR hearing, CYFD relied on testimony from Evelyn Anderson-Martin, a clinician with Amistad Family Services, and Claudia Cavazos, the CYFD permanency planning worker assigned to the case.

2019See In re Adoption of Doe, 1984-NMSC-024 , ¶ 2, 100 N.M. 764 , 676 P.2d 1329 (stating that where a party cites no authority to support an argument, we may assume no such authority exists). {16} To establish Mother’s noncompliance with the treatment plan and failure to address the causes and conditions of Child’s neglect at the TPR hearing, CYFD relied on testimony from Evelyn Anderson-Martin, a clinician with Amistad Family Services, and Claudia Cavazos, the CYFD permanency planning worker assigned to the case.

2004See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27 , 101 S.Ct. 2153 ; see also Mafin M., 2003-NMSC-015, ¶ 18 , 133 N.M. 827 , 70 P.3d 1266 (requiring the State to conduct proceedings with “scrupulous fairness” to the parents when it seeks to sever the legal relationship of a parent and child).

2004See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27 , 101 S.Ct. 2153 ; see also Mafin M., 2003-NMSC-015, ¶ 18 , 133 N.M. 827 , 70 P.3d 1266 (requiring the State to conduct proceedings with “scrupulous fairness” to the parents when it seeks to sever the legal relationship of a parent and child).

2004See Stella P., 1999— NMCA-100, ¶¶ 17-19, 127 N.M. 699 , 986 P.2d 495 (indicating that parents have a fundamental right to defend against a proposed TPR).

2004See Stella P., 1999— NMCA-100, ¶¶ 17-19, 127 N.M. 699 , 986 P.2d 495 (indicating that parents have a fundamental right to defend against a proposed TPR).