competent defense in California

1994He was, however, unaware of the decision in United States v. Henry, supra, 447 U.S. 264 , which was decided about eight months before defendant’s trial.

1994He was, however, unaware of the decision in United States v. Henry, supra, 447 U.S. 264 , which was decided about eight months before defendant's trial.

1993(See, e.g., People v. Westbrook (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 260 [ 129 Cal.Rptr. 143 ].) Counsel must also look into whether former counsel prepared adequately, conducted adequate investigation to discover witnesses and other evidence, and did the myriad of things necessary to a competent defense.

1993(See, e.g., People v. Westbrook (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 260 [ 129 Cal.Rptr. 143 ].) Counsel must also look into whether former counsel prepared adequately, conducted adequate investigation to discover witnesses and other evidence, and did the myriad of things necessary to a competent defense.

1982(People v. Byoune, supra, 65 Cal.2d 345 [reversing on that ground though it was undisputed that counsel conducted a competent defense]; People v. Crovedi, supra, 65 Cal.2d 199, 205 .) Accordingly, the judgment is reversed.

1966In the recent case of People v. Crovedi, ante, p. 199 [ 53 Cal.Rptr. 284 , 417 P.2d 868 ], we held that due process of law, as it is expressed through the right-to-counsel provisions of the state and federal Constitutions, comprehends a right to appear and defend with retained counsel of one’s own choice.

1979The Munoz court stated at page 66: “In our view, the court’s ruling denying appellant’s request for a substitution of attorneys, without an inquiry into the state of mind of the court-appointed attorney and without attempting to ascertain in what particulars the attorney was not providing appellant with a competent defense was tantamount to a, refusal on the part of the court to adjudicate a fundamental issue; the court’s failure to make the inquiry also resulted in a silent record, making intelligent appellate review impossible.” A similar result was reached in People v. Groce (1971) 18 Cal.

1979The Munoz court stated at page 66: “In our view, the court’s ruling denying appellant’s request for a substitution of attorneys, without an inquiry into the state of mind of the court-appointed attorney and without attempting to ascertain in what particulars the attorney was not providing appellant with a competent defense was tantamount to a, refusal on the part of the court to adjudicate a fundamental issue; the court’s failure to make the inquiry also resulted in a silent record, making intelligent appellate review impossible.” A similar result was reached in People v. Groce (1971) 18 Cal.

2025It is settled that “counsel does not render ineffective assistance by choosing one or several theories of defense over another.” (People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1007 .) B.

2024Defendant is entitled to remand for a new resentencing hearing with a supplemental probation report only if “‘it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.’” (Hendrix, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 944 .) Based on the record, we do not agree that but for the deficient waiver and the failure to order a supplemental probation report, it is reasonably probable that defendant would have been granted probation or the court would have elected to stay the life term rather than the eight-year term under section 654.

2017We agree with Cervantes that Kirkpatrick‘s selection of experts was not optimal and we find her reasons for deciding not to present a mental health expert, in light of the whole record, do not reflect the level of representation reasonably expected of a competent defense attorney in like circumstances. mental states. (§ 28; People v. Elmore, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 139 .) A mental health expert, or an expert on intoxication or addiction, also may not give testimony that the defendant did or did not, in fact, form the mental state required for conviction, for making that determination is the ju

2017We agree with Cervantes that Kirkpatrick‘s selection of experts was not optimal and we find her reasons for deciding not to present a mental health expert, in light of the whole record, do not reflect the level of representation reasonably expected of a competent defense attorney in like circumstances. mental states. (§ 28; People v. Elmore, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 139 .) A mental health expert, or an expert on intoxication or addiction, also may not give testimony that the defendant did or did not, in fact, form the mental state required for conviction, for making that determination is the ju

2017We agree with Cervantes that Kirkpatrick‘s selection of experts was not optimal and we find her reasons for deciding not to present a mental health expert, in light of the whole record, do not reflect the level of representation reasonably expected of a competent defense attorney in like circumstances. mental states. (§ 28; People v. Elmore, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 139 .) A mental health expert, or an expert on intoxication or addiction, also may not give testimony that the defendant did or did not, in fact, form the mental state required for conviction, for making that determination is the ju

2017We agree with Cervantes that Kirkpatrick‘s selection of experts was not optimal and we find her reasons for deciding not to present a mental health expert, in light of the whole record, do not reflect the level of representation reasonably expected of a competent defense attorney in like circumstances. mental states. (§ 28; People v. Elmore, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 139 .) A mental health expert, or an expert on intoxication or addiction, also may not give testimony that the defendant did or did not, in fact, form the mental state required for conviction, for making that determination is the ju

2017We agree with Cervantes that Kirkpatrick‘s selection of experts was not optimal and we find her reasons for deciding not to present a mental health expert, in light of the whole record, do not reflect the level of representation reasonably expected of a competent defense attorney in like circumstances. mental states. (§ 28; People v. Elmore, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 139 .) A mental health expert, or an expert on intoxication or addiction, also may not give testimony that the defendant did or did not, in fact, form the mental state required for conviction, for making that determination is the ju

2016(People v. Martinez (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1169, 1190 ; see also People v. Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 351 [“defense attorney who fails to adequately understand the available sentencing alternatives, promote their proper application, or pursue the most advantageous disposition for his client may be found incompetent”]; People v. Le (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 925, 936 [counsel ineffective in failing to object to fine calculation].) Here, defense counsel affirmatively requested the “statutory minimum” restitution fine of “$400” or “whatever amount the minimum is” when the actual minimum was $200 i

2015Competent defense counsel would probably recognize not just that an objection would be overruled, but that jurors might be unnecessarily antagonized 2 The fact that, like the defendant, the district attorney in Criscione was also Italian-American renders the situation in that case similar to that in People v. Bain (1971) 5 Cal.3d 839 , in which an African-American prosecutor “in effect, asked the jury to give credence to his belief in defendant’s guilt from the inception of the case, because he, as a black man, ‘understood’ black defendants.

2009In 1997’s People v. Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at page 1364 , we noted Godinez's holdings that ability to represent oneself is irrelevant to a competent waiver of counsel and that the competence standard for waiver is the same as to stand trial.

1998Such statutes are merely in aid of, and do not supersede or detract from, the power of the judicial department to control the practice of law.”]; People v. Culkin (1928) 248 N.Y. 465 [ 162 N.E. 487, 492 , 60 A.L.R. 851 ] [state constitutional and statutory provisions authorizing the court to regulate attorneys were “declaratory of a jurisdiction that would have been implied, if not expressed”]; Banales v. Jackson, supra, 601 S.W.2d 508, 511 [“The original act creating the integrated bar was simply legislative recognition of the inherent power of the judicial department to regulate the practice

1998Such statutes are merely in aid of, and do not supersede or detract from, the power of the judicial department to control the practice of law.”]; People v. Culkin (1928) 248 N.Y. 465 [ 162 N.E. 487, 492 , 60 A.L.R. 851 ] [state constitutional and statutory provisions authorizing the court to regulate attorneys were “declaratory of a jurisdiction that would have been implied, if not expressed”]; Banales v. Jackson, supra, 601 S.W.2d 508, 511 [“The original act creating the integrated bar was simply legislative recognition of the inherent power of the judicial department to regulate the practice

1998Such statutes are merely in aid of, and do not supersede or detract from, the power of the judicial department to control the practice of law.”]; People v. Culkin (1928) 248 N.Y. 465 [ 162 N.E. 487, 492 , 60 A.L.R. 851 ] [state constitutional and statutory provisions authorizing the court to regulate attorneys were “declaratory of a jurisdiction that would have been implied, if not expressed”]; Banales v. Jackson, supra, 601 S.W.2d 508, 511 [“The original act creating the integrated bar was simply legislative recognition of the inherent power of the judicial department to regulate the practice

1998Such statutes are merely in aid of, and do not supersede or detract from, the power of the judicial department to control the practice of law.”]; People v. Culkin (1928) 248 N.Y. 465 [ 162 N.E. 487, 492 , 60 A.L.R. 851 ] [state constitutional and statutory provisions authorizing the court to regulate attorneys were “declaratory of a jurisdiction that would have been implied, if not expressed”]; Banales v. Jackson, supra, 601 S.W.2d 508, 511 [“The original act creating the integrated bar was simply legislative recognition of the inherent power of the judicial department to regulate the practice

1997Thus, there was nothing improper about subpoenaing Susan S.’s mental health records. *1303 As discussed above, the Reber court went on to hold where good cause for discovery of mental health records is shown the person subject to the subpoena should furnish those records to the trial court which should review the records in camera, weigh the criminal defendant’s constitutional rights of confrontation and cross-examination against the statutory privilege for such records, determine which privileged matters, if any, are essential to vindicate the defendant’s constitutional rights and create a re