de novo sentencing hearing in Ohio

2020We did not employ the Galatis test in Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92 , 2010-Ohio-6238 , 942 N.E.2d 332 , at ¶ 36, in which this court overruled the part of the holding in State v. Bezak, 114 Ohio St.3d 94 , 2007-Ohio-3250 , 868 N.E.2d 961 , that requires a de novo sentencing hearing to correct a trial court’s failure to impose a statutorily mandated term of postrelease control.

2020We did not employ the Galatis test in Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92 , 2010-Ohio-6238 , 942 N.E.2d 332 , at ¶ 36, in which this court overruled the part of the holding in State v. Bezak, 114 Ohio St.3d 94 , 2007-Ohio-3250 , 868 N.E.2d 961 , that requires a de novo sentencing hearing to correct a trial court’s failure to impose a statutorily mandated term of postrelease control.

2025State v. Wilson, 2011-Ohio-2669, ¶ 30 . {¶30} In Wilson, the Supreme Court observed: A remand for a new sentencing hearing generally anticipates a de novo sentencing hearing.

2024Hamilton No. C-230165, 2023-Ohio-439, ¶ 10 , citing State v. Wilson, 129 Ohio St.3d 214 , 2011-Ohio-2669 , 951 N.E.2d 381 , ¶ 15 (“[W]hile a remand for a new sentencing hearing generally anticipates a de novo sentencing hearing, only the sentences for the offenses that were affected by the appealed error are reviewed de novo.

2009Id.; See also, State v. Bruner , Ashtabula App. No. 2007-A0012, 2007-Ohio-4767 ; State v. Smalls , Stark App. No. 2008 CA 00164, 2009-Ohio-832 . {¶ 12} Contrary to appellant's assertions, this Court did not hold that appellant's sentence was "not deficient." Rather our holding was clearly and unequivocally that appellant's attempt to utilize Civ.

2008However, that sentence was void, and the trial court was required to conduct a de novo sentencing hearing. {¶ 8} In State v. Marsh , Cuyahoga App. No. 89281, 2007-Ohio-6491 , this court recognized that we have "previously upheld the trial court's authority under R.C. 2929.191 to correct a sentence that omits notification of postrelease control." However, "we are now compelled by the Bezak decision to ensure that an offender who was not provided with notice of postrelease control at his or her original sentencing hearing is afforded a full de novo resentencing hearing rather than one in which t

2020We did not employ the Galatis test in Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92 , 2010-Ohio-6238 , 942 N.E.2d 332 , at ¶ 36, in which this court overruled the part of the holding in State v. Bezak, 114 Ohio St.3d 94 , 2007-Ohio-3250 , 868 N.E.2d 961 , that requires a de novo sentencing hearing to correct a trial court’s failure to impose a statutorily mandated term of postrelease control.

2020We did not employ the Galatis test in Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92 , 2010-Ohio-6238 , 942 N.E.2d 332 , at ¶ 36, in which this court overruled the part of the holding in State v. Bezak, 114 Ohio St.3d 94 , 2007-Ohio-3250 , 868 N.E.2d 961 , that requires a de novo sentencing hearing to correct a trial court’s failure to impose a statutorily mandated term of postrelease control.

2023Thus, for sentences that were imposed prior to the statute’s effective date, trial courts were to continue using the previous procedures, namely, finding that the sentence was void and subject to a de novo sentencing hearing. -7- Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus.

2020Thus, "to validly impose postrelease control, a minimally compliant entry must provide the APA [Adult Parole Authority] the information 7 See also State v. Singleton, 124 Ohio St.3d 173 , 2009-Ohio-6434, ¶ 35-36 (Pfeifer, J., concurring/dissenting), which notes that, rather than provide a de novo sentencing hearing, courts may apply corrective procedures as set forth in R.C. 2929.191.

2018DISCUSSION {¶ 9} "[A] trial court has a statutory duty to provide notice of postrelease control at the sentencing hearing" and "any sentence imposed without such notification is contrary to law." State v. Jordan, 104 Ohio St.3d 21 , 2004-Ohio-6085 , ¶ 23.2 "[S]tatutorily compliant notification" includes "notifying the defendant of the details of the postrelease control and the consequences of violating postrelease control." State v. Qualls, 131 Ohio St.3d 499 , 2See also State v. Singleton, 124 Ohio St.3d 173 , 2009-Ohio-6434, ¶ 35-36 , noting that, rather than provide a de novo sentencing hea

2018See State v. Jordan , 104 Ohio St.3d 21 , 2004-Ohio-6085 , 817 N.E.2d 864 , ¶ 23 (holding that a trial court's failure to properly impose a statutorily mandated term of postrelease control renders the sentence contrary to law and void); State v. Bezak , 114 Ohio St.3d 94 , 2007-Ohio-3250 , 868 N.E.2d 961 , ¶ 12-13 (explaining that a void sentence is a nullity and a de novo sentencing hearing therefore is required to correct it); State v. Fischer , 128 Ohio St.3d 92 , 2010-Ohio-6238 , 942 N.E.2d 332 , ¶ 17, 36 (overruling Bezak , holding that the improper imposition of postrelease control does

2008However, that sentence was void, and the trial court was required to conduct a de novo sentencing hearing. {¶ 8} In State v. Marsh , Cuyahoga App. No. 89281, 2007-Ohio-6491 , this court recognized that we have "previously upheld the trial court's authority under R.C. 2929.191 to correct a sentence that omits notification of postrelease control." However, "we are now compelled by the Bezak decision to ensure that an offender who was not provided with notice of postrelease control at his or her original sentencing hearing is afforded a full de novo resentencing hearing rather than one in which t

2008Schneider , 2007-Ohio-5536 , ¶ 21 . 2 Defendant herein is now advocating the opposite result, *Page 4 arguing in this instance that the trial court exceeded its authority by conducting a de novo sentencing hearing rather than simply limiting the hearing to an imposition of postrelease control.

2022Consistent with Cherry’s argument, the law-of-the-case doctrine states that “ ‘the decision of a reviewing court in a case remains the law of that case on all legal questions involved for all subsequent proceedings in the case at both the trial and reviewing levels.’ ” (Emphasis added.) Hopkins v. Dyer, 104 Ohio St.3d 461 , 2004-Ohio-6769 , 820 N.E.2d 329 , ¶ 15, quoting Nolan v. Nolan, 11 Ohio St.3d 1 , 3, 462 N.E.2d 410 (1984).

2022Consistent with Cherry’s argument, the law-of-the-case doctrine states that “ ‘the decision of a reviewing court in a case remains the law of that case on all legal questions involved for all subsequent proceedings in the case at both the trial and reviewing levels.’ ” (Emphasis added.) Hopkins v. Dyer, 104 Ohio St.3d 461 , 2004-Ohio-6769 , 820 N.E.2d 329 , ¶ 15, quoting Nolan v. Nolan, 11 Ohio St.3d 1 , 3, 462 N.E.2d 410 (1984).

2014Id. at ¶ 32, 844 N.E.2d 301 . {¶25} “* * * {¶26} “In State v. Bezak, 114 Ohio St.3d 94 , 2007–Ohio–3250, 868 N.E.2d 961 , we concluded that an offender is entitled to a de novo sentencing hearing for the trial court to correct a sentence that omitted notice of post-release control. * * * Importantly, because Bezak had already completed his term of imprisonment, the trial court could not, consistent with our decision in Hernandez * * * conduct a resentencing. {¶27} “* * * {¶28} “Most recently, in State v. Bloomer, 122 Ohio St.3d 200 , 2009–Ohio– 2462, 909 N.E.2d 1254 , we * * * held that when a

2014Id. at ¶ 32, 844 N.E.2d 301 . {¶25} “* * * {¶26} “In State v. Bezak, 114 Ohio St.3d 94 , 2007–Ohio–3250, 868 N.E.2d 961 , we concluded that an offender is entitled to a de novo sentencing hearing for the trial court to correct a sentence that omitted notice of post-release control. * * * Importantly, because Bezak had already completed his term of imprisonment, the trial court could not, consistent with our decision in Hernandez * * * conduct a resentencing. {¶27} “* * * {¶28} “Most recently, in State v. Bloomer, 122 Ohio St.3d 200 , 2009–Ohio– 2462, 909 N.E.2d 1254 , we * * * held that when a

2010In his written statement at resentencing, Davis argued that Bolton held that “upon resentencing, a defendant may not receive the same amount of time without denying him statutory provisions of law.” After reviewing Bolton we believe that Davis is arguing that the court failed to hold a de novo sentencing hearing, an argument similar to that proposed by appointed counsel. {¶36} Bolton held that when an appeals court reverses and remands a sentence that is contrary to law, a trial court must “conduct a complete sentencing hearing upon resentencing a defendant.” Id. at 189 .

2007No. 97 CA 0019, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 4544 , at *7; cf. State v. Bolton (2001), 143 Ohio App.3d 185 , 187-188 (overturning appellant's sentence on the basis of a lack of a de novo sentencing hearing where the trial court solely relied upon "the terms to which [it] had previously sentenced the defendant," and neither appellant, his counsel, nor the prosecutor were given an opportunity to speak at the hearing). *Page 13 {¶ 64} After Foster , a sentencing court, upon remand for resentencing, possesses "full discretion to impose a prison sentence within the statutory range * * *." Foster , 2006-Ohi

2018State v. Holdcroft, 137 Ohio St.3d 526 , 2013-Ohio-5014, ¶ 18 (when the prison-sanction portion of a sentence that also includes a void sanction has not been completely served, the void sanction may be modified). {¶ 15} We note that appellant is not entitled to a de novo sentencing hearing in order for the trial court to correct its error under R.C. 2950.09(E).

2018State v. Holdcroft, 137 Ohio St.3d 526 , 2013-Ohio-5014, ¶ 18 (when the prison-sanction portion of a sentence that also includes a void sanction has not been completely served, the void sanction may be modified). {¶ 15} We note that appellant is not entitled to a de novo sentencing hearing in order for the trial court to correct its error under R.C. 2950.09(E).

2025State v. Vega-Medina, 2024-Ohio-3409, ¶ 17 (8th Dist.). 2 R.C. 2903.42 creates a rebuttable presumption that anyone convicted of a violent offense as defined by R.C. 2903.41, which includes kidnapping, is classified as a violent offender and must enroll in the violent offender database upon release from prison. sentence as it pertained to this case and remanded the case to the trial court to conduct a de novo sentencing hearing because the trial court failed to procedurally comply with the requirements specified in R.C. 2903.42 regarding the violent- offender designation and database.

2021See State v. Christian, 159 Ohio St.3d 510 , 2020-Ohio-828, ¶16-18 , citing United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 136 (1980) and State v. Roberts, 119 Ohio St.3d 294 , 2008-Ohio-3835 , ¶16. 11 {¶36} All considered, appellant has failed to show that the imposition of consecutive sentences on remand was the product of actual vindictiveness, and the imposition of a shorter overall prison term does not imply a reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness.

2021See State v. Christian, 159 Ohio St.3d 510 , 2020-Ohio- 828, ¶16-18, citing United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 , 136 (1980) and State v. Roberts, 119 Ohio St.3d 294 , 2008-Ohio-3835 , ¶16. {¶36} All considered, appellant has failed to show that the imposition of consecutive sentences on remand was the product of actual vindictiveness, and the imposition of a shorter overall prison term does not imply a reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness.

2021See State v. Christian, 159 Ohio St.3d 510 , 2020-Ohio-828, ¶16-18 , citing United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 136 (1980) and State v. Roberts, 119 Ohio St.3d 294 , 2008-Ohio-3835 , ¶16. 11 {¶36} All considered, appellant has failed to show that the imposition of consecutive sentences on remand was the product of actual vindictiveness, and the imposition of a shorter overall prison term does not imply a reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness.

2021See State v. Christian, 159 Ohio St.3d 510 , 2020-Ohio- 828, ¶16-18, citing United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 , 136 (1980) and State v. Roberts, 119 Ohio St.3d 294 , 2008-Ohio-3835 , ¶16. {¶36} All considered, appellant has failed to show that the imposition of consecutive sentences on remand was the product of actual vindictiveness, and the imposition of a shorter overall prison term does not imply a reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness.