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36 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1990–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Trotter v. Stategreen2 sentences2020This Court has held that “[i]n both capital and noncapital cases, . . . resentencing is a new proceeding” and that “ ‘resentencing -8- entitles the defendant to a de novo sentencing hearing with the full array of due process rights.’ ” State v. Collins, 985 So. 2d 985, 989 (Fla. 2008) (quoting Trotter v. State, 825 So. 2d 362, 367-68 (Fla. 2002)); see also Galindez v. State, 955 So. 2d 517, 526 (Fla. 2007) (Cantero, J., specially concurring) (explaining that without the empaneling of new juries, a resentencing court would be limited to the facts found by the original jury and the State would, 2020Of particular importance is the Florida Supreme Court’s specific cite to State v. Collins in which, in pertinent part, the court held: In noncapital cases, too, we have concluded that “resentencing entitles the defendant to a de novo sentencing hearing with the full array of due process rights.” Trotter v. State, 825 So. 2d 362, 367-68 (Fla. 2002); see also Galindez v. State, 955 So. 2d 517, 525 (Fla. 2007) (Cantero, J., specially concurring) (“We have consistently held that resentencing proceedings must be a ‘clean slate,’ meaning that the defendant’s vacated sentence becomes a ‘nullity’ and | 8 | 8 |
Baldwin v. Stategreen2 sentences2001State v. Scott, 439 So.2d 219, 220 (Fla.1983); Baldwin v. State, 700 So.2d 95, 96 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (holding that on resentencing, a defendant is entitled to a de novo sentencing hearing and may challenge his prior record even though the priors had not been previously challenged). "[W]hen a discrepancy concerning the scoresheet is brought to the sentencing court's attention, the court should resolve the discrepancy and correct the scoresheet to reflect the accurate numbers." Erickson v. State, 565 So.2d 328, 336 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). 2001See also Baldwin v. State, 700 So.2d 95, 96 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)(holding that on re-sentencing, a defendant is entitled to receive a de novo sentencing hearing and can challenge his prior record even though the prior convictions had not been previously challenged). | 5 | 5 |
St. Lawrence v. Stategreen2 sentences2001Lawrence v. State, 785 So.2d 728 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001), once the trial court determines that the defendant is entitled to re-sentencing under Heggs, the defendant is entitled to a de novo sentencing hearing and any discrepancy in scoring brought to the trial court’s attention should be resolved. 2001Lawrence v. State, 785 So.2d 728 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001); June v. State, 784 So.2d 1257, 1259 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001). [2] Accordingly, the trial court had the authority at the de novo sentencing hearing to exercise its discretion to apply the multiplier. | 3 | 5 |
June v. Stategreen2 sentences2002See June v. State, 784 So.2d 1257 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (holding that when defendant receives a resentencing hearing pursuant to a Heggs challenge, he or she is entitled to receive a de novo sentencing hearing with the full array of due process rights). 2001In June v. State, 784 So.2d 1257 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001), we held that when a defendant receives a re-sentencing hearing pursuant to a Heggs ’ challenge, he or she is entitled to receive a de novo sentencing hearing with the full array of due process rights. | 3 | 4 |
Galindez v. Stategreen2 sentences2020This Court has held that “[i]n both capital and noncapital cases, . . . resentencing is a new proceeding” and that “ ‘resentencing -8- entitles the defendant to a de novo sentencing hearing with the full array of due process rights.’ ” State v. Collins, 985 So. 2d 985, 989 (Fla. 2008) (quoting Trotter v. State, 825 So. 2d 362, 367-68 (Fla. 2002)); see also Galindez v. State, 955 So. 2d 517, 526 (Fla. 2007) (Cantero, J., specially concurring) (explaining that without the empaneling of new juries, a resentencing court would be limited to the facts found by the original jury and the State would, 2020Of particular importance is the Florida Supreme Court’s specific cite to State v. Collins in which, in pertinent part, the court held: In noncapital cases, too, we have concluded that “resentencing entitles the defendant to a de novo sentencing hearing with the full array of due process rights.” Trotter v. State, 825 So. 2d 362, 367-68 (Fla. 2002); see also Galindez v. State, 955 So. 2d 517, 525 (Fla. 2007) (Cantero, J., specially concurring) (“We have consistently held that resentencing proceedings must be a ‘clean slate,’ meaning that the defendant’s vacated sentence becomes a ‘nullity’ and | 3 | 3 |
State v. Collinsgreen2 sentences2020This Court has held that “[i]n both capital and noncapital cases, . . . resentencing is a new proceeding” and that “ ‘resentencing -8- entitles the defendant to a de novo sentencing hearing with the full array of due process rights.’ ” State v. Collins, 985 So. 2d 985, 989 (Fla. 2008) (quoting Trotter v. State, 825 So. 2d 362, 367-68 (Fla. 2002)); see also Galindez v. State, 955 So. 2d 517, 526 (Fla. 2007) (Cantero, J., specially concurring) (explaining that without the empaneling of new juries, a resentencing court would be limited to the facts found by the original jury and the State would, 2014See State v. Collins, 985 So.2d 985, 989 (Fla.2008) (“In both capital and noncapital cases, we have held that resentencing is a new proceeding [and] that ‘resentencing entitles the defendant to a de novo sentencing hearing with the full array of due process rights.’ ” (quoting Trotter v. State, 825 So.2d 362, 367-68 (Fla.2002))). | 2 | 3 |
State v. Scottgreen2 sentences2001State v. Scott, 439 So.2d 219, 220 (Fla.1983); Baldwin v. State, 700 So.2d 95, 96 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (holding that on resentencing, a defendant is entitled to a de novo sentencing hearing and may challenge his prior record even though the priors had not been previously challenged). "[W]hen a discrepancy concerning the scoresheet is brought to the sentencing court's attention, the court should resolve the discrepancy and correct the scoresheet to reflect the accurate numbers." Erickson v. State, 565 So.2d 328, 336 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). 2001Since the robbery with a mask was resolved prior to the time of his Heggs resentencing, it was correctly included as part of his prior record at resentencing. *1259 Once the trial court determined that resentencing was appropriate, June was entitled to a de novo sentencing hearing with the full array of due process rights. [1] State v. Scott, 439 So.2d 219, 220 (Fla.1983); Baldwin v. State, 700 So.2d 95, 96 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (holding that on resentencing, a defendant is entitled to a de novo sentencing hearing and may challenge his prior record even though the priors had not been previously c | 2 | 3 |
Maxwell Leon v. Stategreen2 sentences2021Appellant further argues that the remedy for the illegal sentence in this case is a de novo sentencing hearing, as that was the remedy on remand in both Hernandez, 162 So. 3d at 131 and Leon v. State, 190 So. 3d 243, 244 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016). 2021Appellant further argues that the remedy for the illegal sentence in this case is a de novo sentencing hearing, as that was the remedy on remand in both Hernandez and Leon v. State, 190 So. 3d 243, 244 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016). | 2 | 2 |
Webb v. Stategreen2 sentences2017We agree with Appellant that, once the trial court determines that de novo resentencing is appropriate, the defendant is “entitled to a de novo sentencing hearing with the full array of due process rights.” Webb v. State, 805 So. 2d 856, 857 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (quoting St. 2002See Pelham v. State, 815 So.2d 733, 734 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); Webb v. State, 805 So.2d 856, 857 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Duvalt v. State, 805 So.2d 834, 834 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Williams v. State, 801 So.2d 301, 302 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Diaz v. State, 790 So.2d 523, 523 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); Smith v. State, 800 So.2d 752, 753 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001); St. | 2 | 2 |
Morris v. Stategreen2 sentences2001Morris, 605 So.2d at 514 (footnote omitted). 1993See Morris v. State, 605 So.2d 511 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). | 2 | 2 |
Erickson v. Stategreen2 sentences2001State v. Scott, 439 So.2d 219, 220 (Fla.1983); Baldwin v. State, 700 So.2d 95, 96 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (holding that on resentencing, a defendant is entitled to a de novo sentencing hearing and may challenge his prior record even though the priors had not been previously challenged). "[W]hen a discrepancy concerning the scoresheet is brought to the sentencing court's attention, the court should resolve the discrepancy and correct the scoresheet to reflect the accurate numbers." Erickson v. State, 565 So.2d 328, 336 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). 2001Since the robbery with a mask was resolved prior to the time of his Heggs resentencing, it was correctly included as part of his prior record at resentencing. *1259 Once the trial court determined that resentencing was appropriate, June was entitled to a de novo sentencing hearing with the full array of due process rights. [1] State v. Scott, 439 So.2d 219, 220 (Fla.1983); Baldwin v. State, 700 So.2d 95, 96 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (holding that on resentencing, a defendant is entitled to a de novo sentencing hearing and may challenge his prior record even though the priors had not been previously c | 2 | 2 |
Jackson v. Stategreen1 sentence2024To qualify as fundamental error when the issue is not preserved, “the error ‘must be basic to the judicial decision under review and equivalent to a denial of due process.’” Hill, 246 So. 3d at 394 (quoting Jackson v. State, 983 So. 2d 562, 575 (Fla. 2008)). 3 Appellant’s resentencing entitled him to a de novo sentencing hearing with the full array of due process rights. | 1 | 1 |
Walker v. Stategreen1 sentence2020Of particular importance is the Florida Supreme Court’s specific cite to State v. Collins in which, in pertinent part, the court held: In noncapital cases, too, we have concluded that “resentencing entitles the defendant to a de novo sentencing hearing with the full array of due process rights.” Trotter v. State, 825 So. 2d 362, 367-68 (Fla. 2002); see also Galindez v. State, 955 So. 2d 517, 525 (Fla. 2007) (Cantero, J., specially concurring) (“We have consistently held that resentencing proceedings must be a ‘clean slate,’ meaning that the defendant’s vacated sentence becomes a ‘nullity’ and | 1 | 1 |
Dixon v. Stategreen1 sentence2019See Dixon v. State, 41 So. 3d 990, 991 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010). | 1 | 1 |
Tumblin v. Stategreen1 sentence2007See Ross v. State, 901 So.2d 252 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005); see also Tumblin v. State, 965 So.2d 354 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007); Granatino v. State, 965 So.2d 361 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007). | 1 | 1 |
Street v. Stategreen1 sentence2007During a de novo sentencing hearing, "both sides are free to argue or present evidence on whatever factors the law permits a trial court to consider before imposing sentence." Gisi v. State, 948 So.2d 816 , 819 (Fla. 2d DCA), review granted, 952 So.2d 1189 (Fla.2007); see also Street v. State, 899 So.2d 440, 441 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). | 1 | 1 |
Lloyd v. Stategreen1 sentence2007As I have previously noted in Lloyd v. State, 844 So.2d 713, 713 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (Altenbernd, J., concurring), I disagree that anything other than a de novo sentencing hearing is required on remand. | 1 | 1 |
Ross v. Stategreen1 sentence2007See Ross v. State, 901 So.2d 252 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005); see also Tumblin v. State, 965 So.2d 354 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007); Granatino v. State, 965 So.2d 361 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007). | 1 | 1 |
Aponte v. Stategreen1 sentence2005See Aponte v. State, 810 So.2d 1008 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); Altman v. State, 756 So.2d 148 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). | 1 | 1 |
Diaz v. Stategreen1 sentence2002See Pelham v. State, 815 So.2d 733, 734 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); Webb v. State, 805 So.2d 856, 857 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Duvalt v. State, 805 So.2d 834, 834 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Williams v. State, 801 So.2d 301, 302 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Diaz v. State, 790 So.2d 523, 523 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); Smith v. State, 800 So.2d 752, 753 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001); St. | 1 | 1 |
| Smith v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Carswell v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Duvalt v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Pelham v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Merkt v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Nicewonder v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Wilson v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Mills v. State
green
2 sentences2006We followed Baldwin in Mills v. State, 724 So.2d 173 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). 2005This finding was erroneous in light of Mills v. State, 724 So.2d 173 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), in which this court determined that upon resentencing after appellate reversal of an illegal sentence, a defendant is entitled to a de novo sentencing hearing, during which both the state and the defendant can put on additional evidence and raise issues regarding a defendant's scoresheet anew. | 3 | 2000–2006 |
HARVEY MICHAEL HILL v. STATE OF FLORIDA
green
1 sentence2024To qualify as fundamental error when the issue is not preserved, “the error ‘must be basic to the judicial decision under review and equivalent to a denial of due process.’” Hill, 246 So. 3d at 394 (quoting Jackson v. State, 983 So. 2d 562, 575 (Fla. 2008)). 3 Appellant’s resentencing entitled him to a de novo sentencing hearing with the full array of due process rights. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Luis Hernandez v. State
green
2 sentences2021Appellant further argues that the remedy for the illegal sentence in this case is a de novo sentencing hearing, as that was the remedy on remand in both Hernandez, 162 So. 3d at 131 and Leon v. State, 190 So. 3d 243, 244 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016). 2021As it did in Hernandez, the State in this case properly concedes that Appellant’s life sentences for the molestation counts erroneously included a twenty-five year mandatory minimum. 162 So. 3d at 131 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
KERN R. DAVIS v. STATE OF FLORIDA
green
1 sentence2020Thus, as in Davis, “although the trial court afforded substantial due process to” Dean by allowing him to present evidence, “it failed to afford the full panoply of due process, to which he was entitled.” See Davis, 227 So. 3d at 140 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Granatino v. State
neutral
1 sentence2007See Ross v. State, 901 So.2d 252 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005); see also Tumblin v. State, 965 So.2d 354 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007); Granatino v. State, 965 So.2d 361 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
ELLER DRIVE LTD. PARTNERSHIP v. Broward County
green
1 sentence2007During a de novo sentencing hearing, "both sides are free to argue or present evidence on whatever factors the law permits a trial court to consider before imposing sentence." Gisi v. State, 948 So.2d 816 , 819 (Fla. 2d DCA), review granted, 952 So.2d 1189 (Fla.2007); see also Street v. State, 899 So.2d 440, 441 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Gisi v. State
green
1 sentence2007During a de novo sentencing hearing, "both sides are free to argue or present evidence on whatever factors the law permits a trial court to consider before imposing sentence." Gisi v. State, 948 So.2d 816 , 819 (Fla. 2d DCA), review granted, 952 So.2d 1189 (Fla.2007); see also Street v. State, 899 So.2d 440, 441 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Altman v. State
green
1 sentence2005See Aponte v. State, 810 So.2d 1008 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); Altman v. State, 756 So.2d 148 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Gonzalez v. State
green
1 sentence2003Trotter v. State, 825 So.2d 362, 368 (Fla.2002); Gonzalez v. State, 838 So.2d 1242 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Bull v. State
green
1 sentence2002Bull, Id. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Montague v. State green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| English v. State green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Woodard Tire Co. v. Hartley Realty Inc. green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Dupont v. State green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| North Carolina v. Pearce red | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.