residual hearsay exception in Colorado

2025However, reviewing courts may nevertheless analyze “the admissibility of hearsay statements under [the residual hearsay exception] in cases in which trial courts failed to make on-the-record findings, or based their rulings on other grounds.” People v. Fuller, 788 P.2d 741, 745 (Colo. 1990).

2016See id. at 745-46 ; see also People v. Jensen, 55 P.3d 135, 139 (Colo. App. 2001); cf. Brown, ¶ 31 (collecting cases in other jurisdictions applying the residual hearsay exception that find statements to 8 family members and close friends about marital matters trustworthy, even in the case of a heated divorce). ¶ 22 In addition, L.E. had personal knowledge of the threats she described, and there was no reason to question her ability to perceive or recount the threats.

2025The residual hearsay rule also requires the proponent of the statement to provide notice of its intent to introduce the statement "sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it." Id. ; see also Vasquez v. People , 173 P.3d 1099, 1106-07 ( Colo. 2007 ) . ii.

2025The residual hearsay rule also requires the proponent of the statement to provide notice of its intent to introduce the statement "sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it." Id. ; see also Vasquez v. People, 173 P.3d 1099, 1106-07 (Colo. 2007). ii.

2016See id. at 745-46 ; see also People v. Jensen, 55 P.3d 135, 139 (Colo. App. 2001); cf. Brown, ¶ 31 (collecting cases in other jurisdictions applying the residual hearsay exception that find statements to 8 family members and close friends about marital matters trustworthy, even in the case of a heated divorce). ¶ 22 In addition, L.E. had personal knowledge of the threats she described, and there was no reason to question her ability to perceive or recount the threats.

2016See Jensen, 55 P.3d at 139-40 .

2011The trial court found that the evidence lacked sufficient cireamstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, commenting, "I can't imagine a statement that has [fewer] guarantees of trustworthiness.... [Ilf this came under the residual hearsay exception ... every statement would come in under that exception and that would swallow the rule." Hearsay is inadmissible unless an exception or exclusion applies People v. Carlson, 72 P.3d 411, 420 (Colo.App.2003).

2007"Trial courts have considerable discretion in deciding on the admissibility of evidence, including application of the residual hearsay exception." People v. Carlson, 72 P.3d 411, 420 (Colo.App.2003) (citing Fuller, 788 P.2d 741 ).

2004We note at the outset that the residual hearsay exception is not a firmly rooted exception, see Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 , 110 S.Ct. 3139 , 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990), and thus particularized guarantees of trustworthiness are required for statements to satisfy the Confrontation Clause under this exception.

2004We note at the outset that the residual hearsay exception is not a firmly rooted exception, see Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 , 110 S.Ct. 3139 , 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990), and thus particularized guarantees of trustworthiness are required for statements to satisfy the Confrontation Clause under this exception.

2025We use "N-word" in this opinion instead to minimize the harm such language may cause. [9] Even if nineteen-year-olds were juveniles for sentencing purposes, the Supreme Court in Miller held only that mandatory LWOP sentences for juveniles are unconstitutional. 567 U.S. at 479 -80 ; see also, e.g. , Graham , 560 U.S. at 74 -75 .

2025We use "N-word" in this opinion instead to minimize the harm such language may cause. [9] Even if nineteen-year-olds were juveniles for sentencing purposes, the Supreme Court in Miller held only that mandatory LWOP sentences for juveniles are unconstitutional. 567 U.S. at 479-80; see also, e.g., Graham, 560 U.S. at 74-75.

2025We therefore review the district court’s decision to exclude evidence on CRE 807 grounds for an abuse of that discretion, but “[a]n erroneous evidentiary ruling may rise to the level of constitutional error if it deprives a defendant of his . . . right to present a defense or to conduct meaningful cross- examination on material issues.” Brown, ¶¶ 6, 18. 21 ¶ 43 Yet “a defendant’s right to present a defense is violated ‘only where the defendant was denied virtually his . . . only means of effectively testing significant prosecution evidence.’” Id. at ¶ 6 (quoting Krutsinger v. People, 219 P.3d

2025See People v. Notyce , 2014 COA 52, ¶ 4, 328 P.3d 302, 303. [4] The tattoo references a lyric from the song, "Crime Pays" by Cam'ron: "Crime pays 99 ways, 9 gauge, AK-47 homey hit the highway." Cam'ron, Crime Pays , on Crime Pays (Diplomat Records 2009). [5] Even if these statements weren't excited utterances, they were admissible under the residual hearsay rule.

2025See People v. Notyce , 2014 COA 52, ¶ 4, 328 P.3d 302, 303. [4] The tattoo references a lyric from the song, "Crime Pays" by Cam'ron: "Crime pays 99 ways, 9 gauge, AK-47 homey hit the highway." Cam'ron, Crime Pays , on Crime Pays (Diplomat Records 2009). [5] Even if these statements weren't excited utterances, they were admissible under the residual hearsay rule.

2025We use "N-word" in this opinion instead to minimize the harm such language may cause. [9] Even if nineteen-year-olds were juveniles for sentencing purposes, the Supreme Court in Miller held only that mandatory LWOP sentences for juveniles are unconstitutional. 567 U.S. at 479 -80 ; see also, e.g. , Graham , 560 U.S. at 74 -75 .

2025We use "N-word" in this opinion instead to minimize the harm such language may cause. [9] Even if nineteen-year-olds were juveniles for sentencing purposes, the Supreme Court in Miller held only that mandatory LWOP sentences for juveniles are unconstitutional. 567 U.S. at 479-80; see also, e.g., Graham, 560 U.S. at 74-75.

2025See Pena , 173 P.3d at 1112 .

2025See Pena , 173 P.3d at 1112.

2025A court abuses its discretion only if its decision is “arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair.” People v. James, 117 P.3d 91, 94 (Colo. App. 2004).

2025See id . ; Compan , 121 P.3d at 882 . [6] For this same reason, the statements weren't admissible under the residual hearsay exception.

2025See id .; Compan , 121 P.3d at 882. [6] For this same reason, the statements weren't admissible under the residual hearsay exception.

2014Because "the residual hearsay exception is not a firmly rooted exception ... particularized guarantees of trustworthiness are required for statements to satisfy the Confrontation Clause under this exception." People v. Garrison, 109 P.3d 1009, 1012 (Colo.App.2004). 122 Under CRE 402, all relevant evidence is admissible.

2014See McNaughton v. State, 290 Ga. 894 , 725 S.E.2d 590, 595 (2012) (trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding guarantees of trustworthiness where the murder victim made statements about her husband's hostility toward her to a close family member, placed confidence in the witness, and turned to the witness for help with personal problems); State v. Griffin, 834 N.W.2d 688, 693 (Minn.2013) (trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting wife's statement to friends that defendant, her husband, was stalking her when she was with another man); State v. Davi, 504 N.W.2d 844, 851-52 (

2014See McNaughton v. State, 290 Ga. 894 , 725 S.E.2d 590, 595 (2012) (trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding guarantees of trustworthiness where the murder victim made statements about her husband's hostility toward her to a close family member, placed confidence in the witness, and turned to the witness for help with personal problems); State v. Griffin, 834 N.W.2d 688, 693 (Minn.2013) (trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting wife's statement to friends that defendant, her husband, was stalking her when she was with another man); State v. Davi, 504 N.W.2d 844, 851-52 (

2014Vasquez v. People, 173 P.3d 1099 , 1106 n.7 (Colo.2007); Medina v. People, 114 P.3d 845, 859 (Colo.2005).

2014"To be relevant, the evidence must have the tendency to make the existence of a fact more or less probable than without the evidence." Medina, 114 P.3d at 859 .

2014Trade Comm'n v. Figgie Int'l, Inc., 994 F.2d 595, 608 (9th Cir.1993) ("In the absence of such findings [on the residual hearsay exception], an appellate court may review the record to determine if the prerequisites to admissibility have been met.").

2014Trade Comm'n v. Figgie Int'l, Inc., 994 F.2d 595, 608 (9th Cir.1993) ("In the absence of such findings [on the residual hearsay exception], an appellate court may review the record to determine if the prerequisites to admissibility have been met.").

2014People v. Preciado-Flores, 66 P.3d 155, 164 (Colo.App.2002).

2014See People v. Bowers, 773 P.2d 1093, 1096 (Colo.App.1988). ' 31 Indeed, cases from other jurisdictions applying the residual hearsay exception have found statements to family members and close friends about marital matters, even in the case of a heated divorce, are trustworthy.

2014See McNaughton v. State, 290 Ga. 894 , 725 S.E.2d 590, 595 (2012) (trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding guarantees of trustworthiness where the murder victim made statements about her husband's hostility toward her to a close family member, placed confidence in the witness, and turned to the witness for help with personal problems); State v. Griffin, 834 N.W.2d 688, 693 (Minn.2013) (trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting wife's statement to friends that defendant, her husband, was stalking her when she was with another man); State v. Davi, 504 N.W.2d 844, 851-52 (

2014See McNaughton v. State, 290 Ga. 894 , 725 S.E.2d 590, 595 (2012) (trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding guarantees of trustworthiness where the murder victim made statements about her husband's hostility toward her to a close family member, placed confidence in the witness, and turned to the witness for help with personal problems); State v. Griffin, 834 N.W.2d 688, 693 (Minn.2013) (trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting wife's statement to friends that defendant, her husband, was stalking her when she was with another man); State v. Davi, 504 N.W.2d 844, 851-52 (