addressed claim in Michigan

2021In People v Gadomski, 232 Mich App 24, 30 ; 592 NW2d 75 (1998), this Court addressed the requirement of jury unanimity, observing: Criminal defendants are guaranteed a unanimous jury verdict under the state constitution.

2021In People v Gadomski, 232 Mich App 24, 30 ; 592 NW2d 75 (1998), this Court addressed the requirement of jury unanimity, observing: Criminal defendants are guaranteed a unanimous jury verdict under the state constitution.

2017Earl provided an identical response. -5- said that directly contradictory testimony was so far impeached that it was deprived of all probative value or that the jury could not believe it, or contradicted indisputable physical facts or defied physical realities, the trial court must defer to the jury’s determination. [People v Musser, 259 Mich App 215, 218-219 ; 673 NW2d 800 (2003) (quotation marks and citations omitted; alteration in original).] Accordingly, “[i]n general, conflicting testimony or questions concerning the credibility of the witnesses are not sufficient grounds for granting a n

2017Earl provided an identical response. -5- said that directly contradictory testimony was so far impeached that it was deprived of all probative value or that the jury could not believe it, or contradicted indisputable physical facts or defied physical realities, the trial court must defer to the jury’s determination. [People v Musser, 259 Mich App 215, 218-219 ; 673 NW2d 800 (2003) (quotation marks and citations omitted; alteration in original).] Accordingly, “[i]n general, conflicting testimony or questions concerning the credibility of the witnesses are not sufficient grounds for granting a n

2017Earl provided an identical response. -5- said that directly contradictory testimony was so far impeached that it was deprived of all probative value or that the jury could not believe it, or contradicted indisputable physical facts or defied physical realities, the trial court must defer to the jury’s determination. [People v Musser, 259 Mich App 215, 218-219 ; 673 NW2d 800 (2003) (quotation marks and citations omitted; alteration in original).] Accordingly, “[i]n general, conflicting testimony or questions concerning the credibility of the witnesses are not sufficient grounds for granting a n

2017Earl provided an identical response. -5- said that directly contradictory testimony was so far impeached that it was deprived of all probative value or that the jury could not believe it, or contradicted indisputable physical facts or defied physical realities, the trial court must defer to the jury’s determination. [People v Musser, 259 Mich App 215, 218-219 ; 673 NW2d 800 (2003) (quotation marks and citations omitted; alteration in original).] Accordingly, “[i]n general, conflicting testimony or questions concerning the credibility of the witnesses are not sufficient grounds for granting a n

2025In People v Dobek, 274 Mich App 58, 106 ; 732 NW2d 546 (2007), this Court addressed the principle of “cumulative error,” stating: We review this issue to determine if the combination of alleged errors denied defendant a fair trial.

2025In People v Dobek, 274 Mich App 58, 106 ; 732 NW2d 546 (2007), this Court addressed the principle of “cumulative error,” stating: We review this issue to determine if the combination of alleged errors denied defendant a fair trial.

2025People v. Knapp, 244 Mich App 361, 387-388 ; 624 NW2d 227 (2001).

2025People v. Knapp, 244 Mich App 361, 387-388 ; 624 NW2d 227 (2001).

2025In Lawrence v Burdi, 314 Mich App 203, 211 ; 886 NW2d 748 (2016), this Court addressed the claim of abuse of process: -14- “Abuse of process is the wrongful use of the process of a court.” Spear v Pendill, 164 Mich 620, 623 ; 130 NW 343 (1911).

2025In Lawrence v Burdi, 314 Mich App 203, 211 ; 886 NW2d 748 (2016), this Court addressed the claim of abuse of process: -14- “Abuse of process is the wrongful use of the process of a court.” Spear v Pendill, 164 Mich 620, 623 ; 130 NW 343 (1911).

2025In Lawrence v Burdi, 314 Mich App 203, 211 ; 886 NW2d 748 (2016), this Court addressed the claim of abuse of process: -14- “Abuse of process is the wrongful use of the process of a court.” Spear v Pendill, 164 Mich 620, 623 ; 130 NW 343 (1911).

2025In Lawrence v Burdi, 314 Mich App 203, 211 ; 886 NW2d 748 (2016), this Court addressed the claim of abuse of process: -14- “Abuse of process is the wrongful use of the process of a court.” Spear v Pendill, 164 Mich 620, 623 ; 130 NW 343 (1911).

2023Berry, 316 Mich App at 40 .

2022Although the court’s departure explanation predated Steanhouse II by five years, the court addressed the factors identified as relevant to proportionality in that case and in People v Milbourne, 435 Mich 630 ; 461 NW2d 1 (1990), including the seriousness of the offense, the -6- defendant’s background, the likelihood of rehabilitation, and the protection of society.

2022Although the court’s departure explanation predated Steanhouse II by five years, the court addressed the factors identified as relevant to proportionality in that case and in People v Milbourne, 435 Mich 630 ; 461 NW2d 1 (1990), including the seriousness of the offense, the -6- defendant’s background, the likelihood of rehabilitation, and the protection of society.

2022Al-Maliki v LaGrant, 286 Mich App 483, 485-486 ; 781 NW2d 853 (2009).

2022Al-Maliki v LaGrant, 286 Mich App 483, 485-486 ; 781 NW2d 853 (2009).

2021In People v Kanaan, 278 Mich App 594, 618-619 ; 751 NW2d 57 (2008), this Court addressed a claim of insufficient evidence in the context of a bench trial, stating as follows: We review claims of insufficient evidence de novo.

2021In People v Kanaan, 278 Mich App 594, 618-619 ; 751 NW2d 57 (2008), this Court addressed a claim of insufficient evidence in the context of a bench trial, stating as follows: We review claims of insufficient evidence de novo.

2019Moll and Solowy addressed what a plaintiff must become aware of: “a possible cause of action” rather than “a probable cause of action.” In Jendrusina, this Court addressed the standard for imputing awareness in the first place: specifically, “should” rather than “could.” Jendrusina used the same word chosen by the Legislature in the statute, and it observed that “should” dictates the standard for evaluating a 5 Nor are we. 6 Our Supreme Court denied leave to appeal in Jendrusina, 501 Mich 958 ; 905 NW2d 231 (2018), and denied reconsideration of its denial of leave, 501 Mich 1027 ; 908 NW2d 306

2019Moll and Solowy addressed what a plaintiff must become aware of: “a possible cause of action” rather than “a probable cause of action.” In Jendrusina, this Court addressed the standard for imputing awareness in the first place: specifically, “should” rather than “could.” Jendrusina used the same word chosen by the Legislature in the statute, and it observed that “should” dictates the standard for evaluating a 5 Nor are we. 6 Our Supreme Court denied leave to appeal in Jendrusina, 501 Mich 958 ; 905 NW2d 231 (2018), and denied reconsideration of its denial of leave, 501 Mich 1027 ; 908 NW2d 306

2015In People v Bowling, 299 Mich App 552 , 563- 564; 830 NW2d 800 (2013), this Court addressed a challenge to the amount of restitution ordered by the trial court, stating: [A]t sentencing the trial court may treat the contents of the presentence investigation report as presumptively accurate.

2015In People v Bowling, 299 Mich App 552 , 563- 564; 830 NW2d 800 (2013), this Court addressed a challenge to the amount of restitution ordered by the trial court, stating: [A]t sentencing the trial court may treat the contents of the presentence investigation report as presumptively accurate.

2015In Barclay, 241 Mich App at 653 , this Court addressed the required analysis under MCR 2.603(D)(1): Michigan law generally disfavors setting aside default judgments that have been properly entered.

2014In Smith , the Court addressed the principle that “[a] court’s judgment binds only the parties to a suit, subject to a handful of discrete and limited exceptions” in relation to class actions. 4 Smith, 564 US at_; 131 S Ct at 2379 ; 180 L Ed 2d at 353 .

2014In Smith , the Court addressed the principle that “[a] court’s judgment binds only the parties to a suit, subject to a handful of discrete and limited exceptions” in relation to class actions. 4 Smith, 564 US at_; 131 S Ct at 2379 ; 180 L Ed 2d at 353 .

2010Thus, the proponent of other acts evidence does not necessarily ask “the trier of fact to infer the defendant’s conduct . . . from the defendant’s personal, subjective character.”18 Instead, the proponent may properly ask the trier of fact 16 Id. at 135. 17 United States v York, 933 F2d 1343, 1350 (CA 7, 1991), cert den 502 US 916 (1991). 18 Crawford, 458 Mich at 393 (citation and quotation marks omitted). 9 “whether the uncharged incidents are so numerous that it is objectively improbable that so many accidents would befall the accused.”19 This Court addressed the doctrine of chances in Peopl

2002Id. at 538, 122 N.W.2d 800 .

2001CONSTITUTIONALITY CLAIM Mr. Ziny says, erroneously, that the trial court erred because it failed to address his claim that the provisions of the Child Custody Act allowing for third-party custody actions are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad under Troxel v Granville, supra. 14 Per *154 haps Mr. Ziny and his counsel overlooked the fact that the trial court addressed this claim, both at the June 20, 2000, hearing on Mr. Ziny’s motion to dismiss, and again in its July 28, 2000, written opinion.

2001The Court concluded in one of the twenty-four consolidated cases, Courtney, that the judge did not "personally advise the defendant of the maximum sentence but in moving to add a second count the prosecutor stated the maximum penalty of five years." Id. at 114 , 235 N.W.2d 132 .

2001The Court concluded in one of the twenty-four consolidated cases, Courtney, that the judge did not “personally advise the defendant of the maximum sentence but in moving to add a second count the prosecutor stated the maximum penalty of five years.” Id. at 114 .

1998After further analysis of the accomplishments and efforts of the prevailing attorney, the Court held: In Hensley v Eckerhart, 461 US 424 ; 103 S Ct 1933 ; 76 L Ed 2d 40 (1983), the Supreme Court held that the degree of plaintiff’s success is a “crucial” factor in determining a proper award of attorney fees under 42 USC 1988.

1998After further analysis of the accomplishments and efforts of the prevailing attorney, the Court held: In Hensley v Eckerhart, 461 US 424 ; 103 S Ct 1933 ; 76 L Ed 2d 40 (1983), the Supreme Court held that the degree of plaintiff’s success is a “crucial” factor in determining a proper award of attorney fees under 42 USC 1988.

1992In Frey Dairy v AO Smith Harvestore Products, Inc, 680 F Supp 253 (ED Mich, 1988), aff'd on other grounds 886 F2d 128 (CA 6, 1989), the court addressed a claim of economic loss arising out of defective silos causing reduced milk production and lost profits.

1992In Frey Dairy v A O Smith Harvestore Products, Inc, 680 F Supp 253 (ED Mich, 1988), aff’d on other grounds 886 F2d 128 (CA 6, 1989), the court addressed a claim of economic loss arising out of defective silos causing reduced milk production and lost profits.

1992However, we ultimately conclude that an unconditional plea of guilty or nolo contendere waives the statute of limitations defense._ *601 In the recent decision of our Supreme Court in People v Smith, 438 Mich 715 ; 475 NW2d 333 (1991), five members of the Court addressed the waiver question in a similar context.

1992However, we ultimately conclude that an unconditional plea of guilty or nolo contendere waives the statute of limitations defense._ *601 In the recent decision of our Supreme Court in People v Smith, 438 Mich 715 ; 475 NW2d 333 (1991), five members of the Court addressed the waiver question in a similar context.

1989MCL 15.243(1)(a); MSA 4.1801(13)(1)(a) exempts from disclosure "[information of a personal nature where the public disclosure of the information would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of an individual’s privacy.” In State Employees Ass’n v Dep’t of Management & Budget, 428 Mich 104 ; 404 NW2d 606 (1987), the Court addressed the standard governing the privacy exemption, and several tests emerged from the differing opinions of the justices.

1982Preliminarily, the Court *797 held that an overbreadth challenge based on the Supreme Court’s decisions in Bates v State Bar of Arizona, 433 US 350 ; 97 S Ct 2691 ; 53 L Ed 2d 810 (1977), and Ohralik v Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 US 447 ; 98 S Ct 1912 ; 56 L Ed 2d 444 (1978), was unavailable since the statute involved the restriction of commercial speech. 409 Mich 500, 535-536 .

1982Preliminarily, the Court *797 held that an overbreadth challenge based on the Supreme Court’s decisions in Bates v State Bar of Arizona, 433 US 350 ; 97 S Ct 2691 ; 53 L Ed 2d 810 (1977), and Ohralik v Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 US 447 ; 98 S Ct 1912 ; 56 L Ed 2d 444 (1978), was unavailable since the statute involved the restriction of commercial speech. 409 Mich 500, 535-536 .

1982Preliminarily, the Court *797 held that an overbreadth challenge based on the Supreme Court’s decisions in Bates v State Bar of Arizona, 433 US 350 ; 97 S Ct 2691 ; 53 L Ed 2d 810 (1977), and Ohralik v Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 US 447 ; 98 S Ct 1912 ; 56 L Ed 2d 444 (1978), was unavailable since the statute involved the restriction of commercial speech. 409 Mich 500, 535-536 .