addressed claim in Texas

2015The view in Texas was the same, as exemplified by cases such as Milliken v. City Council of Weatherford, 54 Tex. 388 (1881). 3 There the Court addressed a claim by Weatherford’s mayor that he had been improperly removed from office for violating a city ordinance that barred renting rooms to prostitutes without respect to whether the rooms were used for prostitution.

2015The view in Texas was the same, as exemplified by cases such as Milliken v. City Council of Weatherford, 54 Tex. 388 (1881).3 There the Court addressed a claim by Weatherford’s mayor that he had been improperly removed from 3 As to procedural due process relationships between the Fourteenth Amendment and Article I, § 19, see City of Sherman v. Henry, 928 S.W .2d 464, 472-73 & n.5 (Tex. 1996) (citing Univ. of Tex. Med.

2004Confusion apparently had arisen because article V , section 28 of the Texas Constitution provided that vacancies in the office of district judge "shall be filled by the Governor until the next succeeding general election." Id.

2004Confusion apparently had arisen because article V, section 28 of the Texas Constitution provided that vacancies in the office of district judge “shall be tilled by the Governor until the next succeeding general election.” Id.

1987In Bomer v. Ector County Commissioners Court, 676 S.W.2d 662 , the court addressed a challenge to the reasonableness of a $20 per month salary.

1987In Bomer v. Ector County Commissioners Court, 676 S.W.2d 662 , the court addressed a challenge to the reasonableness of a $20 per month salary.

2025The court addressed the factors that the lower court had relied on to find involuntariness including two that ring familiar here: 1) “the officers’ use of statements that the polygraph examination showed that Vice remembered the assault” and 2) “the officers’ failure to correct Vice’s ‘stated misunderstanding’ that ‘I’ll admit that I must have did it because obviously the test says that I did it, but I don’t physically remember.’” Id. at 14-15 .

2025This Court addressed this framework in Lin v. Houston Community College System, 948 S.W.2d 328 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1997, writ denied).

2022They also cite Gardner v. Martin, 345 S.W.2d 274 , 276–77 (Tex. 1961), in which the court addressed the requirement that papers, records, or other documents from prior proceeding be certified or sworn, and Old Republic Surety Co. v. Bonham State Bank, 172 S.W.3d 210 , 218 n.4 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2005, no pet.), in which the court held that an uncertified trial transcript consisting entirely of unsworn statements was not admissible summary judgment evidence. –7– was taken, that deposition is inadmissible hearsay as to Parkhill.”).

2022They also cite Gardner v. Martin, 345 S.W.2d 274 , 276–77 (Tex. 1961), in which the court addressed the requirement that papers, records, or other documents from prior proceeding be certified or sworn, and Old Republic Surety Co. v. Bonham State Bank, 172 S.W.3d 210 , 218 n.4 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2005, no pet.), in which the court held that an uncertified trial transcript consisting entirely of unsworn statements was not admissible summary judgment evidence. –7– was taken, that deposition is inadmissible hearsay as to Parkhill.”).

2016According to our precedent, these exceptions apply: “(1) when the movant has conclusively proved or disproved a matter that would also preclude the unaddressed claim as a matter of law and (2) when the unaddressed claim is derivative of the addressed claim and the movant proved its entitlement to summary judgment on the addressed claim.” Id.

2016See Engel, 350 S.W.3d at 609-10 ; Dubose, 117 S.W.3d at 922 .

2014Some courts of appeals have recognized a very limited exception to the general rule that a summary judgment must stand or fall on the grounds expressly presented in the motion, see Science Spectrum, 941 S.W.2d at 912 , the application of which can be reduced to the following: (1) when the movant has conclusively proved or disproved a matter (usually corresponding to a claim's element or to an affirmative defense) that would also preclude the unaddressed claim as a matter of law[;] or (2) when the unaddressed claim is derivative of the addressed claim, and the movant proved its entitlement to s

2010Wilson v. Davis , No. 01-06-00424-CV, 2009 WL 2526439 , at *11 & n.13 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 14, 2009, no pet.); Lampasas v. Spring Center, Inc. , 988 S.W.2d 428 , 436–37 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.); Hayes v. Vista Host, Inc. , No. 03-08-00053-CV, 2009 WL 722288 , at *5 (Tex. App.—Austin Mar. 20, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.).

2008In Shumake , the Court addressed a claim where a young girl was swimming in a river at a state-owned park when she was “sucked underwater by a powerful undertow,” became trapped in a man-made culvert, and drowned. 199 S.W.3d at 281 .

2008Addressing the denial of the State’s plea to the jurisdiction, the Court recognized that the recreational use statute does not “ ‘limit the liability of [a landowner] who has been grossly negligent or has acted with malicious intent or in bad faith.’ ” Id. at 286-87 .

2000Co., 310 F.2d 308 (4th Cir.1962), the court addressed a claim of ambiguity under a similar clause.

2000Co., 310 F.2d 308 (4th Cir.1962), the court addressed a claim of ambiguity under a similar clause.

1999In that case, the Court addressed a challenge to Minnesota’s borrowing statute, which stat *575 ed that, “[w]hen a cause of action has arisen outside of this state and, by the laws of the place where it arose, an action thereon is there barred by lapse of time, no such action shall be maintain[ed] in this state unless the plaintiff be a citizen of the state who has owned the cause of action ever since it accrued.” Id. at 558 , 40 S.Ct. 402 .

1999In that case, the Court addressed a challenge to Minnesota’s borrowing statute, which stat *575 ed that, “[w]hen a cause of action has arisen outside of this state and, by the laws of the place where it arose, an action thereon is there barred by lapse of time, no such action shall be maintain[ed] in this state unless the plaintiff be a citizen of the state who has owned the cause of action ever since it accrued.” Id. at 558 , 40 S.Ct. 402 .

1996In Wooten, 612 S.W.2d 561 , this Court addressed a claim of an involuntary plea brought after a defendant had pled guilty in accord with a plea agreement so that the proviso to Art. 44.02 applied.

1989This Court addressed such a claim in Matcha v. Mattox on Behalf of the People of Texas, 711 S.W.2d 95 (Tex.App.1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1024 , 107 S.Ct. 1911 , 95 L.Ed.2d 517 (1987).

1989This Court addressed such a claim in Matcha v. Mattox on Behalf of the People of Texas, 711 S.W.2d 95 (Tex.App.1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1024 , 107 S.Ct. 1911 , 95 L.Ed.2d 517 (1987).

1989This Court addressed such a claim in Matcha v. Mattox on Behalf of the People of Texas, 711 S.W.2d 95 (Tex.App.1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1024 , 107 S.Ct. 1911 , 95 L.Ed.2d 517 (1987).