commits error in Michigan

2025A defendant is entitled to resentencing when a trial court commits an error in scoring the sentencing guidelines and when this error “altered the appropriate guidelines range.” People v Francisco, 474 Mich 82, 88-91 ; 711 NW2d 44 (2006).

2025A defendant is entitled to resentencing when a trial court commits an error in scoring the sentencing guidelines and when this error “altered the appropriate guidelines range.” People v Francisco, 474 Mich 82, 88-91 ; 711 NW2d 44 (2006).

2018Therefore, “when a trial court commits an error that denies a defendant his constitutional rights under the Confrontation Clause . . . we need not reverse if the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v McPherson, 263 Mich App 124, 131-132 ; 687 NW2d 370 (2004).

2018Therefore, “when a trial court commits an error that denies a defendant his constitutional rights under the Confrontation Clause . . . we need not reverse if the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v McPherson, 263 Mich App 124, 131-132 ; 687 NW2d 370 (2004).

2017An abuse of discretion occurs if the trial court’s decision is outside the range of “reasonable and principled” outcomes, People v Carnicom, 272 Mich App 614 , 616- 617; 727 NW2d 399 (2006), or if the trial court commits an error of law.

2017An abuse of discretion occurs if the trial court’s decision is outside the range of “reasonable and principled” outcomes, People v Carnicom, 272 Mich App 614 , 616- 617; 727 NW2d 399 (2006), or if the trial court commits an error of law.

2017People v Giovannini, 271 Mich App 409, 417 ; 722 NW2d 237 (2006).

2017People v Giovannini, 271 Mich App 409, 417 ; 722 NW2d 237 (2006).

2004HARMLESS ERROR However, “when a trial court commits an error that denies [a defendant’s] constitutional rights under the Confrontation Clause... we need not reverse if the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” McPherson, supra at 131-132 , citing People v Smith, 243 Mich App 657, 690 ; 625 NW2d 46 (2000), citing People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 774 ; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).

2004HARMLESS ERROR However, “when a trial court commits an error that denies [a defendant’s] constitutional rights under the Confrontation Clause... we need not reverse if the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” McPherson, supra at 131-132 , citing People v Smith, 243 Mich App 657, 690 ; 625 NW2d 46 (2000), citing People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 774 ; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).

2004HARMLESS ERROR However, “when a trial court commits an error that denies [a defendant’s] constitutional rights under the Confrontation Clause... we need not reverse if the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” McPherson, supra at 131-132 , citing People v Smith, 243 Mich App 657, 690 ; 625 NW2d 46 (2000), citing People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 774 ; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).

2004HARMLESS ERROR However, “when a trial court commits an error that denies [a defendant’s] constitutional rights under the Confrontation Clause... we need not reverse if the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” McPherson, supra at 131-132 , citing People v Smith, 243 Mich App 657, 690 ; 625 NW2d 46 (2000), citing People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 774 ; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).

2025Moreover, “jurors are presumed to follow the trial court’s instructions[.]” People v Solmonson, 261 Mich App 657, 663 ; 683 NW2d 761 (2004).

2025If a trial court commits error in its instructions, this Court “[w]ill not reverse where the jury instructions fairly presented the issued to be tried and sufficiently protected the defendant’s rights.” -7- People v Eisen, 296 Mich App 326, 330 ; 820 NW2d 229 (2012).

2025If a trial court commits error in its instructions, this Court “[w]ill not reverse where the jury instructions fairly presented the issued to be tried and sufficiently protected the defendant’s rights.” -7- People v Eisen, 296 Mich App 326, 330 ; 820 NW2d 229 (2012).

2025Moreover, “jurors are presumed to follow the trial court’s instructions[.]” People v Solmonson, 261 Mich App 657, 663 ; 683 NW2d 761 (2004).

2024Determining whether the veil of impartiality has been pierced is a fact-specific inquiry, and “[a] defendant claiming judicial bias must overcome a heavy presumption of judicial impartiality.” People v Jackson, 292 Mich App 583 598 ; 808 NW2d 541 (2011) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2024Determining whether the veil of impartiality has been pierced is a fact-specific inquiry, and “[a] defendant claiming judicial bias must overcome a heavy presumption of judicial impartiality.” People v Jackson, 292 Mich App 583 598 ; 808 NW2d 541 (2011) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2024A court commits an error requiring reversal when the error is so gross “as to have deprived defendant of a fair trial, that his conviction was, in truth, a miscarriage of justice.” People v Ritholz, 359 Mich 539, 559 ; 103 NW2d 481 (1960). “[W]hether judicial misconduct denied defendant a fair trial is a question of constitutional law that this Court reviews de novo.” People v Stevens, 498 Mich 162, 168 ; 869 NW2d 233 (2015).

2024A court commits an error requiring reversal when the error is so gross “as to have deprived defendant of a fair trial, that his conviction was, in truth, a miscarriage of justice.” People v Ritholz, 359 Mich 539, 559 ; 103 NW2d 481 (1960). “[W]hether judicial misconduct denied defendant a fair trial is a question of constitutional law that this Court reviews de novo.” People v Stevens, 498 Mich 162, 168 ; 869 NW2d 233 (2015).

2024“Offense variables must be scored giving consideration to the sentencing offense alone, unless otherwise provided in the particular variable.” People v McGraw, 484 Mich 120, 133 ; 771 NW2d 655 (2009).

2024“Offense variables must be scored giving consideration to the sentencing offense alone, unless otherwise provided in the particular variable.” People v McGraw, 484 Mich 120, 133 ; 771 NW2d 655 (2009).

2024A court commits an error requiring reversal when the error is so gross “as to have deprived defendant of a fair trial, that his conviction was, in truth, a miscarriage of justice.” People v Ritholz, 359 Mich 539, 559 ; 103 NW2d 481 (1960). “[W]hether judicial misconduct denied defendant a fair trial is a question of constitutional law that this Court reviews de novo.” People v Stevens, 498 Mich 162, 168 ; 869 NW2d 233 (2015).

2024A court commits an error requiring reversal when the error is so gross “as to have deprived defendant of a fair trial, that his conviction was, in truth, a miscarriage of justice.” People v Ritholz, 359 Mich 539, 559 ; 103 NW2d 481 (1960). “[W]hether judicial misconduct denied defendant a fair trial is a question of constitutional law that this Court reviews de novo.” People v Stevens, 498 Mich 162, 168 ; 869 NW2d 233 (2015).

2023Defendant, relying on People v Swint, 225 Mich App 353, 378 ; 572 NW2d 666 (1997), and this Court’s interpretation therein of Old Chief v United States, 519 US 172 ; 117 S Ct 644 ; 136 L Ed 2d 574 (1997), argues that a trial court commits error by denying a motion to preclude evidence of a prior conviction when a stipulation is offered.

2023Defendant, relying on People v Swint, 225 Mich App 353, 378 ; 572 NW2d 666 (1997), and this Court’s interpretation therein of Old Chief v United States, 519 US 172 ; 117 S Ct 644 ; 136 L Ed 2d 574 (1997), argues that a trial court commits error by denying a motion to preclude evidence of a prior conviction when a stipulation is offered.

2023Defendant, relying on People v Swint, 225 Mich App 353, 378 ; 572 NW2d 666 (1997), and this Court’s interpretation therein of Old Chief v United States, 519 US 172 ; 117 S Ct 644 ; 136 L Ed 2d 574 (1997), argues that a trial court commits error by denying a motion to preclude evidence of a prior conviction when a stipulation is offered.

2023Defendant, relying on People v Swint, 225 Mich App 353, 378 ; 572 NW2d 666 (1997), and this Court’s interpretation therein of Old Chief v United States, 519 US 172 ; 117 S Ct 644 ; 136 L Ed 2d 574 (1997), argues that a trial court commits error by denying a motion to preclude evidence of a prior conviction when a stipulation is offered.

2022People v Duncan, 494 Mich 713, 723 ; 835 NW2d 399 (2013).

2016The Confrontation Clause guarantees a defendant’s right to be confronted with the witnesses against him or her, US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20, and “prohibits the admission of all out-of-court testimonial statements unless the declarant was unavailable at trial and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” People v Chambers, 277 Mich App 1, 10 ; 742 NW2d 610 (2007), citing Crawford v Washington, 541 US 36, 68 ; 124 S Ct 1354 , 158 L Ed 2d 177 (2004).

2016The Confrontation Clause guarantees a defendant’s right to be confronted with the witnesses against him or her, US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20, and “prohibits the admission of all out-of-court testimonial statements unless the declarant was unavailable at trial and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” People v Chambers, 277 Mich App 1, 10 ; 742 NW2d 610 (2007), citing Crawford v Washington, 541 US 36, 68 ; 124 S Ct 1354 , 158 L Ed 2d 177 (2004).

2016The Confrontation Clause guarantees a defendant’s right to be confronted with the witnesses against him or her, US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20, and “prohibits the admission of all out-of-court testimonial statements unless the declarant was unavailable at trial and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” People v Chambers, 277 Mich App 1, 10 ; 742 NW2d 610 (2007), citing Crawford v Washington, 541 US 36, 68 ; 124 S Ct 1354 , 158 L Ed 2d 177 (2004).

2016The Confrontation Clause guarantees a defendant’s right to be confronted with the witnesses against him or her, US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20, and “prohibits the admission of all out-of-court testimonial statements unless the declarant was unavailable at trial and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” People v Chambers, 277 Mich App 1, 10 ; 742 NW2d 610 (2007), citing Crawford v Washington, 541 US 36, 68 ; 124 S Ct 1354 , 158 L Ed 2d 177 (2004).

2000People v Sammons, 191 Mich App 351, 372 ; 478 NW2d 901 (1991).

2000People v Sammons, 191 Mich App 351, 372 ; 478 NW2d 901 (1991).

1997Indeed, the holding in Vail flatly contradicts “[t]he general rule . . . that, where a crime is divided into degrees, if the court commits error in instructing the jury as to the higher degree of such crime, and they return a verdict of guilty of a lower degree as to which they were properly instructed, the defendant cannot complain.” [State v Schaefer, 170 W Va 649, 654; 295 SE2d 814 (1982), quoting State v McMillan,, 104 W Va 1, 10; 138 SE 732 (1927).] Accord Commonwealth v Forde, 392 Mass 453, 456; 466 NE2d 510 (1984); Brewer v State, 251 Ark 7, 20 ; 470 SW2d 581 (1971); State v Horton, 57

1997Indeed, the holding in Vail flatly contradicts "[t]he general rule ... that, where a crime is divided into degrees, if the court commits error in instructing the jury as to the higher degree of such crime, and they return a verdict of guilty of a lower degree as to which they were properly instructed, the defendant cannot complain." [ State v. Schaefer, 170 W.Va. 649, 654 , 295 S.E.2d 814 (1982), quoting State v. McMillion, 104 W.Va. 1, 10 , 138 S.E. 732 (1927).] Accord Commonwealth v. Forde, 392 Mass. 453, 456 , 466 N.E.2d 510 (1984); Brewer v. State, 251 Ark. 7, 20 , 470 S.W.2d 581 (1971); S

1997Indeed, the holding in Vail flatly contradicts “[t]he general rule . . . that, where a crime is divided into degrees, if the court commits error in instructing the jury as to the higher degree of such crime, and they return a verdict of guilty of a lower degree as to which they were properly instructed, the defendant cannot complain.” [State v Schaefer, 170 W Va 649, 654; 295 SE2d 814 (1982), quoting State v McMillan,, 104 W Va 1, 10; 138 SE 732 (1927).] Accord Commonwealth v Forde, 392 Mass 453, 456; 466 NE2d 510 (1984); Brewer v State, 251 Ark 7, 20 ; 470 SW2d 581 (1971); State v Horton, 57

1997Indeed, the holding in Vail flatly contradicts "[t]he general rule ... that, where a crime is divided into degrees, if the court commits error in instructing the jury as to the higher degree of such crime, and they return a verdict of guilty of a lower degree as to which they were properly instructed, the defendant cannot complain." [ State v. Schaefer, 170 W.Va. 649, 654 , 295 S.E.2d 814 (1982), quoting State v. McMillion, 104 W.Va. 1, 10 , 138 S.E. 732 (1927).] Accord Commonwealth v. Forde, 392 Mass. 453, 456 , 466 N.E.2d 510 (1984); Brewer v. State, 251 Ark. 7, 20 , 470 S.W.2d 581 (1971); S

1997Indeed, the holding in Vail flatly contradicts “[t]he general rule . . . that, where a crime is divided into degrees, if the court commits error in instructing the jury as to the higher degree of such crime, and they return a verdict of guilty of a lower degree as to which they were properly instructed, the defendant cannot complain.” [State v Schaefer, 170 W Va 649, 654; 295 SE2d 814 (1982), quoting State v McMillan,, 104 W Va 1, 10; 138 SE 732 (1927).] Accord Commonwealth v Forde, 392 Mass 453, 456; 466 NE2d 510 (1984); Brewer v State, 251 Ark 7, 20 ; 470 SW2d 581 (1971); State v Horton, 57

1997Indeed, the holding in Vail flatly contradicts "[t]he general rule ... that, where a crime is divided into degrees, if the court commits error in instructing the jury as to the higher degree of such crime, and they return a verdict of guilty of a lower degree as to which they were properly instructed, the defendant cannot complain." [ State v. Schaefer, 170 W.Va. 649, 654 , 295 S.E.2d 814 (1982), quoting State v. McMillion, 104 W.Va. 1, 10 , 138 S.E. 732 (1927).] Accord Commonwealth v. Forde, 392 Mass. 453, 456 , 466 N.E.2d 510 (1984); Brewer v. State, 251 Ark. 7, 20 , 470 S.W.2d 581 (1971); S

1997Indeed, the holding in Vail flatly contradicts “[t]he general rule . . . that, where a crime is divided into degrees, if the court commits error in instructing the jury as to the higher degree of such crime, and they return a verdict of guilty of a lower degree as to which they were properly instructed, the defendant cannot complain.” [State v Schaefer, 170 W Va 649, 654; 295 SE2d 814 (1982), quoting State v McMillan,, 104 W Va 1, 10; 138 SE 732 (1927).] Accord Commonwealth v Forde, 392 Mass 453, 456; 466 NE2d 510 (1984); Brewer v State, 251 Ark 7, 20 ; 470 SW2d 581 (1971); State v Horton, 57

1997Indeed, the holding in Vail flatly contradicts "[t]he general rule ... that, where a crime is divided into degrees, if the court commits error in instructing the jury as to the higher degree of such crime, and they return a verdict of guilty of a lower degree as to which they were properly instructed, the defendant cannot complain." [ State v. Schaefer, 170 W.Va. 649, 654 , 295 S.E.2d 814 (1982), quoting State v. McMillion, 104 W.Va. 1, 10 , 138 S.E. 732 (1927).] Accord Commonwealth v. Forde, 392 Mass. 453, 456 , 466 N.E.2d 510 (1984); Brewer v. State, 251 Ark. 7, 20 , 470 S.W.2d 581 (1971); S

1997Indeed, the holding in Vail flatly contradicts “[t]he general rule . . . that, where a crime is divided into degrees, if the court commits error in instructing the jury as to the higher degree of such crime, and they return a verdict of guilty of a lower degree as to which they were properly instructed, the defendant cannot complain.” [State v Schaefer, 170 W Va 649, 654; 295 SE2d 814 (1982), quoting State v McMillan,, 104 W Va 1, 10; 138 SE 732 (1927).] Accord Commonwealth v Forde, 392 Mass 453, 456; 466 NE2d 510 (1984); Brewer v State, 251 Ark 7, 20 ; 470 SW2d 581 (1971); State v Horton, 57

1997Indeed, the holding in Vail flatly contradicts "[t]he general rule ... that, where a crime is divided into degrees, if the court commits error in instructing the jury as to the higher degree of such crime, and they return a verdict of guilty of a lower degree as to which they were properly instructed, the defendant cannot complain." [ State v. Schaefer, 170 W.Va. 649, 654 , 295 S.E.2d 814 (1982), quoting State v. McMillion, 104 W.Va. 1, 10 , 138 S.E. 732 (1927).] Accord Commonwealth v. Forde, 392 Mass. 453, 456 , 466 N.E.2d 510 (1984); Brewer v. State, 251 Ark. 7, 20 , 470 S.W.2d 581 (1971); S

1997Indeed, the holding in Vail flatly contradicts “[t]he general rule . . . that, where a crime is divided into degrees, if the court commits error in instructing the jury as to the higher degree of such crime, and they return a verdict of guilty of a lower degree as to which they were properly instructed, the defendant cannot complain.” [State v Schaefer, 170 W Va 649, 654; 295 SE2d 814 (1982), quoting State v McMillan,, 104 W Va 1, 10; 138 SE 732 (1927).] Accord Commonwealth v Forde, 392 Mass 453, 456; 466 NE2d 510 (1984); Brewer v State, 251 Ark 7, 20 ; 470 SW2d 581 (1971); State v Horton, 57

1997Indeed, the holding in Vail flatly contradicts "[t]he general rule ... that, where a crime is divided into degrees, if the court commits error in instructing the jury as to the higher degree of such crime, and they return a verdict of guilty of a lower degree as to which they were properly instructed, the defendant cannot complain." [ State v. Schaefer, 170 W.Va. 649, 654 , 295 S.E.2d 814 (1982), quoting State v. McMillion, 104 W.Va. 1, 10 , 138 S.E. 732 (1927).] Accord Commonwealth v. Forde, 392 Mass. 453, 456 , 466 N.E.2d 510 (1984); Brewer v. State, 251 Ark. 7, 20 , 470 S.W.2d 581 (1971); S

1996In Poet v Traverse City Osteopathic Hosp, 433 Mich 228, 231 ; 445 *321 NW2d 115 (1989), the Court set out the following criteria for such claims: We hold that a trial court commits error requiring reversal when the record reveals that: (1) the court improperly denied a challenge for cause, (2) the aggrieved party had exhausted all peremptory challenges, (3) the party demonstrated a desire to excuse another subsequently summoned juror, and (4) the juror whom the party wished later to excuse was objectionable.

1996In Poet v Traverse City Osteopathic Hosp, 433 Mich 228, 231 ; 445 *321 NW2d 115 (1989), the Court set out the following criteria for such claims: We hold that a trial court commits error requiring reversal when the record reveals that: (1) the court improperly denied a challenge for cause, (2) the aggrieved party had exhausted all peremptory challenges, (3) the party demonstrated a desire to excuse another subsequently summoned juror, and (4) the juror whom the party wished later to excuse was objectionable.

1980In People v Baldwin, 405 Mich 550 ; 275 NW2d 253 (1979), the Supreme Court held that a trial court commits error when it considers the similarity of a prior conviction as an element in favor of admissibility.

1980In People v Baldwin, 405 Mich 550 ; 275 NW2d 253 (1979), the Supreme Court held that a trial court commits error when it considers the similarity of a prior conviction as an element in favor of admissibility.