general exclusionary rule in Michigan

2020MRE 404(b) stands as a sentinel at the gate: the proffered evidence truly must be probative of something other than the defendant’s propensity to commit the crime.” People v Crawford, 458 Mich 376, 390 ; 582 NW2d 785 (1998) (emphasis in original). “[T]he prosecution bears the initial burden of establishing the relevance of the evidence to prove a fact within one of the exceptions to the general exclusionary rule of MRE 404(b).” People v Knox, 469 Mich 502, 509 ; 674 NW2d 366 (2004).

2020MRE 404(b) stands as a sentinel at the gate: the proffered evidence truly must be probative of something other than the defendant’s propensity to commit the crime.” People v Crawford, 458 Mich 376, 390 ; 582 NW2d 785 (1998) (emphasis in original). “[T]he prosecution bears the initial burden of establishing the relevance of the evidence to prove a fact within one of the exceptions to the general exclusionary rule of MRE 404(b).” People v Knox, 469 Mich 502, 509 ; 674 NW2d 366 (2004).

2026Finally, the trial court, upon request, may provide a limiting instruction under MRE 105. [People v Knox, 469 Mich 502, 509 ; 674 NW2d 366 (2004).] The VanderVliet four-part test requires the prosecutor to meet the initial burden of establishing evidentiary relevance to prove a fact within the exceptions to the general exclusionary rule of MRE 404(b).

2026Finally, the trial court, upon request, may provide a limiting instruction under MRE 105. [People v Knox, 469 Mich 502, 509 ; 674 NW2d 366 (2004).] The VanderVliet four-part test requires the prosecutor to meet the initial burden of establishing evidentiary relevance to prove a fact within the exceptions to the general exclusionary rule of MRE 404(b).

2025“By enacting a general exclusionary rule, the Legislature recognized that in the vast majority of cases, evidence of a rape victim’s prior sexual conduct with others, and sexual reputation, when offered to prove that the conduct at issue was consensual or for general impeachment is inadmissible.” People v Hackett, 421 Mich 338, 347-348 ; 365 NW2d 120 (1984), citing Arenda, 416 Mich at 10 .

2025“By enacting a general exclusionary rule, the Legislature recognized that in the vast majority of cases, evidence of a rape victim’s prior sexual conduct with others, and sexual reputation, when offered to prove that the conduct at issue was consensual or for general impeachment is inadmissible.” People v Hackett, 421 Mich 338, 347-348 ; 365 NW2d 120 (1984), citing Arenda, 416 Mich at 10 .

2025“By enacting a general exclusionary rule, the Legislature recognized that in the vast majority of cases, evidence of a rape victim’s prior sexual conduct with others, and sexual reputation, when offered to prove that the conduct at issue was consensual or for general impeachment is inadmissible.” People v Hackett, 421 Mich 338, 347-348 ; 365 NW2d 120 (1984), citing Arenda, 416 Mich at 10 .

2017People v. Arenda, [416 -6- Mich. 1, 10, 330 N.W.2d 814 (1982)].

2021During her case-in-chief, however, the prosecutor explored the sexting activity with the detective. -7- In People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52, 55 ; 508 NW2d 114 (1993), amended 445 Mich 1205 (1994), the Court stated the standard to be applied to evaluate claims under MRE 404(b): First, that the evidence be offered for a proper purpose under Rule 404(b); second, that it be relevant under Rule 402 as enforced through Rule 104(b); third, that the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice; fourth, that the trial court may, upon request, provide a limiting i

2021During her case-in-chief, however, the prosecutor explored the sexting activity with the detective. -7- In People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52, 55 ; 508 NW2d 114 (1993), amended 445 Mich 1205 (1994), the Court stated the standard to be applied to evaluate claims under MRE 404(b): First, that the evidence be offered for a proper purpose under Rule 404(b); second, that it be relevant under Rule 402 as enforced through Rule 104(b); third, that the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice; fourth, that the trial court may, upon request, provide a limiting i

2025This good-faith exception to the general exclusionary rule, though, has a few exceptions of its own: -5- [r]eliance on a warrant is reasonable even if the warrant is later invalidated for lack of probable cause, except under three circumstances: (1) if the issuing magistrate or judge is misled by information in the affidavit that the affiant either knew was false or would have known was false except for his or her reckless disregard of the truth; (2) if the issuing judge or magistrate wholly abandons his or her judicial role; or (3) if an officer relies on a warrant based on a “bare bones” aff

2025This good-faith exception to the general exclusionary rule, though, has a few exceptions of its own: -5- [r]eliance on a warrant is reasonable even if the warrant is later invalidated for lack of probable cause, except under three circumstances: (1) if the issuing magistrate or judge is misled by information in the affidavit that the affiant either knew was false or would have known was false except for his or her reckless disregard of the truth; (2) if the issuing judge or magistrate wholly abandons his or her judicial role; or (3) if an officer relies on a warrant based on a “bare bones” aff

2023When proposing evidence to overcome the general exclusionary bar of the rape-shield statute, “[t]he defendant is obligated initially to make an offer of proof regarding the proposed evidence and to demonstrate its relevance.” People v Byrne, 199 Mich App 674, 678 ; 502 NW2d 386 (1993).

2023When proposing evidence to overcome the general exclusionary bar of the rape-shield statute, “[t]he defendant is obligated initially to make an offer of proof regarding the proposed evidence and to demonstrate its relevance.” People v Byrne, 199 Mich App 674, 678 ; 502 NW2d 386 (1993).

2016People v Adair, 452 Mich 473, 478 ; 550 NW2d 505 (1996).

2016People v Adair, 452 Mich 473, 478 ; 550 NW2d 505 (1996).

1999Co., 60 Ohio St.3d 148, 150 , 573 N.E.2d 650 (1991), a condition, be it acute or chronic, may be excluded by a general exclusionary clause for preexisting conditions within two years of the issuance of the insurance policy.

1999Co., 60 Ohio St.3d 148, 150 , 573 N.E.2d 650 (1991), a condition, be it acute or chronic, may be excluded by a general exclusionary clause for preexisting conditions within two years of the issuance of the insurance policy.

1996“It bars, with two narrow exceptions, evidence of all sexual activity by the complainant not incident to the alleged rape.” People v Stull, 127 Mich App 14, 17 ; 338 NW2d 403 (1983) (emphasis in original). 4 We turn first to the proposed evidence of subsequent consensual sexual relations.

1996“It bars, with two narrow exceptions, evidence of all sexual activity by the complainant not incident to the alleged rape.” People v Stull, 127 Mich App 14, 17 ; 338 NW2d 403 (1983) (emphasis in original). 4 We turn first to the proposed evidence of subsequent consensual sexual relations.

1996The defendant has not challenged this portion of the order. [4] See also United States v. Torres, 937 F.2d 1469, 1472 (C.A.9, 1991) (FRE 412 applies to all sexual behavior preceding trial); Flurry v. State, 290 Ark. 417, 419 , 720 S.W.2d 699 (1986) (the statute applies to all sexual conduct); Cuyler v. State, 841 S.W.2d 933, 936 (Tex.App., 1992) (the statute applies to all sexual conduct occurring before trial); State v. Gulrud, 140 Wis.2d 721, 729 , 412 N.W.2d 139 (Wis.App., 1987) (the statute precludes evidence of all secual conduct occurring before the conclusion of the trial). [5] There ar

1996The defendant has not challenged this portion of the order. [4] See also United States v. Torres, 937 F.2d 1469, 1472 (C.A.9, 1991) (FRE 412 applies to all sexual behavior preceding trial); Flurry v. State, 290 Ark. 417, 419 , 720 S.W.2d 699 (1986) (the statute applies to all sexual conduct); Cuyler v. State, 841 S.W.2d 933, 936 (Tex.App., 1992) (the statute applies to all sexual conduct occurring before trial); State v. Gulrud, 140 Wis.2d 721, 729 , 412 N.W.2d 139 (Wis.App., 1987) (the statute precludes evidence of all secual conduct occurring before the conclusion of the trial). [5] There ar

1996Id. at 348-349, 365 N.W.2d 120 . [6] See People v. Haley, 153 Mich.App. 400, 405 , 395 N.W.2d 60 (1986) (the evidence of adult third-party penetration was relevant to prove that the condition of the eight-year-old girl's hymen may have been caused by someone other than the defendant). [7] The trial court stated that he would find evidence of consensual sexual relations with the alleged assailant on the day after the alleged sexual assault to be more probative of whether the sexual assault occurred than evidence of consensual sexual relations on the day before the alleged sexual assault. [8] Th

1996Id. at 348-349, 365 N.W.2d 120 . [6] See People v. Haley, 153 Mich.App. 400, 405 , 395 N.W.2d 60 (1986) (the evidence of adult third-party penetration was relevant to prove that the condition of the eight-year-old girl's hymen may have been caused by someone other than the defendant). [7] The trial court stated that he would find evidence of consensual sexual relations with the alleged assailant on the day after the alleged sexual assault to be more probative of whether the sexual assault occurred than evidence of consensual sexual relations on the day before the alleged sexual assault. [8] Th

1996The defendant has not challenged this portion of the order. [4] See also United States v. Torres, 937 F.2d 1469, 1472 (C.A.9, 1991) (FRE 412 applies to all sexual behavior preceding trial); Flurry v. State, 290 Ark. 417, 419 , 720 S.W.2d 699 (1986) (the statute applies to all sexual conduct); Cuyler v. State, 841 S.W.2d 933, 936 (Tex.App., 1992) (the statute applies to all sexual conduct occurring before trial); State v. Gulrud, 140 Wis.2d 721, 729 , 412 N.W.2d 139 (Wis.App., 1987) (the statute precludes evidence of all secual conduct occurring before the conclusion of the trial). [5] There ar

1996The defendant has not challenged this portion of the order. [4] See also United States v. Torres, 937 F.2d 1469, 1472 (C.A.9, 1991) (FRE 412 applies to all sexual behavior preceding trial); Flurry v. State, 290 Ark. 417, 419 , 720 S.W.2d 699 (1986) (the statute applies to all sexual conduct); Cuyler v. State, 841 S.W.2d 933, 936 (Tex.App., 1992) (the statute applies to all sexual conduct occurring before trial); State v. Gulrud, 140 Wis.2d 721, 729 , 412 N.W.2d 139 (Wis.App., 1987) (the statute precludes evidence of all secual conduct occurring before the conclusion of the trial). [5] There ar

1985Alford v United States, 282 US 687 ; 51 S Ct 218 ; 75 L Ed 624 (1931). 1 By enacting a general exclusionary rule, the Legislature recognized that in the vast majority of cases, evidence of a rape victim’s prior sexual conduct with others, and sexual reputation, when offered to prove that the conduct at issue was consensual or for general impeachment is inadmissible.

1985Alford v United States, 282 US 687 ; 51 S Ct 218 ; 75 L Ed 624 (1931). 1 By enacting a general exclusionary rule, the Legislature recognized that in the vast majority of cases, evidence of a rape victim’s prior sexual conduct with others, and sexual reputation, when offered to prove that the conduct at issue was consensual or for general impeachment is inadmissible.

1976In McConkey v United States, 444 F2d 788 (CA 8, 1971), cert den, 404 US 885 ; 92 S Ct 223 ; 30 L Ed 2d 168 (1971), the defendant had been convicted of three violations of the Federal wire fraud statute for using interstate telegrams to fraudulently obtain loans.

1976In McConkey v United States, 444 F2d 788 (CA 8, 1971), cert den, 404 US 885 ; 92 S Ct 223 ; 30 L Ed 2d 168 (1971), the defendant had been convicted of three violations of the Federal wire fraud statute for using interstate telegrams to fraudulently obtain loans.

1976In McConkey v United States, 444 F2d 788 (CA 8, 1971), cert den, 404 US 885 ; 92 S Ct 223 ; 30 L Ed 2d 168 (1971), the defendant had been convicted of three violations of the Federal wire fraud statute for using interstate telegrams to fraudulently obtain loans.