general exclusionary rule (Illinois) · Go Syfert
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general exclusionary rule in Illinois

12 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1967–1999 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (2)

CaseFollowedCited
Millette v. Radostagreen
illappct · 1980 · cited in 1 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 1985–1985
1 sentence

1985See Millette v. Radosta (1980), 84 Ill.

11
The People v. Lewerenzgreen
ill · 1962 · cited in 1 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 1967–1967
1 sentence

1967See People v. Lewerenz, 24 Ill2d 295, 298, 181 NE2d 99 , where the court said: In prosecutions for offenses involving narcotics, authorities are in accord that evidence of other offenses is inadmissible unless it comes within one of the recognized exceptions to the general rule, i. e., where it is part of the res gestae, or where it helps to disclose motive, intent, premeditation, guilty knowledge, malice or a common plan or scheme.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (11)

CaseCitedYears
Gaunt & Haynes, Inc. v. Moritz Corp. green
illappct · 1985
2 sentences

1999Gaunt, 138 Ill.

1999Gaunt , 138 Ill.

21999–1999
Hodges v. Percival green
ill · 1890
2 sentences

1985(See Hodges v. Percival (1890), 132 Ill. 53 , 23 N.E. 423 .) However, as these subsequent remedial measures were required by a governmental authority, and thus not a voluntary act by defendant, the policy underlying the general exclusionary rule relating to subsequent remedial measures does not apply here.

1985(See Hodges v. Percival (1890), 132 Ill. 53 , 23 N.E. 423 .) However, as these subsequent remedial measures were required by a governmental authority, and thus not a voluntary act by defendant, the policy underlying the general exclusionary rule relating to subsequent remedial measures does not apply here.

11985–1985
People v. Saffold green
illappct · 1977
1 sentence

1979It cannot be said to be completely accurate because of the human elements ” ” *.” ( 47 Ill.

11979–1979
The PEOPLE v. Durso green
ill · 1968
2 sentences

1978The evidence was held to be admissible, the court saying: “It is true, nevertheless, that evidence relevant to the main issue, and which serves to place the defendant in proximity to the time and place of the offense and which aids or establishes identity, and tends to prove design, motive, or knowledge, is admissible as an exception to the general exclusionary rule barring such evidence.” In People v. Durso (1968), 40 Ill. 2d 242 , 239 N.E.2d 842 , defendant, who was charged with murder, urged error in admitting evidence of narcotics transactions.

1978The evidence was held to be admissible, the court saying: “It is true, nevertheless, that evidence relevant to the main issue, and which serves to place the defendant in proximity to the time and place of the offense and which aids or establishes identity, and tends to prove design, motive, or knowledge, is admissible as an exception to the general exclusionary rule barring such evidence.” In People v. Durso (1968), 40 Ill. 2d 242 , 239 N.E.2d 842 , defendant, who was charged with murder, urged error in admitting evidence of narcotics transactions.

11978–1978
People v. Bassett green
ill · 1974
2 sentences

1975While these exceptions may, at times, seem to nullify the general exclusionary rule, they are, of course, subject to the requirements of relevancy and materiality (see People v. Bassett, 56 Ill.2d 285 , 307 N.E.2d 359 ).

1975While these exceptions may, at times, seem to nullify the general exclusionary rule, they are, of course, subject to the requirements of relevancy and materiality (see People v. Bassett, 56 Ill.2d 285 , 307 N.E.2d 359 ).

11975–1975
The People v. Hurry neutral
ill · 1943
2 sentences

1974In support of its position, the State cites People v. Hurry (1943), 385 Ill. 486 , 52 N.E.2d 173 , where a police officer testified to a conversation with defendant wherein the defendant made admissions and statements implicating himself in a crime other than the one at issue.

1974In support of its position, the State cites People v. Hurry (1943), 385 Ill. 486 , 52 N.E.2d 173 , where a police officer testified to a conversation with defendant wherein the defendant made admissions and statements implicating himself in a crime other than the one at issue.

11974–1974
People v. Norfleet neutral
illappct · 1972
2 sentences

1974(People v. Norfleet, 4 Ill.App.3d 758 , 281 N.E.2d 761 .) In the instant case the evidence was properly admitted as a corollary to the general exclusionary rule.

1974(People v. Norfleet, 4 Ill.App.3d 758 , 281 N.E.2d 761 .) In the instant case the evidence was properly admitted as a corollary to the general exclusionary rule.

11974–1974
The PEOPLE v. Wilson green
ill · 1970
1 sentence

1973(People v. Wilson (1970), 46 Ill.2d 376 ; People v. Dewey (1969), 42 Ill.2d 148 .) In Dewey, at page 157, we stated: “The defendant next contends that the trial court erred by allowing the introduction of evidence that defendant attempted to pick up girls of the same age as Susan Brady in his car on prior occasions.

11973–1973
The People v. Dewey green
ill · 1969
1 sentence

1973(People v. Wilson (1970), 46 Ill.2d 376 ; People v. Dewey (1969), 42 Ill.2d 148 .) In Dewey, at page 157, we stated: “The defendant next contends that the trial court erred by allowing the introduction of evidence that defendant attempted to pick up girls of the same age as Susan Brady in his car on prior occasions.

11973–1973
Mapp v. Ohio green
scotus · 1961
2 sentences

1971This exclusionary rule was applied before the application of the fourth amendment to the States and the establishment of the general exclusionary rule in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 .

1971This exclusionary rule was applied before the application of the fourth amendment to the States and the establishment of the general exclusionary rule in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 .

11971–1971
The People v. Tranowski green
ill · 1960
1 sentence

1968In People v. Tranowski, 20 Ill2d 11, 169 NE2d 347 , the defendant was tried for robbery.

11968–1968

Where else courts name it

AL 161 (1977–2026) LA 36 (1975–2017) MI 25 (1976–2026) MN 22 (1965–2016) MD 13 (1976–2023) IL 12 (1967–1999) CA 9 (1955–2010) MO 8 (1970–2025) IN 7 (1974–2005) GA 5 (1970–2019) RI 5 (2000–2010) WI 4 (1957–2006) TX 4 (1986–2015) CT 3 (1989–2007) NY 3 (1972–2013) PA 3 (1978–2022) FL 3 (1980–2009) NJ 2 (2024–2025) CO 2 (2021–2021) AZ 2 (2010–2010) KY 2 (2018–2024) WV 2 (1994–2022) VA 2 (1984–1987) KS 2 (1992–1995)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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