erroneous denial challenge in Ohio

2019“As a matter of state law, we have ‘recognized that where the defense exhausts its peremptory challenges before the full jury is seated, the erroneous denial of a challenge for cause in a criminal case may be prejudicial.’” State v. Hale, 119 Ohio St.3d 118 , 2008-Ohio-3426 , ¶ 87, quoting State v. Cornwell, 86 Ohio St.3d 560, 564 , (1999).

2018As a matter of state law, the Ohio Supreme Court has " 'recognized that where the defense exhausts its peremptory challenges before the full jury is seated, the erroneous denial of a challenge for cause in a criminal case may be prejudicial.' " State v. Hale , 119 Ohio St.3d 118 , 2008-Ohio-3426 , ¶ 87, 892 N.E.2d 864 , quoting State v. Cornwell , 86 Ohio St.3d 560 , 564, 715 N.E.2d 1144 (1999).

2018"However, '[a] defendant in a criminal case cannot *119 complain of prejudicial error in the overruling of a challenge for cause if such ruling does not force him to exhaust his peremptory challenges.' " Id. , quoting State v. Eaton , 19 Ohio St.2d 145 , 249 N.E.2d 897 (1969), paragraph one of the syllabus.

2018"However, '[a] defendant in a criminal case cannot *119 complain of prejudicial error in the overruling of a challenge for cause if such ruling does not force him to exhaust his peremptory challenges.' " Id. , quoting State v. Eaton , 19 Ohio St.2d 145 , 249 N.E.2d 897 (1969), paragraph one of the syllabus.

2016State v. Williams, 79 Ohio St.3d 1 , 1997-Ohio-407 , 679 N.E.2d 646 .

2008That said, Ohio has recognized that "where the defense exhausts its peremptory challenges before the full jury is seated, the erroneous denial of a challenge for cause in a criminal case may be prejudicial." State v. Cornwell , 86 Ohio St.3d 560 , 564 , 1999-Ohio-125 , citing Hartnett v. State (1885), 42 Ohio St. 568 .

2008However, “[a] defendant in a criminal case cannot complain of prejudicial error in the overruling of a challenge for cause if such ruling does not force him to exhaust his peremptory challenges.” (Emphasis added.) State v. Eaton (1969), 19 Ohio St.2d 145 , 48 O.O.2d 188 , 249 N.E.2d 897 , paragraph one of the syllabus, vacated in part by Eaton v. Ohio (1972), 408 U.S. 935 , 92 S.Ct. 2857 , 33 L.Ed.2d 750 .

2008However, “[a] defendant in a criminal case cannot complain of prejudicial error in the overruling of a challenge for cause if such ruling does not force him to exhaust his peremptory challenges.” (Emphasis added.) State v. Eaton (1969), 19 Ohio St.2d 145 , 48 O.O.2d 188 , 249 N.E.2d 897 , paragraph one of the syllabus, vacated in part by Eaton v. Ohio (1972), 408 U.S. 935 , 92 S.Ct. 2857 , 33 L.Ed.2d 750 .

2008“So long as the jury that sits is impartial, the fact that the defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to achieve that result does not mean the Sixth Amendment was violated.” Ross v. Oklahoma (1988), 487 U.S. 81, 88 , 108 S.Ct. 2273 , 101 L.Ed.2d 80 . {¶ 87} As a matter of state law, we have “recognized that where the defense exhausts its peremptory challenges before the full jury is seated, the erroneous denial of a challenge for cause in a criminal ease may be prejudicial.” State v. Cornwell (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 560, 564 , 715 N.E.2d 1144 .

2008“So long as the jury that sits is impartial, the fact that the defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to achieve that result does not mean the Sixth Amendment was violated.” Ross v. Oklahoma (1988), 487 U.S. 81, 88 , 108 S.Ct. 2273 , 101 L.Ed.2d 80 . {¶ 87} As a matter of state law, we have “recognized that where the defense exhausts its peremptory challenges before the full jury is seated, the erroneous denial of a challenge for cause in a criminal ease may be prejudicial.” State v. Cornwell (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 560, 564 , 715 N.E.2d 1144 .

2006Voluntariness of Confession (VIII) {¶ 32} In proposition of law VIH, Tenace contends that a confession made to police when a defendant is not informed that he faces the death penalty is involuntary and violates his rights to counsel and to be free from self-incrimination. {¶ 33} Yet as Tenace concedes, we have held that police are not required to inform a suspect that he or she is “potentially eligible for a death sentence prior to obtaining a valid waiver of the right to counsel.” State v. Garner (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 49 , 60, 656 N.E.2d 623 .

2006Voluntariness of Confession (VIII) {¶ 32} In proposition of law VIH, Tenace contends that a confession made to police when a defendant is not informed that he faces the death penalty is involuntary and violates his rights to counsel and to be free from self-incrimination. {¶ 33} Yet as Tenace concedes, we have held that police are not required to inform a suspect that he or she is “potentially eligible for a death sentence prior to obtaining a valid waiver of the right to counsel.” State v. Garner (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 49 , 60, 656 N.E.2d 623 .

2006Unlike the erroneous denial of a challenge for cause, an erroneous excusal cannot cause the seating of a biased juror and therefore does not taint the jury’s impartiality.” Accord State v. Gross, 97 Ohio St.3d 121 , 2002-Ohio-5524 , 776 N.E.2d 1061 , ¶ 39. {¶ 26} Moreover, excusing juror Vitale was within the trial court’s discretion under CrimR. 24(C), which provides: {¶ 27} “A person called as a juror may be challenged for the following causes: {¶ 28} “* * * {¶ 29} “(14) That the juror is otherwise unsuitable for any other cause to serve as a juror.” {¶ 30} See, also, R.C. 2313.42(G) (a pros

2006Unlike the erroneous denial of a challenge for cause, an erroneous excusal cannot cause the seating of a biased juror and therefore does not taint the jury’s impartiality.” Accord State v. Gross, 97 Ohio St.3d 121 , 2002-Ohio-5524 , 776 N.E.2d 1061 , ¶ 39. {¶ 26} Moreover, excusing juror Vitale was within the trial court’s discretion under CrimR. 24(C), which provides: {¶ 27} “A person called as a juror may be challenged for the following causes: {¶ 28} “* * * {¶ 29} “(14) That the juror is otherwise unsuitable for any other cause to serve as a juror.” {¶ 30} See, also, R.C. 2313.42(G) (a pros

2006Group, 98 Ohio St.3d 248 , 2002-Ohio-7247 , 781 N.E.2d 980 , ¶ 61, quoting State v. Cornwell (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 560, 564 , 715 N.E.2d 1144 (“Ohio law recognizes that ‘where the defense exhausts its peremptory challenges before the full jury is seated, the erroneous denial of a challenge for cause in a criminal may be prejudicial’ ”).

2006Group, 98 Ohio St.3d 248 , 2002-Ohio-7247 , 781 N.E.2d 980 , ¶ 61, quoting State v. Cornwell (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 560, 564 , 715 N.E.2d 1144 (“Ohio law recognizes that ‘where the defense exhausts its peremptory challenges before the full jury is seated, the erroneous denial of a challenge for cause in a criminal may be prejudicial’ ”).

2001See, e.g., United States v. Cornell (C.C.D.R.I.1820), 25 F. Cas. 650, 656 ; United States v. Brooks (C.A.8, 1999), 175 F.3d 605 , 606; Jones v. State (Tex.Crim.App.1998), 982 S.W.2d 386, 392 (citing 6 January Term, 2001 {¶ 29} In any event, excusing this venireman was within the trial court’s discretion.

2000State v. Wilson (1972), 29 Ohio St.2d 203 , 211 . * * * "* * * While it is true, regarding the right to an impartial jury, that the proper focus is on the jurors who were seated, * * *, if the defense peremptorily excuses the biased prospective juror, but the defense exhausts its peremptory challenges before the full jury is seated, the erroneous denial of a challenge for cause in a criminal case may be prejudicial.