willfulness violation in Washington

2014However, by elliptically quoting the three-part test of rSnedioar v. Hodderson. 53 Wn.

2014However, by elliptically quoting the three-part test of Snedigar [u Hodderson, 53 Wn.

2013Id. at 490-91 . ¶34 In Mayer, 156 Wn.2d at 688 , this court held that Burnet applies to witness exclusion: when imposing a severe sanction such as witness exclusion, “the record must show three things — the trial court’s consideration of a lesser sanction, the willfulness of the violation, and substantial prejudice arising from it.” ¶35 More recently, this court applied Burnet in Blair v. TA-Seattle East No. 176, 171 Wn.2d 342 , 254 P.3d 797 (2011) (Blair II).

2011Although a trial court generally has broad discretion to fashion remedies for discovery violations, when imposing a severe sanction such as witness exclusion, "the record must show three things—the trial court's consideration of a lesser sanction, the willfulness of the violation, and substantial prejudice arising from it." Mayer, 156 Wash.2d at 688 , 132 P.3d 115 (relying on Burnet, 131 Wash.2d at 494 , 933 P.2d 1036 ).

2013Id. at 490-91 . ¶34 In Mayer, 156 Wn.2d at 688 , this court held that Burnet applies to witness exclusion: when imposing a severe sanction such as witness exclusion, “the record must show three things — the trial court’s consideration of a lesser sanction, the willfulness of the violation, and substantial prejudice arising from it.” ¶35 More recently, this court applied Burnet in Blair v. TA-Seattle East No. 176, 171 Wn.2d 342 , 254 P.3d 797 (2011) (Blair II).

2013It noted, "[W]hen imposing a severe sanction such as witness exclusion, 'the record must show three things—the trial court's consideration of a lesser sanction, the willfulness of the violation, and substantial prejudice arising from it.'" Blair, 171 Wn.2d at 348 (quoting Mayer, 156 Wn.2d at 688 ).

2013Inc.. 156 Wn.2d 677, 688 , 132 P.3d 115 (2006).

2011Although a trial court generally has broad discretion to fashion remedies for discovery violations, when imposing a severe sanction such as witness exclusion, "the record must show three things—the trial court's consideration of a lesser sanction, the willfulness of the violation, and substantial prejudice arising from it." Mayer, 156 Wash.2d at 688 , 132 P.3d 115 (relying on Burnet, 131 Wash.2d at 494 , 933 P.2d 1036 ).

2013No. 176, 171 Wn.2d 342 , 254 P.3d 797 (2011) (Blair II).

2013Id. at 490-91 . ¶34 In Mayer, 156 Wn.2d at 688 , this court held that Burnet applies to witness exclusion: when imposing a severe sanction such as witness exclusion, “the record must show three things — the trial court’s consideration of a lesser sanction, the willfulness of the violation, and substantial prejudice arising from it.” ¶35 More recently, this court applied Burnet in Blair v. TA-Seattle East No. 176, 171 Wn.2d 342 , 254 P.3d 797 (2011) (Blair II).

2010Schilling, 136 Wash.2d at 160 , 961 P.2d 371 ; CR 56(c). ¶ 95 Here, it is undisputed that the first part of the willfulness test is met because the County is intentionally refusing to reinstate Ms. Bartleson and pay the back wages awarded by the arbitrator.

2010Schilling, 136 Wn.2d at 160 ; CR 56(c). ¶95 Here, it is undisputed that the first part of the willfulness test is met because the County is intentionally refusing to reinstate Ms. Bartleson and pay the back wages awarded by the arbitrator.

2009As McCormick recognizes, in State v. Riles, 135 Wash.2d 326, 349 , 957 P.2d 655 (1998), Riles argued the condition at issue and a condition requiring him to avoid places where children congregate barred him from all public places.

2009As McCormick recognizes, in State v. Riles, 135 Wn.2d 326, 349 , 957 P.2d 655 (1998), Riles argued the condition at issue and a condition requiring him to avoid places where children congregate barred him from all public places.

2009As McCormick recognizes, in State v. Riles, 135 Wash.2d 326, 349 , 957 P.2d 655 (1998), Riles argued the condition at issue and a condition requiring him to avoid places where children congregate barred him from all public places.

2009As McCormick recognizes, in State v. Riles, 135 Wn.2d 326, 349 , 957 P.2d 655 (1998), Riles argued the condition at issue and a condition requiring him to avoid places where children congregate barred him from all public places.

2009As mentioned above, Kupec also provides an exception to the willfulness requirement when the violation presents a threat to the safety of society. [7] Kupec, 835 P.2d at 362 .

2009As mentioned above, Kupec also provides an exception to the willfulness requirement when the violation presents a threat to the safety of society. 7 Kupec, 835 P.2d at 362 .

2025Ctr., 175 Wn.2d 822, 834 , 287 P.3d 516 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Morgan v. Kingen, 166 Wn.2d 526, 534 , 210 P.3d 995 (2009)); see also Hill, 191 Wn.2d at 561-62 (discussing the willfulness standard under RCW 49.52.050(2)).

2025Ctr., 175 Wn.2d 822, 834 , 287 P.3d 516 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Morgan v. Kingen, 166 Wn.2d 526, 534 , 210 P.3d 995 (2009)); see also Hill, 191 Wn.2d at 561-62 (discussing the willfulness standard under RCW 49.52.050(2)).

2025Ctr., 175 Wn.2d 822, 834 , 287 P.3d 516 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Morgan v. Kingen, 166 Wn.2d 526, 534 , 210 P.3d 995 (2009)); see also Hill, 191 Wn.2d at 561-62 (discussing the willfulness standard under RCW 49.52.050(2)).

2025Ctr., 175 Wn.2d 822, 834 , 287 P.3d 516 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Morgan v. Kingen, 166 Wn.2d 526, 534 , 210 P.3d 995 (2009)); see also Hill, 191 Wn.2d at 561-62 (discussing the willfulness standard under RCW 49.52.050(2)).

2024Huegel also cites Karanjah, but in that case, the court focused on injury resulting from physical abuse and did not address the willfulness requirement for unreasonable confinement. 199 Wn.

2024McCormick, 166 Wn.2d at 704-05 .

2021We have held that “Jones disavowed the usual presumption that violating a rule constitutes a willful act, holding instead that willfulness must be demonstrated.” Farrow v. Alfa Laval, Inc., 179 Wn.

2020Jones, 179 Wn.2d at 345 .

2017Scott, 110 Wn.2d at 686 .

2016App. 466, 469 , 208 P.3d 1201 (2009). 5 State v. Bennett, 161 Wn.2d 303, 307 , 165 P.3d 1241 (2007). -3- No. 75240-5-1 / 4 relieve the State of this burden.6 Instructions must also properly inform the jury about the applicable law and must not mislead the jury.7 RCW 10.99.050(2)(a) prohibits "[wjillful violation of a court order."8 A willfulness requirement "is satisfied if a person acts knowingly with respect to the material elements of the offense, unless a purpose to impose further requirements plainly appears."9 In State v. Clowes,10 Division Two of this court held that the trial court did

2016App. 466, 469 , 208 P.3d 1201 (2009). 5 State v. Bennett, 161 Wn.2d 303, 307 , 165 P.3d 1241 (2007). -3- No. 75240-5-1 / 4 relieve the State of this burden.6 Instructions must also properly inform the jury about the applicable law and must not mislead the jury.7 RCW 10.99.050(2)(a) prohibits "[wjillful violation of a court order."8 A willfulness requirement "is satisfied if a person acts knowingly with respect to the material elements of the offense, unless a purpose to impose further requirements plainly appears."9 In State v. Clowes,10 Division Two of this court held that the trial court did

2016App. 466, 469 , 208 P.3d 1201 (2009). 5 State v. Bennett, 161 Wn.2d 303, 307 , 165 P.3d 1241 (2007). -3- No. 75240-5-1 / 4 relieve the State of this burden.6 Instructions must also properly inform the jury about the applicable law and must not mislead the jury.7 RCW 10.99.050(2)(a) prohibits "[wjillful violation of a court order."8 A willfulness requirement "is satisfied if a person acts knowingly with respect to the material elements of the offense, unless a purpose to impose further requirements plainly appears."9 In State v. Clowes,10 Division Two of this court held that the trial court did

2011This Court in Mayer stated, "[We] ... hold that the reference in Burnet to the `"harsher remedies allowable under CR 37(b)"' applies to such remedies as dismissal, default, and the exclusion of testimony—sanctions that affect a party's ability to present its case—but does not encompass monetary compensatory sanctions." Id. at 690, 132 P.3d 115 (quoting Burnet, 131 Wash.2d at 494 , 933 P.2d 1036 (quoting Snedigar v. Hodderson, 53 Wash. App. 476, 487 , 768 P.2d 1 (1989), rev'd in part, 114 Wash.2d 153 , 786 P.2d 781 (1990))). ¶ 16 Neither of the trial court's orders striking Blair's witnesses co

2011This Court in Mayer stated, "[We] ... hold that the reference in Burnet to the `"harsher remedies allowable under CR 37(b)"' applies to such remedies as dismissal, default, and the exclusion of testimony—sanctions that affect a party's ability to present its case—but does not encompass monetary compensatory sanctions." Id. at 690, 132 P.3d 115 (quoting Burnet, 131 Wash.2d at 494 , 933 P.2d 1036 (quoting Snedigar v. Hodderson, 53 Wash. App. 476, 487 , 768 P.2d 1 (1989), rev'd in part, 114 Wash.2d 153 , 786 P.2d 781 (1990))). ¶ 16 Neither of the trial court's orders striking Blair's witnesses co

2010Schilling, 136 Wash.2d at 160 , 961 P.2d 371 ; CR 56(c). ¶ 95 Here, it is undisputed that the first part of the willfulness test is met because the County is intentionally refusing to reinstate Ms. Bartleson and pay the back wages awarded by the arbitrator.

2006App. 740, 750 , 695 P.2d 600 (1985))). ¶20 In sum, the case law that the Burnet court relied on established that before a trial court may impose a CR 37(b)(2)(B) sanction excluding testimony, a showing of willfulness was required; that for “one of the harsher remedies allowable under CR 37(b),” the record must clearly state the reasons for the sanction; and that for the “most severe” CR 37(b)(2)(C) sanction of dismissal or default, the record must show three things — the trial court’s consideration of a lesser sanction, the willfulness of the violation, and substantial prejudice arising from i