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8 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1999–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re EBgreen2 sentences2017Furthermore, the dissent believed that the evidence supported the juvenile court’s findings. ¶ 17 ANALYSIS ¶ 18 Before this court, the State argues that (1) the appellate court majority improperly grafted a willfulness requirement onto the plain language of subsections (b) and (m) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b), (m) (West 2014)); (2) the juvenile court did not err by failing to -5- expressly state, when ruling on subsection (m), that it did not consider evidence outside the statutorily prescribed nine-month period of consideration; (3) the juvenile court’s ruling was not against the 2016Furthermore, the dissent believed that the evidence supported the juvenile court’s findings. -6- ¶ 17 ANALYSIS ¶ 18 Before this court, the State argues that (1) the appellate court majority improperly grafted a willfulness requirement onto the plain language of subsections (b) and (m) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b), (m) (West 2014)); (2) the juvenile court did not err by failing to expressly state, when ruling on subsection (m), that it did not consider evidence outside the statutorily prescribed nine-month period of consideration; (3) the juvenile court’s ruling was not against the | 2 | 2 |
In Re Adoption of Syckgreen2 sentences2017“Each case concerning parental unfitness is sui generis, unique unto itself.” In re Adoption of Syck, 138 Ill. 2d at 279. ¶ 22 Here, whether the juvenile court’s findings were against the manifest weight of the evidence depends on whether subsections (b) and (m) of the Adoption Act expressly or implicitly contain a willfulness requirement. 2016“Each case concerning parental unfitness is sui generis, unique unto itself.” In re Adoption of Syck, 138 Ill. 2d at 279. -7- ¶ 22 Here, whether the juvenile court’s findings were against the manifest weight of the evidence depends on whether subsections (b) and (m) of the Adoption Act expressly or implicitly contain a willfulness requirement. | 2 | 2 |
Dickson v. West Koke Mill Village Partnersgreen1 sentence2022Dickson v. West Koke Mill Village Partners, 329 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
Namur v. Habitat Co.green2 sentences2001See Namur v. Habitat Co., 294 Ill.App.3d 1007, 1011 , 229 Ill.Dec. 309 , 691 N.E.2d 782 (1998); 307 Ill.App.3d at 156 , 240 Ill.Dec. 350 , 717 N.E.2d 443 ("a willfulness requirement can only stand if the ordinance is penal"). 2001See Namur v. Habitat Co., 294 Ill.App.3d 1007, 1011 , 229 Ill.Dec. 309 , 691 N.E.2d 782 (1998); 307 Ill.App.3d at 156 , 240 Ill.Dec. 350 , 717 N.E.2d 443 ("a willfulness requirement can only stand if the ordinance is penal"). | 1 | 1 |
People v. O'BRIENgreen1 sentence2001See 197 Ill. 2d at 11 (“The Chicago city council was presumably aware of that statute when it enacted the ordinance at issue here, but chose not to include the statute’s willfulness requirement in its own version of the law”). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Davis
green
2 sentences2010The court reasoned that to read a willfulness requirement into section 5--6--2(c) would render section 5--6--4(d) "superfluous and unnecessary." Davis, 123 Ill. 2010The court reasoned that to read a willfulness requirement into section 5 — 6—2(c) would render section 5 — 6—4(d) “superfluous and unnecessary.” Davis, 123 Ill. | 2 | 2010–2010 |
People v. Smith
green
1 sentence2024Smith, 188 Ill. 2d at 347-48 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Lawrence v. Regent Realty Group, Inc.
green
2 sentences2001See Namur v. Habitat Co., 294 Ill.App.3d 1007, 1011 , 229 Ill.Dec. 309 , 691 N.E.2d 782 (1998); 307 Ill.App.3d at 156 , 240 Ill.Dec. 350 , 717 N.E.2d 443 ("a willfulness requirement can only stand if the ordinance is penal"). 2001See Namur v. Habitat Co., 294 Ill.App.3d 1007, 1011 , 229 Ill.Dec. 309 , 691 N.E.2d 782 (1998); 307 Ill.App.3d at 156 , 240 Ill.Dec. 350 , 717 N.E.2d 443 ("a willfulness requirement can only stand if the ordinance is penal"). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Friedman v. Krupp Corp.
green
1 sentence1999We follow in this opinion the reasoning set out in Friedman v. Krupp Corp., 282 Ill. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.