willfulness requirement in California

2024“Although notice alone does not satisfy the willfulness requirement, a jury may infer from proof of notice that the defendant did have actual knowledge, which 13 would satisfy the requirement.” (Garcia, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 752 .) Moreover, the jury was at liberty to reject as self-serving and not credible defendant’s testimony that he did not understand or believe the information that these persons had conveyed to him.

2016The willfulness element of the statute requires “actual knowledge” of the duty to register, and the trier of fact “may infer knowledge from notice, but notice alone does not necessarily satisfy the willfulness requirement.” (People v. Garcia (2001) 25 Cal.4th 744, 752 .) In People v. Barker (2004) 34 Cal.4th 345 (Barker), our Supreme Court held that the willfulness element may not be negated by evidence a defendant “just forgot” to 12 register, although the court left open the question of “whether forgetfulness resulting from, for example, an acute psychological condition, or a chronic deficit

2016The willfulness element of the statute requires “actual knowledge” of the duty to register, and the trier of fact “may infer knowledge from notice, but notice alone does not necessarily satisfy the willfulness requirement.” (People v. Garcia (2001) 25 Cal.4th 744, 752 .) In People v. Barker (2004) 34 Cal.4th 345 (Barker), our Supreme Court held that the willfulness element may not be negated by evidence a defendant “just forgot” to 12 register, although the court left open the question of “whether forgetfulness resulting from, for example, an acute psychological condition, or a chronic deficit

2015(People v. Rodriguez, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 443 .) In order to establish a failure to register, the prosecutor must show the failure was willful. (§ 290.018, subd. (a).) In People v. Garcia (2001) 25 Cal.4th 744 , 752 the California Supreme Court held the willfulness element of the statute requires actual knowledge of the duty to register and that “[a] jury may infer knowledge from notice, but notice alone does not necessarily satisfy the willfulness requirement.” And, as noted above, in Sorden, supra, 36 Cal.4th at page 69 , the California Supreme Court held “that the willfulness element of

2016The willfulness element of the statute requires “actual knowledge” of the duty to register, and the trier of fact “may infer knowledge from notice, but notice alone does not necessarily satisfy the willfulness requirement.” (People v. Garcia (2001) 25 Cal.4th 744, 752 .) In People v. Barker (2004) 34 Cal.4th 345 (Barker), our Supreme Court held that the willfulness element may not be negated by evidence a defendant “just forgot” to 12 register, although the court left open the question of “whether forgetfulness resulting from, for example, an acute psychological condition, or a chronic deficit

2005A jury may infer knowledge from notice, but notice alone does not necessarily satisfy the willfulness requirement.” (People v. Garcia (2001) 25 Cal.4th 744, 752 [ 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 355 , 23 P.3d 590 ], original italics; see People v. Barker (2004) 34 Cal.4th 345, 351 [ 18 Cal.Rptr.3d 260 ].) However, merely forgetting to register is not a defense to a section 290 charge.

2006Nor is an actual loss to the city or public agency necessary for a section 1090 violation.” (Thomson, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 648 , fn. omitted.) *1331 When section 1090 is transgressed, “the public entity involved is entitled to recover any compensation that it . . . paid under the contract without restoring any of the benefits it. . . received. [Citations.] The contract is against the express prohibition of the law, and ‘ “. . . courts will not entertain any rights growing out of such a contract, or permit a recovery upon quantum meruit or quantum valebat.” ’ [Citations.] This principle appli

2001Code, § 1092.) The contract is against the express prohibition of the law, and “ \ . . courts will not entertain any rights growing out of such a contract, or permit a recovery upon quantum meruit or quantum valebat.’ ” (Thomson v. Call, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 647 , quoting County of Shasta v. Moody (1928) 90 Cal.App. 519, 523-524 [ 265 P. 1032 ], italics omitted.) This principle applies without regard to the willfulness of the violation.

2003As in Edgar , "[t]he trial court in this case gave the same willfulness instruction found inadequate in Garcia [(2001) 25 Cal.4th 744 , [ 107 Cal. Rptr.2d 355 , 23 P.3d 590 ]] ([s]ee CALJIC No. 1.20)" and "like the `"ignorance of the law is no excuse"' instruction (CALJIC No. 4.36) given in Garcia , the general intent instruction given here (CALJIC No. 3.30) `on its face would allow the jury to convict [appellant] of failing to register even if he were unaware of his obligation to do so.' ( People v. Garcia, supra, 25 *822 Cal.4th at p. 754, [ 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 355 , 23 P.3d 590 ].)" ( Edgar, su

2003As in Edgar , "[t]he trial court in this case gave the same willfulness instruction found inadequate in Garcia [(2001) 25 Cal.4th 744 , [ 107 Cal. Rptr.2d 355 , 23 P.3d 590 ]] ([s]ee CALJIC No. 1.20)" and "like the `"ignorance of the law is no excuse"' instruction (CALJIC No. 4.36) given in Garcia , the general intent instruction given here (CALJIC No. 3.30) `on its face would allow the jury to convict [appellant] of failing to register even if he were unaware of his obligation to do so.' ( People v. Garcia, supra, 25 *822 Cal.4th at p. 754, [ 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 355 , 23 P.3d 590 ].)" ( Edgar, su

2024(See V.V., supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1031, fn. 6 [explaining “arson’s willful requirement” is met when “the act of setting fire to, of burning, or that causes to be burned (§ 451) is intentional,” italics added].) We do not believe the court intended to import an additional willfulness requirement of “intentional ignition.” b.

2014(Compare Acosta v. Glenfed Development Corp. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1278 , 1292–1293 (Acosta) [defendant has no burden of production on the willfulness exception to the section 337.15 statute of repose] & Varshock v. Department of Forestry & Fire Protection (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 635, 651 (Varshock) [generally, when “an affirmative defense contains an exception, a defendant must also negate the exception as part of its initial burden on summary judgment if, but only if, the complaint alleges facts triggering potential applicability of the exception”].) We need not resolve whether the apparent

2014(See Varshock, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 651 [generally, a defendant’s summary judgment showing need only meet claims made in the complaint].) 15 is apparent plaintiffs, themselves, read Howard’s declaration this way, since they argued in the trial court that, contrary to what Howard said in his declaration, West’s declaration raised a triable issue that Howard had “willfully” covered over contamination.16 We thus conclude the trial court properly granted Howard’s motion for summary judgment.

2013The applicable statute "does not require a misuse of the discovery process to be willful before monetary sanctions may be imposed." (Kohan v. Cohan (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 967, 971 (Kohan), italics added; see also Reedy v. Bussell (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1272, 1291 ["willfulness is no longer a requirement for the imposition of discovery sanctions"].) Instead, current law removes the willfulness requirement present in the former law, and places the burden on the sanctioned party to justify his conduct, in that the law now "allows one against whom sanctions are sought to show substantial justificat

2013The applicable statute "does not require a misuse of the discovery process to be willful before monetary sanctions may be imposed." (Kohan v. Cohan (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 967, 971 (Kohan), italics added; see also Reedy v. Bussell (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1272, 1291 ["willfulness is no longer a requirement for the imposition of discovery sanctions"].) Instead, current law removes the willfulness requirement present in the former law, and places the burden on the sanctioned party to justify his conduct, in that the law now "allows one against whom sanctions are sought to show substantial justificat

2013(Parker, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 294 ["The court need not make an explicit finding the exception [for acting with substantial justification] does not exist as this is implied in the order awarding sanctions."].) It is clear from the trial court's comments that it was not making a finding that Skyer was substantially justified in violating the court's order.6 We therefore conclude that the trial court properly imposed monetary sanctions for Skyer's misuse of the discovery process regardless of whether Skyer intentionally violated the court's order.

2013The applicable statute "does not require a misuse of the discovery process to be willful before monetary sanctions may be imposed." (Kohan v. Cohan (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 967, 971 (Kohan), italics added; see also Reedy v. Bussell (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1272, 1291 ["willfulness is no longer a requirement for the imposition of discovery sanctions"].) Instead, current law removes the willfulness requirement present in the former law, and places the burden on the sanctioned party to justify his conduct, in that the law now "allows one against whom sanctions are sought to show substantial justificat

2013The applicable statute "does not require a misuse of the discovery process to be willful before monetary sanctions may be imposed." (Kohan v. Cohan (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 967, 971 (Kohan), italics added; see also Reedy v. Bussell (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1272, 1291 ["willfulness is no longer a requirement for the imposition of discovery sanctions"].) Instead, current law removes the willfulness requirement present in the former law, and places the burden on the sanctioned party to justify his conduct, in that the law now "allows one against whom sanctions are sought to show substantial justificat

2007(E.g., Danjaq LLC, supra, 263 F.3d at pp. 956-957; Hermès Intern. v. Lederer de Paris Fifth Ave. (2d Cir. 2000) 219 F.3d 104, 107 .) 5 However, while the willfulness exception has been held to apply where a defendant intentionally infringed on another’s rights, it does not extend, as plaintiffs suggest, to mere intentional copying.

2007Rather, “ ‘[t]o establish willful infringement, a plaintiff must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant acted without a reasonable belief that its action avoided infringement.’ ” (State Contracting & Engineering Corp. v. Condotte America, Inc. (Fed.Cir. 2003) 346 F.3d 1057 , 1063, quoting Crystal Semiconductor v. TriTech Microelectronics (Fed.Cir. 2001) 246 F.3d 1336 , 1351; see also Danjaq LLC, supra, 263 F.3d at p. 957 [“for purposes of the willfulness exception to laches, ... the term ‘willful’ *1166 refers to conduct that occurs ‘with knowledge that the defendant’s condu

2007Rather, “ ‘[t]o establish willful infringement, a plaintiff must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant acted without a reasonable belief that its action avoided infringement.’ ” (State Contracting & Engineering Corp. v. Condotte America, Inc. (Fed.Cir. 2003) 346 F.3d 1057 , 1063, quoting Crystal Semiconductor v. TriTech Microelectronics (Fed.Cir. 2001) 246 F.3d 1336 , 1351; see also Danjaq LLC, supra, 263 F.3d at p. 957 [“for purposes of the willfulness exception to laches, ... the term ‘willful’ *1166 refers to conduct that occurs ‘with knowledge that the defendant’s condu

2007Rather, “ ‘[t]o establish willful infringement, a plaintiff must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant acted without a reasonable belief that its action avoided infringement.’ ” (State Contracting & Engineering Corp. v. Condotte America, Inc. (Fed.Cir. 2003) 346 F.3d 1057 , 1063, quoting Crystal Semiconductor v. TriTech Microelectronics (Fed.Cir. 2001) 246 F.3d 1336 , 1351; see also Danjaq LLC, supra, 263 F.3d at p. 957 [“for purposes of the willfulness exception to laches, ... the term ‘willful’ *1166 refers to conduct that occurs ‘with knowledge that the defendant’s condu

2006Nor is an actual loss to the city or public agency necessary for a section 1090 violation.” (Thomson, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 648 , fn. omitted.) *1331 When section 1090 is transgressed, “the public entity involved is entitled to recover any compensation that it . . . paid under the contract without restoring any of the benefits it. . . received. [Citations.] The contract is against the express prohibition of the law, and ‘ “. . . courts will not entertain any rights growing out of such a contract, or permit a recovery upon quantum meruit or quantum valebat.” ’ [Citations.] This principle appli

2006Nor is an actual loss to the city or public agency necessary for a section 1090 violation.” (Thomson, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 648 , fn. omitted.) *1331 When section 1090 is transgressed, “the public entity involved is entitled to recover any compensation that it . . . paid under the contract without restoring any of the benefits it. . . received. [Citations.] The contract is against the express prohibition of the law, and ‘ “. . . courts will not entertain any rights growing out of such a contract, or permit a recovery upon quantum meruit or quantum valebat.” ’ [Citations.] This principle appli