extensive evidentiary hearing in California

24 California opinions name it 3 courts 1975–2023 2 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (11)

Case	Followed	Cited
Kington v. Fonggreen calctapp · 2011 · cited in 7 California opinions naming this issue, 2011–2023 2 sentences 2019There was no trial in this case, and "courts have held that a statement of decision [under Code of Civil Procedure section 632 ] ordinarily is not required in connection with a ruling on a motion [citations], even if the motion involves an extensive evidentiary hearing." ( In re Marriage of Fong (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 278 , 294, 123 Cal.Rptr.3d 260 , fn. omitted.) Even assuming the importance of the issues at stake might have entitled her to such a statement ( Lien v. Lucky United Properties Investment, Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 620 , 624, 77 Cal.Rptr.3d 707 ), there is no indication in the 2019There was no trial in this case, and "courts have held that a statement of decision [under Code of Civil Procedure section 632 ] ordinarily is not required in connection with a ruling on a motion [citations], even if the motion involves an extensive evidentiary hearing." ( In re Marriage of Fong (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 278 , 294, 123 Cal.Rptr.3d 260 , fn. omitted.) Even assuming the importance of the issues at stake might have entitled her to such a statement ( Lien v. Lucky United Properties Investment, Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 620 , 624, 77 Cal.Rptr.3d 707 ), there is no indication in the	1	7
Lien v. Lucky United Properties Investment, Inc.green calctapp · 2008 · cited in 4 California opinions naming this issue, 2011–2019 2 sentences 2019There was no trial in this case, and "courts have held that a statement of decision [under Code of Civil Procedure section 632 ] ordinarily is not required in connection with a ruling on a motion [citations], even if the motion involves an extensive evidentiary hearing." ( In re Marriage of Fong (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 278 , 294, 123 Cal.Rptr.3d 260 , fn. omitted.) Even assuming the importance of the issues at stake might have entitled her to such a statement ( Lien v. Lucky United Properties Investment, Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 620 , 624, 77 Cal.Rptr.3d 707 ), there is no indication in the 2019There was no trial in this case, and "courts have held that a statement of decision [under Code of Civil Procedure section 632 ] ordinarily is not required in connection with a ruling on a motion [citations], even if the motion involves an extensive evidentiary hearing." ( In re Marriage of Fong (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 278 , 294, 123 Cal.Rptr.3d 260 , fn. omitted.) Even assuming the importance of the issues at stake might have entitled her to such a statement ( Lien v. Lucky United Properties Investment, Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 620 , 624, 77 Cal.Rptr.3d 707 ), there is no indication in the	1	4
People v. McKeegreen calctapp · 2012 · cited in 4 California opinions naming this issue, 2013–2014 2 sentences 2014(People v. McKee (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1325, 1330, 1332 (McKee II).) On appeal, the reviewing court reached the same conclusion: "[T]he trial court correctly found the People presented substantial evidence to support a reasonable perception by the electorate that SVP's present a substantially greater danger to society than do MDO's or NGI's, and therefore the disparate treatment of SVP's under the Act is necessary to further the People's compelling 5 interests of public safety and humane treatment of the mentally disordered." (Id. at pp. 1330-1331.)3 Due Process Challenge to the SVPA Rubalcav 2013(McKee II, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at p. 1330 , see id. at p. 1332.) On appeal, the reviewing court reached the same conclusion: "[T]he trial court correctly found the People presented substantial evidence to support a reasonable perception by the electorate that SVP's present a substantially greater danger to society than do MDO's or NGI's, and therefore the disparate treatment of SVP's under the Act is necessary to further the People's compelling interests of public safety and humane treatment of the mentally disordered." (Id. at pp. 1330-1331.) 2 B.	1	4
People v. Landlords Professional Services, Inc.green calctapp · 1986 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011 2 sentences 2011(In re Marriage of Fong (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 278, 294 [ 123 Cal.Rptr.3d 260 ] [references to “trial” in § 632 suggest that a statement of decision is required only “in the event of a trial, as that term is commonly understood”]; see Lien v. Lucky United Properties Investment, Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 620, 624 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.3d 707 ] (Lien) [general rule is that a statement of decision is not required for an order on a motion].) Indeed, section 632 has been held inapplicable even where the motion involved an extensive evidentiary hearing (People v. Landlords Professional Services, Inc. (198 2011Proc., former § 632 required findings of fact “only upon issues joined by the pleadings under section 590 of the Code of Civil Procedure, where the decision of the court following the.findings is a judgment”].) Accordingly, courts have held that a statement of decision ordinarily is not required in connection with a ruling on a motion (Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1294 [ 240 Cal.Rptr. 872 , 743 P.2d 932 ] ; 10 Mechanical Contractors Assn. v. Greater Bay Area Assn. (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 672, 678 [ 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 225 ]), even if the motion involves an extensive evidentiary hearing (P	1	2
People v. McPetersred cal · 1992 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015 1 sentence 2015(See McPeters, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1175 [relying on the determination “[i]mplicit in the [trial] court’s findings and remarks” in considering whether there was juror misconduct].) Further, a trial court is “presumed to have applied the law correctly in the absence of a clear indication to the contrary.” (People v. Fuhrman (1997) 16 Cal.4th 930, 944 .) After an extensive evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that Juror 17’s omission to disclose the restraining orders was a “critical” omission; it was “relevant information” and “material information that should have been disclosed.” The	1	1
Mech. Contractors Ass'n of N. Cal. v. Greater Bay Area Ass'n of Plumbing & Mech. Contractorsgreen calctapp · 1998 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011 2 sentences 2011Proc., former § 632 required findings of fact “only upon issues joined by the pleadings under section 590 of the Code of Civil Procedure, where the decision of the court following the.findings is a judgment”].) Accordingly, courts have held that a statement of decision ordinarily is not required in connection with a ruling on a motion (Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1294 [ 240 Cal.Rptr. 872 , 743 P.2d 932 ] ; 10 Mechanical Contractors Assn. v. Greater Bay Area Assn. (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 672, 678 [ 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 225 ]), even if the motion involves an extensive evidentiary hearing (P 2011Proc., former § 632 required findings of fact “only upon issues joined by the pleadings under section 590 of the Code of Civil Procedure, where the decision of the court following the.findings is a judgment”].) Accordingly, courts have held that a statement of decision ordinarily is not required in connection with a ruling on a motion (Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1294 [ 240 Cal.Rptr. 872 , 743 P.2d 932 ] ; 10 Mechanical Contractors Assn. v. Greater Bay Area Assn. (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 672, 678 [ 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 225 ]), even if the motion involves an extensive evidentiary hearing (P	1	1
Simmons v. Simmonsgreen calctapp · 1975 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011 2 sentences 2011Proc., former § 632 required findings of fact “only upon issues joined by the pleadings under section 590 of the Code of Civil Procedure, where the decision of the court following the.findings is a judgment”].) Accordingly, courts have held that a statement of decision ordinarily is not required in connection with a ruling on a motion (Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1294 [ 240 Cal.Rptr. 872 , 743 P.2d 932 ] ; 10 Mechanical Contractors Assn. v. Greater Bay Area Assn. (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 672, 678 [ 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 225 ]), even if the motion involves an extensive evidentiary hearing (P 2011Proc., former § 632 required findings of fact “only upon issues joined by the pleadings under section 590 of the Code of Civil Procedure, where the decision of the court following the.findings is a judgment”].) Accordingly, courts have held that a statement of decision ordinarily is not required in connection with a ruling on a motion (Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1294 [ 240 Cal.Rptr. 872 , 743 P.2d 932 ] ; 10 Mechanical Contractors Assn. v. Greater Bay Area Assn. (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 672, 678 [ 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 225 ]), even if the motion involves an extensive evidentiary hearing (P	1	1
Maria P. v. Rilesgreen cal · 1987 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011 2 sentences 2011Proc., former § 632 required findings of fact “only upon issues joined by the pleadings under section 590 of the Code of Civil Procedure, where the decision of the court following the.findings is a judgment”].) Accordingly, courts have held that a statement of decision ordinarily is not required in connection with a ruling on a motion (Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1294 [ 240 Cal.Rptr. 872 , 743 P.2d 932 ] ; 10 Mechanical Contractors Assn. v. Greater Bay Area Assn. (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 672, 678 [ 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 225 ]), even if the motion involves an extensive evidentiary hearing (P 2011Proc., former § 632 required findings of fact “only upon issues joined by the pleadings under section 590 of the Code of Civil Procedure, where the decision of the court following the.findings is a judgment”].) Accordingly, courts have held that a statement of decision ordinarily is not required in connection with a ruling on a motion (Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1294 [ 240 Cal.Rptr. 872 , 743 P.2d 932 ] ; 10 Mechanical Contractors Assn. v. Greater Bay Area Assn. (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 672, 678 [ 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 225 ]), even if the motion involves an extensive evidentiary hearing (P	1	1
Askmo v. Askmogreen calctapp · 2000 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011 2 sentences 2011(In re Marriage of Fong (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 278, 294 [ 123 Cal.Rptr.3d 260 ] [references to “trial” in § 632 suggest that a statement of decision is required only “in the event of a trial, as that term is commonly understood”]; see Lien v. Lucky United Properties Investment, Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 620, 624 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.3d 707 ] (Lien) [general rule is that a statement of decision is not required for an order on a motion].) Indeed, section 632 has been held inapplicable even where the motion involved an extensive evidentiary hearing (People v. Landlords Professional Services, Inc. (198 2011(In re Marriage of Fong (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 278, 294 [ 123 Cal.Rptr.3d 260 ] [references to “trial” in § 632 suggest that a statement of decision is required only “in the event of a trial, as that term is commonly understood”]; see Lien v. Lucky United Properties Investment, Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 620, 624 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.3d 707 ] (Lien) [general rule is that a statement of decision is not required for an order on a motion].) Indeed, section 632 has been held inapplicable even where the motion involved an extensive evidentiary hearing (People v. Landlords Professional Services, Inc. (198	1	1
Hovey v. Superior Courtred cal · 1980 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1984–1984 2 sentences 1984(See Hovey v. Superior Court (1980) 28 Cal.3d 1, 8 [ 168 Cal.Rptr. 128 , 616 P.2d 1301 ].) Jury selection commenced and was completed on December 3, 1979. 1984(See Hovey v. Superior Court (1980) 28 Cal.3d 1, 8 [ 168 Cal.Rptr. 128 , 616 P.2d 1301 ].) Jury selection commenced and was completed on December 3, 1979.	1	1
People v. Richardsgreen cal · 1976 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1982–1982 1 sentence 1982In Lent the Supreme Court upheld the restitution condition because the trial court had held an extensive evidentiary hearing which supported its conclusion that the defendant had displayed the same type of dishonesty regarding the disposition of the funds ordered repaid to the victim as he had in the proven theft. ( 15 Cal.3d at p. 487 ; see also Richards, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 625 .) In Richards the Supreme Court reversed the restitution condition, because the trial court had not held a probation hearing where facts supporting the order were shown, and had made no findings showing that the r	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (17)

Case	Cited	Years
Thompson v. Asimos green calctapp · 2016 2 sentences 2019There was no trial in this case, and "courts have held that a statement of decision [under Code of Civil Procedure section 632 ] ordinarily is not required in connection with a ruling on a motion [citations], even if the motion involves an extensive evidentiary hearing." ( In re Marriage of Fong (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 278 , 294, 123 Cal.Rptr.3d 260 , fn. omitted.) Even assuming the importance of the issues at stake might have entitled her to such a statement ( Lien v. Lucky United Properties Investment, Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 620 , 624, 77 Cal.Rptr.3d 707 ), there is no indication in the 2019There was no trial in this case, and "courts have held that a statement of decision [under Code of Civil Procedure section 632 ] ordinarily is not required in connection with a ruling on a motion [citations], even if the motion involves an extensive evidentiary hearing." ( In re Marriage of Fong (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 278 , 294, 123 Cal.Rptr.3d 260 , fn. omitted.) Even assuming the importance of the issues at stake might have entitled her to such a statement ( Lien v. Lucky United Properties Investment, Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 620 , 624, 77 Cal.Rptr.3d 707 ), there is no indication in the	3	2019–2019
Hollywood v. Superior Court green cal · 2008 1 sentence 2023(Ibid.) Following an extensive evidentiary hearing, the trial court found the prosecutor’s disclosure of confidential documents was not intentional and at most negligent. ( Hollywood, supra, 43 Cal.4th at pp. 726, 730.) In denying the recusal motion, it reasoned that even if the prosecutor had committed a legal or ethical breach, it did not create a conflict that would deprive the defendant of a fair trial.	1	2023–2023
People v. Seaton green cal · 2001 1 sentence 2015However, “[t]he specific procedures to follow in investigating an allegation of juror misconduct are generally a matter for the trial court’s discretion. [Citation.]” (People v. Seaton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 598, 676 .) This case is very similar to People v. Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 622 , where Juror J. telephoned the trial court one morning very upset because she “had observed two female spectators in the courtroom, who she believed were ‘aligned’ with the defense, apparently speaking of the jurors and pointing at several of them.	1	2015–2015
In Re Hitchings green cal · 1997 1 sentence 2015(In re Hitchings (1993) 6 Cal.4th 97, 118 .) 3 Stallworth argues any objection would have been futile because the trial court told defense counsel, “You don’t have a say in the matter, Mr. Dumas.” This obviously was said rhetorically, as the trial court in its next breath allowed Dumas to question Juror No. 2. 7 was an inadequate substitute for a more extensive evidentiary hearing.	1	2015–2015
People v. Fuhrman green cal · 1997 1 sentence 2015(See McPeters, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1175 [relying on the determination “[i]mplicit in the [trial] court’s findings and remarks” in considering whether there was juror misconduct].) Further, a trial court is “presumed to have applied the law correctly in the absence of a clear indication to the contrary.” (People v. Fuhrman (1997) 16 Cal.4th 930, 944 .) After an extensive evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that Juror 17’s omission to disclose the restraining orders was a “critical” omission; it was “relevant information” and “material information that should have been disclosed.” The	1	2015–2015
People v. Hedgecock green cal · 1990 1 sentence 2015Citing People v. Hedgecock (1990) 51 Cal.3d 395 , Stallworth asserts an evidentiary hearing was warranted to resolve “the questions raised by the [discrepancy between the] bailiff’s report and Juror No. 2’s answers.” Stallworth complains that simply inviting other jurors to voluntarily come forward, if they had also been affected, “was inadequate to resolve whether appellant’s jury was infected by one or more jurors who may have committed misconduct by . . . conversing among themselves regarding a defendant or formed or expressed an opinion before jury deliberations.” However, holding a more e	1	2015–2015
People v. Fuiava green cal · 2012 1 sentence 2015However, “[t]he specific procedures to follow in investigating an allegation of juror misconduct are generally a matter for the trial court’s discretion. [Citation.]” (People v. Seaton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 598, 676 .) This case is very similar to People v. Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 622 , where Juror J. telephoned the trial court one morning very upset because she “had observed two female spectators in the courtroom, who she believed were ‘aligned’ with the defense, apparently speaking of the jurors and pointing at several of them.	1	2015–2015
People v. Verdugo green cal · 2010 1 sentence 2014(Verdugo, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 306 .) There was an extensive evidentiary hearing, at which Tucker confirmed she had written the letters, but said she was never romantically involved with the detective.	1	2014–2014
Gruendl v. Oewel Partnership, Inc. green calctapp · 1997 2 sentences 2011Proc., former § 632 required findings of fact “only upon issues joined by the pleadings under section 590 of the Code of Civil Procedure, where the decision of the court following the.findings is a judgment”].) Accordingly, courts have held that a statement of decision ordinarily is not required in connection with a ruling on a motion (Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1294 [ 240 Cal.Rptr. 872 , 743 P.2d 932 ] ; 10 Mechanical Contractors Assn. v. Greater Bay Area Assn. (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 672, 678 [ 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 225 ]), even if the motion involves an extensive evidentiary hearing (P 2011Proc., former § 632 required findings of fact “only upon issues joined by the pleadings under section 590 of the Code of Civil Procedure, where the decision of the court following the.findings is a judgment”].) Accordingly, courts have held that a statement of decision ordinarily is not required in connection with a ruling on a motion (Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1294 [ 240 Cal.Rptr. 872 , 743 P.2d 932 ] ; 10 Mechanical Contractors Assn. v. Greater Bay Area Assn. (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 672, 678 [ 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 225 ]), even if the motion involves an extensive evidentiary hearing (P	1	2011–2011
Idaho v. Wright green scotus · 1990 2 sentences 2001He argued that section 1360, “on its face, is at odds with the Confrontation Clause, as interpreted by our High Court” in Idaho v. Wright (1990) 497 U.S. 805 [ 110 S.Ct. 3139 , 111 L.Ed.2d 638 ], and that the victim’s statements “are not reliable, based upon analysis of relevant factors identified by the Supreme Court” in that decision. 1 The motions were the subject of an extensive evidentiary hearing. 2001He argued that section 1360, “on its face, is at odds with the Confrontation Clause, as interpreted by our High Court” in Idaho v. Wright (1990) 497 U.S. 805 [ 110 S.Ct. 3139 , 111 L.Ed.2d 638 ], and that the victim’s statements “are not reliable, based upon analysis of relevant factors identified by the Supreme Court” in that decision. 1 The motions were the subject of an extensive evidentiary hearing.	1	2001–2001
Broussard v. Regents of the University of California neutral calctapp · 1982 2 sentences 1996Proc., § 1094.5). 23 In sum, “the extensive evidentiary hearing[s] provided the necessary due process safeguards.” (Broussard v. Regents of University of 298 California, supra, 131 Cal.App.3d at p. 642 .) Sworn testimony was not required. 1996*The lack of an oath in this case did not make this otherwise extensive evidentiary hearing fundamentally unfair or Constitutionally infirm.” (462 F.Supp. at pp. 334-335.) In other words, “the trial court [in Potemra] concluded that, notwithstanding plaintiff’s property interest in his faculty position and the minor administrative burden to administer an oath, the extensive evidentiary hearing provided the necessary due process safeguards.” (Broussard v. Regents of University of California, supra, 131 Cal.App.3d at p. 642 , construing Potemra.) As the federal district court recognized in Baker	1	1996–1996
Baker v. City of Detroit green mied · 1979 2 sentences 1996The lack of an oath in this case did not make this otherwise extensive evidentiary hearing fundamentally unfair or Constitutionally infirm.” (462 F.Supp. at pp. 334-335.) In other words, “the trial court [in Potemra] concluded that, notwithstanding plaintiff’s property interest in his faculty position and the minor administrative burden to administer an oath, the extensive evidentiary hearing provided the necessary due process safeguards.” (Broussard v. Regents of University of California, supra, 131 Cal.App.3d at p. 642 , construing Potemra.) As the federal district court recognized in Baker 1996The lack of an oath in this case did not make this otherwise extensive evidentiary hearing fundamentally unfair or Constitutionally infirm.” (462 F.Supp. at pp. 334-335.) In other words, “the trial court [in Potemra] concluded that, notwithstanding plaintiff’s property interest in his faculty position and the minor administrative burden to administer an oath, the extensive evidentiary hearing provided the necessary due process safeguards.” (Broussard v. Regents of University of California, supra, 131 Cal.App.3d at p. 642 , construing Potemra.) As the federal district court recognized in Baker	1	1996–1996
cluster 379026 green ca9 · 1980 1 sentence 1987Com’n. v. Wencke (9th Cir. 1980) 622 F.2d 1363 .) Once the matter was returned to the district court, a federal magistrate acting as a special master conducted an extensive evidentiary hearing on Superior’s renewed application for relief from the stay.	1	1987–1987
People v. Lent green cal · 1975 1 sentence 1982In Lent the Supreme Court upheld the restitution condition because the trial court had held an extensive evidentiary hearing which supported its conclusion that the defendant had displayed the same type of dishonesty regarding the disposition of the funds ordered repaid to the victim as he had in the proven theft. ( 15 Cal.3d at p. 487 ; see also Richards, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 625 .) In Richards the Supreme Court reversed the restitution condition, because the trial court had not held a probation hearing where facts supporting the order were shown, and had made no findings showing that the r	1	1982–1982
Potemra v. Ping green ohsd · 1978 1 sentence 1982(Potemra v. Ping, supra, 462 F.Supp. at pp. 332-335.) The court reasoned that few facts were “hotly contested,” that the central concern was whether plaintiff’s conduct was professionally acceptable, and that the witnesses had no motivation to be untruthful. {Id., at p. 335.) Based upon the foregoing analysis, we conclude that appellant received all necessary procedural safeguards.	1	1982–1982
In Re Kirschke green calctapp · 1975 2 sentences 1976After an extensive evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the petition, the Court of Appeal unanimously concurred (In re Kirschke (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 405 [ 125 Cal.Rptr. 680 ]), and we again denied a hearing. 1976After an extensive evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the petition, the Court of Appeal unanimously concurred (In re Kirschke (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 405 [ 125 Cal.Rptr. 680 ]), and we again denied a hearing.	1	1976–1976
People v. McCuiston green calctapp · 1966 1 sentence 1975Appellant maintains that the court did not exercise its power pursuant to section 3051 of the Welfare and Institutions Code to order commitment in unusual cases even though the defendant otherwise may be ineligible for commitment because he stands convicted of one of the crimes enumerated in section 3052 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. *568 The same argument was rejected by the appellate court in People v. McCuiston, supra, 246 Cal. App.2d 799, 805-806 .	1	1975–1975

Statutes the citing opinions construe

CA § Cal. Business and Professions Code § 17200 (3) CA § Cal. Evidence Code § 664 (3) USC § 18u.s.c.1151 (3) USC § 18u.s.c.1162 (3) USC § 28u.s.c.1360 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

CA 24 (1975–2023) FL 6 (1993–2026) MI 5 (2018–2023) IL 3 (1976–2023) AZ 2 (2016–2020) DC 2 (1989–1991) TX 2 (2004–2016) WA 2 (2009–2009) MD 2 (2017–2017) NH 2 (1979–2013) NY 2 (2002–2026)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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