24 California opinions name it 2 courts 1975–2025 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
CPS v. TIG Specialty Ins. Co.green2 sentences2021Co (2002) 29 Cal.4th 189, 195, 198 .) As noted above, the Mims suggest the equitable doctrine of setoff is, for all intents and purposes, identical to statutory setoff, except that it is not limited to use by defendants. 2021Co. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 189, 195 (Construction Protective Services).) The affirmative defense of setoff is codified at Code of Civil Procedure 4 section 431.70 (section 431.70), which does not give rise to recovery of affirmative relief: “Significantly, nothing in the legislative history of section 431.70 suggests the Legislature intended to permit defendants to obtain affirmative relief (that is, relief beyond defeating the plaintiff’s claims) without filing a cross-complaint.” (Construction Protective Services, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 197 .) The California Supreme Court, in interpreting sectio | 3 | 5 |
Griffith v. Pajaro Valley Water Management Agencygreen2 sentences2025(Coziahr, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 830, fn. 23; Griffith, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 601 [there may be more than one method of apportioning costs of service under Proposition 218].) 103 sued and has a “cross-demand[] for money” against the plaintiff to “assert in the answer the defense of payment.” ’ ” (Coziahr, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. at p. 828.) Coziahr rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that “the right to offset applies when the parties have ‘mutual debts and credits’ and ‘may assert cross-demands for money,’ summarizing offset principles from Granberry and elsewhere.” (Coziahr, s 2025(Coziahr, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 830, fn. 23; Griffith, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 601 [there may be more than one method of apportioning costs of service under Proposition 218].) 103 sued and has a “cross-demand[] for money” against the plaintiff to “assert in the answer the defense of payment.” ’ ” (Coziahr, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. at p. 828.) Coziahr rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that “the right to offset applies when the parties have ‘mutual debts and credits’ and ‘may assert cross-demands for money,’ summarizing offset principles from Granberry and elsewhere.” (Coziahr, s | 2 | 2 |
Granberry v. Islay Investmentsgreen2 sentences2025The refund award in Coziahr, like the refund award here, “considered both undercharges and overcharges, to assess net damages.” (Coziahr, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 829.) Like Class here, the plaintiffs in Coziahr claimed the undercharges were “an unpled offset without legal or equitable justification.” (Id. at p. 827.) In rejecting the plaintiffs’ setoff claim, Coziahr began by noting that “[s]etoff is a defense ‘founded on the equitable principle that “either party to a transaction involving mutual debts and credits can strike a balance, holding himself owing or entitled only to the net di 2025The refund award in Coziahr, like the refund award here, “considered both undercharges and overcharges, to assess net damages.” (Coziahr, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 829.) Like Class here, the plaintiffs in Coziahr claimed the undercharges were “an unpled offset without legal or equitable justification.” (Id. at p. 827.) In rejecting the plaintiffs’ setoff claim, Coziahr began by noting that “[s]etoff is a defense ‘founded on the equitable principle that “either party to a transaction involving mutual debts and credits can strike a balance, holding himself owing or entitled only to the net di | 2 | 2 |
Fullington v. Equilon Enterprisesgreen2 sentences2020(See Fullington v. Equilon Enterprises, LLC (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 667, 685-687 [even where a party’s award of compensatory damages is completely offset, the requirement of actual damages as prerequisite for punitive damages is satisfied]; see also McMillin Companies, LLC v. American Safety Indemnity Co. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 518, 534-535 [equitable offset arising from settlement does not affect amount of damages awarded, only right to recover full amount of damages awarded].) In some instances, a defendant’s offset claim may be directly related to and intertwined with the claims asserted in 2020(See Fullington v. Equilon Enterprises, LLC (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 667, 685-687 [even where a party’s award of compensatory damages is completely offset, the requirement of actual damages as prerequisite for punitive damages is satisfied]; see also McMillin Companies, LLC v. American Safety Indemnity Co. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 518, 534-535 [equitable offset arising from settlement does not affect amount of damages awarded, only right to recover full amount of damages awarded].) In some instances, a defendant’s offset claim may be directly related to and intertwined with the claims asserted in | 2 | 2 |
McMillin Companies, LLC v. American Safety Indemnity Co.green2 sentences2020(See Fullington v. Equilon Enterprises, LLC (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 667, 685-687 [even where a party’s award of compensatory damages is completely offset, the requirement of actual damages as prerequisite for punitive damages is satisfied]; see also McMillin Companies, LLC v. American Safety Indemnity Co. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 518, 534-535 [equitable offset arising from settlement does not affect amount of damages awarded, only right to recover full amount of damages awarded].) In some instances, a defendant’s offset claim may be directly related to and intertwined with the claims asserted in 2020(See Fullington v. Equilon Enterprises, LLC (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 667, 685-687 [even where a party’s award of compensatory damages is completely offset, the requirement of actual damages as prerequisite for punitive damages is satisfied]; see also McMillin Companies, LLC v. American Safety Indemnity Co. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 518, 534-535 [equitable offset arising from settlement does not affect amount of damages awarded, only right to recover full amount of damages awarded].) In some instances, a defendant’s offset claim may be directly related to and intertwined with the claims asserted in | 2 | 2 |
Mejia v. Reedgreen2 sentences2007(Mejia v. Reed, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 663.) Proposition 51 can be construed as an implied limitation on the setoff requirement of section 877 only if there is no rational basis on which to harmonize the statutes. 2007It is therefore necessary to harmonize section 877 with Proposition 51, if possible. ( Mejia v. Reed, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 663, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 390 , 74 P.3d 166 .) Proposition 51 can be construed as an implied limitation on the setoff requirement of section 877 only if there is no rational basis on which to harmonize the statutes. ( Garcia v. McCutchen (1997) 16 Cal.4th 469, 476-477 , 66 Cal. Rptr.2d 319 , 940 P.2d 906 .) "`[A]ll presumptions are against a repeal by implication. [Citations.]' [Citation.] Absent an express declaration of legislative intent [or voters' intent], we will find an | 2 | 2 |
Garcia v. McCutchengreen2 sentences2007It is therefore necessary to harmonize section 877 with Proposition 51, if possible. ( Mejia v. Reed, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 663, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 390 , 74 P.3d 166 .) Proposition 51 can be construed as an implied limitation on the setoff requirement of section 877 only if there is no rational basis on which to harmonize the statutes. ( Garcia v. McCutchen (1997) 16 Cal.4th 469, 476-477 , 66 Cal. Rptr.2d 319 , 940 P.2d 906 .) "`[A]ll presumptions are against a repeal by implication. [Citations.]' [Citation.] Absent an express declaration of legislative intent [or voters' intent], we will find an 2007It is therefore necessary to harmonize section 877 with Proposition 51, if possible. ( Mejia v. Reed, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 663, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 390 , 74 P.3d 166 .) Proposition 51 can be construed as an implied limitation on the setoff requirement of section 877 only if there is no rational basis on which to harmonize the statutes. ( Garcia v. McCutchen (1997) 16 Cal.4th 469, 476-477 , 66 Cal. Rptr.2d 319 , 940 P.2d 906 .) "`[A]ll presumptions are against a repeal by implication. [Citations.]' [Citation.] Absent an express declaration of legislative intent [or voters' intent], we will find an | 1 | 2 |
Western Land Office, Inc. v. Cervantesgreen1 sentence2013Co. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 189, 197-198 [“a setoff claim may only be used defensively, being in nature a defensive pleading asserting that the claim constituted prior payment for the amount sought in the plaintiff’s complaint”]; Western Land Office, Inc. v. Cervantes (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 724, 731 [“The burden is on the party alleging an affirmative defense to prove it”].) Thus, the City bore the burden of proving that encroachment permit fees were due on the AT&T boxes. | 1 | 1 |
Abbott Ford, Inc. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2007(Abbott Ford, Inc. v. Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal.3d 858, 871-873 [ 239 Cal.Rptr. 626 , 741 P.2d 124 ].) Section 877 embodies a “strong public policy in favor of encouraging settlement of litigation” by providing incentives to settle to both tortfeasors and injured plaintiffs, in that a settling tortfeasor is discharged from liability for contribution to any other party, while the plaintiff’s award against nonsettling defendants is reduced only by the amount of the settlement rather than by the settling defendant’s pro rata share of liability. 4 (American Motorcycle, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 60 2007(Abbott Ford, Inc. v. Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal.3d 858, 871-873 [ 239 Cal.Rptr. 626 , 741 P.2d 124 ].) Section 877 embodies a “strong public policy in favor of encouraging settlement of litigation” by providing incentives to settle to both tortfeasors and injured plaintiffs, in that a settling tortfeasor is discharged from liability for contribution to any other party, while the plaintiff’s award against nonsettling defendants is reduced only by the amount of the settlement rather than by the settling defendant’s pro rata share of liability. 4 (American Motorcycle, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 60 | 1 | 1 |
Carr v. Covegreen2 sentences2007(Reed v. Wilson (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 439, 444 [ 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 510 ]; McComber v. Wells (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 512, 517 [ 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 376 ]; Carr v. Cove (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 851, 854 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 449 ].) The Supreme Court has explained that the setoff requirement also helps to ensure an equitable apportionment of liability among tortfeasors. 2007(Reed v. Wilson (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 439, 444 [ 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 510 ]; McComber v. Wells (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 512, 517 [ 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 376 ]; Carr v. Cove (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 851, 854 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 449 ].) The Supreme Court has explained that the setoff requirement also helps to ensure an equitable apportionment of liability among tortfeasors. | 1 | 1 |
American Motorcycle Assn. v. Superior Courtgreen1 sentence2007(Abbott Ford, Inc. v. Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal.3d 858, 871-873 [ 239 Cal.Rptr. 626 , 741 P.2d 124 ].) Section 877 embodies a “strong public policy in favor of encouraging settlement of litigation” by providing incentives to settle to both tortfeasors and injured plaintiffs, in that a settling tortfeasor is discharged from liability for contribution to any other party, while the plaintiff’s award against nonsettling defendants is reduced only by the amount of the settlement rather than by the settling defendant’s pro rata share of liability. 4 (American Motorcycle, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 60 | 1 | 1 |
Reed v. Wilsongreen2 sentences2007(Reed v. Wilson (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 439, 444 [ 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 510 ]; McComber v. Wells (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 512, 517 [ 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 376 ]; Carr v. Cove (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 851, 854 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 449 ].) The Supreme Court has explained that the setoff requirement also helps to ensure an equitable apportionment of liability among tortfeasors. 2007(Reed v. Wilson (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 439, 444 [ 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 510 ]; McComber v. Wells (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 512, 517 [ 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 376 ]; Carr v. Cove (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 851, 854 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 449 ].) The Supreme Court has explained that the setoff requirement also helps to ensure an equitable apportionment of liability among tortfeasors. | 1 | 1 |
McComber v. Wellsgreen2 sentences2007(Reed v. Wilson (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 439, 444 [ 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 510 ]; McComber v. Wells (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 512, 517 [ 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 376 ]; Carr v. Cove (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 851, 854 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 449 ].) The Supreme Court has explained that the setoff requirement also helps to ensure an equitable apportionment of liability among tortfeasors. 2007(Reed v. Wilson (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 439, 444 [ 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 510 ]; McComber v. Wells (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 512, 517 [ 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 376 ]; Carr v. Cove (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 851, 854 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 449 ].) The Supreme Court has explained that the setoff requirement also helps to ensure an equitable apportionment of liability among tortfeasors. | 1 | 1 |
Lewis v. Reynoldsgreen2 sentences1995By contrast, in our case, the Board’s setoff claim flows from a complete reassessment of Sprint’s underlying tax liability, which in turn allows the Board to retain any tax payment in its possession “which might have been properly assessed and demanded.” (Lewis, supra, 284 U.S. at p. 283 [ 76 L.Ed. at p. 295 ].) B. 1995By contrast, in our case, the Board’s setoff claim flows from a complete reassessment of Sprint’s underlying tax liability, which in turn allows the Board to retain any tax payment in its possession “which might have been properly assessed and demanded.” (Lewis, supra, 284 U.S. at p. 283 [ 76 L.Ed. at p. 295 ].) B. | 1 | 1 |
Southern California Acoustics Co. v. C. V. Holder, Inc.green2 sentences1987Holder, Inc. (1969) 71 Cal.2d 719, 726, fn. 7 [ 79 Cal.Rptr. 319 , 456 P.2d 975 ].) 9 We reject the contention that Thomason’s conduct was merely a “technical” violation and “not one of the practices that the Act was intended to prevent.” Its conduct was expressly forbidden by sections 4106 and 4107 of the act (see fn. 4, ante) and the assertion to the contrary verges on the frivolous. * See footnote, ante, page 559. 10 Since we have concluded that the setoff defense is without merit we need not consider whether defendants were estopped to assert that defense or whether defendant Industrial In 1987Holder, Inc. (1969) 71 Cal.2d 719, 726, fn. 7 [ 79 Cal.Rptr. 319 , 456 P.2d 975 ].) 9 We reject the contention that Thomason’s conduct was merely a “technical” violation and “not one of the practices that the Act was intended to prevent.” Its conduct was expressly forbidden by sections 4106 and 4107 of the act (see fn. 4, ante) and the assertion to the contrary verges on the frivolous. * See footnote, ante, page 559. 10 Since we have concluded that the setoff defense is without merit we need not consider whether defendants were estopped to assert that defense or whether defendant Industrial In | 1 | 1 |
Hauger v. Gatesgreen2 sentences1975Under the setoff rule, each claimant is deemed paid to the extent that the claims equal each other (Hauger v. Gates, 42 Cal.2d 752, 755 [ 269 P.2d 609 ]) and without the necessity of bringing an action on the claims. 1975Under the setoff rule, each claimant is deemed paid to the extent that the claims equal each other (Hauger v. Gates, 42 Cal.2d 752, 755 [ 269 P.2d 609 ]) and without the necessity of bringing an action on the claims. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Prentice v. North American Title Guaranty Corp.
green
2 sentences2022(See Prentice, supra, 59 Cal.2d at p. 620 .) In support of the Law Corporation’s claim that a Pennsylvania court’s $30,000 sanction order against Dougherty should be set off against the Law Corporation’s judgment debt to Musick Peeler, the Law Corporation submitted an October 4, 2006 order by the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County awarding the Individual and his counsel $30,000 as a contempt sanction against Dougherty. 2022(See Prentice, supra, 59 Cal.2d at p. 620 .) In support of the Law Corporation’s claim that a Pennsylvania court’s $30,000 sanction order against Dougherty should be set off against the Law Corporation’s judgment debt to Musick Peeler, the Law Corporation submitted an October 4, 2006 order by the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County awarding the Individual and his counsel $30,000 as a contempt sanction against Dougherty. | 2 | 2022–2022 |
Hoch v. Allied-Signal, Inc.
green
2 sentences2020The dissenting members of the Lee family felt the entire case should have been resolved and believed their attorney (paid for by their insurance company) and the plaintiff’s attorney had agreed to a deal not in the Lee family’s best interests. 44 purposes of the setoff requirement . . . is to avoid an unjust double recovery”] (conc. opn. of Croskey, Acting P.J.).) “When multiple defendants are responsible for the same compensatory damages, a setoff . . . is required by the fundamental principle that ‘. . . a plaintiff may not recover in excess of the amount of damages which will fully compensa 2007Construed in this manner, the setoff requirement, in my view, would also provide a greater incentive to settlement and help to ensure an equitable apportionment of liability among tortfeasors through the resulting right of equitable indemnity in favor of a settling defendant against a nonsettling defendant. e. Proposition 51 Does Not Preclude a Setoff for the Noneconomic Portion of a Settlement Hoch, supra, 24 Cal.App.4th at page 64, 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 615 also stated that Civil Code section 1431.2, subdivision (a) expressly requires the court to enter a judgment awarding noneconomic damages again | 2 | 2007–2020 |
Jones v. Mortimer
green
2 sentences2002Indeed, section 431.70 expressly refers to the setoff claim as "the defense of payment," and partial payment of Jones's judgment was the logic of our holding in Jones . ( Jones, supra, 28 Cal.2d at p. 633 , 170 P.2d 893 .) One who has paid a liability in full or in part can allege that payment as a defense to a cause of action, but in that case the defendant merely hopes to defeat the plaintiffs complaint. 2002Indeed, section 431.70 expressly refers to the setoff claim as "the defense of payment," and partial payment of Jones's judgment was the logic of our holding in Jones . ( Jones, supra, 28 Cal.2d at p. 633 , 170 P.2d 893 .) One who has paid a liability in full or in part can allege that payment as a defense to a cause of action, but in that case the defendant merely hopes to defeat the plaintiffs complaint. | 2 | 2002–2002 |
Foster-Gardner, Inc. v. National Union Fire Insurance
green
2 sentences2002TIG Insurance argues that a setoff claim asserted in an answer is not a suit seeking damages, and it relies on our literal interpretation of the word "suit" in Foster-Gardner, supra, 18 Cal.4th at page 887 , 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 107 , 959 P.2d 265 , where we stated that a "suit" is a "court proceeding initiated by the filing of a complaint. " (Italics added.) TIG Insurance also points out that the insurance policy at issue here requires it to defend CPS in a "suit seeking ... damages. " (Italics added.) TIG Insurance argues that SHC's setoff claim is not a "suit seeking ... damages," because, contra 2002TIG Insurance argues that a setoff claim asserted in an answer is not a suit seeking damages, and it relies on our literal interpretation of the word "suit" in Foster-Gardner, supra, 18 Cal.4th at page 887 , 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 107 , 959 P.2d 265 , where we stated that a "suit" is a "court proceeding initiated by the filing of a complaint. " (Italics added.) TIG Insurance also points out that the insurance policy at issue here requires it to defend CPS in a "suit seeking ... damages. " (Italics added.) TIG Insurance argues that SHC's setoff claim is not a "suit seeking ... damages," because, contra | 2 | 2002–2002 |
Prudential Reinsurance Co. v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1995The Supreme Court rejected this contention, stating: “The key to setoff is the requirement of mutuality. . . . ‘To be mutual, [the debts] must be due to and from the same persons in the same capacity.’ ” ( 3 Cal.4th at p. 1127 , bracketed material in Prudential Reinsurance.) The high court continued: “[T]he Court of Appeal limited application of the setoff doctrine to true contractual debtor-creditor relationships between principal insurers. 1995Accordingly, we refuse to expand the section 1031 setoff of debts in the absence of express mutual agreement that the subsidiary would be deemed a mutual debtor-creditor of the parent. [Citations.] We conclude that such an unwarranted expansion of the setoff doctrine would permit an exponential increase in the amount subsidiaries could set off to the detriment of liquidation estates.” ( 3 Cal.4th at p. 1137 , italics added.) Thus, the high court rejected Prudential’s setoff claim, in part because the debts it sought to offset involved different Mission entities. | 2 | 1995–1995 |
Jaramillo v. State of California
green
1 sentence2020The dissenting members of the Lee family felt the entire case should have been resolved and believed their attorney (paid for by their insurance company) and the plaintiff’s attorney had agreed to a deal not in the Lee family’s best interests. 44 purposes of the setoff requirement . . . is to avoid an unjust double recovery”] (conc. opn. of Croskey, Acting P.J.).) “When multiple defendants are responsible for the same compensatory damages, a setoff . . . is required by the fundamental principle that ‘. . . a plaintiff may not recover in excess of the amount of damages which will fully compensa | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Wash. Mut. Bank v. Superior Court of Orange Cty.
green
1 sentence2014(Id. at p. 749.) In rejecting the plaintiffs’ argument that these difficulties should bar the landlord from raising the setoff defense, we stressed that “it is inappropriate to deprive defendants of their substantive rights merely because those rights are inconvenient in light of the litigation posture plaintiffs have chosen.” (Ibid.) We voiced similar concerns in Washington Mutual, supra, 24 Cal.4th 906 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Redevelopment Agency v. Salvation Army
green
2 sentences2004As we have already discussed, Block is not liable for any money expenditure; the underlying case involved only a determination of the fair market value of the property. 10 Also unavailing is Block’s reliance on Redevelopment Agency v. Salvation Army (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 755 [ 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 30 ] (Salvation Army), for the proposition that the estimated remediation costs constituted damages because the agency could have sued Block to clean up the property.* 11 The issue in that case was whether the redevelopment agency had satisfied the legal requirements for recovery of the costs it actually 2004As we have already discussed, Block is not liable for any money expenditure; the underlying case involved only a determination of the fair market value of the property. 10 Also unavailing is Block’s reliance on Redevelopment Agency v. Salvation Army (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 755 [ 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 30 ] (Salvation Army), for the proposition that the estimated remediation costs constituted damages because the agency could have sued Block to clean up the property.* 11 The issue in that case was whether the redevelopment agency had satisfied the legal requirements for recovery of the costs it actually | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Black & Decker Mfg Co. v. Union Trust Co.
green
2 sentences1992Co. v. Union Trust Co. (1936) 53 OhioApp. 356 [ 4 N.E.2d 929 ].) We conclude that such an unwarranted expansion of the setoff doctrine would permit an exponential increase in the amount subsidiaries could set off to the detriment of liquidation estates. 1992Co. v. Union Trust Co. (1936) 53 OhioApp. 356 [ 4 N.E.2d 929 ].) We conclude that such an unwarranted expansion of the setoff doctrine would permit an exponential increase in the amount subsidiaries could set off to the detriment of liquidation estates. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
McKean v. German-American Savings Bank
green
2 sentences1990Applying the rule of McKean, supra, 118 Cal. 334 , and its progeny, the court held the setoff was a violation of section 726. 1990Applying the rule of McKean, supra, 118 Cal. 334 , and its progeny, the court held the setoff was a violation of section 726. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Stuyvesant Ins. Co. v. Bournazian
green
2 sentences1979Co. v. Bournazian (Fla. 1977) 342 So.2d 471 , the court concluded that while a setoff rule could properly be applied "between injured parties liable to each other in order to avoid an unnecessary exchange of checks and the possibility of inequitable judgment executions," the setoff concept "should have no effect on the contractual obligation of liability insurance carriers to pay the amounts for which their insureds are legally responsible." ( Id., at p. 473.) Although the insurer in Stuyvesant, like the numerous amici in the instant case, argued that its obligation under its insurance policy 1979Co. v. Bournazian (Fla. 1977) 342 So.2d 471 , the court concluded that while a setoff rule could properly be applied “between injured parties liable to each other in order to avoid an unnecessary exchange of checks and the possibility of inequitable judgment executions,” the setoff concept “should have no effect on the contractual obligation of liability insurance carriers to pay the amounts for which their insureds are legally responsible.” (Id., at p. 473.) Although the insurer in Stuyyesant, like the numerous amici in the instant case, argued that its obligation under its insurance policy s | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.