setoff clause in Illinois

2023The court held that the setoff did not apply to medical expenses paid by the City to a firefighter because the language “would not convey to the average, ordinary, normal, reasonable person an intention to include our pension statute within the setoff clause of the policy.” Id. at 395 .

2023The court held that the setoff did not apply to medical expenses paid by the City to a firefighter because the language “would not convey to the average, ordinary, normal, reasonable person an intention to include our pension statute within -6- No. 1-22-1057 the setoff clause of the policy.” Id. at 395 .

1991App. 3d 136 , in support of its allegation that its set-off and subrogation provisions are enforceable; but although Schutt allowed the insurance company to set off uninsured motorist coverage against bodily injury liability coverage, the court noted “that the setoff clause only acts to prevent double recovery in accordance with principles of Illinois law on damages and does not prejudice a plaintiff who has sustained injuries as a result of the negligence of an uninsured motorist.” ( 135 Ill.

1991On appeal, the reviewing court affirmed the trial court’s decision as to setoff on the ground that, “Since plaintiff has already received [the sum awarded by the arbitrators], the application of the setoff clause did not deprive him of any damages and fairly awarded him only that to which he is entitled.” ( 135 Ill.

2005“Where competing reasonable interpretations of a policy exist, a court is not permitted to choose which interpretation it will follow. *** Rather, in such circumstances, the court must construe the policy in favor of the insured and against the insurer that drafted the policy.” Employers Insurance of Wausau, 186 Ill. 2d at 141 .

2005“Where competing reasonable interpretations of a policy exist, a court is not permitted to choose which interpretation it will follow. *** Rather, in such circumstances, the court must construe the policy in favor of the insured and against the insurer that drafted the policy.” Employers Insurance of Wausau , 186 Ill. 2d at 141 .

2005That is, the setoff clause placed the officer in a worse position than the officer would have occupied had the wrongful driver maintained the minimum liability coverage. 109 Ill.

2005That is, the setoff clause placed the officer in a worse position than the officer would have occupied had the wrongful driver maintained the minimum liability coverage. 109 Ill.

1995To adopt the familiar definition of a setoff, it was "a counterdemand interposed by a defendant against a plaintiff in a lawsuit, arising out of a transaction extrinsic to plaintiff's cause of action." ( Bank of Chicago, 237 Ill.App.3d at 1091 , 179 Ill.Dec. 240 , 606 N.E.2d 72 , citing, e.g., Peterson v. Iris Theatre Co. (1920), 218 Ill.App. 416, 420 ; Luther v. Mathis (1918), 211 Ill.App. 596, 601 ; see also Black's Law Dictionary 1372 (6th Ed.1990).) Thus, we find no error in the trial court's decision to allow defendant to assert a setoff defense.

1995To adopt the familiar definition of a setoff, it was "a counterdemand interposed by a defendant against a plaintiff in a lawsuit, arising out of a transaction extrinsic to plaintiff's cause of action." ( Bank of Chicago, 237 Ill.App.3d at 1091 , 179 Ill.Dec. 240 , 606 N.E.2d 72 , citing, e.g., Peterson v. Iris Theatre Co. (1920), 218 Ill.App. 416, 420 ; Luther v. Mathis (1918), 211 Ill.App. 596, 601 ; see also Black's Law Dictionary 1372 (6th Ed.1990).) Thus, we find no error in the trial court's decision to allow defendant to assert a setoff defense.

2005The State Farm policy issued to Stewart contained a setoff clause identical to the one at issue here, permitting State Farm to reduce uninsured-motorist benefits by the amount of benefits the insured received “ ‘under any worker’s compensation, disability benefits, or similar law.’ ” Murphy, 263 Ill.

2005The State Farm policy issued to Stewart contained a setoff clause identical to the one at issue here, permitting State Farm to reduce uninsured-motorist benefits by the amount of benefits the insured received “ ‘under any worker’s compensation, disability benefits, or similar law.’ ” Murphy , 263 Ill.

2016Id. ¶ 19 Kentucky Joint Stock was decided in a foreign jurisdiction nearly 80 years ago, but its rationale remains compelling and consistent with the setoff doctrine in Illinois today.

1995To adopt the familiar definition of a setoff, it was "a counterdemand interposed by a defendant against a plaintiff in a lawsuit, arising out of a transaction extrinsic to plaintiff's cause of action." ( Bank of Chicago, 237 Ill.App.3d at 1091 , 179 Ill.Dec. 240 , 606 N.E.2d 72 , citing, e.g., Peterson v. Iris Theatre Co. (1920), 218 Ill.App. 416, 420 ; Luther v. Mathis (1918), 211 Ill.App. 596, 601 ; see also Black's Law Dictionary 1372 (6th Ed.1990).) Thus, we find no error in the trial court's decision to allow defendant to assert a setoff defense.

1995To adopt the familiar definition of a setoff, it was "a counterdemand interposed by a defendant against a plaintiff in a lawsuit, arising out of a transaction extrinsic to plaintiff's cause of action." ( Bank of Chicago, 237 Ill.App.3d at 1091 , 179 Ill.Dec. 240 , 606 N.E.2d 72 , citing, e.g., Peterson v. Iris Theatre Co. (1920), 218 Ill.App. 416, 420 ; Luther v. Mathis (1918), 211 Ill.App. 596, 601 ; see also Black's Law Dictionary 1372 (6th Ed.1990).) Thus, we find no error in the trial court's decision to allow defendant to assert a setoff defense.

1994App. 3d 118 , 625 N.E.2d 336 , that indicates that a setoff claim must be pursued before the arbitrators.

1993State Farm’s policy contained a setoff clause stating that the amounts payable under the uninsured motorist coverage would be reduced "by or for any person or organization who is or may be held legally liable for the bodily injury to the insured.” (Emphasis omitted.) (Hoglund, 148 Ill. 2d at 275 .) Relying on the policy language and section 143a(4) the Illinois Insurance Code (215 ILCS 5/143a (West 1992)), State Farm argued that since plaintiff had already received $100,000 from a legally liable party, it was entitled to reduce its uninsured motorist coverage by $100,000, and that it, therefor

1988App. 3d at 58 .) The court also stated that the bank lost its right to assert a setoff claim. ( 108 Ill.

1985The same analysis and conclusion led to the holdings in Stryker v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 507 , 386 N.E.2d 36 , and Ullman v. Wolverine Insurance Co. (1970), 48 Ill. 2d 1 , 269 N.E.2d 295 , relied on by the trial court, that upheld the deduction of worker’s compensation benefits received from the recovery under the uninsured motorist coverage.

1985The same analysis and conclusion led to the holdings in Stryker v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 507 , 386 N.E.2d 36 , and Ullman v. Wolverine Insurance Co. (1970), 48 Ill. 2d 1 , 269 N.E.2d 295 , relied on by the trial court, that upheld the deduction of worker’s compensation benefits received from the recovery under the uninsured motorist coverage.

1985That provision had a setoff clause, which the Minnesota Supreme Court held to be unenforceable because it would “limit [plaintiff’s] recovery to less than she would have received had the tortfeasor actually been insured, in which event she would not have been required to deduct from that coverage amounts paid by her own liability insurer or paid by other tortfeasors.” 305 Minn. 446, 449 , 234 N.W.2d 590, 591-92 .

1985That provision had a setoff clause, which the Minnesota Supreme Court held to be unenforceable because it would “limit [plaintiff’s] recovery to less than she would have received had the tortfeasor actually been insured, in which event she would not have been required to deduct from that coverage amounts paid by her own liability insurer or paid by other tortfeasors.” 305 Minn. 446, 449 , 234 N.W.2d 590, 591-92 .

1985While the rationale of Taylor comports with the Illinois policy of protecting persons injured by uninsured motorists at least to the same extent as if the tortfeasor had the statutorily minimum amount of insurance (see Severs v. Country Mutual Insurance Co. (1982), 89 Ill. 2d 515, 519 , 434 N.E.2d 290 ), the result here is not controlled by Taylor because we believe that the protection afforded by uninsured motorist insurance is not diminished by the setoff clause.

1985While the rationale of Taylor comports with the Illinois policy of protecting persons injured by uninsured motorists at least to the same extent as if the tortfeasor had the statutorily minimum amount of insurance (see Severs v. Country Mutual Insurance Co. (1982), 89 Ill. 2d 515, 519 , 434 N.E.2d 290 ), the result here is not controlled by Taylor because we believe that the protection afforded by uninsured motorist insurance is not diminished by the setoff clause.

1985The same analysis and conclusion led to the holdings in Stryker v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 507 , 386 N.E.2d 36 , and Ullman v. Wolverine Insurance Co. (1970), 48 Ill. 2d 1 , 269 N.E.2d 295 , relied on by the trial court, that upheld the deduction of worker’s compensation benefits received from the recovery under the uninsured motorist coverage.

1985The same analysis and conclusion led to the holdings in Stryker v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 507 , 386 N.E.2d 36 , and Ullman v. Wolverine Insurance Co. (1970), 48 Ill. 2d 1 , 269 N.E.2d 295 , relied on by the trial court, that upheld the deduction of worker’s compensation benefits received from the recovery under the uninsured motorist coverage.

1980Stat. 1975, ch. 73, par. 755a(l). 2 Although the Wilhelm court invalidated the setoff clause, it also noted that the Insurance Code provides “that the insurer having paid the claim, is entitled to recover, to the extent of such payment, out of the proceeds of any settlement or judgment against any person legally responsible for the injury.” 60 Ill.

1952App. 327 ; Streeter v. Junker, 230 Ill.

1952The surety asserts that the allowance as a setoff of a claim acquired against an insolvent prior to the insolvency proceeding is generally recognized in all jurisdictions ; that the receiver takes the estate of the insolvent as he finds it and succeeds only to such rights and is burdened with such obligations as the insolvent had at the time of his appointment; that the allowance of such a setoff does not affect an unlawful preference; that the claims alleged in the complaint and in the amended counterclaim both arose prior to the closing of the currency exchange and plaintiff’s appointment as

1952The surety asserts that the allowance as a setoff of a claim acquired against an insolvent prior to the insolvency proceeding is generally recognized in all jurisdictions ; that the receiver takes the estate of the insolvent as he finds it and succeeds only to such rights and is burdened with such obligations as the insolvent had at the time of his appointment; that the allowance of such a setoff does not affect an unlawful preference; that the claims alleged in the complaint and in the amended counterclaim both arose prior to the closing of the currency exchange and plaintiff’s appointment as