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24 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1986–2024 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Cox v. Peoplegreen2 sentences2022See Cox v. People, 735 P.2d 153, 155 (Colo. 1987); see also People v. Mersman, 148 P.3d 199, 201 (Colo. App. 2006) (interpreting Cox to mean that the jury may be instructed to “consider a driver’s refusal to take a blood or breath test, along with other evidence, in determining his or her guilt of driving under the influence”). ¶ 40 We also acknowledge that our supreme court has concluded that introducing evidence of a person’s refusal to take a chemical test neither violates a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights nor violates the defendant’s equal protection rights. 2022Cox, 735 P.2d at 155 ; see also, e.g., People v. Mersman, 148 P.3d 199, 201 (Colo. App. 2006) (“[I]t is proper to instruct a jury that it can consider a driver’s refusal to take a blood or breath test, along with other evidence, in determining his or her guilt of driving under the influence.”). | 4 | 6 |
People v. Hydegreen2 sentences2022See Fitzgerald v. People, 2017 CO 26, ¶ 27 (“The prosecution’s use of a defendant’s 23 refusal to consent to a blood or breath test as evidence of guilt, in accordance with the terms of Colorado’s Expressed Consent Statute, does not violate the Fourth Amendment.”); see also People v. Hyde, 2017 CO 24, ¶ 31 (taking a chemical test of an unconscious driver does not violate equal protection because without it the People are “deprived of the evidence they typically rely on in drunk-driving prosecutions,” such as having the defendant “perform roadside maneuvers, display speech or conduct indicative 2021Based on this, “this case does not present a situation in which t he evidentiary use of the driver’s refusal to perform the roadside test s might impermissibly burden a constitutional or statutory right .” Id. at 963; cf. Fitzgerald v. P eople , 2017 CO 26, ¶ 26 (holding that in troducing evidence of a defendant’s “refusal to consent t o a blood or breath test to determine his BAC d[oes] not imper missibly burden his Fourth Amendment right”); People v. Hy de , 2017 CO 24, ¶ 27 (“[T]here is no constitutional right to refuse a blood -alcohol test.”). ¶ 26 Balog contends that courts that have rea | 2 | 5 |
Fitzgerald v. Peoplegreen2 sentences2022See Fitzgerald v. People, 2017 CO 26, ¶ 27 (“The prosecution’s use of a defendant’s 23 refusal to consent to a blood or breath test as evidence of guilt, in accordance with the terms of Colorado’s Expressed Consent Statute, does not violate the Fourth Amendment.”); see also People v. Hyde, 2017 CO 24, ¶ 31 (taking a chemical test of an unconscious driver does not violate equal protection because without it the People are “deprived of the evidence they typically rely on in drunk-driving prosecutions,” such as having the defendant “perform roadside maneuvers, display speech or conduct indicative 2021Based on this, “this case does not present a situation in which t he evidentiary use of the driver’s refusal to perform the roadside test s might impermissibly burden a constitutional or statutory right .” Id. at 963; cf. Fitzgerald v. P eople , 2017 CO 26, ¶ 26 (holding that in troducing evidence of a defendant’s “refusal to consent t o a blood or breath test to determine his BAC d[oes] not imper missibly burden his Fourth Amendment right”); People v. Hy de , 2017 CO 24, ¶ 27 (“[T]here is no constitutional right to refuse a blood -alcohol test.”). ¶ 26 Balog contends that courts that have rea | 2 | 4 |
Brewer v. Motor Vehicle Division, Department of Revenuegreen2 sentences1997See also Brewer, 720 P.2d at 568 (“Therefore, it makes sense to require the same blood or breath test under sections 42-4-1202 and 42-2-122.1 and to require that test to be administered in accordance with the health department rules and regulations.”). 1988We have construed section 42-2-122.1 to require that a blood or breath test “be administered in accordance with the health department rules and regulations.” Brewer v. Motor Vehicle Div., 720 P.2d 564, 568 (Colo.1986). | 2 | 3 |
Augustino v. Colorado Department of Revenuegreen2 sentences2011See also Augustino v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 193 Colo. 273, 276 , 565 P.2d 933, 935 (1977) (explaining that the purpose of mandatory drivers license revocation procedures is to encourage suspected drunk drivers to voluntarily undergo blood alcohol testing and assist in the prosecution of such crimes). 2011See also Augustino v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 193 Colo. 273, 276 , 565 P.2d 933, 935 (1977) (explaining that the purpose of mandatory drivers license revocation procedures is to encourage suspected drunk drivers to voluntarily undergo blood alcohol testing and assist in the prosecution of such crimes). | 2 | 2 |
Rogers v. Charnesgreen2 sentences2006Zahtila v. Motor Vehicle Div., supra ; see also Rogers v. Charnes, 656 P.2d 1322 (Colo. App.1982). 1996See Rogers v. Charnes, 656 P.2d 1322 (Colo.App.1982); Zahtila v. Motor Vehicle Division, supra. By statutory mandate, a driver who consents to and fails a blood or breath test is not subject to an admimstrative revocation unless the test is performed within two hours of the time of driving. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Mersmangreen2 sentences2024That statute provides that any person who drives in Colorado must “ cooperate in the taking and completing of ” testing to determine their blood or breath alcohol 17 content if a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe the person is driving while impaired . § 42 -4-1301.1(2)(a)(I). ¶ 39 If a driver refuses a breath or blood test, evidence that the driver refused the test is admissible in a DUI trial. § 42 -4-1301(6)(d) ; Mersman , 148 P.3d at 2 01 ( “ [I]t is proper to instruct a jury that it can consider a driver’s refusal to t ake a blood or breath test, along with other eviden 2024That statute provides that any person who drives in Colorado must “ cooperate in the taking and completing of ” testing to determine their blood or breath alcohol 17 content if a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe the person is driving while impaired . § 42 -4-1301.1(2)(a)(I). ¶ 39 If a driver refuses a breath or blood test, evidence that the driver refused the test is admissible in a DUI trial. § 42 -4-1301(6)(d) ; Mersman , 148 P.3d at 2 01 ( “ [I]t is proper to instruct a jury that it can consider a driver’s refusal to t ake a blood or breath test, along with other eviden | 1 | 3 |
McGuire v. Peoplegreen1 sentence2021Based on this, “this case does not present a situation in which t he evidentiary use of the driver’s refusal to perform the roadside test s might impermissibly burden a constitutional or statutory right .” Id. at 963; cf. Fitzgerald v. P eople , 2017 CO 26, ¶ 26 (holding that in troducing evidence of a defendant’s “refusal to consent t o a blood or breath test to determine his BAC d[oes] not imper missibly burden his Fourth Amendment right”); People v. Hy de , 2017 CO 24, ¶ 27 (“[T]here is no constitutional right to refuse a blood -alcohol test.”). ¶ 26 Balog contends that courts that have rea | 1 | 1 |
Qwest Services Corp. v. Bloodgreen1 sentence2017To prevail on an as-applied constitutional challenge, the challenging party must “establish that the statute, is unconstitutional ‘under the circumstances in which the plaintiff has acted or proposes to act.’ ” Qwest Servs, Corp, v. Blood, 252 P.3d 1071, 1085 (Colo.2011) (quoting Developmental -Pathways v. Ritter, 178,P.3d 624,..534 (Colo.2008)). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Shinautgreen1 sentence2010Null, 233 P.3d at 682 *584 (dismissal is appropriate where law enforcement failed to provide the defendant with the test he chose, and prosecution failed to demonstrate extraordinary cireumstances justified the failure); cf. Shinaut, 940 P.2d at 383-84 (officer's accommodation of the defendant's request to change the type of test is akin to a technical violation, not a violation of a defendant's rights, and dismissal is not warranted). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Gillettgreen1 sentence1997When the district court here upheld the county court’s suppression ruling, it relied on People v. Gillett, 629 P.2d 613, 619 (Colo.1981) (A trial court has broad discretion to prevent “manifest unfairness in governmental procedures relating to the acquisition and preservation of evidence potentially favorable to an accused.”). | 1 | 1 |
Vigil v. Motor Vehicle Division of Dept. of Revenuegreen2 sentences1987There the driver received no warning of any consequences resulting from refusal to take a blood or breath test, but we held that due process was satisfied by publication of section 42-4-1202(3)(e), 17 C.R.S. (1984), because a licensed driver “is presumed to know the law regarding his use of the public highways.” Id. at 569 ; see Vigil v. Motor Vehicle Division of Dept. of Revenue, 184 Colo. 142, 145 , 519 P.2d 332, 334 (1974). 1987There the driver received no warning of any consequences resulting from refusal to take a blood or breath test, but we held that due process was satisfied by publication of section 42-4-1202(3)(e), 17 C.R.S. (1984), because a licensed driver “is presumed to know the law regarding his use of the public highways.” Id. at 569 ; see Vigil v. Motor Vehicle Division of Dept. of Revenue, 184 Colo. 142, 145 , 519 P.2d 332, 334 (1974). | 1 | 1 |
Aultman v. Motor Vehicle Division, Department of Revenuegreen2 sentences1986See Aultman v. Motor Vehicle Division, Dept. of Revenue, 706 P.2d 5 (Colo.App.1985). 1986See Aultman v. Motor Vehicle Division, Dept. of Revenue, 706 P.2d 5 (Colo.App.1985). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
South Dakota v. Neville
green
2 sentences2017The Court explained that the right to refuse a blood or breath test is distinguishable from other rights because it is not a constitutional right but rather is “simply a matter of grace bestowed by the [state] legislature.” Id. at 565 , 103 S.Ct. 916 . 2017The Court explained that the right to refuse a blood or breath test is distinguishable from other rights because it is not a constitutional right but rather is “simply a matter of grace bestowed by the [state] legislature.” Id. at 565 . | 3 | 1987–2017 |
Griffin v. California
green
2 sentences2017Prohibition Against Penalizing the Exercise of a Constitutional Privilege ¶ 16 Fitzgerald argues that because the Fourth Amendment grants an individual the right to be free from unreasonable searches, and a blood or breath test is a Fourth Amendment search, introducing a defendant’s refusal to consent to a blood or breath test as evidence of guilt amounts to an impermissible penalty on the exercise of his Fourth Amendment right. ¶ 17 Fitzgerald’s argument is rooted in Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 , 85 S.Ct. 1229 , 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965). 2017Prohibition Against Penalizing the Exercise of a Constitutional Privilege ¶16 Fitzgerald argues that because the Fourth Amendment grants an individual the right to be free from unreasonable searches, and a blood or breath test is a Fourth Amendment search, introducing a defendant’s refusal to consent to a blood or breath test as evidence of guilt amounts to an impermissible penalty on the exercise of his Fourth Amendment right. ¶17 Fitzgerald’s argument is rooted in Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
People v. Simpson
green
1 sentence2017Opinions are also posted on the 4 Colorado Bar Association’s homepage at http://www.cobar.org. 5 6 ADVANCE SHEET HEADNOTE 7 April 17, 2017 8 9 2017 CO 25 0 1 No. 15SA330, People v. Simpson—Searches and Seizures—Warrantless Blood 2 Draw—Consent to Search. 3 4 Colorado’s Expressed Consent Statute (“the Statute”), section 42-4-1301.1, C.R.S. 5 (2016), provides that any motorist who drives on the roads of the state has consented to 6 take a blood or breath test when requested to do so by a law enforcement officer with 7 probable cause to suspect the motorist of driving under the influence. 8 In th | 1 | 2017–2017 |
People v. Null
green
1 sentence2010Null, 233 P.3d at 682 *584 (dismissal is appropriate where law enforcement failed to provide the defendant with the test he chose, and prosecution failed to demonstrate extraordinary cireumstances justified the failure); cf. Shinaut, 940 P.2d at 383-84 (officer's accommodation of the defendant's request to change the type of test is akin to a technical violation, not a violation of a defendant's rights, and dismissal is not warranted). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Charnes v. Olona
green
1 sentence1988In order to sustain a driver’s license revocation, § 42-2-122.1(1)(a)(I), C.R.S. (1984 Repl.Vol. 17), in effect at the time, required that a blood or breath test be given “at the time of the commission of the alleged offense or within one hour thereafter.” See Charnes v. Olona, 743 P.2d 36 (Colo.1987); Colorado Division of Revenue v. Lounsbury, 743 P.2d 23 (Colo.1987). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
People v. Greathouse
green
1 sentence1988The question presented is whether the sanction of dismissal of the criminal charge of driving while under the influence of an intoxicating liquor is automatically required under article II, section 25 of the Colorado Constitution when a second sample of a defendant’s blood or breath test is not available for independent testing. *667 Based on our holding in People v. Greathouse, 742 P.2d 334 (Colo.1987), we conclude that it does not. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
People v. Bowers
green
1 sentence1988However, we also held in Brewer that “[e]ven if there was a deficiency in the evidence of compliance with board of health regulations, a question we do not decide, the intoxilyzer test results are not automatically inadmissible.” Id. (emphasis added). 4 *242 We came to the same conclusion in People v. Bowers, 716 P.2d 471 (Colo.1986), where we addressed the admissibility of BAC test results as evidence in a criminal trial, rather than in a revocation hearing. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Colorado Division of Revenue v. Lounsbury
green
1 sentence1988In order to sustain a driver’s license revocation, § 42-2-122.1(1)(a)(I), C.R.S. (1984 Repl.Vol. 17), in effect at the time, required that a blood or breath test be given “at the time of the commission of the alleged offense or within one hour thereafter.” See Charnes v. Olona, 743 P.2d 36 (Colo.1987); Colorado Division of Revenue v. Lounsbury, 743 P.2d 23 (Colo.1987). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
California v. Trombetta
green
2 sentences1988The United States Supreme Court addressed the state’s failure to preserve non-incidental evidence under the federal due process clause in California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 , 104 S.Ct. 2528 , 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984). 1988The United States Supreme Court addressed the state’s failure to preserve non-incidental evidence under the federal due process clause in California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 , 104 S.Ct. 2528 , 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.