cause-and-prejudice test in Georgia

2020As we observed in Turpin, in the context of the cause-and-prejudice test under OCGA § 9-14-48 (d), while “we are not willing to conclude[] that the State’s concealment of the factual basis of a claim will always constitute cause[,] . . . it is a significant factor to be considered in the cause equation.” 268 Ga. at 827 (2) (a).

2012See Todd, 268 Ga. at 824-829 (2) (a), (b) (a successful ineffective assistance claim satisfies both prongs of the cause and prejudice test).

2008See also Waldrip v. Head, 279 Ga. 826, 832-833 (II) (H) ( 620 SE2d 829 ) (2005) (applying procedural default and the cause and prejudice test to an evidence suppression claim). 5 Ferrell, 274 Ga. at 401-402 (III) (describing the cause and prejudice test and noting that relief is also available despite procedural default under circumstances, not alleged to he present in Whatley’s case, amounting to a miscarriage of justice). 6 Schofield v. Palmer, 279 Ga. 848, 851 (2) ( 621 SE2d 726 ) (2005). 7 Id. at 852 (2). 8 See Turpin v. Todd, 268 Ga. 820, 824-827 (2) (a) ( 493 SE2d 900 ) (1997) (finding c

2008See also Waldrip v. Head, 279 Ga. 826, 832-833 (II) (H) ( 620 SE2d 829 ) (2005) (applying procedural default and the cause and prejudice test to an evidence suppression claim). 5 Ferrell, 274 Ga. at 401-402 (III) (describing the cause and prejudice test and noting that relief is also available despite procedural default under circumstances, not alleged to he present in Whatley’s case, amounting to a miscarriage of justice). 6 Schofield v. Palmer, 279 Ga. 848, 851 (2) ( 621 SE2d 726 ) (2005). 7 Id. at 852 (2). 8 See Turpin v. Todd, 268 Ga. 820, 824-827 (2) (a) ( 493 SE2d 900 ) (1997) (finding c

2011Miscarriage of Justice In addition to the cause and prejudice exception, OCGA § 9-14-48 (d) provides an exception to the procedural default rule where necessary “to avoid a miscarriage of justice.” Like its non-statutory federal counterpart, our statutory miscarriage of justice exception has always been interpreted as a very narrow exception tied to evidence of actual innocence, thereby advancing the fundamental purpose of the habeas writ, “which is to free the innocent wrongfully deprived of their liberty.” Valenzuela v. Newsome, 253 Ga. 793, 796 ( 325 SE2d 370 ) (1985).

2011Miscarriage of Justice In addition to the cause and prejudice exception, OCGA § 9-14-48 (d) provides an exception to the procedural default rule where necessary “to avoid a miscarriage of justice.” Like its non-statutory federal counterpart, our statutory miscarriage of justice exception has always been interpreted as a very narrow exception tied to evidence of actual innocence, thereby advancing the fundamental purpose of the habeas writ, “which is to free the innocent wrongfully deprived of their liberty.” Valenzuela v. Newsome, 253 Ga. 793, 796 ( 325 SE2d 370 ) (1985).

2008See also Waldrip v. Head, 279 Ga. 826, 832-833 (II) (H) ( 620 SE2d 829 ) (2005) (applying procedural default and the cause and prejudice test to an evidence suppression claim). 5 Ferrell, 274 Ga. at 401-402 (III) (describing the cause and prejudice test and noting that relief is also available despite procedural default under circumstances, not alleged to he present in Whatley’s case, amounting to a miscarriage of justice). 6 Schofield v. Palmer, 279 Ga. 848, 851 (2) ( 621 SE2d 726 ) (2005). 7 Id. at 852 (2). 8 See Turpin v. Todd, 268 Ga. 820, 824-827 (2) (a) ( 493 SE2d 900 ) (1997) (finding c

2008See also Waldrip v. Head, 279 Ga. 826, 832-833 (II) (H) ( 620 SE2d 829 ) (2005) (applying procedural default and the cause and prejudice test to an evidence suppression claim). 5 Ferrell, 274 Ga. at 401-402 (III) (describing the cause and prejudice test and noting that relief is also available despite procedural default under circumstances, not alleged to he present in Whatley’s case, amounting to a miscarriage of justice). 6 Schofield v. Palmer, 279 Ga. 848, 851 (2) ( 621 SE2d 726 ) (2005). 7 Id. at 852 (2). 8 See Turpin v. Todd, 268 Ga. 820, 824-827 (2) (a) ( 493 SE2d 900 ) (1997) (finding c

2019See Perkins, 288 Ga. at 822 (III) (C) (explaining that “[a] common method of satisfying the cause and prejudice test is to show that trial and direct appeal counsel rendered ineffective assistance”).

2014But “[a] claim that is subject to procedural default may nevertheless be considered in habeas corpus proceedings if the petitioner can satisfy the cause and prejudice test.” Perkins, 288 Ga. at 822 (III) (C).

2008See also Waldrip v. Head, 279 Ga. 826, 832-833 (II) (H) ( 620 SE2d 829 ) (2005) (applying procedural default and the cause and prejudice test to an evidence suppression claim). 5 Ferrell, 274 Ga. at 401-402 (III) (describing the cause and prejudice test and noting that relief is also available despite procedural default under circumstances, not alleged to he present in Whatley’s case, amounting to a miscarriage of justice). 6 Schofield v. Palmer, 279 Ga. 848, 851 (2) ( 621 SE2d 726 ) (2005). 7 Id. at 852 (2). 8 See Turpin v. Todd, 268 Ga. 820, 824-827 (2) (a) ( 493 SE2d 900 ) (1997) (finding c

2008See Ferrell, 274 Ga. at 402 (III) (noting that ineffective assistance of counsel can be used to *726 satisfy the cause portion of the cause and prejudice test where a claim is procedurally defaulted).

2012Because [Lewis’] underlying claim is a constitutional claim involving the denial of his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, Brady, 373 U. S. at 86 , the underlying claim and the prejudice analysis necessary to satisfy the cause-and-prejudice test are coextensive.

2010See, e.g., Upton v. Parks, 284 Ga. 254, 255 ( 664 SE2d 196 ) (2008) (where a habeas petitioner alleges a violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (83 SC 1194, 10 LE2d 215) (1963), “‘“the underlying claim and the prejudice analysis necessary to satisfy the cause-and-prejudice test are coextensive.” ’ ” (citations omitted)).

2026See Humphrey, 294 Ga. at 858 (“A common method of satisfying the cause and prejudice test is to show that trial and direct appeal counsel rendered ineffective assistance[.]”) (citation and punctuation omitted). “[W]here the alleged ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is premised upon the failure to raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal, two layers of fact and law are involved in the analysis of the habeas court’s decision.” Gramiak v. Beasley, 304 Ga. 512, 513 (2018).

2016See Humphrey v. Walker, 294 Ga. 855, 858 (II) (A) ( 757 SE2d 68 ) (2014) (“A common method of satisfying the cause and prejudice test is to show that trial and direct appeal counsel rendered ineffective assistance . . .

2026See Humphrey, 294 Ga. at 858 (“A common method of satisfying the cause and prejudice test is to show that trial and direct appeal counsel rendered ineffective assistance[.]”) (citation and punctuation omitted). “[W]here the alleged ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is premised upon the failure to raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal, two layers of fact and law are involved in the analysis of the habeas court’s decision.” Gramiak v. Beasley, 304 Ga. 512, 513 (2018).

2026See Humphrey, 294 Ga. at 858 (“A common method of satisfying the cause and prejudice test is to show that trial and direct appeal counsel rendered ineffective assistance[.]”) (citation and punctuation omitted). “[W]here the alleged ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is premised upon the failure to raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal, two layers of fact and law are involved in the analysis of the habeas court’s decision.” Gramiak v. Beasley, 304 Ga. 512, 513 (2018).

2020(Citation omitted.) Whatley v. Terry, 284 Ga. 555, 559 (II) (B) (1) ( 668 SE2d 651 ) (2008) (concluding that petitioner had shown “cause” in the cause-and-prejudice test for procedural default under OCGA § 9-14-48 (d)).

2020(Citation omitted.) Whatley v. Terry, 284 Ga. 555, 559 (II) (B) (1) ( 668 SE2d 651 ) (2008) (concluding that petitioner had shown “cause” in the cause-and-prejudice test for procedural default under OCGA § 9-14-48 (d)).

2020And in Smith, 250 Ga. at 652 (3), this Court considered whether the State’s failure to correct the false testimony of a witness could “reasonably have been raised in the original [habeas] petition.” OCGA § 9-14-51.

2019See id.

2019With regard to the first prong of Strickland, “[w]hether to file a demand for speedy trial is usually a matter of trial tactics and strategy, as a delay in bringing the case to trial may work to a defendant’s advantage.” Smith v. State, 297 Ga. 214, 217 (5) (a) ( 773 SE2d 209 ) (2015) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2019With regard to the first prong of Strickland, “[w]hether to file a demand for speedy trial is usually a matter of trial tactics and strategy, as a delay in bringing the case to trial may work to a defendant’s advantage.” Smith v. State, 297 Ga. 214, 217 (5) (a) ( 773 SE2d 209 ) (2015) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2011See id.

2010See, e.g., Upton v. Parks, 284 Ga. 254, 255 ( 664 SE2d 196 ) (2008) (where a habeas petitioner alleges a violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (83 SC 1194, 10 LE2d 215) (1963), “‘“the underlying claim and the prejudice analysis necessary to satisfy the cause-and-prejudice test are coextensive.” ’ ” (citations omitted)).

2010See, e.g., Upton v. Parks, 284 Ga. 254, 255 ( 664 SE2d 196 ) (2008) (where a habeas petitioner alleges a violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (83 SC 1194, 10 LE2d 215) (1963), “‘“the underlying claim and the prejudice analysis necessary to satisfy the cause-and-prejudice test are coextensive.” ’ ” (citations omitted)).

2008See also Waldrip v. Head, 279 Ga. 826, 832-833 (II) (H) ( 620 SE2d 829 ) (2005) (applying procedural default and the cause and prejudice test to an evidence suppression claim). 5 Ferrell, 274 Ga. at 401-402 (III) (describing the cause and prejudice test and noting that relief is also available despite procedural default under circumstances, not alleged to he present in Whatley’s case, amounting to a miscarriage of justice). 6 Schofield v. Palmer, 279 Ga. 848, 851 (2) ( 621 SE2d 726 ) (2005). 7 Id. at 852 (2). 8 See Turpin v. Todd, 268 Ga. 820, 824-827 (2) (a) ( 493 SE2d 900 ) (1997) (finding c

2008See also Waldrip v. Head, 279 Ga. 826, 832-833 (II) (H) ( 620 SE2d 829 ) (2005) (applying procedural default and the cause and prejudice test to an evidence suppression claim). 5 Ferrell, 274 Ga. at 401-402 (III) (describing the cause and prejudice test and noting that relief is also available despite procedural default under circumstances, not alleged to he present in Whatley’s case, amounting to a miscarriage of justice). 6 Schofield v. Palmer, 279 Ga. 848, 851 (2) ( 621 SE2d 726 ) (2005). 7 Id. at 852 (2). 8 See Turpin v. Todd, 268 Ga. 820, 824-827 (2) (a) ( 493 SE2d 900 ) (1997) (finding c

2008See also Waldrip v. Head, 279 Ga. 826, 832-833 (II) (H) ( 620 SE2d 829 ) (2005) (applying procedural default and the cause and prejudice test to an evidence suppression claim). 5 Ferrell, 274 Ga. at 401-402 (III) (describing the cause and prejudice test and noting that relief is also available despite procedural default under circumstances, not alleged to he present in Whatley’s case, amounting to a miscarriage of justice). 6 Schofield v. Palmer, 279 Ga. 848, 851 (2) ( 621 SE2d 726 ) (2005). 7 Id. at 852 (2). 8 See Turpin v. Todd, 268 Ga. 820, 824-827 (2) (a) ( 493 SE2d 900 ) (1997) (finding c

2008See also Waldrip v. Head, 279 Ga. 826, 832-833 (II) (H) ( 620 SE2d 829 ) (2005) (applying procedural default and the cause and prejudice test to an evidence suppression claim). 5 Ferrell, 274 Ga. at 401-402 (III) (describing the cause and prejudice test and noting that relief is also available despite procedural default under circumstances, not alleged to he present in Whatley’s case, amounting to a miscarriage of justice). 6 Schofield v. Palmer, 279 Ga. 848, 851 (2) ( 621 SE2d 726 ) (2005). 7 Id. at 852 (2). 8 See Turpin v. Todd, 268 Ga. 820, 824-827 (2) (a) ( 493 SE2d 900 ) (1997) (finding c

2008See also Waldrip v. Head, 279 Ga. 826, 832-833 (II) (H) ( 620 SE2d 829 ) (2005) (applying procedural default and the cause and prejudice test to an evidence suppression claim). 5 Ferrell, 274 Ga. at 401-402 (III) (describing the cause and prejudice test and noting that relief is also available despite procedural default under circumstances, not alleged to he present in Whatley’s case, amounting to a miscarriage of justice). 6 Schofield v. Palmer, 279 Ga. 848, 851 (2) ( 621 SE2d 726 ) (2005). 7 Id. at 852 (2). 8 See Turpin v. Todd, 268 Ga. 820, 824-827 (2) (a) ( 493 SE2d 900 ) (1997) (finding c

2008See also Waldrip v. Head, 279 Ga. 826, 832-833 (II) (H) ( 620 SE2d 829 ) (2005) (applying procedural default and the cause and prejudice test to an evidence suppression claim). 5 Ferrell, 274 Ga. at 401-402 (III) (describing the cause and prejudice test and noting that relief is also available despite procedural default under circumstances, not alleged to he present in Whatley’s case, amounting to a miscarriage of justice). 6 Schofield v. Palmer, 279 Ga. 848, 851 (2) ( 621 SE2d 726 ) (2005). 7 Id. at 852 (2). 8 See Turpin v. Todd, 268 Ga. 820, 824-827 (2) (a) ( 493 SE2d 900 ) (1997) (finding c

2008See also Waldrip v. Head, 279 Ga. 826, 832-833 (II) (H) ( 620 SE2d 829 ) (2005) (applying procedural default and the cause and prejudice test to an evidence suppression claim). 5 Ferrell, 274 Ga. at 401-402 (III) (describing the cause and prejudice test and noting that relief is also available despite procedural default under circumstances, not alleged to he present in Whatley’s case, amounting to a miscarriage of justice). 6 Schofield v. Palmer, 279 Ga. 848, 851 (2) ( 621 SE2d 726 ) (2005). 7 Id. at 852 (2). 8 See Turpin v. Todd, 268 Ga. 820, 824-827 (2) (a) ( 493 SE2d 900 ) (1997) (finding c

2008In assessing prejudice for purposes of procedural default with respect to an alleged Brady violation, we have held that “ ‘the underlying claim and the prejudice analysis necessary to satisfy the cause-and-prejudice test are coextensive.’ ” (Citation omitted.) Walker v. Johnson, 282 Ga. 168, 169 (1) ( 646 SE2d 44 ) (2007).

2008In assessing prejudice for purposes of procedural default with respect to an alleged Brady violation, we have held that “ ‘the underlying claim and the prejudice analysis necessary to satisfy the cause-and-prejudice test are coextensive.’ ” (Citation omitted.) Walker v. Johnson, 282 Ga. 168, 169 (1) ( 646 SE2d 44 ) (2007).

2006Compare United States v. Mohawk, supra, 20 F3d at 1487-1488 (Doggett presumption not applicable) with United States v. Smith, supra, 94 F3d at 211-212 (Doggett presumption applicable). 18 To the extent that the habeas court’s second finding of prejudice under the cause and prejudice test can be applied to provide the prejudice under the fourth modified Barker factor, that second finding is also not supported by the record.

2006Compare United States v. Mohawk, supra, 20 F3d at 1487-1488 (Doggett presumption not applicable) with United States v. Smith, supra, 94 F3d at 211-212 (Doggett presumption applicable). 18 To the extent that the habeas court’s second finding of prejudice under the cause and prejudice test can be applied to provide the prejudice under the fourth modified Barker factor, that second finding is also not supported by the record.

2006See Meders, supra, 261 Ga. at 807 (2).

2005See Banks v. Dretke, 540 U. S. 668, 691 (124 SC 1256, 157 LE2d 1166) (2004).

2005See Lipham, supra at 209 ; Turpin v. Todd, 268 Ga. 820, 825 ( 493 SE2d 900 ) (1997) (to show cause, a petitioner may demonstrate that “ ‘some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel’s efforts’ to raise the claim that has been procedurally defaulted. [Cit.]”).

2005To show prejudice, Palmer must demonstrate actual prejudice that “ ‘ “worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.” ’ [Cit.]” Lipham, supra. Because Palmer’s underlying claim is a constitutional claim involving the denial of his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, Brady, 373 U. S. at 86 , the underlying claim and the prejudice analysis necessary to satisfy the cause-and-prejudice test are coextensive.

1998To show cause, Christenson must demonstrate that "some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts to raise the claim that has been procedurally defaulted." Turpin v. Todd, 268 Ga. 820, 825 , 493 S.E.2d 900 (1997); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 493 , 111 S.Ct. 1454, 1469-70 , 113 L.Ed.2d 517 (1991).

1998To show cause, Christenson must demonstrate that "some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts to raise the claim that has been procedurally defaulted." Turpin v. Todd, 268 Ga. 820, 825 , 493 S.E.2d 900 (1997); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 493 , 111 S.Ct. 1454, 1469-70 , 113 L.Ed.2d 517 (1991).

1985See Stynchcombe v. Floyd, 252 Ga. 113, 115, fn. 1 ( 311 SE2d 828 ) (1984).

1985See Stynchcombe v. Floyd, 252 Ga. 113, 115, fn. 1 ( 311 SE2d 828 ) (1984).