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10 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1987–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
McCleskey v. Zantgreen2 sentences2003Moreover, when, as in this case, “the defendant has already launched several collateral attacks on his conviction, the reasons supporting the application of the cause and prejudice test are even more compelling.” Matos v. United States, 631 A.2d 28, 30 (D.C.1993); see McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 490 , 111 S.Ct. 1454 , 113 L.Ed.2d 517 (1991) (“abuse of writ” doctrine generally “prohibits subsequent ... consideration of claims not raised, and thus defaulted, in the first [collateral] proceeding”). 7 The procedural default articulated in Shepard and other cases is not insurmountable. 2003Moreover, when, as in this case, “the defendant has already launched several collateral attacks on his conviction, the reasons supporting the application of the cause and prejudice test are even more compelling.” Matos v. United States, 631 A.2d 28, 30 (D.C.1993); see McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 490 , 111 S.Ct. 1454 , 113 L.Ed.2d 517 (1991) (“abuse of writ” doctrine generally “prohibits subsequent ... consideration of claims not raised, and thus defaulted, in the first [collateral] proceeding”). 7 The procedural default articulated in Shepard and other cases is not insurmountable. | 5 | 6 |
Matos v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2018Additionally, we have said that in situations where appellant “has already launched several collateral attacks on his conviction, the reasons supporting the application of the cause and prejudice test are even more compelling.” Washington, 834 A.2d at 902 (quoting Matos v. United States, 631 A.2d 28, 30 (D.C. 1993)). 6 procedural default is the result of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Sixth Amendment itself requires that responsibility for the default be imputed to the State . . . .”); see also Washington, 834 A.2d at 904 n.10 (interpreting Murray v. Carrier as saying that “ineffective 2018Additionally, we have said that in situations where appellant "has already launched several collateral attacks on his conviction, the reasons supporting the application of the cause and prejudice test are even more compelling." Washington , 834 A.2d at 902 (quoting Matos v. United States , 631 A.2d 28 , 30 (D.C. 1993) ). | 3 | 3 |
Washington v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2018Additionally, we have said that in situations where appellant “has already launched several collateral attacks on his conviction, the reasons supporting the application of the cause and prejudice test are even more compelling.” Washington, 834 A.2d at 902 (quoting Matos v. United States, 631 A.2d 28, 30 (D.C. 1993)). 6 procedural default is the result of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Sixth Amendment itself requires that responsibility for the default be imputed to the State . . . .”); see also Washington, 834 A.2d at 904 n.10 (interpreting Murray v. Carrier as saying that “ineffective 2018Additionally, we have said that in situations where appellant "has already launched several collateral attacks on his conviction, the reasons supporting the application of the cause and prejudice test are even more compelling." Washington , 834 A.2d at 902 (quoting Matos v. United States , 631 A.2d 28 , 30 (D.C. 1993) ). | 1 | 1 |
Byrd v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2002Rule 35(a) is an unconditional grant of authority to the court to “correct an illegal sentence at any time.” The premise is that an illegal sentence is “a nullity,” Prince v. United States, 432 A.2d 720, 721 (D.C.1981), and is “void ab initio on its face.” (James) Byrd v. United States, 487 A.2d 616, 617 (D.C.1985). | 1 | 1 |
Prince v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2002Rule 35(a) is an unconditional grant of authority to the court to “correct an illegal sentence at any time.” The premise is that an illegal sentence is “a nullity,” Prince v. United States, 432 A.2d 720, 721 (D.C.1981), and is “void ab initio on its face.” (James) Byrd v. United States, 487 A.2d 616, 617 (D.C.1985). | 1 | 1 |
Kuhlmann v. Wilsongreen2 sentences1995Finally, appellant argues that he need not meet the cause and prejudice requirement because he is asserting his “actual innocence.” Sawyer v. Whitley, — U.S. -, -, 112 S.Ct. 2514, 2518-20 , 120 L.Ed.2d 269 (1992); Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454, 106 S.Ct. 2616, 2627 , 91 L.Ed.2d 364 (1986); Carrier, 477 U.S. at 496, 106 S.Ct. at 2649-50. 1995Finally, appellant argues that he need not meet the cause and prejudice requirement because he is asserting his “actual innocence.” Sawyer v. Whitley, — U.S. -, -, 112 S.Ct. 2514, 2518-20 , 120 L.Ed.2d 269 (1992); Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454, 106 S.Ct. 2616, 2627 , 91 L.Ed.2d 364 (1986); Carrier, 477 U.S. at 496, 106 S.Ct. at 2649-50. | 1 | 1 |
Murray v. Carriergreen2 sentences1995Finally, appellant argues that he need not meet the cause and prejudice requirement because he is asserting his “actual innocence.” Sawyer v. Whitley, — U.S. -, -, 112 S.Ct. 2514, 2518-20 , 120 L.Ed.2d 269 (1992); Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454, 106 S.Ct. 2616, 2627 , 91 L.Ed.2d 364 (1986); Carrier, 477 U.S. at 496, 106 S.Ct. at 2649-50. 1995Finally, appellant argues that he need not meet the cause and prejudice requirement because he is asserting his “actual innocence.” Sawyer v. Whitley, — U.S. -, -, 112 S.Ct. 2514, 2518-20 , 120 L.Ed.2d 269 (1992); Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454, 106 S.Ct. 2616, 2627 , 91 L.Ed.2d 364 (1986); Carrier, 477 U.S. at 496, 106 S.Ct. at 2649-50. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Bernard Fostergreen2 sentences1987See United States v. Foster, 251 U.S.App.D.C. 267, 271 , 783 F.2d 1082, 1086 (1986). 1987See United States v. Foster, 251 U.S.App.D.C. 267, 271 , 783 F.2d 1082, 1086 (1986). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Brown v. United States
green
1 sentence2010Id. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Sawyer v. Whitley
green
2 sentences1995Finally, appellant argues that he need not meet the cause and prejudice requirement because he is asserting his “actual innocence.” Sawyer v. Whitley, — U.S. -, -, 112 S.Ct. 2514, 2518-20 , 120 L.Ed.2d 269 (1992); Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454, 106 S.Ct. 2616, 2627 , 91 L.Ed.2d 364 (1986); Carrier, 477 U.S. at 496, 106 S.Ct. at 2649-50. 1995Finally, appellant argues that he need not meet the cause and prejudice requirement because he is asserting his “actual innocence.” Sawyer v. Whitley, — U.S. -, -, 112 S.Ct. 2514, 2518-20 , 120 L.Ed.2d 269 (1992); Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454, 106 S.Ct. 2616, 2627 , 91 L.Ed.2d 364 (1986); Carrier, 477 U.S. at 496, 106 S.Ct. at 2649-50. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.