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648 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1999–2026 340 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Pitsonbargergreen2 sentences2026People v. Griffin, 2024 IL 128587, ¶ 66 (“ ‘the cause-and-prejudice test must be applied to individual claims, not to the petition as a whole.’ ” (quoting Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d at 462 )). ¶ 18 The one exception to the cause-and-prejudice requirement is a claim of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence. 2026People v. Griffin, 2024 IL 128587, ¶ 66 (“ ‘the cause-and-prejudice test must be applied to individual claims, not to the petition as a whole.’ ” (quoting Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d at 462 )). ¶ 18 The one exception to the cause-and-prejudice requirement is a claim of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence. | 163 | 223 |
People v. Edwardsgreen2 sentences2026Edwards, 2012 IL 111711, ¶ 22-23 ; People v. Smith, 2014 IL 115946, ¶ 30 . ¶ 26 Under the cause-and-prejudice test, a defendant must establish both (1) cause for the failure to raise the claim in an earlier proceeding and (2) prejudice resulting from that failure. 2026People v. Edwards, 2012 IL 111711 , ¶¶ 24- 29. ¶ 19 The cause-and-prejudice test is a procedural prerequisite to obtaining further review of a defendant’s claim. | 61 | 103 |
People v. Tidwellgreen2 sentences2026Id. ¶ 14 (quoting 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2024)). ¶ 24 To meet the cause-and-prejudice test for a successive petition, a petitioner must “ ‘submit enough in the way of documentation to allow a circuit court to make that determination.’ ” People v. Smith, 2014 IL 115946, ¶ 35 (quoting People v. Tidwell, 236 Ill. 2d 150, 161 (2010)). 2026As our supreme court has explained, “To meet the cause-and-prejudice test for a successive petition requires the defendant to ‘submit enough in the way of documentation to allow a circuit court to make that determination.’ ” People v. Smith, 2014 IL 115946, ¶ 35 (quoting People v. Tidwell, 236 Ill. 2d 150, 161 (2010)). | 40 | 55 |
People v. Ortizgreen2 sentences2024Id. ¶ 61 This court first rejected the State’s argument that the cause and prejudice test be applied to a claim of actual innocence, because applying the test could theoretically bar a petitioner from filing a freestanding actual innocence claim. 2024As part of that argument, the State contended that, “even if a petitioner’s first successive postconviction petition based on actual innocence need not comply with the cause-and-prejudice test, subsequent - 16 - petitions are subject to the test because they present the same ‘claim.’ ” Id. at 332 . | 27 | 40 |
People v. Wricegreen2 sentences2024Otherwise, the three-stage postconviction process would be - 25 - ‘superfluous.’ ” (quoting Bailey, 2017 IL 121450, ¶ 22 )); Wrice II, 2012 IL 111860, ¶ 85 (“In cases, such as the present one, where the defendant does satisfy both prongs of the cause-and- prejudice test, the defendant is yet required to establish the allegations set forth in his postconviction petition. 2024Wrice, 2012 IL 111860, ¶ 48 . ¶ 13 The cause and prejudice test for successive postconviction petitions involves a higher standard than that required at the first stage of postconviction proceedings. | 26 | 41 |
People v. Conickgreen2 sentences2025The cause-and-prejudice test is a “more exacting standard” than the “ ‘gist’ standard” under which initial postconviction petitions are reviewed. 9 People v. Conick, 232 Ill. 2d 132, 142 (2008). 2024(Also see People v. Conick, 232 Ill. 2d 132, 142 (2008) (the cause-and-prejudice test is a more exacting standard than the test to survive summary dismissal at the first stage of an initial postconviction petition).) Here, the defendant received a discretionary sentence which he seeks to challenge in a successive postconviction petition. ¶ 14 The Post-Conviction Hearing Act provides a procedural mechanism for defendants to raise claims of violations of their constitutional rights. | 23 | 23 |
People v. Clarkgreen2 sentences2026In proceedings under the Act, “fundamental fairness for relaxing the doctrine [of res judicata] is established by satisfying the requirements of the cause- and-prejudice test.” People v. Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 45 . ¶ 29 Mack contends that People v. Guy, 2025 IL 129967 , has “superseded” this Court’s prior conclusion in Mack, 2022 IL App (1st) 162344-U, ¶ 31 (“We lack the supervisory authority of our supreme court *** We find no authority to overcome the strictures of the Act and res judicata”), and now empowers this court to reach the merits of his ineffective assistance claim. 2026Id. (“Defendant seeks to avoid the procedural consequences of res judicata and waiver by application of the cause-and-prejudice test.”). | 18 | 37 |
People v. Tennergreen2 sentences2025See People v. Tenner, 206 Ill. 2d 381, 399 (2002) (Freeman, J., specially concurring) (reasoning that “[a]n issue that was previously litigated and is raised anew in a successive proceeding can never fall under the ambit of the cause and prejudice test because the issue had, indeed, been raised in the earlier proceeding”). ¶ 36 The third basis, and most fatal to defendant’s contention, is that defendant failed to set forth a constitutional claim on appeal. 2021People v. Tenner, 206 Ill. 2d 381, 392 (2002); see 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2018). ¶ 19 Per the cause-and-prejudice test, “ ‘cause’ ” is defined as “any objective factor, external to the defense, which impeded the [defendant’s] ability to raise a specific claim in the initial postconviction proceeding.” People v. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d 444, 462 (2002); see 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f)(1) (West 2018). | 18 | 21 |
People v. Smithgreen2 sentences2026See, e.g., Smith, 2014 IL 115946, ¶ 37 (failure to establish either prong of the cause-and-prejudice test is fatal to the proposed successive postconviction petition and warrants its dismissal). ¶ 34 III. 2026For purposes of this subsection (f): (1) a prisoner shows cause by identifying an objective factor that -5- impeded his or her ability to raise a specific claim during his or her initial post-conviction proceedings; and (2) a prisoner shows prejudice by demonstrating that the claim not raised during his or her initial post-conviction proceedings so infected the trial that the resulting conviction or sentence violated due process.” ¶ 15 A motion for leave to file a successive petition satisfies the cause and prejudice test if it “adequately alleges facts demonstrating cause and prejudice.” Peop | 17 | 50 |
People v. Mooregreen2 sentences2026See People v. Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶ 74 (Miller does not provide cause to raise a claim under the proportionate penalties clause); People v. Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 94 (“the Miller line of cases does not satisfy the ‘cause’ prong of the cause-and-prejudice test for raising a proportionate penalties claim in a successive postconviction petition”); People v. Moore, 2023 IL 126461, ¶ 40 (Miller “does not provide cause for a young adult offender to raise a claim under the proportionate penalties clause” in a successive petition); see also People v. Leach, 2024 IL App (4th) 230298, ¶ 88 (“The s 2026The supreme court concluded that, “citing the Miller line of cases does not satisfy the ‘cause’ prong of the cause-and-prejudice test for raising a proportionate penalties claim in a successive postconviction petition, as Miller’s unavailability does nothing to explain why defendant neglected to raise the proportionate penalties clause claim in his prior postconviction proceedings.” Id. ¶ 94; see Moore, 2023 IL 126461, ¶ 42 (“As Miller did not change the law applicable to young adults, it does not provide cause for the proportionate penalties challenges advanced in [the defendants’] proposed s | 11 | 17 |
People v. Almodovargreen2 sentences2020See People v. Sanders, 2016 IL 118123, ¶¶ 25, 28 (with a successive petition, the initial issue before the trial court is whether it “should be docketed for second-stage proceedings”); People v. Wrice, 2012 IL 111860, ¶ 90 (“reversing the trial court’s order denying leave to file his second successive postconviction petition and remand[ing] to the trial court for *** second-stage postconviction proceedings”); People v. Jackson, 2015 IL App (3d) 130575, ¶ 14 (“When a defendant is granted leave to file a successive postconviction petition, the petition is effectively advanced to the second stage 2020See People v. Sanders, 2016 IL 118123, ¶¶ 25-28 (with a successive petition, the initial issue before the trial court is whether it “should be docketed for second-stage proceedings”); People v. Jackson, 2015 IL App (3d) 130575, ¶ 14 (“When a defendant is granted leave to file a successive postconviction petition, the petition is effectively advanced to the second stage of postconviction proceedings.”); People v. Almodovar, 2013 IL App (1st) 101476, ¶ 81 (reversing the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion for leave to file a successive petition and remanding for second-stage proceedin | 11 | 13 |
People v. Orangegreen2 sentences2016Rather, the State relies on People v. Orange, 195 Ill. 2d 437 (2001), to assert that the supreme court “addressed and rejected a claim that closely resembles the instant one.” In Orange, the supreme court declined to find the cause and prejudice test satisfied after the defendant asserted that newly discovered evidence corroborated that his confession was physically coerced. 2004A defendant who fails to include an issue in his original or amended postconviction petition, although precluded from raising the issue on appeal from the petition's dismissal, may raise the issue in a successive petition if he can meet the strictures of the "cause and prejudice test." See People v. Orange, 195 Ill.2d 437, 449 , 255 Ill.Dec. 450 , 749 N.E.2d 932 (2001); People v. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill.2d 444, 459 , 275 Ill.Dec. 838 , 793 N.E.2d 609 (2002) ("the cause-and-prejudice test is the analytical tool that is to be used to determine whether fundamental fairness requires that an exceptio | 11 | 13 |
People v. LaPointegreen2 sentences2026Where no express finding of cause and prejudice has occurred for the filing of the successive petition, “the postconviction court was without authority to consider the merits of the petition, which technically still has not been ‘filed’ ” Id. (citing Thames, 2021 IL App (1st) 180071 , ¶¶ 84-85; People v. Nowlan-McCue, 2022 IL App (3d) 200112-U, ¶ 10 ); People v. LaPointe, 227 Ill. 2d 39, 44 (2007) (“Because the statute expressly conditions leave to file on the petitioner’s satisfaction of the cause-and-prejudice test, a second or successive petition cannot be considered filed [until the court 2022As such, “it is incumbent upon defendant *** to prompt the circuit court to consider whether leave should be granted, and obtain a ruling on that question, i.e., a determination as to whether defendant has demonstrated cause and prejudice.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.; People v. LaPointe, 227 Ill. 2d 39, 44 (2007) (section 122-1(f) expressly conditions leave to file on the defendant’s satisfaction of the cause-and-prejudice test); People v. Thames, 2021 IL App (1st) 180071 , ¶ 84 (the circuit court must render a determination that each individual claim 1 On February 18, 2020, befor | 10 | 21 |
People v. Baileygreen2 sentences2026Id. ¶ 14 (quoting 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2024)). ¶ 24 To meet the cause-and-prejudice test for a successive petition, a petitioner must “ ‘submit enough in the way of documentation to allow a circuit court to make that determination.’ ” People v. Smith, 2014 IL 115946, ¶ 35 (quoting People v. Tidwell, 236 Ill. 2d 150, 161 (2010)). 2026Bailey, 2017 IL 121450, ¶ 13 . ¶ 39 Here, Tony sought leave under the cause-and-prejudice exception to the general rule against the filing of successive postconviction petitions. | 9 | 80 |
People v. Guerrerogreen2 sentences2026See People v. Guerrero, 2012 IL 112020, ¶¶ 15, 22 (holding that where the petitioner failed to establish cause there was no need to consider prejudice because “both elements or prongs of the cause-and-prejudice test must be satisfied in order for the [petitioner] to prevail.”). ¶ 39 III. 2025People v. Guerrero, 2012 IL 112020, ¶ 15, 22 (affirming trial court’s denial of motion for leave to file successive petition where the defendant did not establish cause without addressing prejudice because “both elements or prongs of the cause-and-prejudice test must be satisfied in order for the defendant to prevail”). ¶ 37 The trial court’s judgment denying defendant’s motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition challenging defendant’s sentence under the proportionate penalties clause is, therefore, affirmed. ¶ 38 ACTUAL INNOCENCE - 20 - 1-23-1591 ¶ 39 Defendant argues the | 9 | 44 |
People v. Edwardsgreen2 sentences2023Edwards, 2012 IL App (1st) 091651, ¶ 25 . ¶ 16 Our supreme court has held that “the cause-and-prejudice test for a successive petition involves a higher standard than the first-stage frivolous or patently without merit standard that is set forth in section 122-2.1(a)(2) of the Act.” Smith, 2014 IL 2014 115946, ¶ 35. 2023See People v. Edwards, 2012 IL App (1st) 091651, ¶ 32 (“[B]oth prongs [of the cause-and-prejudice test] must be met before leave to file a successive petition will be granted.”). ¶ 22 III. | 9 | 22 |
People v. Floresgreen2 sentences2023For instance, in Pitsonbarger, our supreme court adopted the Strickland standard of prejudice for successive postconviction petitions, which was first articulated in People v. Flores, 153 Ill.2d 264 , 280 1992) (“Whether the seemingly narrower test of prejudice required in a Strickland analysis satisfies the requisite showing of prejudice under McCleskey is uncertain”), and reaffirmed that adoption in People v. Smith, 2014 IL 115946, ¶ 34 (“We analogized the cause-and-prejudice test in the context of a successive postconviction petition to the cause-and-prejudice test for ineffective assistanc 2022In Pitsonbarger, our supreme court adopted the Strickland standard of prejudice for successive postconviction petitions, which was first articulated in People v. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d 264, 280 (1992) (“Whether the seemingly narrower test of prejudice required in a Strickland analysis satisfies the requisite showing of prejudice under McCleskey is uncertain.”), and reaffirmed that adoption in Smith, 2014 IL 115946, ¶ 34 (“We analogized the cause-and-prejudice test in the context of a successive postconviction petition to the cause-and-prejudice test for ineffective assistance of counsel articulat | 9 | 17 |
| People v. Sandersgreen | 8 | 9 |
| People v. Browngreen | 8 | 8 |
| People v. Jacksongreen | 8 | 8 |
Strickland v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2024Upon review of the pleadings and arguments at hearing on the State’s objection the Court denied the successive petition finding the claim was not newly discovered evidence, that it was cumulative and was evidence which was available at trial and at the earlier Post-Conviction filing.” (Emphasis added.) The court’s comments indicate it did not find defendant to have adequately alleged cause and - 24 - prejudice and that it faulted him for not raising his ineffective-assistance claims in his initial postconviction proceeding. ¶ 74 However, even setting aside issues related to forfeiture and the 2015We analogized the cause-and-prejudice test in the context of a successive postconviction petition to the cause-and-prejudice test for ineffective assistance of counsel articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). | 7 | 10 |
People v. Hilliardgreen2 sentences2026The State conceded that the cause-and-prejudice test did not apply. ¶ 14 The circuit court granted the State’s motion, finding that Sapp’s sentence was discretionary (rather than mandatory) and that, under People v. Hilliard, 2023 IL 128186 , Miller-based proportionate penalties challenges are available only to defendants serving mandatory life sentences. 2026The supreme court concluded that, “citing the Miller line of cases does not satisfy the ‘cause’ prong of the cause-and-prejudice test for raising a proportionate penalties claim in a successive postconviction petition, as Miller’s unavailability does nothing to explain why defendant neglected to raise the proportionate penalties clause claim in his prior postconviction proceedings.” Id. ¶ 94; see Moore, 2023 IL 126461, ¶ 42 (“As Miller did not change the law applicable to young adults, it does not provide cause for the proportionate penalties challenges advanced in [the defendants’] proposed s | 7 | 9 |
| People v. Ruddockgreen | 7 | 7 |
| People v. Colemangreen | 6 | 7 |
| People v. Thompsongreen | 6 | 7 |
| People v. Szabogreen | 6 | 6 |
People v. Robinsongreen2 sentences2026In Prante, like Brandon and Blalock, the material necessary to build the claim at all—both the application of the Frye test to bite mark evidence and the doubt cast on the validity of the science—were “unobtainable” by the defendant; whereas in defendant’s case, the materials to build the claim had only improved. ¶ 41 Nor does our supreme court’s decision in Robinson, 2020 IL 123849 , help defendant’s argument that his evidence was sufficient to satisfy the cause element of the cause-and-prejudice test because it was previously unavailable. 2026The court held that the latter was correct, “that the cause- and-prejudice test is the analytical tool that is to be used to determine whether fundamental fairness requires that an exception be made to section 122-3 [of the Act (725 ILCS 5/122-3 (West 1996))] so that a claim raised in a successive petition may be considered on its merits.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 459 . ¶ 40 Further, “the denial of a motion for leave to file a successive petition alleging cause and prejudice is reviewed de novo” (People v. Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶ 39 ), not for an abuse of discretion (People v. Jackson, 201 | 5 | 21 |
People v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2024When applying the test, this court was clear that “the fundamental fairness exception applies to claims, not to petitions, and the cause-and-prejudice test must be applied to individual claims, not to the petition as a whole.” Id. at 462 . ¶ 67 Earlier in Washington, 171 Ill. 2d at 489 , in recognizing that there was “footing in the Illinois Constitution for asserting freestanding innocence claims based upon newly discovered evidence under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act,” we stated that “such claims should be resolved as any other brought under the Act.” Therefore, in Coleman, 2013 IL 113307, 2023A defendant claiming actual innocence in a successive postconviction petition does not have to meet the requirements of the cause-and-prejudice test but, instead, must meet the standard set out in People v. Washington, 171 Ill. 2d 475 (1996). | 5 | 12 |
People v. Pendletongreen2 sentences2019However, a forfeited claim may be raised in a successive postconviction petition if the defendant can satisfy the cause-and-prejudice test. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2014); Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d at 476 ; Jones, 211 Ill. 2d at 148-49. ¶ 17 In this case, it is uncontroverted that defendant’s claim for additional presentence custody credit under section 5-4.5-100 has been forfeited. 2018Because “a ‘reasonable’ level of assistance” (Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d at 472 ) means nothing more than investigating, burnishing, and buttressing the claims already in the pro se petition (id.), it is unclear how the cause-and-prejudice rule necessarily would come up in the interactions between postconviction counsel and the defendant. ¶ 47 B. | 5 | 11 |
| Murray v. Carriergreen | 5 | 7 |
| People v. Holmangreen | 5 | 5 |
| Schlup v. Delored | 5 | 5 |
Miller v. Alabamagreen2 sentences2026Defendant argued he met the cause prong of the cause- and-prejudice test because (1) “sweeping” changes in sentencing laws (“730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105”) and (2) the decisions in People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327 , and Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) occurred after he had filed his initial postconviction petition. 2026People v. Howard, 2021 IL App (2d) 190695, ¶ 21 . ¶ 29 A. Defendant’s Proportionate Pentalties Claim ¶ 30 Defendant contends that he satisfied the cause and prejudice test for his claim that his mandatory de facto life sentence violates the proportionate penalties clause 1) because the legal basis for his claim was not previously available until the United States Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012) (holding “life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders” violates the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution) and related Illinois cas | 4 | 33 |
People v. Davisgreen2 sentences2026People v. Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶¶ 13-14 . ¶ 24 To proceed on a successive postconviction petition, a petitioner must either assert a claim of actual innocence or satisfy the cause-and-prejudice test. 2024People v. Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶¶ 13-14 . ¶ 25 To proceed on a successive postconviction petition, a petitioner must either assert a claim of actual innocence or satisfy the cause and prejudice test. | 4 | 23 |
People v. Montanezgreen2 sentences2026Id. ¶ 12 The cause-and-prejudice test is a more exacting standard than the gist-of-a-claim standard circuit courts use to review initial postconviction petitions at the first stage of proceedings. 2026To establish “cause” under the cause-and-prejudice test, a defendant must identify an objective factor, external to the defense, that impeded his ability to raise a specific claim during his initial postconviction proceeding. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2022); Montanez, 2023 IL 128740, ¶ 77 . | 4 | 12 |
People v. Jacksongreen2 sentences2025Jackson, 2021 IL 124818, ¶ 27 (citing Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶ 42 (citing People v. Edwards, 2012 IL 111711, ¶ 23 )). ¶ 28 To meet the cause-and-prejudice test for a successive petition, a petitioner must “ ‘submit enough in the way of documentation to allow a circuit court to make that determination.’ ” People v. Smith, 2014 IL 115946, ¶ 35 (quoting People v. Tidwell, 236 Ill. 2d 150, 161 (2010)). 2023Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d at 459 (cause and prejudice test is an exception to section 122-3). ¶ 77 Except when a defendant asserts a claim of actual innocence, the Postconviction Act allows circuit courts to grant leave to file a successive postconviction petition “only” if a defendant can satisfy both prongs of this cause and prejudice test. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2018); Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 14 ; People v. Jackson, 2021 IL 124818, ¶ 27 . | 4 | 10 |
People v. Morgangreen2 sentences2026People v. Morgan, 212 Ill. 2d 148, 153 (2004). ¶ 39 To obtain leave to file a successive postconviction petition, the defendant must establish both prongs of the cause and prejudice test. 2022People v. Morgan, 212 Ill. 2d 148, 153 (2004). ¶ 10 To determine whether the fundamental fairness exception applies, courts use the cause- and-prejudice test codified in section 122-1(f) of the Act. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2016). | 4 | 9 |
| People v. Jonesgreen | 4 | 7 |
| People v. Brockmangreen | 4 | 6 |
| People v. Leasongreen | 4 | 5 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| People v. Brockmangreen | 2 | 6 |
| People v. Davisgreen | 2 | 4 |
| People v. Fordgreen | 1 | 6 |
| People v. Handygreen | 1 | 5 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Domagala
green
2 sentences2021That is, we assess whether defendant satisfied his burden to make a substantial showing of a constitutional violation, which is a “measure - 21 - of the legal sufficiency of the petition’s well-pled allegations of a constitutional violation, which if proven at an evidentiary hearing, would entitle petitioner to relief.” (Emphasis in original.) People v. Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 35 . 2020See People v. Sanders, 2016 IL 118123, ¶¶ 25-28 (with a successive petition, the initial issue before the trial court is whether it “should be docketed for second-stage proceedings”); People v. Jackson, 2015 IL App (3d) 130575, ¶ 14 (“When a defendant is granted leave to file a successive postconviction petition, the petition is effectively advanced to the second stage of postconviction proceedings.”); People v. Almodovar, 2013 IL App (1st) 101476, ¶ 81 (reversing the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion for leave to file a successive petition and remanding for second-stage proceedin | 13 | 2016–2021 |
| People v. Ryburn green | 6 | 2023–2025 |
| People v. Carrasquillo green | 5 | 2020–2022 |
| People v. Crenshaw green | 4 | 2016–2026 |
| People v. Moore green | 4 | 2023–2024 |
| People v. Holman green | 4 | 2018–2023 |
| People v. Jackson green | 4 | 2020–2021 |
| People v. English green | 4 | 2008–2017 |
| People v. Smith green | 4 | 2007–2008 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.