cause-and-prejudice test in Illinois

2026In Pitsonbarger, the court clarified whether the cause-and-prejudice test was “merely an aid that courts may use to determine whether a claim raised in a successive petition should be allowed to proceed,” or 14 No. 1-24-1357 “the analytical tool that ha[d] been adopted by th[e] court for use in all such cases.” Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d at 457-58 .

2026The court held that the latter was correct, “that the cause- and-prejudice test is the analytical tool that is to be used to determine whether fundamental fairness requires that an exception be made to section 122-3 [of the Act (725 ILCS 5/122-3 (West 1996))] so that a claim raised in a successive petition may be considered on its merits.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 459 . ¶ 40 Further, “the denial of a motion for leave to file a successive petition alleging cause and prejudice is reviewed de novo” (People v. Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶ 39 ), not for an abuse of discretion (People v. Jackson, 201

2026Edwards, 2012 IL 111711, ¶ 22-23 ; People v. Smith, 2014 IL 115946, ¶ 30 . ¶ 26 Under the cause-and-prejudice test, a defendant must establish both (1) cause for the failure to raise the claim in an earlier proceeding and (2) prejudice resulting from that failure.

2026People v. Edwards, 2012 IL 111711 , ¶¶ 24- 29. ¶ 19 The cause-and-prejudice test is a procedural prerequisite to obtaining further review of a defendant’s claim.

2026See, e.g., Smith, 2014 IL 115946, ¶ 37 (failure to establish either prong of the cause-and-prejudice test is fatal to the proposed successive postconviction petition and warrants its dismissal). ¶ 34 III.

2026For purposes of this subsection (f): (1) a prisoner shows cause by identifying an objective factor that -5- impeded his or her ability to raise a specific claim during his or her initial post-conviction proceedings; and (2) a prisoner shows prejudice by demonstrating that the claim not raised during his or her initial post-conviction proceedings so infected the trial that the resulting conviction or sentence violated due process.” ¶ 15 A motion for leave to file a successive petition satisfies the cause and prejudice test if it “adequately alleges facts demonstrating cause and prejudice.” Peop

2026Id. ¶ 14 (quoting 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2024)). ¶ 24 To meet the cause-and-prejudice test for a successive petition, a petitioner must “ ‘submit enough in the way of documentation to allow a circuit court to make that determination.’ ” People v. Smith, 2014 IL 115946, ¶ 35 (quoting People v. Tidwell, 236 Ill. 2d 150, 161 (2010)).

2025See People v. Tidwell, 236 Ill. 2d 150, 161 (2010) ( “[A] successive postconviction petition is not considered ‘filed’ *** and further proceedings will not follow, until leave is granted, a determination dependent upon a defendant’s satisfaction of the cause-and-prejudice test.”); People v. Salgado, 2024 IL App (4th) 230405-U , ¶ 47 (cited as persuasive authority under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23) (concluding that while the record did not disclose any discussion of cause and prejudice when the petition was set for second stage review, the trial court implicitly found cause and prejudice had

2024As part of that argument, the State contended that, “even if a petitioner’s first successive postconviction petition based on actual innocence need not comply with the cause-and-prejudice test, subsequent - 16 - petitions are subject to the test because they present the same ‘claim.’ ” Id. at 332 .

2024Id. ¶ 61 This court first rejected the State’s argument that the cause and prejudice test be applied to a claim of actual innocence, because applying the test could theoretically bar a petitioner from filing a freestanding actual innocence claim.

2024Otherwise, the three-stage postconviction process would be - 25 - No. 1-22-1268 ‘superfluous.’ ” (quoting Bailey, 2017 IL 121450, ¶ 22 )); Wrice II, 2012 IL 111860, ¶ 85 (“In cases, such as the present one, where the defendant does satisfy both prongs of the cause-and- prejudice test, the defendant is yet required to establish the allegations set forth in his postconviction petition.

2024Wrice, 2012 IL 111860, ¶ 48 . ¶ 13 The cause and prejudice test for successive postconviction petitions involves a higher standard than that required at the first stage of postconviction proceedings.

2025The cause-and-prejudice test is a “more exacting standard” than the “ ‘gist’ standard” under which initial postconviction petitions are reviewed. 9 No. 1-23-2266 People v. Conick, 232 Ill. 2d 132, 142 (2008).

2024(Also see People v. Conick, 232 Ill. 2d 132, 142 (2008) (the cause-and-prejudice test is a more exacting standard than the test to survive summary dismissal at the first stage of an initial postconviction petition).) Here, the defendant received a discretionary sentence which he seeks to challenge in a successive postconviction petition. ¶ 14 The Post-Conviction Hearing Act provides a procedural mechanism for defendants to raise claims of violations of their constitutional rights.

2025See People v. Tenner, 206 Ill. 2d 381, 399 (2002) (Freeman, J., specially concurring) (reasoning that “[a]n issue that was previously litigated and is raised anew in a successive proceeding can never fall under the ambit of the cause and prejudice test because the issue had, indeed, been raised in the earlier proceeding”). ¶ 36 The third basis, and most fatal to defendant’s contention, is that defendant failed to set forth a constitutional claim on appeal.

2021People v. Tenner, 206 Ill. 2d 381, 392 (2002); see 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2018). ¶ 19 Per the cause-and-prejudice test, “ ‘cause’ ” is defined as “any objective factor, external to the defense, which impeded the [defendant’s] ability to raise a specific claim in the initial post- conviction proceeding.” People v. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d 444, 462 (2002); see 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f)(1) (West 2018).

2026The second petition raised the same ineffective-assistance claim raised in the first petition and added claims that (1) appellate counsel was ineffective for not arguing that the State failed to prove that he was armed with a firearm during the commission of the offense, (2) the State allowed a witness to present false and misleading testimony, and (3) the trial court erred in denying him new counsel when he complained that his trial attorney was not consulting him in preparation for trial. ¶8 On January 9, 2025, the trial court entered an order titled “Ruling on Petitioner’s Motion for Leave

2026To obtain leave of court to file a successive petition, a petitioner must either demonstrate “actual innocence” (Sanders, 2016 IL 118123 , ¶ 24) or satisfy the cause-and-prejudice test codified in section 122-1(f) of the Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2022)).

2026ORDER ¶1 Held: We affirm the circuit court’s dismissal of a successive postconviction petition at the second stage where defendant failed to satisfy the cause and prejudice standard. ¶2 Illinois law has long “recognized the special status of juvenile offenders for purposes of applying the principles under the proportionate penalties clause.” People v. Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶¶ 61, 92 (citing People ex rel.

2026Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 39 . ¶ 16 This bar is relaxed under two grounds, including, as relevant here, where a defendant can satisfy the cause and prejudice test for failure to assert a claim in an earlier postconviction petition.

2020See People v. Sanders, 2016 IL 118123, ¶¶ 25, 28 (with a successive petition, the initial issue before the trial court is whether it “should be docketed for second-stage proceedings”); People v. Wrice, 2012 IL 111860, ¶ 90 (“reversing the trial court’s order denying leave to file his second successive postconviction petition and remand[ing] to the trial court for *** second-stage postconviction proceedings”); People v. Jackson, 2015 IL App (3d) 130575, ¶ 14 (“When a defendant is granted leave to file a successive postconviction petition, the petition is effectively advanced to the second stage

2020See People v. Sanders, 2016 IL 118123, ¶¶ 25-28 (with a successive petition, the initial issue before the trial court is whether it “should be docketed for second-stage proceedings”); People v. Jackson, 2015 IL App (3d) 130575, ¶ 14 (“When a defendant is granted leave to file a successive postconviction petition, the petition is effectively advanced to the second stage of postconviction proceedings.”); People v. Almodovar, 2013 IL App (1st) 101476, ¶ 81 (reversing the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion for leave to file a successive petition and remanding for second-stage proceedin

2020Almodovar, 2013 IL App (1st) 101476, ¶¶ 59, 62 .

2020See People v. Sanders, 2016 IL 118123, ¶¶ 25, 28 (with a successive petition, the initial issue before the trial court is whether it “should be docketed for second-stage proceedings”); People v. Wrice, 2012 IL 111860, ¶ 90 (“reversing the trial court’s order denying leave to file his second successive postconviction petition and remand[ing] to the trial court for *** second-stage postconviction proceedings”); People v. Jackson, 2015 IL App (3d) 130575, ¶ 14 (“When a defendant is granted leave to file a successive postconviction petition, the petition is effectively advanced to the second stage

2016Rather, the State relies on People v. Orange, 195 Ill. 2d 437 (2001), to assert that the supreme court “addressed and rejected a claim that closely resembles the instant one.” In Orange, the supreme court declined to find the cause and prejudice test satisfied after the defendant asserted that newly discovered evidence corroborated that his confession was physically coerced.

2004A defendant who fails to include an issue in his original or amended postconviction petition, although precluded from raising the issue on appeal from the petition's dismissal, may raise the issue in a successive petition if he can meet the strictures of the "cause and prejudice test." See People v. Orange, 195 Ill.2d 437, 449 , 255 Ill.Dec. 450 , 749 N.E.2d 932 (2001); People v. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill.2d 444, 459 , 275 Ill.Dec. 838 , 793 N.E.2d 609 (2002) ("the cause-and-prejudice test is the analytical tool that is to be used to determine whether fundamental fairness requires that an exceptio

2026People v. Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶¶ 13-14 . ¶ 24 To proceed on a successive postconviction petition, a petitioner must either assert a claim of actual innocence or satisfy the cause-and-prejudice test.

2024Thus, the situations are different, and the defendant’s lack of knowledge and evidentiary support concerning Cassidy’s pattern and practice of coercing confessions is a relevant consideration in the cause analysis. ¶ 34 To the extent that the circuit court was worried about defendants holding onto claims and filing them in a piecemeal fashion when they believe that they have enough evidence to support them (see People v. Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 55 (“A defendant is not permitted to develop the evidentiary basis for a claim in a piecemeal fashion in successive postconviction petitions *** .”)),

2026See People v. Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶ 74 (Miller does not provide cause to raise a claim under the proportionate penalties clause); People v. Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 94 (“the Miller line of cases does not satisfy the ‘cause’ prong of the cause-and-prejudice test for raising a proportionate penalties claim in a successive postconviction petition”); People v. Moore, 2023 IL 126461, ¶ 40 (Miller “does not provide cause for a young adult offender to raise a claim under the proportionate penalties clause” in a successive petition); see also People v. Leach, 2024 IL App (4th) 230298, ¶ 88 (“The s

2025The Clark court thus concluded that because “Miller’s unavailability does nothing to explain why the defendant neglected to raise the proportionate penalties claim in his prior postconviction proceedings,” “citing the Miller line of cases does not satisfy the ‘cause’ prong of the cause-and-prejudice test.” Id. ¶ 94. ¶ 45 Shortly after Clark, in Moore, 2023 IL 126461, ¶¶ 12, 23 , our supreme court reaffirmed that young adult offenders cannot rely on the unavailability of Miller to establish the requisite cause for their failure to raise youth-based proportionate penalties challenges in their or

2026See People v. Guerrero, 2012 IL 112020, ¶¶ 15, 22 (holding that where the petitioner failed to establish cause there was no need to consider prejudice because “both elements or prongs of the cause-and-prejudice test must be satisfied in order for the [petitioner] to prevail.”). ¶ 39 III.

2025See People v. Guerrero, 2012 IL 112020, ¶¶ 15, 22 (affirming the circuit court’s denial of a motion for leave to file a successive petition where the petitioner did not establish cause without addressing prejudice because “both element or prongs of the cause-and-prejudice test must be satisfied in order for the [petitioner] to prevail.”). ¶ 54 III.

2023See People v. Edwards, 2012 IL App (1st) 091651, ¶ 32 (“[B]oth prongs [of the cause-and-prejudice test] must be met before leave to file a successive petition will be granted.”). ¶ 22 III.

2023Edwards, 2012 IL App (1st) 091651, ¶ 25 . ¶ 16 Our supreme court has held that “the cause-and-prejudice test for a successive petition involves a higher standard than the first-stage frivolous or patently without merit standard that is set forth in section 122-2.1(a)(2) of the Act.” Smith, 2014 IL 2014 115946, ¶ 35.

2022Id. ¶ 85 (“As this determination is a statutory requirement, we find the circuit court erred when it advanced the petition in its entirety to second-stage proceedings without making a cause-and-prejudice determination.”); see also People v. LaPointe, 227 Ill. 2d 39, 44 (2007) (“Because the statute expressly conditions leave to file on the petitioner's satisfaction of the cause-and-prejudice test, a second or successive petition cannot be considered filed [until the court expressly rules on cause and prejudice,] despite its having been previously accepted by the clerk's office.”). ¶5 In this ca

2022As such, “it is incumbent upon defendant *** to prompt the circuit court to consider whether leave should be granted, and obtain a ruling on that question, i.e., a determination as to whether defendant has demonstrated cause and prejudice.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.; People v. LaPointe, 227 Ill. 2d 39, 44 (2007) (section 122-1(f) expressly conditions leave to file on the defendant’s satisfaction of the cause-and-prejudice test); People v. Thames, 2021 IL App (1st) 180071 , ¶ 84 (the circuit court must render a determination that each individual claim 1 On February 18, 2020, befor

2023For instance, in Pitsonbarger, our supreme court adopted the Strickland standard of prejudice for successive postconviction petitions, which was first articulated in People v. Flores, 153 Ill.2d 264 , 280 1992) (“Whether the seemingly narrower test of prejudice required in a Strickland analysis satisfies the requisite showing of prejudice under McCleskey is uncertain”), and reaffirmed that adoption in People v. Smith, 2014 IL 115946, ¶ 34 (“We analogized the cause-and-prejudice test in the context of a successive postconviction petition to the cause-and-prejudice test for ineffective assistanc

2022In Pitsonbarger, our supreme court adopted the Strickland standard of prejudice for successive postconviction petitions, which was first articulated in People v. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d 264, 280 (1992) (“Whether the seemingly narrower test of prejudice required in a Strickland analysis satisfies the requisite showing of prejudice under McCleskey is uncertain.”), and reaffirmed that adoption in Smith, 2014 IL 115946, ¶ 34 (“We analogized the cause-and-prejudice test in the context of a successive postconviction petition to the cause-and-prejudice test for ineffective assistance of counsel articulat

2026Bailey, 2017 IL 121450, ¶ 13 . ¶ 39 Here, Tony sought leave under the cause-and-prejudice exception to the general rule against the filing of successive postconviction petitions.

2026See Bailey, 2017 IL 121450, ¶ 24 . ¶ 81 In sum, although defendant’s Brady claim is meritless, defendant has set forth a colorable claim of actual innocence and has satisfied the cause-and-prejudice test for his general due process violation claim.

2024When applying the test, this court was clear that “the fundamental fairness exception applies to claims, not to petitions, and the cause-and-prejudice test must be applied to individual claims, not to the petition as a whole.” Id. at 462 . ¶ 67 Earlier in Washington, 171 Ill. 2d at 489 , in recognizing that there was “footing in the Illinois Constitution for asserting freestanding innocence claims based upon newly discovered evidence under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act,” we stated that “such claims should be resolved as any other brought under the Act.” Therefore, in Coleman, 2013 IL 113307,

2023“First, a defendant may raise a constitutional claim by satisfying the cause-and-prejudice test. [Citations.] Second, even without showing cause and prejudice, a defendant may assert a claim of actual innocence pursuant to People v. Washington, 171 Ill. 2d 475 [, 665 N.E.2d 1330 ] (1996).” Id.

2026The court held that the latter was correct, “that the cause- and-prejudice test is the analytical tool that is to be used to determine whether fundamental fairness requires that an exception be made to section 122-3 [of the Act (725 ILCS 5/122-3 (West 1996))] so that a claim raised in a successive petition may be considered on its merits.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 459 . ¶ 40 Further, “the denial of a motion for leave to file a successive petition alleging cause and prejudice is reviewed de novo” (People v. Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶ 39 ), not for an abuse of discretion (People v. Jackson, 201

2026In Prante, like Brandon and Blalock, the material necessary to build the claim at all—both the application of the Frye test to bite mark evidence and the doubt cast on the validity of the science—were “unobtainable” by the defendant; whereas in defendant’s case, the materials to build the claim had only improved. ¶ 41 Nor does our supreme court’s decision in Robinson, 2020 IL 123849 , help defendant’s argument that his evidence was sufficient to satisfy the cause element of the cause-and-prejudice test because it was previously unavailable.

2026ORDER ¶1 Held: We affirm the circuit court’s dismissal of defendant’s successive postconviction petition because (1) as an adult offender, defendant cannot raise an eighth amendment challenge to his life sentence under Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012); (2) defendant cannot demonstrate the cause prong of the cause and prejudice test with respect to his claim under the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution; and (3) postconviction counsel did not render unreasonable assistance. ¶2 Defendant Anthony Perez appeals the second-stage dismissal of his successive petition und

2026Defendant argued he met the cause prong of the cause- and-prejudice test because (1) “sweeping” changes in sentencing laws (“730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105”) and (2) the decisions in People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327 , and Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) occurred after he had filed his initial postconviction petition.

2007In sum, we hold that our supreme court’s decision in Shellstrom, 216 Ill. 2d 45 , does not apply retroactively to the successive postconviction petition defendant filed in this case and defendant is not entitled to relief because he has failed to satisfy the cause-and-prejudice test.

2007In sum, we hold that our supreme court's decision in Shellstrom, 216 Ill. 2d 45 , does not apply retroactively to the successive postconviction petition defendant filed in this case and defendant is not entitled to relief because he has failed to satisfy the cause-and-prejudice test.