endangerment standard in Illinois

1985App. 3d 123, 125 ), whereas the endangerment standard governs the restriction of such rights where the court finds that the visitation as it exists seriously endangers the child’s physical, mental, moral, or emotional health (see In re Marriage of Hanson (1983), 112 Ill.

1985With respect to the restriction of visitation, the endangerment standard is an onerous one (In re Marriage of Hanson (1983), 112 Ill.

1990App. 3d 1046, 1048 , 428 N.E.2d 1093, 1095 .) The endangerment standard has been described as onerous, stringent, and rigorous.

1987Stat. 1985, ch. 40, pars. 607(a), (c).) In discussing the provisions of the above paragraph, the First District stated: “The Commissioner’s Note [to this section] described the endangerment standard as ‘onerous’ and states that ‘it was deliberately chosen to indicate its stringency when compared to the “best interest” standard traditionally applied to this problem.’ The statute speaks affirmatively of a parent’s ‘entitlement’ to visitation unless the visits would endanger the children.” In re Marriage of Neat (1981), 101 Ill.

2023In re Parentage of K.E.B., 2014 IL App (2d) 131332, ¶ 33 ; see In re Marriage of Chehaiber, 394 Ill.

2023In re K.E.B., 2014 IL App (2d) 131332, ¶ 33 ; see also In re Marriage of Chehaiber, 394 Ill.

2016Thus, in In re Marriage of Diehl, the mother was challenging an order that, as established by the appellate court in that case, restricted her visitation rights, thus making the serious endangerment standard appropriate. ¶ 54 In In re Marriage of Solomon, 84 Ill.

2016In determining that the serious endangerment standard should have applied to the trial court’s modification of the custody judgment, the appellate court stated that “[a] comparison of the visitation provided in the parties’ original agreement as against that contained in the judge’s order shows the substantial limiting effect of the modification.” Id. at 907 .

1993App. 3d 712, 724 , 558 N.E.2d 388, 432 .) The serious endangerment standard contained in section 607(c) of the Act is “onerous, stringent, and rigorous” to meet because liberal visitation is the rule and restricted visitation is the exception.

1993The endangerment standard is an extraordinary finding (In re Marriage of Lombaer (1990), 200 Ill.

1989App. 3d 772 , 498 N.E.2d 906 .) The endangerment standard is an onerous one and not easily met.

1987App. 3d 772, 774 , 498 N.E.2d 906, 908 .) The endangerment standard in the statute is an onerous one.

1994App.3d 576, 579-80 , 74 Ill.Dec. 252, 254-55 , 455 N.E.2d 282, 284-85 ; In re Marriage of Lee (1993), 246 Ill.App.3d 628, 645 , 186 Ill.

1994App.3d 576, 579-80 , 74 Ill.Dec. 252, 254-55 , 455 N.E.2d 282, 284-85 ; In re Marriage of Lee (1993), 246 Ill.App.3d 628, 645 , 186 Ill.

1994However, a reduction of weekend visitation from 50 hours to 31, and reduction of summer visitation from four weeks to two weeks (because of the children's activities), is not a restriction which had to meet the serious endangerment standard. ( Gibson v. Barton (1983), 118 Ill.

1994(Gibson v. Barton (1983), 118 Ill.

1993The post-decree judge relied on Gottlieb v. Gottlieb (1985), 108 A.D.2d 120 , 488 N.Y.S.2d 180 , and DiStefano v. DiStefano (1978), 60 A.D.2d 976 , 401 N.Y.S.2d 636 , both of which used the best interests standard, not the endangerment standard.

1993The post-decree judge relied on Gottlieb v. Gottlieb (1985), 108 A.D.2d 120 , 488 N.Y.S.2d 180 , and DiStefano v. DiStefano (1978), 60 A.D.2d 976 , 401 N.Y.S.2d 636 , both of which used the best interests standard, not the endangerment standard.

1993In In re Marriage of Birdsall (1988), 197 Cal. App. 3d 1024 , 243 Cal. Rptr. 287 , the California Appellate Court vacated the trial court’s visitation restriction, which read: "Petitioner shall not exercise overnight visitation with the minor child of the parties *** in the presence of any friend, acquaintance or associate who is known to be homosexual.” Birdsall, 197 Cal. App. 3d at 1031 , 243 Cal. Rptr. at 291 .

1993In In re Marriage of Birdsall (1988), 197 Cal. App. 3d 1024 , 243 Cal. Rptr. 287 , the California Appellate Court vacated the trial court’s visitation restriction, which read: "Petitioner shall not exercise overnight visitation with the minor child of the parties *** in the presence of any friend, acquaintance or associate who is known to be homosexual.” Birdsall, 197 Cal. App. 3d at 1031 , 243 Cal. Rptr. at 291 .

1993The post-decree judge relied on Gottlieb v. Gottlieb (1985), 108 A.D.2d 120 , 488 N.Y.S.2d 180 , and DiStefano v. DiStefano (1978), 60 A.D.2d 976 , 401 N.Y.S.2d 636 , both of which used the best interests standard, not the endangerment standard.

1993The post-decree judge relied on Gottlieb v. Gottlieb (1985), 108 A.D.2d 120 , 488 N.Y.S.2d 180 , and DiStefano v. DiStefano (1978), 60 A.D.2d 976 , 401 N.Y.S.2d 636 , both of which used the best interests standard, not the endangerment standard.

1993Using the endangerment standard, the court in In re Marriage of Cabalquinto (1986), 43 Wash. App. 518 , 718 P.2d 7 , struck a visitation restriction which provided that "visitation is only permitted under circumstances where the father does not associate with his homosexual companion to the extent that the companion is a member of the household or the boy could get the idea that 2 men are other than casual friends, including not living in the home in any respect or having other than a casual relationship.” Cabalquinto, 43 Wash. App. at 519 , 718 P.2d at 7-8 .

1993Using the endangerment standard, the court in In re Marriage of Cabalquinto (1986), 43 Wash. App. 518 , 718 P.2d 7 , struck a visitation restriction which provided that "visitation is only permitted under circumstances where the father does not associate with his homosexual companion to the extent that the companion is a member of the household or the boy could get the idea that 2 men are other than casual friends, including not living in the home in any respect or having other than a casual relationship.” Cabalquinto, 43 Wash. App. at 519 , 718 P.2d at 7-8 .

1993Randy’s attorney argued under the second district’s decision in In re Marriage of Oertel (1991), 216 Ill.

1993(Oertel, 216 Ill.

1990App. 3d 202, 207 , 514 N.E.2d 1208, 1211 .) The endangerment standard in the statute is an onerous one.

1990(Blanchard, 162 Ill.

1985Crichton v. Crichton (1979), 75 Ill.

1985App. 3d 564, 568 ; In re Marriage of Kessler (1982), 110 Ill.