adverse inference instruction in Michigan

2020“Michigan courts have long recognized that when material evidence in control of a party is not produced at trial, the opposing party is entitled to an adverse inference instruction.” People v Cress, 250 Mich App 110 , 157 n 27; 645 NW2d 669 (2002), rev’d on other grounds 468 Mich 678 (2003).

2020“Michigan courts have long recognized that when material evidence in control of a party is not produced at trial, the opposing party is entitled to an adverse inference instruction.” People v Cress, 250 Mich App 110 , 157 n 27; 645 NW2d 669 (2002), rev’d on other grounds 468 Mich 678 (2003).

2020“Michigan courts have long recognized that when material evidence in control of a party is not produced at trial, the opposing party is entitled to an adverse inference instruction.” People v Cress, 250 Mich App 110 , 157 n 27; 645 NW2d 669 (2002), rev’d on other grounds 468 Mich 678 (2003).

2019“Michigan courts have long recognized that when material evidence in control of a party is not produced at trial, the opposing party is entitled to an adverse inference instruction.” People v Cress, 250 Mich App 110 , 157 n 27; 645 NW2d 669 (2002), vacated in part on other grounds 466 Mich 883 (2002), rev’d on other grounds 468 Mich 678 (2003).

2021Brenner, 226 Mich App at 160 .

2021Brenner, 226 Mich App at 160 .

1999We therefore do not explore the determination in In re Forfeiture of $25,505, 220 Mich App 572, 579-580 ; 560 NW2d 341 (1996), that an adverse-inference instruction is an appropriate remedy for a violation of the statute.

1999We therefore do not explore the determination in In re Forfeiture of $25,505, 220 Mich App 572, 579-580 ; 560 NW2d 341 (1996), that an adverse-inference instruction is an appropriate remedy for a violation of the statute.

2024Unlike in People v Anstey, 476 Mich 436, 450 ; 719 NW2d 579 (2006), which defendant cites, the police here did not violate a statutory duty by failing to preserve the DVR box, which is what was determined in Anstey to warrant an instruction to the jury.

2024Unlike in People v Anstey, 476 Mich 436, 450 ; 719 NW2d 579 (2006), which defendant cites, the police here did not violate a statutory duty by failing to preserve the DVR box, which is what was determined in Anstey to warrant an instruction to the jury.

2020See Bloemendaal, 255 Mich App at 214-215 ; Citizens, 247 Mich App at 244-245 ; Brenner, 226 Mich App at 163-164 .

2017Lopez, 305 Mich App at 693-694 .

2016Id.

2016“A trial court’s decision regarding discovery is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” People v Phillips, 468 Mich 583, 587 ; 663 NW2d 463 (2003).

2016“A trial court’s decision regarding discovery is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” People v Phillips, 468 Mich 583, 587 ; 663 NW2d 463 (2003).

2015Wilson v Taylor, 457 Mich 232, 243 ; 577 NW2d 100 (1998).

2015Wilson v Taylor, 457 Mich 232, 243 ; 577 NW2d 100 (1998).

2015Under the adverse inference principle, “[a] jury may draw an adverse inference against a party that has failed to produce evidence only when: (1) the evidence was under the party’s control and could have been produced; (2) the party lacks a reasonable excuse for its failure to produce the evidence; and (3) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative, and not equally available to the other party.” Ward v Consol Rail Corp, 472 Mich 77, 85-86 ; 693 NW2d 366 (2005).

2015Under the adverse inference principle, “[a] jury may draw an adverse inference against a party that has failed to produce evidence only when: (1) the evidence was under the party’s control and could have been produced; (2) the party lacks a reasonable excuse for its failure to produce the evidence; and (3) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative, and not equally available to the other party.” Ward v Consol Rail Corp, 472 Mich 77, 85-86 ; 693 NW2d 366 (2005).

2002Barringer v Arnold, 358 Mich 594, 601, 604-605 ; 101 NW2d 365 (1960) (holding that a party’s failure to produce noncumulative evidence within his control raises the presumption that, if produced, the evidence would operate against him); see also People v Pearson, 404 Mich 698, 721-722 ; 273 NW2d 856 (1979) (holding that the prosecutor’s failure to exercise due diligence in attempting to locate a res gestae witness entitled the defendant to an instruction that the jury may infer that the missing witness’ testimony would have been unfavorable to the prosecutor’s case); People v Davis, 199 Mich A

2002Barringer v Arnold, 358 Mich 594, 601, 604-605 ; 101 NW2d 365 (1960) (holding that a party’s failure to produce noncumulative evidence within his control raises the presumption that, if produced, the evidence would operate against him); see also People v Pearson, 404 Mich 698, 721-722 ; 273 NW2d 856 (1979) (holding that the prosecutor’s failure to exercise due diligence in attempting to locate a res gestae witness entitled the defendant to an instruction that the jury may infer that the missing witness’ testimony would have been unfavorable to the prosecutor’s case); People v Davis, 199 Mich A

1999He does not specifically claim that access to the blood sample would have allowed him to offer exculpatory evidence, explain or mitigate the original test results, or in any other way provide himself with a stronger defense. [6] See also Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 56 , 109 S.Ct. 333 , 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988), in which the United States Supreme Court, in the context of unpreserved breath samples, refused to suppress Breathalyzer test results and remarked: [F]irst, "the officers here were acting in `good faith and in accord with their normal practice'"; second, in the light of the proced

1999He does not specifically claim that access to the blood sample would have allowed him to offer exculpatory evidence, explain or mitigate the original test results, or in any other way provide himself with a stronger defense. [6] See also Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 56 , 109 S.Ct. 333 , 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988), in which the United States Supreme Court, in the context of unpreserved breath samples, refused to suppress Breathalyzer test results and remarked: [F]irst, "the officers here were acting in `good faith and in accord with their normal practice'"; second, in the light of the proced

1999Finally, we note the prosecution has argued defendant’s due process rights were not violated in this case, primarily relying on Trombetta, supra. Defendant relies on the search warrant statute, not the constitution, in arguing the police should have preserved the blood sample.

1999However, the majority also held that the destruction of the blood sample constituted a violation of M.C.L. § 780.655; MSA 28.1259(5). [3] On that basis, the Court of Appeals directed that, when this case is tried, the jury should be given "an adverse inference instruction." 232 Mich.App. at 354-356 , 591 N.W.2d 303 .

1999However, the majority also held that the destruction of the blood sample constituted a violation of M.C.L. § 780.655; MSA 28.1259(5). [3] On that basis, the Court of Appeals directed that, when this case is tried, the jury should be given "an adverse inference instruction." 232 Mich.App. at 354-356 , 591 N.W.2d 303 .

1995MRE 609; People v Allen, 429 Mich 558 ; 420 NW2d 499 (1988). 21 Although fact specific in application, the general rule is that the prosecutor may comment as long as such comment does not impermissibly refer to defendant’s silence.

1995MRE 609; People v Allen, 429 Mich 558 ; 420 NW2d 499 (1988). 21 Although fact specific in application, the general rule is that the prosecutor may comment as long as such comment does not impermissibly refer to defendant’s silence.