5 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1991–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Shelton v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2019See Shelton v. United States , 983 A.2d 363 , 369 (D.C. 2009), opinion amended on reh'g , 26 A.3d 216 , 26 A.3d 233 (D.C. 2011). | 1 | 1 |
Shelton v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2019See Shelton v. United States , 983 A.2d 363 , 369 (D.C. 2009), opinion amended on reh'g , 26 A.3d 216 , 26 A.3d 233 (D.C. 2011). | 1 | 1 |
Shelton v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2019See Shelton v. United States , 983 A.2d 363 , 369 (D.C. 2009), opinion amended on reh'g , 26 A.3d 216 , 26 A.3d 233 (D.C. 2011). | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2001See Woodall v. United States, 684 A.2d 1258, 1265 (D.C.1996) (absent “gross negligence” or “significant prejudice” in failing to preserve Jencks material, court’s decision not to strike testimony was not an abuse of discretion), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1130 , 117 S.Ct. 1278 , 137 L.Ed.2d 354 (1997); Williams v. United States, 385 A.2d 760, 763 (D.C.1978) (affirming trial court’s refusal to strike testimony despite evidence that police officer deliberately destroyed Jencks material). 2001See Woodall v. United States, 684 A.2d 1258, 1265 (D.C.1996) (absent "gross negligence" or "significant prejudice" in failing to preserve Jencks material, court's decision not to strike testimony was not an abuse of discretion), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1130 , 117 S.Ct. 1278 , 137 L.Ed.2d 354 (1997); Williams v. United States, 385 A.2d 760, 763 (D.C.1978) (affirming trial court's refusal to strike testimony despite evidence that police officer deliberately destroyed Jencks material). | 1 | 1 |
Scales v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2001See supru Part III, A. Finally, while newly surfaced evidence may give rise to the need for reconsideration of a pretrial suppression decision, see Scales v. United States, 687 A.2d 927, 937 (D.C.1996), and evidence of drug use is relevant to the determination of voluntariness, see (Cullen) Byrd v. United States, 618 A.2d 596, 598 (D.C.1992), the “new evidence” here was far from significant. 2001See supra Part III, A. Finally, while newly surfaced evidence may give rise to the need for reconsideration of a pretrial suppression decision, see Scales v. United States, 687 A.2d 927, 937 (D.C.1996), and evidence of drug use is relevant to the determination of voluntariness, see ( Cullen) Byrd v. United States, 618 A.2d 596, 598 (D.C. 1992), the "new evidence" here was far from significant. | 1 | 1 |
Byrd v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2001See supru Part III, A. Finally, while newly surfaced evidence may give rise to the need for reconsideration of a pretrial suppression decision, see Scales v. United States, 687 A.2d 927, 937 (D.C.1996), and evidence of drug use is relevant to the determination of voluntariness, see (Cullen) Byrd v. United States, 618 A.2d 596, 598 (D.C.1992), the “new evidence” here was far from significant. 2001See supra Part III, A. Finally, while newly surfaced evidence may give rise to the need for reconsideration of a pretrial suppression decision, see Scales v. United States, 687 A.2d 927, 937 (D.C.1996), and evidence of drug use is relevant to the determination of voluntariness, see ( Cullen) Byrd v. United States, 618 A.2d 596, 598 (D.C. 1992), the "new evidence" here was far from significant. | 1 | 1 |
Woodall v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2001See Woodall v. United States, 684 A.2d 1258, 1265 (D.C.1996) (absent “gross negligence” or “significant prejudice” in failing to preserve Jencks material, court’s decision not to strike testimony was not an abuse of discretion), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1130 , 117 S.Ct. 1278 , 137 L.Ed.2d 354 (1997); Williams v. United States, 385 A.2d 760, 763 (D.C.1978) (affirming trial court’s refusal to strike testimony despite evidence that police officer deliberately destroyed Jencks material). 2001See Woodall v. United States, 684 A.2d 1258, 1265 (D.C.1996) (absent "gross negligence" or "significant prejudice" in failing to preserve Jencks material, court's decision not to strike testimony was not an abuse of discretion), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1130 , 117 S.Ct. 1278 , 137 L.Ed.2d 354 (1997); Williams v. United States, 385 A.2d 760, 763 (D.C.1978) (affirming trial court's refusal to strike testimony despite evidence that police officer deliberately destroyed Jencks material). | 1 | 1 |
Carpenter v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2001See Woodall v. United States, 684 A.2d 1258, 1265 (D.C.1996) (absent “gross negligence” or “significant prejudice” in failing to preserve Jencks material, court’s decision not to strike testimony was not an abuse of discretion), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1130 , 117 S.Ct. 1278 , 137 L.Ed.2d 354 (1997); Williams v. United States, 385 A.2d 760, 763 (D.C.1978) (affirming trial court’s refusal to strike testimony despite evidence that police officer deliberately destroyed Jencks material). 2001See Woodall v. United States, 684 A.2d 1258, 1265 (D.C.1996) (absent "gross negligence" or "significant prejudice" in failing to preserve Jencks material, court's decision not to strike testimony was not an abuse of discretion), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1130 , 117 S.Ct. 1278 , 137 L.Ed.2d 354 (1997); Williams v. United States, 385 A.2d 760, 763 (D.C.1978) (affirming trial court's refusal to strike testimony despite evidence that police officer deliberately destroyed Jencks material). | 1 | 1 |
Ramos v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2001See Woodall v. United States, 684 A.2d 1258, 1265 (D.C.1996) (absent “gross negligence” or “significant prejudice” in failing to preserve Jencks material, court’s decision not to strike testimony was not an abuse of discretion), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1130 , 117 S.Ct. 1278 , 137 L.Ed.2d 354 (1997); Williams v. United States, 385 A.2d 760, 763 (D.C.1978) (affirming trial court’s refusal to strike testimony despite evidence that police officer deliberately destroyed Jencks material). 2001See Woodall v. United States, 684 A.2d 1258, 1265 (D.C.1996) (absent "gross negligence" or "significant prejudice" in failing to preserve Jencks material, court's decision not to strike testimony was not an abuse of discretion), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1130 , 117 S.Ct. 1278 , 137 L.Ed.2d 354 (1997); Williams v. United States, 385 A.2d 760, 763 (D.C.1978) (affirming trial court's refusal to strike testimony despite evidence that police officer deliberately destroyed Jencks material). | 1 | 1 |
Keller v. Gillgreen2 sentences1994See Mathews v. O’Donnell, 289 Mo. 235 , 233 S.W. 451, 459 (1921). 28 Indeed, it has been said that “the failure to deny charges of fraud is tantamount to an admission of the truth of those charges.” Brooks, supra, 218 A.2d at 189 (citing Berger v. Bullock, 85 Md. 441 , 37 A. 368, 369 (1897)); see also Keller v. Gill, 92 Md. 190 , 48 A. 69, 71 (1900). 1994See Mathews v. O’Donnell, 289 Mo. 235 , 233 S.W. 451, 459 (1921). 28 Indeed, it has been said that “the failure to deny charges of fraud is tantamount to an admission of the truth of those charges.” Brooks, supra, 218 A.2d at 189 (citing Berger v. Bullock, 85 Md. 441 , 37 A. 368, 369 (1897)); see also Keller v. Gill, 92 Md. 190 , 48 A. 69, 71 (1900). | 1 | 1 |
Mathews v. O'Donnellgreen2 sentences1994See Mathews v. O’Donnell, 289 Mo. 235 , 233 S.W. 451, 459 (1921). 28 Indeed, it has been said that “the failure to deny charges of fraud is tantamount to an admission of the truth of those charges.” Brooks, supra, 218 A.2d at 189 (citing Berger v. Bullock, 85 Md. 441 , 37 A. 368, 369 (1897)); see also Keller v. Gill, 92 Md. 190 , 48 A. 69, 71 (1900). 1994See Mathews v. O’Donnell, 289 Mo. 235 , 233 S.W. 451, 459 (1921). 28 Indeed, it has been said that “the failure to deny charges of fraud is tantamount to an admission of the truth of those charges.” Brooks, supra, 218 A.2d at 189 (citing Berger v. Bullock, 85 Md. 441 , 37 A. 368, 369 (1897)); see also Keller v. Gill, 92 Md. 190 , 48 A. 69, 71 (1900). | 1 | 1 |
Berger v. Bullockgreen2 sentences1994See Mathews v. O’Donnell, 289 Mo. 235 , 233 S.W. 451, 459 (1921). 28 Indeed, it has been said that “the failure to deny charges of fraud is tantamount to an admission of the truth of those charges.” Brooks, supra, 218 A.2d at 189 (citing Berger v. Bullock, 85 Md. 441 , 37 A. 368, 369 (1897)); see also Keller v. Gill, 92 Md. 190 , 48 A. 69, 71 (1900). 1994See Mathews v. O’Donnell, 289 Mo. 235 , 233 S.W. 451, 459 (1921). 28 Indeed, it has been said that “the failure to deny charges of fraud is tantamount to an admission of the truth of those charges.” Brooks, supra, 218 A.2d at 189 (citing Berger v. Bullock, 85 Md. 441 , 37 A. 368, 369 (1897)); see also Keller v. Gill, 92 Md. 190 , 48 A. 69, 71 (1900). | 1 | 1 |
Brooks v. Daleygreen2 sentences1994See Mathews v. O'Donnell, 289 Mo. 235 , 233 S.W. 451, 459 (1921). [28] Indeed, it has been said that "the failure to deny charges of fraud is tantamount to an admission of the truth of those charges." Brooks, supra, 218 A.2d at 189 (citing Berger v. Bullock, 85 Md. 441 , 37 A. 368, 369 (1897)); see also Keller v. Gill, 92 Md. 190 , 48 A. 69, 71 (1900). 1994See Mathews v. O’Donnell, 289 Mo. 235 , 233 S.W. 451, 459 (1921). 28 Indeed, it has been said that “the failure to deny charges of fraud is tantamount to an admission of the truth of those charges.” Brooks, supra, 218 A.2d at 189 (citing Berger v. Bullock, 85 Md. 441 , 37 A. 368, 369 (1897)); see also Keller v. Gill, 92 Md. 190 , 48 A. 69, 71 (1900). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Williams v. Washington Hospital Center
green
2 sentences2010However, "[w]here the negligence is not intentional or reckless, the court is accorded discretion in determining whether to give an adverse inference instruction and we will not disturb its decision absent an abuse of that discretion." Williams, 601 A.2d at 31 . 2010However, “[w]here the negligence is not intentional or reckless, the court is accorded discretion in determining whether to give an adverse inference instruction and we will not disturb its decision absent an abuse of that discretion.” Williams, 601 A.2d at 31 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Everett v. Everett
green
2 sentences1994In Everett v. Everett, 170 A.2d 779, 780 (D.C. 1961), we held that a husband's failure to take the stand in a divorce proceeding to explain statements in a letter which appeared to support his wife's contentions "should have given rise to an inference that his testimony would not have been favorable to his own case." Differences in articulation probably reflect variations in factual context, and we do not take the position that an adverse inference or presumption is mandated in every case. 1994In Everett v. Everett, 170 A.2d 779, 780 (D.C.1961), we held that a husband’s failure to take the stand in a divorce proceeding to explain statements in a letter which appeared to support his wife’s contentions “should have given rise to an inference that his testimony would not have been favorable to his own case.” Differences in articulation probably reflect variations in factual context, and we do not take the position that an adverse inference or presumption is mandated in every case. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Battocchi v. Washington Hospital Center
green
2 sentences1991Moreover, under Battocchi , even if the trial court does not find “gross indifference or reckless disregard,” it may at its discretion impose an adverse inference instruction after consideration of three factors: [1] “the degree of negligence or bad faith involved, [2] the importance of the evidence lost to the issues at hand, and [3] the availability of other proof enabling the party deprived of the evidence to make the same point.” Battocchi, supra, 581 A.2d at 767 . 1991Moreover, under Battocchi , even if the trial court does not find “gross indifference or reckless disregard,” it may at its discretion impose an adverse inference instruction after consideration of three factors: [1] “the degree of negligence or bad faith involved, [2] the importance of the evidence lost to the issues at hand, and [3] the availability of other proof enabling the party deprived of the evidence to make the same point.” Battocchi, supra, 581 A.2d at 767 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.