psychotherapist-patient privilege in California

2026(People v. Hammon, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1127 ; People v. Stritzinger (1983) 34 Cal.3d 505, 511 [“The psychotherapist-patient privilege has been recognized as an aspect of the patient’s constitutional right to privacy”].) For example, had Pollano requested the records again after T.D.’s direct examination, the court may have been able to better weigh the competing rights.

2024The psychotherapist-patient privilege recognizes “that an environment of confidentiality of treatment is vitally important to the successful operation of psychotherapy.” (In re Lifschutz (1970) 2 Cal.3d 415, 422 (Lifschutz).) “Confidential communications between psychotherapist and patient are protected in order to encourage those who may pose a threat to themselves or to others, because of some mental or emotional disturbance, to seek professional assistance.” (People v. Stritzinger (1983) 34 Cal.3d 505, 511 (Stritzinger).) The privilege is “an aspect of the patient’s constitutional right to

2024The psychotherapist-patient privilege recognizes “that an environment of confidentiality of treatment is vitally important to the successful operation of psychotherapy.” (In re Lifschutz (1970) 2 Cal.3d 415, 422 (Lifschutz).) “Confidential communications between psychotherapist and patient are protected in order to encourage those who may pose a threat to themselves or to others, because of some mental or emotional disturbance, to seek professional assistance.” (People v. Stritzinger (1983) 34 Cal.3d 505, 511 (Stritzinger).) The privilege is “an aspect of the patient’s constitutional right to

2024(See Lemelle v. Superior Court (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 148 , 161―162 [psychotherapist-patient privilege applies absent a statutory exception].) 12 this competency proceeding because T.M., through his counsel, tendered the issue of his competency to stand trial to the juvenile court.7 Section 1016, known as “the patient-litigant exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege” (Lifschutz, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 433 ), states in relevant part: “There is no [psychotherapist-patient] privilege . . . as to a communication relevant to an issue concerning the mental or emotional condition of the patie

2024Nevertheless, “ ‘the psychotherapist-patient privilege is not absolute.’ ” (Fish v. Superior Court (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 811 , 818.) The Legislature has “adopted numerous explicit statutory exceptions to the privilege that limit the circumstances in which the privilege is applicable.” (Gonzales, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 372 .) These exceptions establish circumstances where the policy favoring the protection of psychotherapist-patient communications must yield to other important state interests.

2023For example, the mere fact of the patient’s entry into a facility for treatment may be subject to the confidentiality provisions of section 5328, but it may not be protected under Evidence Code section 1014. [Citation.] Likewise, communications between the patient and a non-clinician employee of a hospital that are found in a medical record may be confidential under section 5328 but may not be subject to the psychotherapist-patient privilege.” (Sorenson, supra, 219 Cal.App.4th at p. 446 .) “ ‘Despite its broad and protective nature, the psychotherapist-patient privilege is not absolute. [Citat

2022Alston asserts the records were protected by the psychotherapist-patient privilege of Evidence Code section 1014, and therefore the trial court was required to determine if he waived the privilege, citing Roberts v. Superior Court (1973) 9 Cal.3d 330 .

2021J. that Fernando Nieves, or defendant, could legally waive the psychotherapist-patient privilege during their custody dispute (see In re Cole C. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 900, 911, fn. 3 ), and disclosure by Dr. Jacobs did not otherwise constitute waiver (Roberts v. Superior Court (1973) 9 Cal.3d 330, 341 ).

2023Furthermore, concluding that a petitioner seeking to terminate registration waives the psychotherapist-patient privilege could also have the unintended effect of causing tier one registrants to avoid seeking psychological treatment and/or causing them to be reluctant to “make the full disclosure upon which diagnosis and treatment … depends.” (People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 555 [“We have previously recognized ‘the public interest in supporting effective treatment of mental illness and ... the consequent public importance of safeguarding the confidential character of psychotherapeutic c

2021(People v. Gonzales (2013) 56 Cal.4th 353, 372 .) “[T]he psychotherapist-patient privilege is to be liberally construed in favor of the patient.” (Roberts v. Superior Court (1973) 9 Cal.3d 330, 337 (Roberts).) “We have an ‘obligation to construe narrowly any exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege: we must apply such an exception only when the patient’s case falls squarely within its ambit.’ ” (People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 554 .) “The privilege is also considered ‘paramount to prosecution,’ generally outweighing the People’s interest in successful prosecutions and their r

2026Specifically, whether or not [M.W.] informed the therapist that the defendant provided the items in question, the lubricant, the condoms, and a vibrator, is that the gist of it?” Defense counsel agreed, noted he understood there were certain records protected by the psychotherapist-patient privilege, but asserted that privilege is limited, citing Evidence Code section 912 and People v. Hammon (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1117 (Hammon).

2026(People v. Hammon, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1127 ; People v. Stritzinger (1983) 34 Cal.3d 505, 511 [“The psychotherapist-patient privilege has been recognized as an aspect of the patient’s constitutional right to privacy”].) For example, had Pollano requested the records again after T.D.’s direct examination, the court may have been able to better weigh the competing rights.

2017(See In re Christopher M. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 684 , 695, 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 61 [probation condition requiring disclosure to the probation officer and the court of all records concerning the juvenile's court-ordered medical and psychological treatment did not violate the federal right to privacy], disapproved on other grounds in Gonzales , at p. 375, fn. 6, 154 Cal.Rptr.3d 38 , 296 P.3d 945 .) Even without any waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege, the psychotherapist has a statutory duty to report suspected child abuse or neglect. (§ 11165.7, subd. (a)(21); see generally People v. Str

2017(See In re Christopher M. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 684 , 695, 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 61 [probation condition requiring disclosure to the probation officer and the court of all records concerning the juvenile's court-ordered medical and psychological treatment did not violate the federal right to privacy], disapproved on other grounds in Gonzales , at p. 375, fn. 6, 154 Cal.Rptr.3d 38 , 296 P.3d 945 .) Even without any waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege, the psychotherapist has a statutory duty to report suspected child abuse or neglect. (§ 11165.7, subd. (a)(21); see generally People v. Str

2019By its very terms, the People's 'right to truth-in-evidence' 12 under article I, section 28, [former] subdivision (d) [now subdivision, (f)(2)] of the California Constitution does not 'affect any existing statutory rule of evidence relating to privilege . . . .' Implicit therein is a constitutional determination that the privilege does not undermine the integrity or reliability of the truth-finding function of legal proceedings." ( Menendez, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 456-457, fn. 18; see Nielsen, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at p. 1154 ["The concept of balancing the interest in protecting the psychothe

2019Unlike the physician-patient privilege, for example, the psychotherapist-patient privilege can be invoked in a criminal proceeding.' " (Nielsen v. Superior Court (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1150, 1154 (Nielsen); San Diego Trolley, Inc. v. Superior Court (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1083, 1091 (San Diego Trolley) ["unlike the physician-patient privilege, the psychotherapist-patient privilege is not subject to a good cause exception in personal injury actions"]; Wharton, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 551-552.) "The privilege is also considered 'paramount to prosecution,' generally outweighing the People's interest

2019Unlike the physician-patient privilege, for example, the psychotherapist-patient privilege can be invoked in a criminal proceeding.' " (Nielsen v. Superior Court (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1150, 1154 (Nielsen); San Diego Trolley, Inc. v. Superior Court (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1083, 1091 (San Diego Trolley) ["unlike the physician-patient privilege, the psychotherapist-patient privilege is not subject to a good cause exception in personal injury actions"]; Wharton, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 551-552.) "The privilege is also considered 'paramount to prosecution,' generally outweighing the People's interest

2016(See San Diego Trolley, Inc. v. Superior Court (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1083, 1092 [ 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 476 ] [waiver of psychotherapist-patient privilege “ ‘must be a voluntary and knowing act done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.’ [Citation.]”) Indeed, the All-County Letter itself indicates that a dependent’s privacy should be respected, stating: “To the extent possible, verification for all 5 conditions should be obtained in the manner that respects the nonminor dependent’s privacy . . . and without asking the nonminor to obtain any special document

1992(See, e.g., Board of Medical Quality Assurance v. Gherardini, supra, 93 Cal.App.3d 669 ; Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court, supra, 15 Cal.3d 652 ; Johnson v. Board of Education (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 593, 597 [ 224 Cal.Rptr. 885 ].) In her argument that petitioner failed to establish the foundation necessary for the assertion of the psychotherapist-patient privilege, respondent correctly notes the absence of any declaration from petitioner which sets forth the specific psychotherapist-patient relationship.

1992(See, e.g., Board of Medical Quality Assurance v. Gherardini, supra, 93 Cal. App.3d 669 ; Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court, supra, 15 Cal.3d 652 ; Johnson v. Board of Education (1986) 179 Cal. App.3d 593, 597 [ 224 Cal. Rptr. 885 ].) In her argument that petitioner failed to establish the foundation necessary for the assertion of the psychotherapist-patient privilege, respondent correctly notes the absence of any declaration from petitioner which sets forth the specific psychotherapist-patient relationship. ( Mahoney v. Superior Court, supra, 142 Cal. App.3d 937, 940 .) Such specificity

2005Communications such as these, when made in confidence, should not operate to destroy the privilege." ( Farrell L., supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at p. 527, 250 Cal.Rptr. 25 , italics added.) In In re Pedro M. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 550 , 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 839 , the juvenile court ordered a minor to "`[c]ooperate in a plan for psychiatric, psychological testing or treatment." ( Id. at p. 553, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 839 .) The minor subsequently contended the juvenile court erroneously admitted the testimony of his therapist after he invoked the psychotherapist-patient privilege. ( Id. at p. 554, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 839

2005Communications such as these, when made in confidence, should not operate to destroy the privilege." ( Farrell L., supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at p. 527, 250 Cal.Rptr. 25 , italics added.) In In re Pedro M. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 550 , 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 839 , the juvenile court ordered a minor to "`[c]ooperate in a plan for psychiatric, psychological testing or treatment." ( Id. at p. 553, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 839 .) The minor subsequently contended the juvenile court erroneously admitted the testimony of his therapist after he invoked the psychotherapist-patient privilege. ( Id. at p. 554, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 839

2001On appeal, this court assumed "that the allegations of the complaint state causes of action and that relief would be foreclosed by application of section 47, subdivision 2, unless an alleged violation of a constitutional right requires an exception from that statute." ( Id at p. 841, 228 Cal.Rptr. 545 , fn. omitted.) Reversing the judgment, we saw the need to engage in "a balancing of the policy underlying Civil Code section 47, subdivision 2, with [the plaintiffs] right to maintain the privacy of communication with his psychotherapist." ( Cutter v. Brownbridge, supra, 183 Cal.App.3d at p. 844

2001On appeal, this court assumed "that the allegations of the complaint state causes of action and that relief would be foreclosed by application of section 47, subdivision 2, unless an alleged violation of a constitutional right requires an exception from that statute." ( Id at p. 841, 228 Cal.Rptr. 545 , fn. omitted.) Reversing the judgment, we saw the need to engage in "a balancing of the policy underlying Civil Code section 47, subdivision 2, with [the plaintiffs] right to maintain the privacy of communication with his psychotherapist." ( Cutter v. Brownbridge, supra, 183 Cal.App.3d at p. 844

2024The psychotherapist-patient privilege recognizes “that an environment of confidentiality of treatment is vitally important to the successful operation of psychotherapy.” (In re Lifschutz (1970) 2 Cal.3d 415, 422 (Lifschutz).) “Confidential communications between psychotherapist and patient are protected in order to encourage those who may pose a threat to themselves or to others, because of some mental or emotional disturbance, to seek professional assistance.” (People v. Stritzinger (1983) 34 Cal.3d 505, 511 (Stritzinger).) The privilege is “an aspect of the patient’s constitutional right to

2021(People v. Gonzales (2013) 56 Cal.4th 353, 372 .) “[T]he psychotherapist-patient privilege is to be liberally construed in favor of the patient.” (Roberts v. Superior Court (1973) 9 Cal.3d 330, 337 (Roberts).) “We have an ‘obligation to construe narrowly any exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege: we must apply such an exception only when the patient’s case falls squarely within its ambit.’ ” (People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 554 .) “The privilege is also considered ‘paramount to prosecution,’ generally outweighing the People’s interest in successful prosecutions and their r

2013(See In re Kristine W. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 521, 528 [ 114 Cal.Rptr.2d 369 ] [where juvenile court ordered dependent child to undergo therapy to ameliorate the effects of abuse or neglect, Court of Appeal concluded that “the psychotherapist-patient privilege protects [the child’s] confidential communications and details of the therapy, but does not preclude her therapist from giving circumscribed information to *376 accomplish the information-gathering goal of therapy”]; In re Pedro M., supra, 81 Cal.App.4th 550, 554-555 [Where a juvenile sex offender was required to participate in therapy in

2013Code, supra, foll. § 912, pp. 78-79.) 6 We disapprove the Court of Appeal decisions in In re Christopher M., supra, 127 Cal.App.4th 684 , and In re Pedro M., supra, 81 Cal.App.4th 550 , insofar as they hold that the language of section 1012 in question creates an exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege. 7 Unlike instances in which a private individual voluntarily and confidentially seeks treatment from a psychotherapist—where the fact that treatment has been sought may itself be considered confidential information (see, e.g., Smith v. Superior Court (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 136, 140-14

2016In Griswold [v.] Connecticut [(1965)] 381 U.S. 479, 484 [ 14 L.Ed.2d 510 , 85 S.Ct. 1678 ], the United States Supreme Court declared that ‘Various guarantees [of the Bill of Rights] create zones of privacy,’ and we believe that the confidentiality of the psychotherapeutic session falls within one such zone.” (Last brackets in original.) The psychotherapist-patient privilege also invokes the right of privacy guaranteed by article I, section 1 of the California Constitution.

2016In Griswold [v.] Connecticut [(1965)] 381 U.S. 479, 484 [ 14 L.Ed.2d 510 , 85 S.Ct. 1678 ], the United States Supreme Court declared that ‘Various guarantees [of the Bill of Rights] create zones of privacy,’ and we believe that the confidentiality of the psychotherapeutic session falls within one such zone.” (Last brackets in original.) The psychotherapist-patient privilege also invokes the right of privacy guaranteed by article I, section 1 of the California Constitution.

2016This case is not akin to In re Kristine W. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 521 [ 114 Cal.Rptr.2d 369 ], in which a minor’s psychotherapist-patient privilege was permitted to be invaded for the limited purpose of gathering information to ensure minor was receiving appropriate services.

2016This case is not akin to In re Kristine W. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 521 [ 114 Cal.Rptr.2d 369 ], in which a minor’s psychotherapist-patient privilege was permitted to be invaded for the limited purpose of gathering information to ensure minor was receiving appropriate services.

2005In People v. Gomez (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 874 , 185 Cal.Rptr. 155 , the defendant contended that statements he made to students serving as interns with the family court services office were privileged. ( Id. at p. 880, 185 Cal.Rptr. 155 .) Gomez rejected that argument, noting the psychotherapist-patient privilege extended to virtually every licensed classification of "therapist" but did not apply to student interns. ( Id. at pp. 880-881, 185 Cal.Rptr. 155 .) Gomez went on to state, however, that under some circumstances, communications to student interns could be privileged if the students were

2005In People v. Gomez (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 874 , 185 Cal.Rptr. 155 , the defendant contended that statements he made to students serving as interns with the family court services office were privileged. ( Id. at p. 880, 185 Cal.Rptr. 155 .) Gomez rejected that argument, noting the psychotherapist-patient privilege extended to virtually every licensed classification of "therapist" but did not apply to student interns. ( Id. at pp. 880-881, 185 Cal.Rptr. 155 .) Gomez went on to state, however, that under some circumstances, communications to student interns could be privileged if the students were

2024In so contending, defendant focuses principally on the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation and cross-examination and cases such as People v. Reber (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 523 (Reber), which apply a balancing test to assess when the psychotherapist-patient privilege must yield to this constitutional right.

2017The court in People v. Reber (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 523 , 223 Cal.Rptr. 139 ( Reber ) found that the court should weigh, at an in camera hearing, the defendant's constitutional right to confront a witness against the witness's privilege to keep psychiatric records confidential. ( Id. at p. 532, 223 Cal.Rptr. 139 .) The California Supreme Court overruled Reber and its progeny in People v. Hammon (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1117 , 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 938 P.2d 986 ( Hammon ): "In seeking disclosure of documents protected by the psychotherapist-patient privilege, defendant relied on [ Reber ] and cases follow

1984(Compare Britt v. Superior Court, supra, 20 Cal.3d 844 ; Church of Hakeem, Inc. v. Superior Court (1980) 110 Cal. App.3d 384 [ 168 Cal. Rptr. 13 ].) Nor does disclosure invade an established privilege, such as the physician-patient privilege ( Britt, supra, at pp. 862-864 ) or the psychotherapist-patient privilege ( In re Lifschutz, supra, 2 Cal.3d at pp. 429-435).

1984(Compare Britt v. Superior Court, supra, 20 Cal.3d 844; Church of Hakeem, Inc. v. Superior Court (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 384 [ 168 Cal.Rptr. 13 ].) Nor does disclosure invade an established privilege, such as the physician-patient privilege (Britt, supra, at pp. 862-864 ) or the psychotherapist-patient privilege (In re Lifschutz, supra, 2 Cal.3d at pp. 429-435).

2017(Stritzinger, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 511 ; see Story v. Superior Court (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1007, 1014 [ 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 532 ] (Story); Grosslight v. Superior Court (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 502 [ 140 Cal.Rptr. 278 ].) However, the psychotherapist-patient privilege, like the right to privacy, is not absolute.

2017(Stritzinger, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 511 ; see Story v. Superior Court (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1007, 1014 [ 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 532 ] (Story); Grosslight v. Superior Court (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 502 [ 140 Cal.Rptr. 278 ].) However, the psychotherapist-patient privilege, like the right to privacy, is not absolute.

2023(See, e.g., Mavroudis, supra, 102 Cal.App.3d 594, 598 , 601–604 [in action for damages by parents against hospitals who treated their son for mental health issues after son attacked parents with a hammer, the hospitals objected to the release of the records under both Welfare and Institutions Code section 5328 and Evidence Code section 1014; the appellate court held that section 5328 authorized disclosure of the records unless the evidence was otherwise nondiscloseable and then went on to analyze the applicability of Evidence Code sections 1014 and 1024].) While Evidence Code section 915 prohi

2015“Subdivision (f) of Section 5328 does not authorize the court to order disclosure of matter which the Evidence Code makes privileged. [Citation.]” (People v. Gardner (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 134, 141 ; Mavroudis v. Superior Court, supra, 102 Cal.App.3d at p. 602 .) That is, mental health records produced to the juvenile court pursuant to section 5328, subdivision (f) are subject to disclosure to the parties if the records are not subject to the psychotherapist-patient privilege under the Evidence Code.

2023The protective privilege ends where the public peril begins.’ ” (People v. One Ruger .22-Caliber Pistol (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 310, 315 (22-Caliber Pistol), quoting Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425, 442 (Tarasoff).) Moreover, unlike the common law duty to warn articulated in Tarasoff, the exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege set forth in Evidence Code 1024, by its plain terms, does not require danger to a readily identifiable victim.

2004Because section 43.92 was prompted by Tarasoff and Hedlund, and because Tarasoff itself is rooted in the psychotherapist-patient privilege (see Tarasoff, supra, 17 Cal.3d 425, 441 ), the two statutory schemes should be accorded complementary interpretations, if at all possible.

2016The trial court's order in that case had held that compelling disclosure was proper under Evidence Code section 999, which provides an exception to the physician-patient privilege. 14 ( City of Alhambra v. Superior Court, supra, 110 Cal.App.3d at p. 519 , 168 Cal.Rptr. 49 .) But the Court of Appeal held that the cited exception cannot be applied to the psychotherapist-patient privilege: " Section 999 is applicable only to article 6 of division 8, chapter 4 of the Evidence Code, the physician-patient privilege.

2016The trial court's order in that case had held that compelling disclosure was proper under Evidence Code section 999, which provides an exception to the physician-patient privilege. 14 ( City of Alhambra v. Superior Court, supra, 110 Cal.App.3d at p. 519 , 168 Cal.Rptr. 49 .) But the Court of Appeal held that the cited exception cannot be applied to the psychotherapist-patient privilege: " Section 999 is applicable only to article 6 of division 8, chapter 4 of the Evidence Code, the physician-patient privilege.

2013Code, supra, foll. § 912, pp. 78-79.) 6 We disapprove the Court of Appeal decisions in In re Christopher M., supra, 127 Cal.App.4th 684 , and In re Pedro M., supra, 81 Cal.App.4th 550 , insofar as they hold that the language of section 1012 in question creates an exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege. 7 Unlike instances in which a private individual voluntarily and confidentially seeks treatment from a psychotherapist—where the fact that treatment has been sought may itself be considered confidential information (see, e.g., Smith v. Superior Court (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 136, 140-14

2013Code, supra, foll. § 912, pp. 78-79.) 6 We disapprove the Court of Appeal decisions in In re Christopher M., supra, 127 Cal.App.4th 684 , and In re Pedro M., supra, 81 Cal.App.4th 550 , insofar as they hold that the language of section 1012 in question creates an exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege. 7 Unlike instances in which a private individual voluntarily and confidentially seeks treatment from a psychotherapist—where the fact that treatment has been sought may itself be considered confidential information (see, e.g., Smith v. Superior Court (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 136, 140-14

2006(People v. Clark, supra, 50 Cal.3d 583, 620-621 [although defense psychologist properly disclosed communications to third parties to avert potential danger to them, thereby eliminating the psychotherapist-patient privilege, attorney-client privilege nevertheless applied].) In Clark, we noted that the purpose of the psychotherapist-patient privilege is to promote the therapeutic relationship, a purpose that “can no longer be achieved once the therapist has revealed the confidential communications to third parties.” (Id. at p. 621.) In contrast, however, we found no provision in the Evidence Cod

1993Code, §§ 952, 954, 1010-1027; People v. Clark (1990) 50 Cal.3d 583, 619-623 [ 268 Cal.Rptr. 399 , 789 P.2d 127 ]; People v. Caro (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1035, 1060, fn. 11 [ 251 Cal.Rptr. 757 , 761 P.2d 680 ].) Defendant correctly concedes that at the time he tendered his mental defense at trial, he waived the applicable psychotherapist-patient privilege.