psychotherapist-patient privilege in New Hampshire

2010Compare In re Kathleen M., 126 N.H. at 385-87 (holding mere conclusory statement that treating physician offers best evidence as to dangerousness insufficient to establish necessity where other sources of information were potentially available), with State v. Kupchun, 117 N.H. 412, 415-16 (1977) (finding that without disclosure of privileged records as best information available bearing on defendant’s dangerousness and mental condition, the State would have been “virtually deprived” of evidence to present to trial court in recommitment hearing).

2006The psychotherapist-patient privilege must yield when disclosure of the information concerned is considered “essential.” Id. at 415 .

2011The trial court further ruled that "by the nature of the plaintiff's claim for loss of enjoyment of life and pain and suffering, she has waived the psychotherapist-patient privilege." Id. (quotation and brackets omitted).

2011The plaintiff brought an interlocutory appeal of the trial court's ruling, arguing that the court's order violated "the psychotherapist-patient privilege, and that she did not waive the privilege simply by claiming generic damages that are likely to arise from the injuries caused by the medical negligence alleged." Id.

2010Compare In re Kathleen M., 126 N.H. at 385-87 , 493 A.2d 472 (holding mere conclusory statement that treating physician offers best evidence as to dangerousness insufficient to establish necessity where other sources of information were potentially available), with State v. Kupchun, 117 N.H. 412, 415-16 , 373 A.2d 1325 (1977) (finding that without disclosure of privileged records as best information available bearing on defendant's dangerousness and mental condition, the State would have been "virtually deprived" of evidence to present to trial court in recommitment hearing).

2010Compare In re Kathleen M., 126 N.H. at 385-87 (holding mere conclusory statement that treating physician offers best evidence as to dangerousness insufficient to establish necessity where other sources of information were potentially available), with State v. Kupchun, 117 N.H. 412, 415-16 (1977) (finding that without disclosure of privileged records as best information available bearing on defendant’s dangerousness and mental condition, the State would have been “virtually deprived” of evidence to present to trial court in recommitment hearing).

2010See, e.g., Desclos, 153 N.H. at 615 , 903 A.2d 952 ("The psychotherapist-patient privilege must yield when disclosure of the information concerned is considered essential." (quotation omitted)); Elwell, 132 N.H. at 605-06 , 567 A.2d 1002 (although "the physician-patient privilege is not absolute and will yield when the *220 disclosure of information is essential," where other sources of information are available, the effective enforcement of drunk driving laws, though compelling, is not grounds for piercing the privilege); McGranahan v. Dahar, 119 N.H. 758, 764 , 408 A.2d 121 (1979) ("The atto

2010See, e.g., Desclos, 153 N.H. at 615 (“The psychotherapist-patient privilege must yield when disclosure of the information concerned is considered essential.” (quotation omitted)); Elwell, 132 N.H. at 605-06 (although “the physician-patient privilege is not absolute and will yield when the disclosure of information is essential,” where other sources of information are available, the effective enforcement of drunk driving laws, though compelling, is not grounds for piercing the privilege); McGranahan v. Dahar, 119 N.H. 758, 764 (1979) (“The attorney-client privilege may not be absolute when ther

2011With respect to the psychotherapist-patient privilege, we have found the public policy behind this privilege "may be even more compelling than that behind the usual physician-patient privilege." In the Matter of Berg & Berg, 152 N.H. 658, 664 , 886 A.2d 980 (2005).

2011With respect to the psychotherapist-patient privilege, we have found the public policy behind this privilege "may be even more compelling than that behind the usual physician-patient privilege." In the Matter of Berg & Berg, 152 N.H. 658, 664 , 886 A.2d 980 (2005).

2010See, e.g., Desclos, 153 N.H. at 615 , 903 A.2d 952 ("The psychotherapist-patient privilege must yield when disclosure of the information concerned is considered essential." (quotation omitted)); Elwell, 132 N.H. at 605-06 , 567 A.2d 1002 (although "the physician-patient privilege is not absolute and will yield when the *220 disclosure of information is essential," where other sources of information are available, the effective enforcement of drunk driving laws, though compelling, is not grounds for piercing the privilege); McGranahan v. Dahar, 119 N.H. 758, 764 , 408 A.2d 121 (1979) ("The atto

2010See, e.g., Desclos, 153 N.H. at 615 (“The psychotherapist-patient privilege must yield when disclosure of the information concerned is considered essential.” (quotation omitted)); Elwell, 132 N.H. at 605-06 (although “the physician-patient privilege is not absolute and will yield when the disclosure of information is essential,” where other sources of information are available, the effective enforcement of drunk driving laws, though compelling, is not grounds for piercing the privilege); McGranahan v. Dahar, 119 N.H. 758, 764 (1979) (“The attorney-client privilege may not be absolute when ther

2010See, e.g., Desclos, 153 N.H. at 615 , 903 A.2d 952 ("The psychotherapist-patient privilege must yield when disclosure of the information concerned is considered essential." (quotation omitted)); Elwell, 132 N.H. at 605-06 , 567 A.2d 1002 (although "the physician-patient privilege is not absolute and will yield when the *220 disclosure of information is essential," where other sources of information are available, the effective enforcement of drunk driving laws, though compelling, is not grounds for piercing the privilege); McGranahan v. Dahar, 119 N.H. 758, 764 , 408 A.2d 121 (1979) ("The atto

2010See, e.g., Desclos, 153 N.H. at 615 (“The psychotherapist-patient privilege must yield when disclosure of the information concerned is considered essential.” (quotation omitted)); Elwell, 132 N.H. at 605-06 (although “the physician-patient privilege is not absolute and will yield when the disclosure of information is essential,” where other sources of information are available, the effective enforcement of drunk driving laws, though compelling, is not grounds for piercing the privilege); McGranahan v. Dahar, 119 N.H. 758, 764 (1979) (“The attorney-client privilege may not be absolute when ther

2020State v. Gagne, 136 N.H. 101, 105 (1992).

2006“To establish essential need, the party seeking the privileged records must prove both that the targeted information is unavailable from another source and that there is a compelling justification for its disclosure.” In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Medical Records of Payne), 150 N.H. 436, 442 (2004).

2006Courts in other jurisdictions have held that a plaintiff impliedly waives the psychotherapist-patient privilege by putting his or her emotional or mental condition “at issue,” e.g., Jackson v. Chubb Corp., 193 F.R.D. 216, 225 (D.