assigned claim in New York

1904Jefferson Bank v. Gossett, 86 N. Y.

1904Jefferson Bank v. Gossett, 86 N. Y.

2025Under these circumstances, the court fashioned an appropriate remedy under CPLR 3103 and 3126 ( see Dojce v 1302 Realty Co., LLC , 199 AD3d at 650 ; Wright v Mount Vernon Hosp. , 88 AD3d 873, 874 ).

2025Under these circumstances, the court fashioned an appropriate remedy under CPLR 3103 and 3126 ( see Dojce v 1302 Realty Co., LLC , 199 AD3d at 650 ; Wright v Mount Vernon Hosp. , 88 AD3d 873, 874 ).

2009De-Con’s contention was belied by the fact that Promenade had accepted the assigned claim for the purpose of pursuing the full value of its settlement of contractual claims, not for the purpose of “bringing a claim *201 against De-Con either as an investment or to harass or injure it” ( 39 AD3d at 223 ).

1996Judiciary Law § 489, the statutory codification of the ancient doctrine of champerty, * prohibits a corporation from "tak[ing] an assignment of * * * any claim * * * with the intent and for the purpose of bringing an action or proceeding thereon.” The statute was enacted "[t]o prevent the resulting strife, discord and harassment which could result from permitting attorneys and corporations to purchase claims for the purpose of bringing actions thereon.” (Fairchild Hiller Corp. v McDonnell Douglas Corp., 28 NY2d 325, 329 .) "[T]o fall within the statutory prohibition, the assignment must be mad

1996Judiciary Law § 489, the statutory codification of the ancient doctrine of champerty, * prohibits a corporation from "tak[ing] an assignment of * * * any claim * * * with the intent and for the purpose of bringing an action or proceeding thereon.” The statute was enacted "[t]o prevent the resulting strife, discord and harassment which could result from permitting attorneys and corporations to purchase claims for the purpose of bringing actions thereon.” (Fairchild Hiller Corp. v McDonnell Douglas Corp., 28 NY2d 325, 329 .) "[T]o fall within the statutory prohibition, the assignment must be mad

1996Judiciary Law § 489, the statutory codification of the ancient doctrine of champerty, * prohibits a corporation from "tak[ing] an assignment of * * * any claim * * * with the intent and for the purpose of bringing an action or proceeding thereon.” The statute was enacted "[t]o prevent the resulting strife, discord and harassment which could result from permitting attorneys and corporations to purchase claims for the purpose of bringing actions thereon.” (Fairchild Hiller Corp. v McDonnell Douglas Corp., 28 NY2d 325, 329 .) "[T]o fall within the statutory prohibition, the assignment must be mad

1990Corp., 155 AD2d 579 ).

1983(See, e.g., Czaplicki v Hoegh Silvercloud, supra; Ryan Co. v Pan-Atlantic Corp., 350 US 124 ; Johnson v Sword Line, 257 F2d 541.) Eventually, “a conflict of interest could be presumed to exist whenever the statutory assignee failed to pursue or to reassign the assigned claim, unless that claim was obviously lacking in merit.” (Rodriguez v Compass Shipping Co., 451 US 596, 608 .) This judicial dilution of the mandatory assignment portion of the statute led Congress to a further attempt to resolve the various interests by a new amendment to the statute.

1983(See, e.g., Czaplicki v Hoegh Silvercloud, supra; Ryan Co. v Pan-Atlantic Corp., 350 US 124 ; Johnson v Sword Line, 257 F2d 541.) Eventually, “a conflict of interest could be presumed to exist whenever the statutory assignee failed to pursue or to reassign the assigned claim, unless that claim was obviously lacking in merit.” (Rodriguez v Compass Shipping Co., 451 US 596, 608 .) This judicial dilution of the mandatory assignment portion of the statute led Congress to a further attempt to resolve the various interests by a new amendment to the statute.

1983(See, e.g., Czaplicki v Hoegh Silvercloud, supra; Ryan Co. v Pan-Atlantic Corp., 350 US 124 ; Johnson v Sword Line, 257 F2d 541.) Eventually, “a conflict of interest could be presumed to exist whenever the statutory assignee failed to pursue or to reassign the assigned claim, unless that claim was obviously lacking in merit.” (Rodriguez v Compass Shipping Co., 451 US 596, 608 .) This judicial dilution of the mandatory assignment portion of the statute led Congress to a further attempt to resolve the various interests by a new amendment to the statute.

1964In an opinion ( 28 Misc 2d 612 ), the Appellate Term stated in substance that, pursuant to subdivision 1 of section 267 of the Civil Practice Act (now CPLB 3019, subd. [c]), a defendant in an action brought by an assignee on an assigned claim could assert as a counterclaim only a claim against the assignor which had matured prior to the time of assignment, and concluded that, since the earliest date the freight charge claim could have matured was May 28 and the commission claim July 16, 5 both obviously after the date of assignment on May 11, said claims were not allowable as counterclaims aga

1935Co., 232 App. Div. 536 .) While section 288 authorizes examination before trial of the original owner of an assigned claim forming a cause of action, it is limited to elements material and necessary.

1925(Delaware Bank v. Jarvis, supra; Phœnix Ins.

1920The pleadings in this action were before this court on an appeal from an order upon a motion made to strike out certain portions of the defendant’s answer, but the matters there passed upon do not directly affect the question now presented. ( 193 App. Div. 161 .) The motion of the S. S. Corporation to intervene in this action was made pursuant to the 2d paragraph of section 452 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

1916(Belden v. Schapiro, 138 App. Div. 669 .) Plaintiff’s opposing affidavits array ten witnesses, mostly cumulative, for the purpose of showing that defendant was trustee under the agreement of April 24,1914, and acted as such.

1916We have to consider the county where the cause of action arose (Jacina v. Lemmi, 155 App. Div. 397 ) rather than the convenience of a plaintiff suing upon an assigned claim.

1913Under Judge Werner’s opinions in Brooklyn Bank v. Barnaby (supra) it seems to me that there was here an express authority given by the defendant to the plaintiff to receive the amount from the insolvent bank or its receiver on account of the indebtedness represented by the note, and the receipt of such a pay ment, the statute being not then a bar, was evidence of a new promise which bound the defendant.

1911The account ‘ stated rendered the defendant liable on contract for the payment of a specific amount, the same as on a promissory note, or on a bond, and the fact that part of the indebtedness due on the obligation has been paid does not bring the action within the exception to the rule.' (Acharan v. Samuel Brothers, 144 App. Div. 182 .) It .was sufficient, therefore, for the plaintiff to allege nonpayment, without presenting proof thereof, on his application for a warrant of attachment. ■ The plaintiff sufficiently shows that he is entitled to recover the amount ovér and above all counterclaim

1907Heermans v. Ellsworth, 64 N. Y. 159, 161 ; Stoddard v. Gailor, 90 id. 575, 579; Wangner v. Grimm, 169 id. 421, 428.

1904The appeal taken by the plaintiff from the judgment of dismissal upon the alleged cause of action arising out of the assigned claim may be disposed of under, the authority of Blake v. Griswold, 104 N. Y. 613 , 11 N. E. 137 , which sufficiently discusses the point raised by plaintiff (appellant), and points out that section 1910 of the Code of Civil Procedure confers no right upon a transferee to enforce the payment of a penalty in view of the declaration contained in section 1909 of the Code that an assigned claim is not enforceable “where the rights or liabilities of a party to a claim or dem

1904The appeal taken by the plaintiff from the judgment of dismissal upon the alleged cause of action arising out of the assigned claim may be disposed of under, the authority of Blake v. Griswold, 104 N. Y. 613 , 11 N. E. 137 , which sufficiently discusses the point raised by plaintiff (appellant), and points out that section 1910 of the Code of Civil Procedure confers no right upon a transferee to enforce the payment of a penalty in view of the declaration contained in section 1909 of the Code that an assigned claim is not enforceable “where the rights or liabilities of a party to a claim or dem

1898Hutton v. Railroad Co., 19 App. Div. 243 , 46 N. Y.

1898Hutton v. Railroad Co., 19 App. Div. 243 , 46 N. Y.

1893Fountain v. Pettee, 38 N. Y. 184 ; Ward v. Kilpatrick, 85 N. Y. 417 ; Hoffman v. Conner, 76 N. Y. 121 .

1893Fountain v. Pettee, 38 N. Y. 184 ; Ward v. Kilpatrick, 85 N. Y. 417 ; Hoffman v. Conner, 76 N. Y. 121 .

1885(McConnell v. Sherwood, 84 N. Y., 522 .) In the present case the discretion given is one subject to supervision by a court, and is not absolute and does not, in effect, even interpose .any delay in the right of the creditors to enforce the execution of the assignment.

1883(Petersen v. Chemical Bank, 32 N. Y., 21 .) But it is claimed that by section 1909 (Code) an action can now be brought by an assignee only under the same circumstances which would have entitled the assignor to sue.