assigned error in Georgia

1969In Gale v. State, 135 Ga. 351 ( 69 SE 537 ), when the witness became ill and thus defeated cross examination, the trial judge offered to declare a mistrial, and the accused rejected a mistrial, it was held not error to refuse to rule out the direct testimony of the witness involved.

1969In Gale v. State, 135 Ga. 351 ( 69 SE 537 ), when the witness became ill and thus defeated cross examination, the trial judge offered to declare a mistrial, and the accused rejected a mistrial, it was held not error to refuse to rule out the direct testimony of the witness involved.

1958Bryan v. Barnett, 205 Ga. 94 (4) ( 52 S. E. 2d 613 ); Salter v. Salter, 80 Ga. App. 263 (3) ( 55 S. E. 2d 868 ).

1958Bryan v. Barnett, 205 Ga. 94 (4) ( 52 S. E. 2d 613 ); Salter v. Salter, 80 Ga. App. 263 (3) ( 55 S. E. 2d 868 ).

1958Bryan v. Barnett, 205 Ga. 94 (4) ( 52 S. E. 2d 613 ); Salter v. Salter, 80 Ga. App. 263 (3) ( 55 S. E. 2d 868 ).

1958Bryan v. Barnett, 205 Ga. 94 (4) ( 52 S. E. 2d 613 ); Salter v. Salter, 80 Ga. App. 263 (3) ( 55 S. E. 2d 868 ).

1952Enright v. City of Atlanta, 78 Ga. 288 (2); Lewis Manufacturing Co. v. Davis, 147 Ga. 203 (4) ( 93 S. E. 206 ).

1952Enright v. City of Atlanta, 78 Ga. 288 (2); Lewis Manufacturing Co. v. Davis, 147 Ga. 203 (4) ( 93 S. E. 206 ).

1952Enright v. City of Atlanta, 78 Ga. 288 (2); Lewis Manufacturing Co. v. Davis, 147 Ga. 203 (4) ( 93 S. E. 206 ).

1950Allen v. Moore, 77 Ga. App. 426 (2) ( 49 S. E. 2d, 121 ), and citations. (b) Under the foregoing principles, where the case was heard in this court on July 3, 1950, and was submitted on briefs without oral arguments, and the original brief of counsel for the plaintiff in error was filed on June 21, 1950, containing the argument as aforesaid, and not arguing or insisting upon the special grounds of the motion for new trial, such other grounds are treated as having been abandoned on that date, and the subsequent submission some two months later, without having obtained the prior approval of this

1950Allen v. Moore, 77 Ga. App. 426 (2) ( 49 S. E. 2d, 121 ), and citations. (b) Under the foregoing principles, where the case was heard in this court on July 3, 1950, and was submitted on briefs without oral arguments, and the original brief of counsel for the plaintiff in error was filed on June 21, 1950, containing the argument as aforesaid, and not arguing or insisting upon the special grounds of the motion for new trial, such other grounds are treated as having been abandoned on that date, and the subsequent submission some two months later, without having obtained the prior approval of this

1944While it is well-settled law that it is within the discretion of the judge on the trial of a civil case to allow the jury to disperse at night and during recesses of the court while the evidence is being submitted and before the issues are submitted to them for their determination, without the consent of the parties where no motion is made contra or cause shown for not allowing their dispersal and separation (Stancel v. Kenan, 33 Ga. 56 ; Central of Ga. Ry.

1936Cooper v. Nisbet, 119 Ga. 752 (3) ( 47 S. E. 173 ); Branch v. Bishop, 135 Ga. 110 (2) ( 68 S. E. 1021 ); Knapp Manufacturing Co. v. Cook, 171 Ga. 330 (2) ( 155 S. E. 321 ); Bishop v. Georgia National Bank, 13 Ga. App. 38 (4) ( 78 S. E. 947 ). 4.

1936Cooper v. Nisbet, 119 Ga. 752 (3) ( 47 S. E. 173 ); Branch v. Bishop, 135 Ga. 110 (2) ( 68 S. E. 1021 ); Knapp Manufacturing Co. v. Cook, 171 Ga. 330 (2) ( 155 S. E. 321 ); Bishop v. Georgia National Bank, 13 Ga. App. 38 (4) ( 78 S. E. 947 ). 4.

1936Cooper v. Nisbet, 119 Ga. 752 (3) ( 47 S. E. 173 ); Branch v. Bishop, 135 Ga. 110 (2) ( 68 S. E. 1021 ); Knapp Manufacturing Co. v. Cook, 171 Ga. 330 (2) ( 155 S. E. 321 ); Bishop v. Georgia National Bank, 13 Ga. App. 38 (4) ( 78 S. E. 947 ). 4.

1936Cooper v. Nisbet, 119 Ga. 752 (3) ( 47 S. E. 173 ); Branch v. Bishop, 135 Ga. 110 (2) ( 68 S. E. 1021 ); Knapp Manufacturing Co. v. Cook, 171 Ga. 330 (2) ( 155 S. E. 321 ); Bishop v. Georgia National Bank, 13 Ga. App. 38 (4) ( 78 S. E. 947 ). 4.

1936Cooper v. Nisbet, 119 Ga. 752 (3) ( 47 S. E. 173 ); Branch v. Bishop, 135 Ga. 110 (2) ( 68 S. E. 1021 ); Knapp Manufacturing Co. v. Cook, 171 Ga. 330 (2) ( 155 S. E. 321 ); Bishop v. Georgia National Bank, 13 Ga. App. 38 (4) ( 78 S. E. 947 ). 4.

1936Cooper v. Nisbet, 119 Ga. 752 (3) ( 47 S. E. 173 ); Branch v. Bishop, 135 Ga. 110 (2) ( 68 S. E. 1021 ); Knapp Manufacturing Co. v. Cook, 171 Ga. 330 (2) ( 155 S. E. 321 ); Bishop v. Georgia National Bank, 13 Ga. App. 38 (4) ( 78 S. E. 947 ). 4.

1936Comparing the evidence above recited with the evidence as recited in the decisions in Foster v. Peoples Bank, 47 Ga. App. 447 ( 170 S. E. 408 ), and Peoples Bank v. Foster, 180 Ga. 1 ( 177 S. E. 721 ), there are some points of difference.

1936Comparing the evidence above recited with the evidence as recited in the decisions in Foster v. Peoples Bank, 47 Ga. App. 447 ( 170 S. E. 408 ), and Peoples Bank v. Foster, 180 Ga. 1 ( 177 S. E. 721 ), there are some points of difference.

1936Cooper v. Nisbet, 119 Ga. 752 (3) ( 47 S. E. 173 ); Branch v. Bishop, 135 Ga. 110 (2) ( 68 S. E. 1021 ); Knapp Manufacturing Co. v. Cook, 171 Ga. 330 (2) ( 155 S. E. 321 ); Bishop v. Georgia National Bank, 13 Ga. App. 38 (4) ( 78 S. E. 947 ). 4.

1936Cooper v. Nisbet, 119 Ga. 752 (3) ( 47 S. E. 173 ); Branch v. Bishop, 135 Ga. 110 (2) ( 68 S. E. 1021 ); Knapp Manufacturing Co. v. Cook, 171 Ga. 330 (2) ( 155 S. E. 321 ); Bishop v. Georgia National Bank, 13 Ga. App. 38 (4) ( 78 S. E. 947 ). 4.

1936Comparing the evidence above recited with the evidence as recited in the decisions in Foster v. Peoples Bank, 47 Ga. App. 447 ( 170 S. E. 408 ), and Peoples Bank v. Foster, 180 Ga. 1 ( 177 S. E. 721 ), there are some points of difference.

1936Comparing the evidence above recited with the evidence as recited in the decisions in Foster v. Peoples Bank, 47 Ga. App. 447 ( 170 S. E. 408 ), and Peoples Bank v. Foster, 180 Ga. 1 ( 177 S. E. 721 ), there are some points of difference.

1935In Brown v. West, 35 Ga. App. 444 (2) ( 133 S. E. 304 ), in a case where there was an assignment for the benefit of creditors after the commencement of the action, it was said: “Where such an assignment of a chose in action is not made until after the assignor has filed suit on the assigned claim, the suit in the name of the original plaintiff is not thereby abated; but the original plaintiff, without amendment and without the presence of the assignee, may continue to prosecute the claim to a judgment, holding the amount represented by the secured debt as the trustee for the assignee.” As was

1935In Brown v. West, 35 Ga. App. 444 (2) ( 133 S. E. 304 ), in a case where there was an assignment for the benefit of creditors after the commencement of the action, it was said: “Where such an assignment of a chose in action is not made until after the assignor has filed suit on the assigned claim, the suit in the name of the original plaintiff is not thereby abated; but the original plaintiff, without amendment and without the presence of the assignee, may continue to prosecute the claim to a judgment, holding the amount represented by the secured debt as the trustee for the assignee.” As was

1935In Brown v. West, 35 Ga. App. 444 (2) ( 133 S. E. 304 ), in a case where there was an assignment for the benefit of creditors after the commencement of the action, it was said: “Where such an assignment of a chose in action is not made until after the assignor has filed suit on the assigned claim, the suit in the name of the original plaintiff is not thereby abated; but the original plaintiff, without amendment and without the presence of the assignee, may continue to prosecute the claim to a judgment, holding the amount represented by the secured debt as the trustee for the assignee.” As was

1935In Brown v. West, 35 Ga. App. 444 (2) ( 133 S. E. 304 ), in a case where there was an assignment for the benefit of creditors after the commencement of the action, it was said: “Where such an assignment of a chose in action is not made until after the assignor has filed suit on the assigned claim, the suit in the name of the original plaintiff is not thereby abated; but the original plaintiff, without amendment and without the presence of the assignee, may continue to prosecute the claim to a judgment, holding the amount represented by the secured debt as the trustee for the assignee.” As was

1935Where such party sues for the use of another) the name of the usee may be treated as surplusage.” While it was held in Hunter v. Lawton-Anderson Co., 12 Ga. App. 23 ( 76 S. E. 782 ), that where the owner of the property at the time it was converted had sold and transferred his legal and equitable right to a third party, he, having parted with all his title, could not maintain an action in trover to recover it, and such purchaser would be relegated to his rights under a common-law action, this principle is inapplicable to the case at bar., where the plaintiff assigned his right in the property

1935Where such party sues for the use of another) the name of the usee may be treated as surplusage.” While it was held in Hunter v. Lawton-Anderson Co., 12 Ga. App. 23 ( 76 S. E. 782 ), that where the owner of the property at the time it was converted had sold and transferred his legal and equitable right to a third party, he, having parted with all his title, could not maintain an action in trover to recover it, and such purchaser would be relegated to his rights under a common-law action, this principle is inapplicable to the case at bar., where the plaintiff assigned his right in the property

1935In Brown v. West, 35 Ga. App. 444 (2) ( 133 S. E. 304 ), in a case where there was an assignment for the benefit of creditors after the commencement of the action, it was said: “Where such an assignment of a chose in action is not made until after the assignor has filed suit on the assigned claim, the suit in the name of the original plaintiff is not thereby abated; but the original plaintiff, without amendment and without the presence of the assignee, may continue to prosecute the claim to a judgment, holding the amount represented by the secured debt as the trustee for the assignee.” As was

1935In Brown v. West, 35 Ga. App. 444 (2) ( 133 S. E. 304 ), in a case where there was an assignment for the benefit of creditors after the commencement of the action, it was said: “Where such an assignment of a chose in action is not made until after the assignor has filed suit on the assigned claim, the suit in the name of the original plaintiff is not thereby abated; but the original plaintiff, without amendment and without the presence of the assignee, may continue to prosecute the claim to a judgment, holding the amount represented by the secured debt as the trustee for the assignee.” As was

1926Wood v. McGuire, 21 Ga. 576 (4) ; Suwannee Turpentine Co. v. Baxter, 109 Ga. 597 ( 35 S. E. 142 ). 3.

1926Wood v. McGuire, 21 Ga. 576 (4) ; Suwannee Turpentine Co. v. Baxter, 109 Ga. 597 ( 35 S. E. 142 ). 3.

1926Wood v. McGuire, 21 Ga. 576 (4) ; Suwannee Turpentine Co. v. Baxter, 109 Ga. 597 ( 35 S. E. 142 ). 3.

1925Suple v. State, 133 Ga. 601 (2), 602 ( 66 S. E. 919 ); Wilder v. State, 148 Ga. 270 (2) ( 96 S. E. 325 ). (10) The following charge of the court is assigned as error: “Now, the defendants in this case set up what is called the plea of alibi, and in this connection I will read you the following sec tion of the Criminal Code of the State of Georgia.

1925Suple v. State, 133 Ga. 601 (2), 602 ( 66 S. E. 919 ); Wilder v. State, 148 Ga. 270 (2) ( 96 S. E. 325 ). (10) The following charge of the court is assigned as error: “Now, the defendants in this case set up what is called the plea of alibi, and in this connection I will read you the following sec tion of the Criminal Code of the State of Georgia.

1925Suple v. State, 133 Ga. 601 (2), 602 ( 66 S. E. 919 ); Wilder v. State, 148 Ga. 270 (2) ( 96 S. E. 325 ). (10) The following charge of the court is assigned as error: “Now, the defendants in this case set up what is called the plea of alibi, and in this connection I will read you the following sec tion of the Criminal Code of the State of Georgia.

1925Suple v. State, 133 Ga. 601 (2), 602 ( 66 S. E. 919 ); Wilder v. State, 148 Ga. 270 (2) ( 96 S. E. 325 ). (10) The following charge of the court is assigned as error: “Now, the defendants in this case set up what is called the plea of alibi, and in this connection I will read you the following sec tion of the Criminal Code of the State of Georgia.

1923This court affirmed the judgment of the lower court upon the main bill of exceptions and dismissed the cross-bill ( 28 Ga. App. 524 , 111 S. E. 821 ).

1923This court affirmed the judgment of the lower court upon the main bill of exceptions and dismissed the cross-bill ( 28 Ga. App. 524 , 111 S. E. 821 ).

1920Roberts v. State, 92 Ga. 451 (3) ( 17 S. E. 262 ). 2.

1920Roberts v. State, 92 Ga. 451 (3) ( 17 S. E. 262 ). 2.