assured clear distance ahead rule in Ohio

1999The first doctrine is discussed in Erdman v. Mestrovich (1951), 155 Ohio St. 85 , as follows: Violation of the assured-clear-distance-ahead rule consists of the operation of a motor vehicle at a greater speed than will permit the operator thereof to bring it to a stop within the assured clear distance ahead, unless such assured clear distance ahead is, without his fault, suddenly cut down or lessened by the entrance within such clear distance and into his path or lane of travel of an obstruction which renders him unable, in the exercise of ordinary care, to avoid colliding therewith.

1970In the case of Erdman v. Mestrovich, 155 Ohio St. 85 , the court stated as follows: “The assured clear distance ahead constantly changes as the motorist proceeds and is measured at any moment by the distance between the motorist’s car and the limit of his vision ahead, or by the distance between the motorist’s car and any intermediate discernible static or forward moving object in the street or highway ahead constituting an obstruction in the motorist’s path or lane of travel.” i Violation of the assured-clear-distance-ahead rule consists of the operation of a motor vehicle at a greater speed

2020Allen No. 1-93-30, 1993 WL 430136 , *3 (Oct. 14, 1993), citing Lewis v. Certified Oil Co., 67 Ohio St.2d 277 , 423 N.E.2d 464 (1981); Woods v. Brown’s Bakery, 171 Ohio St. 383 , 171 N.E.2d 496 (1960). {¶13} “The assured-clear-distance-ahead rule mandates that ‘* * * a driver is prohibited from operating any motor vehicle * * * at a rate of speed greater than will permit him to bring it to a stop within the distance at which he can see a discernible object obstructing his path.’” Sabo v. Helsel, 4 Ohio St.3d 70, 71 , 446 N.E.2d 457 (1983), quoting Gumley v. Cowman, 129 Ohio St. 36 , 193 N.E. 62

2020Allen No. 1-93-30, 1993 WL 430136 , *3 (Oct. 14, 1993), citing Lewis v. Certified Oil Co., 67 Ohio St.2d 277 , 423 N.E.2d 464 (1981); Woods v. Brown’s Bakery, 171 Ohio St. 383 , 171 N.E.2d 496 (1960). {¶13} “The assured-clear-distance-ahead rule mandates that ‘* * * a driver is prohibited from operating any motor vehicle * * * at a rate of speed greater than will permit him to bring it to a stop within the distance at which he can see a discernible object obstructing his path.’” Sabo v. Helsel, 4 Ohio St.3d 70, 71 , 446 N.E.2d 457 (1983), quoting Gumley v. Cowman, 129 Ohio St. 36 , 193 N.E. 62

1969Illustrative of this group of cases is the road grader case, Carpenter v. McCourt Construction Co. (1957), 106 Ohio App. 67 .

1964Plaintiff claims that the application of the assured-clear-distance-ahead rule to vehicles approaching from opposite directions is supported by the case of Carpenter v. McCourt Construction Co., 106 Ohio App. 67 .

1944On pages 90 and 91 of the opinion in the Smiley case, supra, the court said: “Under the following circumstances, the driver of the motor vehicle was legally excused from the application of the assured clear distance ahead rule, and was held to the rule of due care under the circumstances: Where a motorist having the right of way at a street intersection collided with a motor vehicle attempting to cross the intersection, at the same time, Morris v Bloomgren, 127 Oh St 147, 158; 187 N. E. 2 ; Blackford v Kaplan, 135 Oh St 268; 20 N. E. (2d) 522; ******.” The appellant also claims that the court

1941Under the following circumstances the driver of the *91 motor vehicle was legally excused from the application of the assured-clear-distance-ahead rule, and was held to the rule of due care under the circumstances: Where a motorist having the right-of-way at a street intersection collided with a motor vehicle attempting to cross the intersection at the same time (Morris v. Bloomgren, 127 Ohio St., 147, 158 , 187 N. E., 2 ; Blackford v. Kaplan, 135 Ohio St., 268 , 20 N. E. [2d], 522); where there was the entrance of a person or vehicle into the line of travel of-a motorist, cutting down his pre

2020Allen No. 1-93-30, 1993 WL 430136 , *3 (Oct. 14, 1993), citing Lewis v. Certified Oil Co., 67 Ohio St.2d 277 , 423 N.E.2d 464 (1981); Woods v. Brown’s Bakery, 171 Ohio St. 383 , 171 N.E.2d 496 (1960). {¶13} “The assured-clear-distance-ahead rule mandates that ‘* * * a driver is prohibited from operating any motor vehicle * * * at a rate of speed greater than will permit him to bring it to a stop within the distance at which he can see a discernible object obstructing his path.’” Sabo v. Helsel, 4 Ohio St.3d 70, 71 , 446 N.E.2d 457 (1983), quoting Gumley v. Cowman, 129 Ohio St. 36 , 193 N.E. 62

2020Allen No. 1-93-30, 1993 WL 430136 , *3 (Oct. 14, 1993), citing Lewis v. Certified Oil Co., 67 Ohio St.2d 277 , 423 N.E.2d 464 (1981); Woods v. Brown’s Bakery, 171 Ohio St. 383 , 171 N.E.2d 496 (1960). {¶13} “The assured-clear-distance-ahead rule mandates that ‘* * * a driver is prohibited from operating any motor vehicle * * * at a rate of speed greater than will permit him to bring it to a stop within the distance at which he can see a discernible object obstructing his path.’” Sabo v. Helsel, 4 Ohio St.3d 70, 71 , 446 N.E.2d 457 (1983), quoting Gumley v. Cowman, 129 Ohio St. 36 , 193 N.E. 62

2008And a complaint prepared under *Page 6 Traf.R. 3 simply needs to advise the defendant of the offense with which he is charged in a manner that can be readily understood by a person making a reasonable attempt to understand." State v. Wiest , Hamilton App. No. C-030674, 2004-Ohio-2577 . {¶ 20} In Wiest , the defendant struck a vehicle in front of him and received a traffic ticket for an assured-clear-distance-ahead violation.

2001Appellant cites to Schade v. Carnegie Body Co . (1982), 70 Ohio St.2d 207 for the proposition that "[w]here inadequate notice is given by the vehicle or object ahead, then there is an exception to the assured clear distance ahead rule." 4 However, under Ohio law, inadequate notice is not a defense.

1999However, the Supreme Court later used the Erdman sudden entrance language in reference to the sudden emergency doctrine in Shinaver v. Szymanski (1984), 14 Ohio St.3d 51 : Plaintiff argues that the "sudden emergency" exception should apply here, excusing him from compliance with the assured-clear-distance-ahead requirement. *** This exception states that a driver does not violate the statute where the assured clear distance ahead is, without his fault, suddenly cut down or lessened by the entrance into his path of an obstruction which renders him unable, in the exercise of reasonable care, to

1999Id. at 54 .

1998Thus, there is sufficient competent, credible evidence to indicate that this accident was not simply a low-speed "fender-bender." Turning to the issue of the obfuscation of the tractor trailer truck caused by the sudden "white-out" condition, "[t]here is some indication * * * that a sudden emergency that will excuse compliance with the assured-clear-distance-ahead requirement must consist of the entry into the driver's path within his assured clear distance ahead of an object such as a person or vehicle with which he cannot avoid colliding." (Emphasis added.) Belcher v. Lindinger (Oct. 21, 198

1998"Skidding upon a wet or icy roadway due to bad road conditions alone does not excuse a driver from operating his vehicle upon the right side of the roadway as required by Sections 4511.25 and 4511.26 , Revised Code." Oechsle v. Hart (1967), 12 Ohio St.2d 29 , paragraph two of the syllabus.

1996As stated by this court in O’Day, supra, 29 Ohio St.2d at 218 , 58 O.O.2d at 426 , 280 N.E.2d at 898 , review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion for new trial is limited to that which the court has specified in writing as the cause for which the new trial was allowed pursuant to Civ.R. 59. 4 January Term, 1996 of the roadway within one hundred feet of an intersection (R.C. 4511.30[C]) and, therefore, that Joyce was negligent as a matter of law. {¶ 11} In reviewing the order for a new trial, the appellate court noted the determinative nature of the trial court’s finding such a void of eviden

1996As stated by this court in O’Day, supra, 29 Ohio St.2d at 218 , 58 O.O.2d at 426 , 280 N.E.2d at 898 , review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion for new trial is limited to that which the court has specified in writing as the cause for which the new trial was allowed pursuant to Civ.R. 59. 4 January Term, 1996 of the roadway within one hundred feet of an intersection (R.C. 4511.30[C]) and, therefore, that Joyce was negligent as a matter of law. {¶ 11} In reviewing the order for a new trial, the appellate court noted the determinative nature of the trial court’s finding such a void of eviden

1969Following a similar vein is Johnson v. Anoka-Butte Lumber Co., 141 Neb. 851 , 5 N. W. 2d 114 , in which, at page 118, the court quotes from a Massachusetts case, Booth v. Meagher (1916), 224 Mass. 472 , 113 N. E. 367 , as follows: “ ‘Whether the principal defendant was negligent in not sooner seeing the plaintiff and in not so operating his automobile with reference to the concurrent right of the plaintiff and himself to travel upon the public way as to avoid a collision, was for the jury.’ ” Many times the question as to the violation of the assured-clear-distance-ahead rule is properly for t

1969Following a similar vein is Johnson v. Anoka-Butte Lumber Co., 141 Neb. 851 , 5 N. W. 2d 114 , in which, at page 118, the court quotes from a Massachusetts case, Booth v. Meagher (1916), 224 Mass. 472 , 113 N. E. 367 , as follows: “ ‘Whether the principal defendant was negligent in not sooner seeing the plaintiff and in not so operating his automobile with reference to the concurrent right of the plaintiff and himself to travel upon the public way as to avoid a collision, was for the jury.’ ” Many times the question as to the violation of the assured-clear-distance-ahead rule is properly for t

1969Following a similar vein is Johnson v. Anoka-Butte Lumber Co., 141 Neb. 851 , 5 N. W. 2d 114 , in which, at page 118, the court quotes from a Massachusetts case, Booth v. Meagher (1916), 224 Mass. 472 , 113 N. E. 367 , as follows: “ ‘Whether the principal defendant was negligent in not sooner seeing the plaintiff and in not so operating his automobile with reference to the concurrent right of the plaintiff and himself to travel upon the public way as to avoid a collision, was for the jury.’ ” Many times the question as to the violation of the assured-clear-distance-ahead rule is properly for t

1969Following a similar vein is Johnson v. Anoka-Butte Lumber Co., 141 Neb. 851 , 5 N. W. 2d 114 , in which, at page 118, the court quotes from a Massachusetts case, Booth v. Meagher (1916), 224 Mass. 472 , 113 N. E. 367 , as follows: “ ‘Whether the principal defendant was negligent in not sooner seeing the plaintiff and in not so operating his automobile with reference to the concurrent right of the plaintiff and himself to travel upon the public way as to avoid a collision, was for the jury.’ ” Many times the question as to the violation of the assured-clear-distance-ahead rule is properly for t

1969A driver who drove 200 feet in the face of blinding sun without reducing his speed is the central figure in Nagata v. Kahului Development Co., Ltd. (1966), 49 Haw. 378 , 420 P. 2d 103 .

1969A driver who drove 200 feet in the face of blinding sun without reducing his speed is the central figure in Nagata v. Kahului Development Co., Ltd. (1966), 49 Haw. 378 , 420 P. 2d 103 .

1969Other cases approach the matter positively, such as Rothe v. Dworkin (1946), 47 Ohio Law Abs. 452 , dealing with the speed factor.

1969A parked truck and blinding lights were facts in Brown v. Wackman (1949), 87 Ohio App. 61 . and the court held that whether there was excuse for failure to observe the assured-clear-distance-ahead rule was for the jury.

1969A decision of this court, Hardy v. Crabbe (1961), 114 Ohio App. 218 , cited by the plaintiff, holds that the assured-clear-distance-ahead rule was applicable where the evidence showed that plaintiff, pedestrian, was in the “path” of defendant’s vehicle as it approached the point of impact.

1969Following a similar vein is Johnson v. Anoka-Butte Lumber Co., 141 Neb. 851 , 5 N. W. 2d 114 , in which, at page 118, the court quotes from a Massachusetts case, Booth v. Meagher (1916), 224 Mass. 472 , 113 N. E. 367 , as follows: “ ‘Whether the principal defendant was negligent in not sooner seeing the plaintiff and in not so operating his automobile with reference to the concurrent right of the plaintiff and himself to travel upon the public way as to avoid a collision, was for the jury.’ ” Many times the question as to the violation of the assured-clear-distance-ahead rule is properly for t

1969Following a similar vein is Johnson v. Anoka-Butte Lumber Co., 141 Neb. 851 , 5 N. W. 2d 114 , in which, at page 118, the court quotes from a Massachusetts case, Booth v. Meagher (1916), 224 Mass. 472 , 113 N. E. 367 , as follows: “ ‘Whether the principal defendant was negligent in not sooner seeing the plaintiff and in not so operating his automobile with reference to the concurrent right of the plaintiff and himself to travel upon the public way as to avoid a collision, was for the jury.’ ” Many times the question as to the violation of the assured-clear-distance-ahead rule is properly for t

1969The closing part of the fifth paragraph of the syllabus reads as follows: “* * * the assured-clear-distance-ahead rule is applicable, and the refusal of the court to charge the jury on such rule is prejudicial error.” Plaintiff cites Meuer, Admx., v. Doerflein (1936), 53 Ohio App. 536 , presumably in support of the common-law proposition that a pedestrian has equal right with a motorist in the use of the road.

1967The present legislative requirement establishes a subjective test whereby a driver is prohibited from operating any motor vehicle in and upon any public road or highway at a rate of speed greater than will permit him to bring it to a stop within the distance at which he can see a discernible object obstructing his path.” (Emphasis added.) In the case of Hangen v. Hadfield (1939), 135 Ohio St. 281 , the Supreme Court held: “ 2.

1967To comply with the assured-clear-distance-ahead provision of Section 12603, General Code, the driver of a motor vehicle must not operate it at a greater speed than will permit him to bring it to a stop within the distance between his motor vehicle and a discernible object obstructing his path or line of travel, unless such assured clear distance ahead is, without his fault, suddenly cut down or lessened by the entrance, within such clear distance ahead and into his path or line of travel, of some obstruction which renders him unable, in the exercise of ordinary care, to avoid colliding therewi

1951In either event, defendant was not proceeding in a lawful manner, and had lost his right of way, and having collided with plaintiff, plaintiff was entitled to an instruction on the clear distance rule.” The Court of Appeals, in holding that the assured-clear-distance-ahead rule was applicable to the instant case, seems to have relied upon the holding of this court in Glasco v. Mendelman, 143 Ohio St., 649 , 56 N. E. (2d), 210.

1951In either event, defendant was not proceeding in a lawful manner, and had lost his right of way, and having collided with plaintiff, plaintiff was entitled to an instruction on the clear distance rule." The Court of Appeals, in holding that the assured clear distance ahead rule was applicable to the instant case, seems to have relied upon the holding of this court in Glasco v. Mendelman, 143 Ohio St. 649 , 56 N.E.2d 210 .

1946The legal principle involved, as it affects the assured clear distance ahead doctrine, was first discussed and adjudicated by this Court in Proctor v White, 22 Abs 115 , and later in Pressing v Roadway Express, Inc., 69 Oh Ap 1; Smiley v Arrow Spring Bed Co., 138 Oh St 81, and particularly in point is Bohn v Deyo, 66 Oh Ap 500.

1941Under the following circumstances the driver of the *91 motor vehicle was legally excused from the application of the assured-clear-distance-ahead rule, and was held to the rule of due care under the circumstances: Where a motorist having the right-of-way at a street intersection collided with a motor vehicle attempting to cross the intersection at the same time (Morris v. Bloomgren, 127 Ohio St., 147, 158 , 187 N. E., 2 ; Blackford v. Kaplan, 135 Ohio St., 268 , 20 N. E. [2d], 522); where there was the entrance of a person or vehicle into the line of travel of-a motorist, cutting down his pre