Telford test in Washington

2017App. 185, 192 , 181 P.3d 881 (2008) (Division Three). 2 Fortgang v. Woodland Park Zoo, No. 92846-1 The Telford test-which derives from case law interpreting the federal Freedom oflnformation Act (FOIA) 3--furthers the PRA's purposes by preventing governments from evading public oversight through creative contracting. 5 U.S.C. § 552 ; see Cedar Grove Composting, Inc. v. City of Marysville, 188 Wn.

2017App. 185, 192 , 181 P.3d 881 (2008) (Division Three). 2 Fortgang v. Woodland Park Zoo, No. 92846-1 The Telford test-which derives from case law interpreting the federal Freedom oflnformation Act (FOIA) 3--furthers the PRA's purposes by preventing governments from evading public oversight through creative contracting. 5 U.S.C. § 552 ; see Cedar Grove Composting, Inc. v. City of Marysville, 188 Wn.

2016The court stated that there was no need to apply the Telford test because there was “no ambiguity as to the Associations’ nongovernmental status.’’ Spokane Research, 133 Wn.

2016The court stated that there was no need to apply the Telford test because there was “no ambiguity as to the Associations’ nongovernmental status.’’ Spokane Research, 133 Wn.

2017Fortgang, 192 Wn.

2017Fortgang, 192 Wn.

2017App. 602, 608 , 137 P.3d 120 (2006), where the court purportedly held that the entity at issue was unambiguously private and therefore not subject to the PRA, and then applied the Telford factors only in dicta.

2017App. 602, 608 , 137 P.3d 120 (2006), where the court purportedly held that the entity at issue was unambiguously private and therefore not subject to the PRA, and then applied the Telford factors only in dicta.

2008App. 887, 891 , 737 P.2d 1279 , review denied, 108 Wn.2d 1035 (1987) (humane society acting as a public entity for the purpose of the public duty doctrine when city of Spokane contracted with it and delegated it the authority to enforce the animal regulations); Brunette v. Humane Soc’y, 294 F.3d 1205 , 1208 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that a humane society created by statute and holding police powers was a state actor for the purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 litigation), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1112 (2003). ¶19 But while TCAC is performing a governmental function, Telford's analysis seems to hinge on w

2008Cf. Champagne v. Spokane Humane Soc'y, 47 Wash.App. 887, 891 , 737 P.2d 1279 , review denied, 108 Wash.2d 1035 (1987) (humane society acting as a public entity for the purpose of the public duty doctrine when City of Spokane contracted with it and delegated it the authority to enforce the animal regulations); Brunette v. Humane Soc'y, 294 F.3d 1205 , 1208 (9th Cir.2002) (noting that a humane society created by statute and holding police powers was a state actor for the purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 litigation), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1112 , 123 S.Ct. 902 , 154 L.Ed.2d 786 (2003). ¶ 19 But while

2008App. 887, 891 , 737 P.2d 1279 , review denied, 108 Wn.2d 1035 (1987) (humane society acting as a public entity for the purpose of the public duty doctrine when city of Spokane contracted with it and delegated it the authority to enforce the animal regulations); Brunette v. Humane Soc’y, 294 F.3d 1205 , 1208 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that a humane society created by statute and holding police powers was a state actor for the purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 litigation), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1112 (2003). ¶19 But while TCAC is performing a governmental function, Telford's analysis seems to hinge on w

2008Cf. Champagne v. Spokane Humane Soc'y, 47 Wash.App. 887, 891 , 737 P.2d 1279 , review denied, 108 Wash.2d 1035 (1987) (humane society acting as a public entity for the purpose of the public duty doctrine when City of Spokane contracted with it and delegated it the authority to enforce the animal regulations); Brunette v. Humane Soc'y, 294 F.3d 1205 , 1208 (9th Cir.2002) (noting that a humane society created by statute and holding police powers was a state actor for the purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 litigation), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1112 , 123 S.Ct. 902 , 154 L.Ed.2d 786 (2003). ¶ 19 But while

2008App. 887, 891 , 737 P.2d 1279 , review denied, 108 Wn.2d 1035 (1987) (humane society acting as a public entity for the purpose of the public duty doctrine when city of Spokane contracted with it and delegated it the authority to enforce the animal regulations); Brunette v. Humane Soc’y, 294 F.3d 1205 , 1208 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that a humane society created by statute and holding police powers was a state actor for the purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 litigation), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1112 (2003). ¶19 But while TCAC is performing a governmental function, Telford's analysis seems to hinge on w

2008Cf. Champagne v. Spokane Humane Soc'y, 47 Wash.App. 887, 891 , 737 P.2d 1279 , review denied, 108 Wash.2d 1035 (1987) (humane society acting as a public entity for the purpose of the public duty doctrine when City of Spokane contracted with it and delegated it the authority to enforce the animal regulations); Brunette v. Humane Soc'y, 294 F.3d 1205 , 1208 (9th Cir.2002) (noting that a humane society created by statute and holding police powers was a state actor for the purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 litigation), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1112 , 123 S.Ct. 902 , 154 L.Ed.2d 786 (2003). ¶ 19 But while

2025And we do not reach whether the documents underlying Carpenter’s report satisfy 7 No. 86209-0-I/8 1, 138 Wn.2d 950, 952 , 983 P.2d 635 (1999) (quoting RCW 42.17.020(36)).

2025And we do not reach whether the documents underlying Carpenter’s report satisfy 7 No. 86209-0-I/8 1, 138 Wn.2d 950, 952 , 983 P.2d 635 (1999) (quoting RCW 42.17.020(36)).

2019Sjokane County, 172 Wn.2d 702, 719-21 , 261 P.3d 119 (2011) (approving reliance on federal open records jurisprudence to interpret and apply the PRA). 15 187 Wn.2d 509 , 387 P.3d 690 (2017).

2019Sjokane County, 172 Wn.2d 702, 719-21 , 261 P.3d 119 (2011) (approving reliance on federal open records jurisprudence to interpret and apply the PRA). 15 187 Wn.2d 509 , 387 P.3d 690 (2017).

2019Yakima Herald-Republic, 170 Wn.2d 775, 791 , 246 P.3d 768 (2011) (quoting RCW42.45.030)). ~ RCW42.56.070(1). ~ RCW42.56.010(1). ~ Fortqanci, 187 Wn.2d at 512 . 3 No. 79656-9-1/4 Commissioners 6 factors.7 West argues, though, Dawson Place is the equivalent of a public agency “regardless of the Telford factors.”8 In the recent case Fortganq v. Woodland Park Zoo, our Supreme Court held “[t]he Telford test is the proper analytical framework for evaluating a private or quasi-public entity’s disclosure requirements under the PRA.”9 Because Fortqanci controls our analysis and West relies on cases pre

2019Yakima Herald-Republic, 170 Wn.2d 775, 791 , 246 P.3d 768 (2011) (quoting RCW42.45.030)). ~ RCW42.56.070(1). ~ RCW42.56.010(1). ~ Fortqanci, 187 Wn.2d at 512 . 3 No. 79656-9-1/4 Commissioners 6 factors.7 West argues, though, Dawson Place is the equivalent of a public agency “regardless of the Telford factors.”8 In the recent case Fortganq v. Woodland Park Zoo, our Supreme Court held “[t]he Telford test is the proper analytical framework for evaluating a private or quasi-public entity’s disclosure requirements under the PRA.”9 Because Fortqanci controls our analysis and West relies on cases pre

2019Yakima Herald-Republic, 170 Wn.2d 775, 791 , 246 P.3d 768 (2011) (quoting RCW42.45.030)). ~ RCW42.56.070(1). ~ RCW42.56.010(1). ~ Fortqanci, 187 Wn.2d at 512 . 3 No. 79656-9-1/4 Commissioners 6 factors.7 West argues, though, Dawson Place is the equivalent of a public agency “regardless of the Telford factors.”8 In the recent case Fortganq v. Woodland Park Zoo, our Supreme Court held “[t]he Telford test is the proper analytical framework for evaluating a private or quasi-public entity’s disclosure requirements under the PRA.”9 Because Fortqanci controls our analysis and West relies on cases pre

2019Yakima Herald-Republic, 170 Wn.2d 775, 791 , 246 P.3d 768 (2011) (quoting RCW42.45.030)). ~ RCW42.56.070(1). ~ RCW42.56.010(1). ~ Fortqanci, 187 Wn.2d at 512 . 3 No. 79656-9-1/4 Commissioners 6 factors.7 West argues, though, Dawson Place is the equivalent of a public agency “regardless of the Telford factors.”8 In the recent case Fortganq v. Woodland Park Zoo, our Supreme Court held “[t]he Telford test is the proper analytical framework for evaluating a private or quasi-public entity’s disclosure requirements under the PRA.”9 Because Fortqanci controls our analysis and West relies on cases pre

2019App. 644, 653 , 334 P.3d 94 (2014) (‘whether an agency complies with the PRA is a fact specific inquiry”). 4 No. 79656-9-1/5 Telford test provide important guidance.14 A survey of selected cases applying the Telford factors is instructive.

2019App. 644, 653 , 334 P.3d 94 (2014) (‘whether an agency complies with the PRA is a fact specific inquiry”). 4 No. 79656-9-1/5 Telford test provide important guidance.14 A survey of selected cases applying the Telford factors is instructive.

2017Abell Publ'g Co. v. Mezzanote, 297 Md. 26, 38-39 , 464 A.2d 1068 (1983) (entity was "an agency or instrumentality of the State" because it served a public purpose, its management was selected by state's insurance commissioner, it did not independently manage its affairs or enforce its regulations, and it had special tax and liability status). 12 Fortgang v. Woodland Park Zoo, No. 92846-1 activities, it is also possible for a government to contract with a private entity so as to evade PRA accountability-precisely what the Telford test is designed to prevent.

2017Abell Publ'g Co. v. Mezzanote, 297 Md. 26, 38-39 , 464 A.2d 1068 (1983) (entity was "an agency or instrumentality of the State" because it served a public purpose, its management was selected by state's insurance commissioner, it did not independently manage its affairs or enforce its regulations, and it had special tax and liability status). 12 Fortgang v. Woodland Park Zoo, No. 92846-1 activities, it is also possible for a government to contract with a private entity so as to evade PRA accountability-precisely what the Telford test is designed to prevent.

2017Keck v. Collins, 184 Wn.2d 358, 370 , 357 P.3d 1080 (2015) (“We review summary judgment orders de novo, considering the evidence and all reasonable inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” (citing Folsom v. Burger King, 135 Wn.2d 658, 663 , 958 P.2d 301 (1998))); Estate of Bunch v. McGraw Residential Ctr., 174 Wn.2d 425, 430 , 275 P.3d 1119 (2012) (questions of statutory interpretation reviewed de novo).

2017Keck v. Collins, 184 Wn.2d 358, 370 , 357 P.3d 1080 (2015) (“We review summary judgment orders de novo, considering the evidence and all reasonable inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” (citing Folsom v. Burger King, 135 Wn.2d 658, 663 , 958 P.2d 301 (1998))); Estate of Bunch v. McGraw Residential Ctr., 174 Wn.2d 425, 430 , 275 P.3d 1119 (2012) (questions of statutory interpretation reviewed de novo).

2017Keck v. Collins, 184 Wn.2d 358, 370 , 357 P.3d 1080 (2015) (“We review summary judgment orders de novo, considering the evidence and all reasonable inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” (citing Folsom v. Burger King, 135 Wn.2d 658, 663 , 958 P.2d 301 (1998))); Estate of Bunch v. McGraw Residential Ctr., 174 Wn.2d 425, 430 , 275 P.3d 1119 (2012) (questions of statutory interpretation reviewed de novo).

2017Keck v. Collins, 184 Wn.2d 358, 370 , 357 P.3d 1080 (2015) (“We review summary judgment orders de novo, considering the evidence and all reasonable inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” (citing Folsom v. Burger King, 135 Wn.2d 658, 663 , 958 P.2d 301 (1998))); Estate of Bunch v. McGraw Residential Ctr., 174 Wn.2d 425, 430 , 275 P.3d 1119 (2012) (questions of statutory interpretation reviewed de novo).

2017Keck v. Collins, 184 Wn.2d 358, 370 , 357 P.3d 1080 (2015) (“We review summary judgment orders de novo, considering the evidence and all reasonable inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” (citing Folsom v. Burger King, 135 Wn.2d 658, 663 , 958 P.2d 301 (1998))); Estate of Bunch v. McGraw Residential Ctr., 174 Wn.2d 425, 430 , 275 P.3d 1119 (2012) (questions of statutory interpretation reviewed de novo).

2017Keck v. Collins, 184 Wn.2d 358, 370 , 357 P.3d 1080 (2015) (“We review summary judgment orders de novo, considering the evidence and all reasonable inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” (citing Folsom v. Burger King, 135 Wn.2d 658, 663 , 958 P.2d 301 (1998))); Estate of Bunch v. McGraw Residential Ctr., 174 Wn.2d 425, 430 , 275 P.3d 1119 (2012) (questions of statutory interpretation reviewed de novo).

2017Repository v. Nova Behavioral Health, Inc., 112 Ohio St. 3d 338 , 2006-0hio-6713, 859 N.E.2d 936 , at ~ 26-31 (private nonprofit corporation, which provided mental health services pursuant to contract with the State, was performing a '"government function"' even though (1) providing mental health services was not traditionally reserved exclusively to the State, (2) there was no transfer of duties from 20 Fortgang v. Woodland Park Zoo, No. 92846-1 given that the purpose of the Telford test is to identify private entities that have effectively assumed the role of government-not to erode the priv

2017Repository v. Nova Behavioral Health, Inc., 112 Ohio St. 3d 338 , 2006-0hio-6713, 859 N.E.2d 936 , at ~ 26-31 (private nonprofit corporation, which provided mental health services pursuant to contract with the State, was performing a '"government function"' even though (1) providing mental health services was not traditionally reserved exclusively to the State, (2) there was no transfer of duties from 20 Fortgang v. Woodland Park Zoo, No. 92846-1 given that the purpose of the Telford test is to identify private entities that have effectively assumed the role of government-not to erode the priv

2017Keck v. Collins, 184 Wn.2d 358, 370 , 357 P.3d 1080 (2015) (“We review summary judgment orders de novo, considering the evidence and all reasonable inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” (citing Folsom v. Burger King, 135 Wn.2d 658, 663 , 958 P.2d 301 (1998))); Estate of Bunch v. McGraw Residential Ctr., 174 Wn.2d 425, 430 , 275 P.3d 1119 (2012) (questions of statutory interpretation reviewed de novo).

2017Keck v. Collins, 184 Wn.2d 358, 370 , 357 P.3d 1080 (2015) (“We review summary judgment orders de novo, considering the evidence and all reasonable inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” (citing Folsom v. Burger King, 135 Wn.2d 658, 663 , 958 P.2d 301 (1998))); Estate of Bunch v. McGraw Residential Ctr., 174 Wn.2d 425, 430 , 275 P.3d 1119 (2012) (questions of statutory interpretation reviewed de novo).

2011Eugster v. City of Spokane, 128 Wash.App. 1, 7 , 114 P.3d 1200 (2005) (citing Eugster v. City of Spokane, 110 Wash.App. 212, 222 , 39 P.3d 380 , review denied, 147 Wash.2d 1021 , 60 P.3d 92 (2002)), review denied, 156 Wash.2d 1014 , 132 P.3d 146 (2006); Loeffelholz v. Citizens for Leaders with Ethics & Accountability Now, 119 Wash.App. 665, 700-01 , 82 P.3d 1199 , review denied, 152 Wash.2d 1023 , 101 P.3d 107 (2004). [6] We note, however, that the Telford test is fact-based—dependent on the governmental function, funding, and control of the entity as a whole— not activity-based.

2011Eugster v. City of Spokane, 128 Wash.App. 1, 7 , 114 P.3d 1200 (2005) (citing Eugster v. City of Spokane, 110 Wash.App. 212, 222 , 39 P.3d 380 , review denied, 147 Wash.2d 1021 , 60 P.3d 92 (2002)), review denied, 156 Wash.2d 1014 , 132 P.3d 146 (2006); Loeffelholz v. Citizens for Leaders with Ethics & Accountability Now, 119 Wash.App. 665, 700-01 , 82 P.3d 1199 , review denied, 152 Wash.2d 1023 , 101 P.3d 107 (2004). [6] We note, however, that the Telford test is fact-based—dependent on the governmental function, funding, and control of the entity as a whole— not activity-based.

2011Eugster v. City of Spokane, 128 Wash.App. 1, 7 , 114 P.3d 1200 (2005) (citing Eugster v. City of Spokane, 110 Wash.App. 212, 222 , 39 P.3d 380 , review denied, 147 Wash.2d 1021 , 60 P.3d 92 (2002)), review denied, 156 Wash.2d 1014 , 132 P.3d 146 (2006); Loeffelholz v. Citizens for Leaders with Ethics & Accountability Now, 119 Wash.App. 665, 700-01 , 82 P.3d 1199 , review denied, 152 Wash.2d 1023 , 101 P.3d 107 (2004). [6] We note, however, that the Telford test is fact-based—dependent on the governmental function, funding, and control of the entity as a whole— not activity-based.

2011Eugster v. City of Spokane, 128 Wash.App. 1, 7 , 114 P.3d 1200 (2005) (citing Eugster v. City of Spokane, 110 Wash.App. 212, 222 , 39 P.3d 380 , review denied, 147 Wash.2d 1021 , 60 P.3d 92 (2002)), review denied, 156 Wash.2d 1014 , 132 P.3d 146 (2006); Loeffelholz v. Citizens for Leaders with Ethics & Accountability Now, 119 Wash.App. 665, 700-01 , 82 P.3d 1199 , review denied, 152 Wash.2d 1023 , 101 P.3d 107 (2004). [6] We note, however, that the Telford test is fact-based—dependent on the governmental function, funding, and control of the entity as a whole— not activity-based.

2011Eugster v. City of Spokane, 128 Wash.App. 1, 7 , 114 P.3d 1200 (2005) (citing Eugster v. City of Spokane, 110 Wash.App. 212, 222 , 39 P.3d 380 , review denied, 147 Wash.2d 1021 , 60 P.3d 92 (2002)), review denied, 156 Wash.2d 1014 , 132 P.3d 146 (2006); Loeffelholz v. Citizens for Leaders with Ethics & Accountability Now, 119 Wash.App. 665, 700-01 , 82 P.3d 1199 , review denied, 152 Wash.2d 1023 , 101 P.3d 107 (2004). [6] We note, however, that the Telford test is fact-based—dependent on the governmental function, funding, and control of the entity as a whole— not activity-based.

2011Eugster v. City of Spokane, 128 Wash.App. 1, 7 , 114 P.3d 1200 (2005) (citing Eugster v. City of Spokane, 110 Wash.App. 212, 222 , 39 P.3d 380 , review denied, 147 Wash.2d 1021 , 60 P.3d 92 (2002)), review denied, 156 Wash.2d 1014 , 132 P.3d 146 (2006); Loeffelholz v. Citizens for Leaders with Ethics & Accountability Now, 119 Wash.App. 665, 700-01 , 82 P.3d 1199 , review denied, 152 Wash.2d 1023 , 101 P.3d 107 (2004). [6] We note, however, that the Telford test is fact-based—dependent on the governmental function, funding, and control of the entity as a whole— not activity-based.