Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
23 Florida opinions name it 1 courts 1982–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Larry Darnell Perry v. State of Floridagreen2 sentences2018The trial court found the following nonstatutory mitigating circumstances and assigned the noted weight: (1) Tisdale was twenty-five years old when he committed the murder (very little weight); (2) Tisdale had a hereditary predisposition to substance abuse and dependence (very little weight); (3) Tisdale’s family history includes generational dysfunction (very little weight); (4) Tisdale was exposed to cocaine while a fetus (very little weight); (5) Tisdale was raised by a single mother (very little weight); (6) Tisdale’s genetic father is unknown (very little weight); (7) Tisdale’s father was 2018The *360 trial court relied only on the two aggravating factors found by the jury as part of its verdict, assigning great weight to both. 4 The portion of chapter 2016-13 authorizing imposition of a death sentence based upon a recommendation of ten jurors would later be declared unconstitutional in Perry v. State , 210 So.3d 630 , 640 (Fla. 2016) (applying Hurst , which held that a death sentence could not be legally imposed absent a unanimous death recommendation by the penalty phase jury). | 1 | 2 |
Singleton v. Stategreen2 sentences2006See Butler, 842 So.2d at 833 (holding the death sentence proportional for the first-degree murder conviction where only the HAC aggravator was found); Singleton v. State, 783 So.2d 970, 979 (Fla.2001) (holding the death sentence proportional for the first-degree murder conviction where the aggravators included prior violent felony conviction and HAC); Johnston, 863 So.2d at 278 (holding death sentence proportional for first-degree murder conviction where the court found two aggravating factors, one statutory mitigator, and twenty-six nonstatutory mitigators). 2004See White v. State, 817 So.2d 799 (Fla.) (finding death sentence proportionate when defendant stabbed victim fourteen times and slit her throat), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1091 , 123 S.Ct. 699 , 154 L.Ed.2d 638 (2002); Singleton v. State, 783 So.2d 970 (Fla.2001) (stating that defendant's death sentence was proportionate in stabbing murder where the two aggravating factors of HAC and prior violent felony conviction outweighed statutory mitigators of extreme mental disturbance, inability to appreciate the criminality of conduct, the defendant's age, and nine nonstatutory mitigators); Mansfield v. | 1 | 2 |
Ocha v. Stategreen1 sentence2017Id. at 960, 966 . | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. Stategreen1 sentence2009See Jones v. State, 690 So.2d 568, 571 (Fla.1996) (in calculated double murder, this Court found death proportionate with three aggravating circumstances — CCP, contemporaneous attempted murder of second victim, and pecuniary gain — and one statutory mitigating circumstance); Pope v. State, 679 So.2d 710, 716 (Fla.1996) (in violent beating and stabbing homicide, this Court held the death penalty proportionate where the two aggravating factors found — murder committed for pecuniary gain and prior violent felony— outweighed the two statutory mitigating circumstances — commission while under the | 1 | 1 |
Heath v. Stategreen1 sentence2009See Jones v. State, 690 So.2d 568, 571 (Fla.1996) (in calculated double murder, this Court found death proportionate with three aggravating circumstances — CCP, contemporaneous attempted murder of second victim, and pecuniary gain — and one statutory mitigating circumstance); Pope v. State, 679 So.2d 710, 716 (Fla.1996) (in violent beating and stabbing homicide, this Court held the death penalty proportionate where the two aggravating factors found — murder committed for pecuniary gain and prior violent felony— outweighed the two statutory mitigating circumstances — commission while under the | 1 | 1 |
Pope v. Stategreen1 sentence2009See Jones v. State, 690 So.2d 568, 571 (Fla.1996) (in calculated double murder, this Court found death proportionate with three aggravating circumstances — CCP, contemporaneous attempted murder of second victim, and pecuniary gain — and one statutory mitigating circumstance); Pope v. State, 679 So.2d 710, 716 (Fla.1996) (in violent beating and stabbing homicide, this Court held the death penalty proportionate where the two aggravating factors found — murder committed for pecuniary gain and prior violent felony— outweighed the two statutory mitigating circumstances — commission while under the | 1 | 1 |
Ponticelli v. Stategreen1 sentence2006The court found two aggravating factors applicable to both murders and a third factor applicable to the murder of Nick Grandinetti [3] and two mitigating factors in connection with both murders. [4] Ponticelli, 593 So.2d at 485-86 (original footnotes omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Johnston v. Stategreen1 sentence2006See Butler, 842 So.2d at 833 (holding the death sentence proportional for the first-degree murder conviction where only the HAC aggravator was found); Singleton v. State, 783 So.2d 970, 979 (Fla.2001) (holding the death sentence proportional for the first-degree murder conviction where the aggravators included prior violent felony conviction and HAC); Johnston, 863 So.2d at 278 (holding death sentence proportional for first-degree murder conviction where the court found two aggravating factors, one statutory mitigator, and twenty-six nonstatutory mitigators). | 1 | 1 |
Butler v. Stategreen1 sentence2006See Butler, 842 So.2d at 833 (holding the death sentence proportional for the first-degree murder conviction where only the HAC aggravator was found); Singleton v. State, 783 So.2d 970, 979 (Fla.2001) (holding the death sentence proportional for the first-degree murder conviction where the aggravators included prior violent felony conviction and HAC); Johnston, 863 So.2d at 278 (holding death sentence proportional for first-degree murder conviction where the court found two aggravating factors, one statutory mitigator, and twenty-six nonstatutory mitigators). | 1 | 1 |
Cook v. Stegall, Wardengreen1 sentence2004See White v. State, 817 So.2d 799 (Fla.) (finding death sentence proportionate when defendant stabbed victim fourteen times and slit her throat), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1091 , 123 S.Ct. 699 , 154 L.Ed.2d 638 (2002); Singleton v. State, 783 So.2d 970 (Fla.2001) (stating that defendant's death sentence was proportionate in stabbing murder where the two aggravating factors of HAC and prior violent felony conviction outweighed statutory mitigators of extreme mental disturbance, inability to appreciate the criminality of conduct, the defendant's age, and nine nonstatutory mitigators); Mansfield v. | 1 | 1 |
N'guessan v. Immigration and Naturalization Servicegreen1 sentence2004See White v. State, 817 So.2d 799 (Fla.) (finding death sentence proportionate when defendant stabbed victim fourteen times and slit her throat), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1091 , 123 S.Ct. 699 , 154 L.Ed.2d 638 (2002); Singleton v. State, 783 So.2d 970 (Fla.2001) (stating that defendant's death sentence was proportionate in stabbing murder where the two aggravating factors of HAC and prior violent felony conviction outweighed statutory mitigators of extreme mental disturbance, inability to appreciate the criminality of conduct, the defendant's age, and nine nonstatutory mitigators); Mansfield v. | 1 | 1 |
Magers v. Bondsgreen1 sentence2004See White v. State, 817 So.2d 799 (Fla.) (finding death sentence proportionate when defendant stabbed victim fourteen times and slit her throat), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1091 , 123 S.Ct. 699 , 154 L.Ed.2d 638 (2002); Singleton v. State, 783 So.2d 970 (Fla.2001) (stating that defendant's death sentence was proportionate in stabbing murder where the two aggravating factors of HAC and prior violent felony conviction outweighed statutory mitigators of extreme mental disturbance, inability to appreciate the criminality of conduct, the defendant's age, and nine nonstatutory mitigators); Mansfield v. | 1 | 1 |
White v. Stategreen1 sentence2004See White v. State, 817 So.2d 799 (Fla.) (finding death sentence proportionate when defendant stabbed victim fourteen times and slit her throat), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1091 , 123 S.Ct. 699 , 154 L.Ed.2d 638 (2002); Singleton v. State, 783 So.2d 970 (Fla.2001) (stating that defendant's death sentence was proportionate in stabbing murder where the two aggravating factors of HAC and prior violent felony conviction outweighed statutory mitigators of extreme mental disturbance, inability to appreciate the criminality of conduct, the defendant's age, and nine nonstatutory mitigators); Mansfield v. | 1 | 1 |
Johnston v. Stategreen1 sentence2003See Johnston v. State, 841 So.2d 349 (Fla.2002) (holding the death sentence proportional for sexual battery, beating, and strangulation of victim where aggravators included prior violent felony conviction and HAC); Orme v. State, 677 So.2d 258, 263 (Fla.1996) (holding the death sentence proportional for the sexual battery, beating, and strangulation of victim where aggravators included HAC, pecuniary gain, and sexual battery); Schwab v. State, 636 So.2d 3, 7 (Fla.1994) (holding the death sentence proportional for kidnaping, murder, and sexual battery of a boy where prior conviction of violent | 1 | 1 |
Schwab v. Stategreen1 sentence2003See Johnston v. State, 841 So.2d 349 (Fla.2002) (holding the death sentence proportional for sexual battery, beating, and strangulation of victim where aggravators included prior violent felony conviction and HAC); Orme v. State, 677 So.2d 258, 263 (Fla.1996) (holding the death sentence proportional for the sexual battery, beating, and strangulation of victim where aggravators included HAC, pecuniary gain, and sexual battery); Schwab v. State, 636 So.2d 3, 7 (Fla.1994) (holding the death sentence proportional for kidnaping, murder, and sexual battery of a boy where prior conviction of violent | 1 | 1 |
Orme v. Stategreen1 sentence2003See Johnston v. State, 841 So.2d 349 (Fla.2002) (holding the death sentence proportional for sexual battery, beating, and strangulation of victim where aggravators included prior violent felony conviction and HAC); Orme v. State, 677 So.2d 258, 263 (Fla.1996) (holding the death sentence proportional for the sexual battery, beating, and strangulation of victim where aggravators included HAC, pecuniary gain, and sexual battery); Schwab v. State, 636 So.2d 3, 7 (Fla.1994) (holding the death sentence proportional for kidnaping, murder, and sexual battery of a boy where prior conviction of violent | 1 | 1 |
Davis v. Stategreen1 sentence2000See Davis v. State, 703 So.2d 1055, 1061-62 , (Fla.1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 930 , 118 S.Ct. 2327 , 141 L.Ed.2d 701 (1998) (affirming the imposition of death where the trial court found, as in this case, the two aggravating factors of heinous, atrocious, or cruel and committed during the course of a sexual battery outweighed slight nonstatutory mitigation); Hauser v. State, 701 So.2d 329 (Fla.1997) (death sentence proportionate where the victim was strangled and the trial court found the three aggravators of heinous, atrocious, or cruel, cold, calculated, and premeditated, and pecuniary ga | 1 | 1 |
| Riechmann v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| In re Zieglergreen | 1 | 1 |
Riechmann v. Floridagreen1 sentence2000See Riechmann v. State, 581 So.2d 133, 140 (Fla.1991). [3] Riechmann v. Florida, 506 U.S. 952 , 113 S.Ct. 405 , 121 L.Ed.2d 331 (1992). [4] This motion contained fourteen claims, eleven of which asserted ineffective assistance of counsel. | 1 | 1 |
Hill v. Mazurkiewiczgreen1 sentence2000See Riechmann v. State, 581 So.2d 133, 140 (Fla.1991). [3] Riechmann v. Florida, 506 U.S. 952 , 113 S.Ct. 405 , 121 L.Ed.2d 331 (1992). [4] This motion contained fourteen claims, eleven of which asserted ineffective assistance of counsel. | 1 | 1 |
Cross v. City of Newarkgreen1 sentence2000See Davis v. State, 703 So.2d 1055, 1061-62 , (Fla.1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 930 , 118 S.Ct. 2327 , 141 L.Ed.2d 701 (1998) (affirming the imposition of death where the trial court found, as in this case, the two aggravating factors of heinous, atrocious, or cruel and committed during the course of a sexual battery outweighed slight nonstatutory mitigation); Hauser v. State, 701 So.2d 329 (Fla.1997) (death sentence proportionate where the victim was strangled and the trial court found the three aggravators of heinous, atrocious, or cruel, cold, calculated, and premeditated, and pecuniary ga | 1 | 1 |
| Davis v. Floridagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Solomon v. Michigangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Melton v. State
green
1 sentence2023Melton, 638 So. 2d at 929 . -4- Melton’s motion is not timely because it was not filed within one year of the date upon which the claim became discoverable through due diligence. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Ring v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2017In imposing the death sentence, the trial court concluded that the two aggravating factors 6 greatly outweighed the two statutory miti-gators and fifty nonstatutory mitigators. 7 ANALYSIS On appeal, Bargo raises seven issues: (1) trial counsel provided ineffective assistance that deprived Bargo of a fair trial; (2) the evidence is not sufficient to convict Bargo of first-degree murder; (3) the trial court erred by denying Bargo’s motion for the appointment of a crime scene expert; (4) Florida’s death penalty statute is unconstitutional under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 , 122 S.Ct. 2428 , 153 2017In imposing the death sentence, the trial court concluded that the two aggravating factors 6 greatly outweighed the two statutory miti-gators and fifty nonstatutory mitigators. 7 ANALYSIS On appeal, Bargo raises seven issues: (1) trial counsel provided ineffective assistance that deprived Bargo of a fair trial; (2) the evidence is not sufficient to convict Bargo of first-degree murder; (3) the trial court erred by denying Bargo’s motion for the appointment of a crime scene expert; (4) Florida’s death penalty statute is unconstitutional under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 , 122 S.Ct. 2428 , 153 | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Asay v. State
green
2 sentences2016Id. 2016Id. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Beasley v. State
green
1 sentence2013Id. at 674 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Henry v. State
green
1 sentence2007Henry v. State, 649 So.2d 1361 (Fla.1994). [7] *614 On September 12, 2002, Henry filed a "Complete Post Conviction Motion to Vacate Judgment and Death Sentence" pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Espinosa v. Florida
green
2 sentences2006This Court denied Ponticelli's claims on *1083 direct appeal. [5] The United States Supreme Court vacated this Court's judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079 , 112 S.Ct. 2926 , 120 L.Ed.2d 854 (1992). 2006This Court denied Ponticelli's claims on *1083 direct appeal. [5] The United States Supreme Court vacated this Court's judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079 , 112 S.Ct. 2926 , 120 L.Ed.2d 854 (1992). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Brady v. Maryland
green
2 sentences2006NOTES [1] The trial court found the following two aggravating factors: (1) the crime was committed while Archer was engaged in or was an accomplice in a robbery; and (2) the crime was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification (CCP). [2] The trial court found the following mitigating factors: (1) Archer had no significant history of prior criminal activity (accorded significant weight); and (2) Archer was a good family member to his grandmother (accorded some weight). [3] Archer raised the following claims in his rule 3.850 mot 2006NOTES [1] The trial court found the following two aggravating factors: (1) the crime was committed while Archer was engaged in or was an accomplice in a robbery; and (2) the crime was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification (CCP). [2] The trial court found the following mitigating factors: (1) Archer had no significant history of prior criminal activity (accorded significant weight); and (2) Archer was a good family member to his grandmother (accorded some weight). [3] Archer raised the following claims in his rule 3.850 mot | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Giglio v. United States
green
2 sentences2006NOTES [1] The trial court found the following two aggravating factors: (1) the crime was committed while Archer was engaged in or was an accomplice in a robbery; and (2) the crime was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification (CCP). [2] The trial court found the following mitigating factors: (1) Archer had no significant history of prior criminal activity (accorded significant weight); and (2) Archer was a good family member to his grandmother (accorded some weight). [3] Archer raised the following claims in his rule 3.850 mot 2006NOTES [1] The trial court found the following two aggravating factors: (1) the crime was committed while Archer was engaged in or was an accomplice in a robbery; and (2) the crime was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification (CCP). [2] The trial court found the following mitigating factors: (1) Archer had no significant history of prior criminal activity (accorded significant weight); and (2) Archer was a good family member to his grandmother (accorded some weight). [3] Archer raised the following claims in his rule 3.850 mot | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Mansfield v. State
green
1 sentence2004See White v. State, 817 So.2d 799 (Fla.) (finding death sentence proportionate when defendant stabbed victim fourteen times and slit her throat), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1091 , 123 S.Ct. 699 , 154 L.Ed.2d 638 (2002); Singleton v. State, 783 So.2d 970 (Fla.2001) (stating that defendant's death sentence was proportionate in stabbing murder where the two aggravating factors of HAC and prior violent felony conviction outweighed statutory mitigators of extreme mental disturbance, inability to appreciate the criminality of conduct, the defendant's age, and nine nonstatutory mitigators); Mansfield v. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Henry v. State
green
1 sentence2003Id. at 1367 n. 2. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Hauser v. State green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Livingston v. State green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Tedder v. State green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Robinson v. State green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Echols v. State green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| In re Green green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Nevada ex rel. Welfare Division of the Department of Human Resources v. Vine green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Waterhouse v. State green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Bottoson v. Florida green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Agan v. State green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| State v. Sarmiento green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Miranda v. Arizona green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.