cognate Federal rule in Massachusetts

2015See generally Doe v. Senechal, 431 Mass. 78 , 81 n.8, cert, denied, 531 U.S. 825 (2000), quoting from Van Christo Advertising, Inc. v. M/A-COM/LCS, 426 Mass. 410, 414 (1998) (“In construing our rules of civil procedure, we are guided by judicial interpretations of the cognate Federal rule ‘absent compelling reasons to the contrary or significant differences in content’ ”). 13 Thus, for example, the judge concluded that the appointment of counsel to represent B.V.G. “vitiatfed] grandfather’s assertion that [her] interests are not adequately represented,” and the judge specifically stated that h

2000In construing the Massachusetts rules of civil procedure, this court is “guided by judicial interpretations of the cognate Federal rule absent compelling reasons to the contrary or significant differences in content.” See Doe v. Senechal, 431 Mass. 78 , 81 n. 8 (2000), quoting Van Christo Advertising, Inc. v. M/A-COM/LCS, 426 Mass. 410, 414 (1998).

2013Servs., Inc. v. Superior Court, 368 Mass. 174, 179-180 (1975).

2008Servs., Inc. v. Superior Court, 368 Mass. 174, 179-180 (1975).

2015See generally Doe v. Senechal, 431 Mass. 78 , 81 n.8, cert, denied, 531 U.S. 825 (2000), quoting from Van Christo Advertising, Inc. v. M/A-COM/LCS, 426 Mass. 410, 414 (1998) (“In construing our rules of civil procedure, we are guided by judicial interpretations of the cognate Federal rule ‘absent compelling reasons to the contrary or significant differences in content’ ”). 13 Thus, for example, the judge concluded that the appointment of counsel to represent B.V.G. “vitiatfed] grandfather’s assertion that [her] interests are not adequately represented,” and the judge specifically stated that h

2013However, “[ijn construing our rules of civil procedure, we are guided by judicial interpretations of the cognate Federal rule ‘absent compelling reasons to the contrary or significant differences in content.’” Doe v. Senechal, 431 Mass. 78 , 81 n.8 (2000), quoting Rollins Envtl.

2015See generally Doe v. Senechal, 431 Mass. 78 , 81 n.8, cert, denied, 531 U.S. 825 (2000), quoting from Van Christo Advertising, Inc. v. M/A-COM/LCS, 426 Mass. 410, 414 (1998) (“In construing our rules of civil procedure, we are guided by judicial interpretations of the cognate Federal rule ‘absent compelling reasons to the contrary or significant differences in content’ ”). 13 Thus, for example, the judge concluded that the appointment of counsel to represent B.V.G. “vitiatfed] grandfather’s assertion that [her] interests are not adequately represented,” and the judge specifically stated that h

2008“In construing our rules of civil procedure, we are guided by judicial interpretations of the cognate Federal rule ‘absent compelling reasons to the contrary or significant differ ences in content.’ ” Doe v. Senechal, 431 Mass. 78 , 81 n.8, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 825 (2000), quoting Rollins Envtl.

2025Kemp v. United States, 596 U.S. 528, 534 (2022) (interpreting Fed.

2020The parties having furnished the Court with no Massachusetts authorities addressed to Rule 35, the undersigned has looked to interpretations of the cognate federal rule for guidance. -1- the rule is not a discovery device, but rather a mechanism to preserve testimony for trial." Commonwealth v. Hilton, 19 Mass. L.

2018Compare Caron v. General Motors Corp. , 37 Mass. App. Ct. at 749 -751 , 643 N.E.2d 471 (construing Mass.R.Civ.P. 32[a] [3][B] ). 12 See Frederick v. Yellow Cab Co. of Philadelphia , 200 F.2d 483 , 486 (3d Cir. 1952).

2018Compare Caron v. General Motors Corp. , 37 Mass. App. Ct. at 749 -751 , 643 N.E.2d 471 (construing Mass.R.Civ.P. 32[a] [3][B] ). 12 See Frederick v. Yellow Cab Co. of Philadelphia , 200 F.2d 483 , 486 (3d Cir. 1952).

2018Compare Caron v. General Motors Corp. , 37 Mass. App. Ct. at 749 -751 , 643 N.E.2d 471 (construing Mass.R.Civ.P. 32[a] [3][B] ). 12 See Frederick v. Yellow Cab Co. of Philadelphia , 200 F.2d 483 , 486 (3d Cir. 1952).

2017Those decisions indicate that such an award may be appropriate where counsel, "'as a trained lawyer, should have known better' than to pursue a frivolous appeal, wasteful of the resources of the opposing party and the court"; counsel has "'an affirmative obligation' to prevent frivolous appeals." Id. at 73 n.6, quoting from Quiroga v. Hasbro, Inc., 943 F.2d 346, 347 (3d Cir. 1991).

2016See Clausen v. Sea-3, Inc., 21 F.3d 1181, 1184 (1st Cir. 1994).

2006The balance of hardship (see Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 [1987], interpreting the cognate Federal rule, Fed.

2005In fact, “every federal court of appeals that has considered the question has held that a class action seeking only declaratory or injunctive relief does not bar subsequent individual suits for damages.” Hiser v. Franklin, 94 F.3d 1287, 1291 (9th Cir. 1996), quoting In re Jackson Lockdown/MCO Cases, 568 F.Sup. 869, 892 (E.D.

2002Nader v. Citron, 372 Mass. 96, 98 (1977) (authorities collected from the cognate federal rule).

2002Dismissal is appropriate “only if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of [her] claim which would entitle [her] to relief.” GMAC v. Abington Casualty Co., 413 Mass. 583, 584 (1992), quoting from Nader v. Citron, 372 Mass. 96, 98 (1977), and from Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).

2002Dismissal is appropriate “only if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of [her] claim which would entitle [her] to relief.” GMAC v. Abington Casualty Co., 413 Mass. 583, 584 (1992), quoting from Nader v. Citron, 372 Mass. 96, 98 (1977), and from Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).

2002Dismissal is appropriate “only if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of [her] claim which would entitle [her] to relief.” GMAC v. Abington Casualty Co., 413 Mass. 583, 584 (1992), quoting from Nader v. Citron, 372 Mass. 96, 98 (1977), and from Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).

1996Export Co. v. RDI / Lux liner, Inc., 13 F.3d 69, 71-72 [3d Cir. 1993]); Mroz v. Lee, 884 F. Supp. 246, 249 [E.D.

1996Export Co. v. RDI / Lux liner, Inc., 13 F.3d 69, 71-72 [3d Cir. 1993]); Mroz v. Lee, 884 F. Supp. 246, 249 [E.D.

1994“Procuring” a witness’s absence means more than simply failing to secure his attendance at trial. “[Procuring absence and doing nothing to facilitate presence are quite different things . . .”; and the deposition will be admitted unless the party offering it “actively took steps to keep the deponents from setting foot in the courtroom.” Houser v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 202 F. Supp. 181, 189 (D.

1994"Procuring" a witness's absence means more than simply failing to secure his attendance at trial. "[P]rocuring absence and doing nothing to facilitate presence are quite different things ..."; and the deposition will be admitted unless the party offering it "actively took steps to keep the deponents from setting foot in the courtroom." Houser v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 202 F. Supp. 181, 189 (D.

1992See Bell v. Hosse, 31 F.R.D. 181, 185 (M.D.

1984See also Katz v. Savitsky, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 792 , 798 n.8 (1980).

1982Morash & Sons v. Commonwealth, 363 Mass. 612, 615 (1973). 4 Rule 9 (c) of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure, 365 Mass. 751 (1974), like the cognate Federal rule, governs pleadings involving statutory as well as contractual conditions precedent.

1982See Weir v. United States, 310 F.2d 149, 155 (8th Cir. 1962); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Mobil Oil Corp., 362 F. Supp. 786, 788 (W.D.

1982The designated portions of the transcript appearing in the record *536 appendix do not reflect that any specification of the grounds for the motion were given at the sidebar hearing on it. “ [T]he denial of a motion for a directed verdict which fails to state the grounds therefor is not error and cannot be complained of on appeal.” Moy v. Jack Madden Ford Sales, Inc., 4 Mass. App. Ct. 102, 108 (1976), and therein cited Federal authorities discussing the cognate Federal rule 50(a).