Taylor v. Jackson, 75 S.E. 275 (S.C. 1912). · Go Syfert
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Taylor v. Jackson, 75 S.E. 275 (S.C. 1912). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“it would be meaningless to describe the right to travel between states as a fundamental precept of personal liberty and not to acknowledge a correlative constitutional right to travel within a state.”
61 citation events (8 in the last 25 years) across 28 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: McCool v. City of Philadelphia (paed, 2007-06-27)
Treatment trajectory · 1971 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1971 1998 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 12 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) McCool v. City of Philadelphia
E.D. Pa. · 2007 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
it would be meaningless to describe the right to travel between states as a fundamental precept of personal liberty and not to acknowledge a correlative constitutional right to travel within a state.
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Pottinger v. City of Miami
S.D. Fla. · 1992 · signal: see, e.g. · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
the right to move freely about one's neighborhood or town ... is indeed 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' and 'deeply rooted in the nation's history
cited Cited "see" Hudson v. State
Kan. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 542 , 92 S.Ct. 113 , 116, 31 L.Ed.2d 424, 429 (1971).
discussed Cited "see" Spencer v. Casavilla
2d Cir. · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See 903 F.2d at 174 (citing King v. New Rochelle Municipal Housing Authority, 442 F.2d 646, 648 (2d Cir.) ("It would be meaningless to describe the right to travel between states as a fundamental precept of personal liberty and not to acknowledge a correlative constitutional right to travel within a state."), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 863 , 92 S.Ct. 113 , 30 L.Ed.2d 107 (1971), and Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 255-56 , 94 S.Ct. 1076, 1080-81 , 39 L.Ed.2d 306 (1974) (declining to consider whether to draw a constitutional distinction between interstate and intrastate travel))…
discussed Cited "see" Spencer v. Casavilla
2d Cir. · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See 903 F.2d at 174 (citing King v. New Rochelle Municipal Housing Authority, 442 F.2d 646, 648 (2d Cir.) (“It would be meaningless to describe the right to travel between states as a fundamental precept of personal liberty and not to acknowledge a correlative constitutional right to travel within a state.”), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 863 , 92 S.Ct. 113 , 30 L.Ed.2d 107 (1971), and Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 255-56 , 94 S.Ct. 1076, 1080-81 , 39 L.Ed.2d 306 (1974) (declining to consider whether to draw a constitutional distinction between interstate and intrastate trav…
cited Cited "see" Spencer v. Casavilla
2d Cir. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See King v. New Rochelle Municipal Housing Authority, 442 F.2d 646 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 863 , 92 S.Ct. 113 , 30 L.Ed.2d 107 (1971).
cited Cited "see" Spencer v. Casavilla
2d Cir. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See King v. New Rochelle Municipal Housing Authority, 442 F.2d 646 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 863 , 92 S.Ct. 113 , 30 L.Ed.2d 107 (1971).
cited Cited "see" Bruno v. Civil Service Commission
Conn. · 1981 · signal: see · confidence high
See King v. New Rochelle Municipal Housing Authority, 442 F.2d 646 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 863 , 92 S. Ct. 113 , 30 *251 L.
discussed Cited "see" Matthews v. City of AtLantic City (2×)
N.J. · 1980 · signal: see · confidence high
See King v. New Rochelle Municipal Housing Auth., 442 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. den., 404 U.S. 863 , 92 S.Ct. 113 , 30 L.Ed.2d 107 (1971); Eggert v. City of Seattle, 81 Wash.2d 840 , 505 P. 2d 801 (1973); see also Abrahams v. Civil Serv.
discussed Cited "see" Rasmussen v. City of Lake Forest, Illinois
N.D. Ill. · 1975 · signal: accord · confidence high
While a number of courts have flatly indicated that durational residency requirements cannot cause a discrimination in the allocation of public housing openings, e. g., Cole v. Housing Authority of City of Newport, 435 F.2d 807 (1st Cir. 1970); accord, King v. New Rochelle Municipal Housing Authority, 442 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1971) cert. denied, 404 U.S. 863 , 92 S.Ct. 113 , 30 L.Ed.2d 107 (1972), they had prospective residents litigating before them, and they based their holdings on the equal protection clause. 6 Public housing may be construed as a governmental benefit which must be distributed…
cited Cited "see, e.g." State v. One (1) Ford Van Econoline
N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. · 1977 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also, Lynch v. Household Finance Corporation, 405 U.S. 538 , 92 S.Ct. 113 , 31 L.Ed.2d 424 (1972) in which the court stated: "Property does not have rights.
cited Cited "see, e.g." States Marine Lines, Inc. v. George P. Shultz, Secretary of the Treasury
4th Cir. · 1974 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also, Lynch v. Household Finance Corporation, 405 U.S. 538 , 92 S.Ct. 113 , 31 L.Ed.2d 424 . (1972) in which the court stated: “Property does not have rights.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Taylor
v.
Jackson.
8269.
Supreme Court of South Carolina.
Jul 22, 1912.
75 S.E. 275
1912 S.C. LEXIS 111
Messrs. Gibson Muller , for appellants. Mr. James R. Coggeshall , contra.
Fraser, Woods.
Cited by 2 opinions  |  Published

The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Mr. Justice Fraser.

The plaintiffs-appellants brought action in this case against the defendants-respondents for a tract of forty acres of land, and alleged that the defendants are in the unlawful possession of said land and wrongfully withhold the possession of the same from the plaintiffs.

The defendants claim that the defendant, Nedie Jackson, is in the lawful possession and is the equitable owner and is entitled to specific performance of an agreement to convey made by one W. W. Hamilton, Sr., the immediate grantor of the plaintiffs, and that the plaintiffs took their title with full knowledge of the equity of the defendant, Nedie Jackson.

The case was withdrawn from the jury by consent of counsel and tried upon the equitable issues by Judge Robert Aldrich, the then presiding Judge.

After reading carefully all the evidence and arguments of counsel, we do not see that the evidence preponderates against the findings of fact by the Circuit Judge.

[*114] There are nine exceptions, but they all raise questions of fact.

In the case of Boatright v. Crosby, 83 S. C. 191, the Court says: “The burden rested upon the appellant to show error, on the part of his Honor, the Circuit Judge, in his finding that the deed was intended as a mortgage. The testimony is conflicting upon every material fact; and the appellant has failed to satisfy this Court that the preponderance of the evidence is in his favor.

“It would subserve no useful purpose to narrate the details of testimony.”

The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed

Mr. Justice Woods absent.