reverse-Batson challenge in New York

2012Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the Supreme Court properly granted the People’s reverse-Batson challenge (see Batson v Kentucky, 476 US 79 [1986]; People v Luciano, 10 NY3d 499, 502-503 [2008]; People v Kern, 75 NY2d 638 [1990], cert denied 498 US 824 [1990]).

2011The trial court properly granted the People’s reverse-Batson challenge (see Batson v Kentucky, 476 US 79 [1986]; People v Luciano, 10 NY3d 499, 502-503 [2008]; People v Kern, 75 NY2d 638 [1990], cert denied 498 US 824 [1990]).

2019The People simply failed to meet their burden that racial discrimination was the motivating factor" ( People v Hecker , 15 NY3d 625, 661 [2010]; see also People v Hechavarria , 138 AD3d 543 [1st Dept 2016], appeal withdrawn 27 NY3d 1133 [2016]).

2016The People simply failed to meet their burden that [gender] discrimination was the motivating factor” (People v Hecker, 15 NY3d 625, 661 [2010]). *544 While the prosecution established a prima facie case of gender-based discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges, defense counsel then presented facially gender-neutral reasons for each of the strikes of male prospective jurors at issue.

2013It was improper for the trial court to permit the People to impeach their own witness since her testimony did not tend to disprove a material issue of the case (see CPL 60.35; People v Fitzpatrick, 40 NY2d 44 [1976]; People v Dunston, 100 AD3d 769, 770 [2012]; see also People v Andre, 185 AD2d 276, 277 [1992]).

2013It was improper for the trial court to permit the People to impeach their own witness since her testimony did not tend to disprove a material issue of the case (see CPL 60.35; People v Fitzpatrick, 40 NY2d 44 [1976]; People v Dunston, 100 AD3d 769, 770 [2012]; see also People v Andre, 185 AD2d 276, 277 [1992]).

2013It was improper for the trial court to permit the People to impeach their own witness since her testimony did not tend to disprove a material issue of the case (see CPL 60.35; People v Fitzpatrick, 40 NY2d 44 [1976]; People v Dunston, 100 AD3d 769, 770 [2012]; see also People v Andre, 185 AD2d 276, 277 [1992]).

2013It was improper for the trial court to permit the People to impeach their own witness since her testimony did not tend to disprove a material issue of the case (see CPL 60.35; People v Fitzpatrick, 40 NY2d 44 [1976]; People v Dunston, 100 AD3d 769, 770 [2012]; see also People v Andre, 185 AD2d 276, 277 [1992]).

2012The Supreme Court’s determination that defense counsel’s proffered reasons for challenging the juror in question were pretextual is entitled to deference and is supported by the record (see People v Clarke, 64 AD3d 612 [2009]; People v Richie, 217 AD2d 84, 89 [1995]).

2009The trial court’s determination that the proffered reason for challenging the juror in question, that she had previously served on a jury, was pretextual, is entitled to great deference and is supported by the record (see People v Quito, 43 AD3d 411, 412-413 [2007]; People v Richie, 217 AD2d 84, 89 [1995]).

2022Contrary to the defendant's contention, the court properly granted the People's reverse- Batson challenge ( see Batson v Kentucky , 476 US 79 ; People v Kern , 75 NY2d 638 ) with respect to the defense's peremptory challenge as to one particular juror.

2015In the course of jury selection, the defendant exercised several peremptory challenges to prospective jurors, one of which was contested by the People on the ground that the defendant was attempting to exclude white females from the jury, thus raising what is commonly known as a reverse-Batson challenge (see Batson v Kentucky, 476 US 79 [1986]; People v Carrington, 105 AD3d 970, 970 [2013]; see generally People v Kern, 75 NY2d 638, 649-650 [1990]).

2015The record supports the court’s express and implied findings (see People v Payne, 88 NY2d 172 [1996]) that the race-neutral reason provided by the defendant for the peremptory challenge at issue was pretextual.

2010In People v Jones, one of the three cases before us in Payne, we observed that in the context of a reverse Batson test, Supreme Court, at step two, commanded the defense to “articulate ‘non-pretextual’ reasons for the challenges” ( 88 NY2d at 186 ).

2022The court's determination that the facially race-neutral reasons given for the defendant's peremptory challenge to that particular juror were pretextual is entitled to great deference on appeal and will not be disturbed where, as here, the determination is supported by the record ( see People v Stokes , 140 AD3d 800, 801 ; People v Carrington , 105 AD3d 970, 970 ; People v Scott , 70 AD3d 978, 980 ; People v Fortunato , 59 AD3d 735 ).

2015In the course of jury selection, the defendant exercised several peremptory challenges to prospective jurors, one of which was contested by the People on the ground that the defendant was attempting to exclude white females from the jury, thus raising what is commonly known as a reverse-Batson challenge (see Batson v Kentucky, 476 US 79 [1986]; People v Carrington, 105 AD3d 970, 970 [2013]; see generally People v Kern, 75 NY2d 638, 649-650 [1990]).

1996The issue of whether the People made a prima facie showing of a reverse-Batson violation by the defense was rendered academic when the defense offered its race-neutral explanations without first objecting to the court’s finding of a prima facie case (see, Hernandez v New York, 500 US 352, 359 ; People v Thomas, 210 AD2d 515 ; People v Jones, 204 AD2d 485 ).

1995Where as here, however, defense counsel proffered race-neutral explanations for his exercise of peremptory challenges without disputing the issue of whether a prima facie case of racial discrimination has been established, and the court ruled on the validity of the defense explanations, the issue of whether the prosecution made out a prima facie case is unpreserved for appellate review (see, Hernandez v New York, supra, at 359; People v Thomas, 210 AD2d 515 ; People v Jones, 204 AD2d 485 ; cf., People v Stiff, 206 AD2d 235 ).

2019The People simply failed to meet their burden that racial discrimination was the motivating factor" ( People v Hecker , 15 NY3d 625, 661 [2010]; see also People v Hechavarria , 138 AD3d 543 [1st Dept 2016], appeal withdrawn 27 NY3d 1133 [2016]).

2016Defendant’s arguments concerning the procedures by which the court adjudicated the reverse Batson claim are unpreserved, since defense counsel did not specifically raise them at trial (see People v James, 99 NY2d 264, 272 [2002]; People v Bruzzley, 105 AD3d 576 [1st Dept 2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 1002 [2013]).

2016Defendant’s arguments concerning the procedures by which the court adjudicated the reverse Batson claim are unpreserved, since defense counsel did not specifically raise them at trial (see People v James, 99 NY2d 264, 272 [2002]; People v Bruzzley, 105 AD3d 576 [1st Dept 2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 1002 [2013]).

2011The defendant’s contention that the prospective juror in question should have been excused because he was a member in a certain club is without merit, as the defendant did not question the prospective juror regarding the specifics of his club membership (see People v Clarke, 64 AD3d 612 [2009]; People v Young, 35 AD3d 324, 325 [2006]; People v McNair, 26 AD3d 245, 246 [2006]).

2011The defendant’s contention that the prospective juror in question should have been excused because he was a member in a certain club is without merit, as the defendant did not question the prospective juror regarding the specifics of his club membership (see People v Clarke, 64 AD3d 612 [2009]; People v Young, 35 AD3d 324, 325 [2006]; People v McNair, 26 AD3d 245, 246 [2006]).

2009The trial court’s determination that the proffered reason for challenging the juror in question, that she had previously served on a jury, was pretextual, is entitled to great deference and is supported by the record (see People v Quito, 43 AD3d 411, 412-413 [2007]; People v Richie, 217 AD2d 84, 89 [1995]).