transcription inquiry in New York

2021People v Valdes , 283 AD2d 187 [1st Dept 2001], lv denied 97 NY2d 688 [2001]).

2004Were we to review it, we would find that the error in question appears to be a transcription error (People v Acosta, 309 AD2d 521 [2003], lv denied 1 NY3d 624 [2004]; People v Fernandez, 287 AD2d 347 , 348 [2001], lv denied 97 NY2d 704 [2002]; People v Valdes, 283 AD2d 187 [2001], lv denied 97 NY2d 688 [2001]), since the defense did not object when the charge was given, since in the other numerous instances where the standard was stated, it was stated correctly, since the error consisted of the inclusion of a single word— “not”—which, if removed, would render the charge entirely correct, and s

2013“Although some deviations from this procedure may be warranted depending on the circumstances, where the court fails to fulfill its ‘core responsibility’ under CPL 310.30 by depriving the defendant of meaningful notice of the communication or a meaningful opportunity to participate in the formulation of the court’s response, the error affects the mode of the proceedings” (People v Lockley, 84 AD3d 836 , 837 [2011], quoting People v Kisoon, 8 NY3d 129, 135 [2007]; see People v O’Rama, 78 NY2d at 279-280 ).

2013“Although some deviations from this procedure may be warranted depending on the circumstances, where the court fails to fulfill its ‘core responsibility’ under CPL 310.30 by depriving the defendant of meaningful notice of the communication or a meaningful opportunity to participate in the formulation of the court’s response, the error affects the mode of the proceedings” (People v Lockley, 84 AD3d 836 , 837 [2011], quoting People v Kisoon, 8 NY3d 129, 135 [2007]; see People v O’Rama, 78 NY2d at 279-280 ).

2024The standard at {**42 NY3d at 728}step one, two or three is the same in this regard: if race (or any other invidious classification) forms any part of a reason for use of a peremptory strike, Batson requires that the strike be rejected ( People v Luciano , 10 NY3d 499, 505 [2008] ["The purpose of the Batson rule is to eliminate discrimination, not minimize it" (citation and quotation marks omitted)]; Smith v United States , 966 A2d 367, 369 [DC 2009, as amended on reh May 14, 2009] ["race is an impermissible factor, even if a minor one, in exercising peremptory strikes"], quoting Tursio v Unit

2024The standard at {**42 NY3d at 728}step one, two or three is the same in this regard: if race (or any other invidious classification) forms any part of a reason for use of a peremptory strike, Batson requires that the strike be rejected ( People v Luciano , 10 NY3d 499, 505 [2008] ["The purpose of the Batson rule is to eliminate discrimination, not minimize it" (citation and quotation marks omitted)]; Smith v United States , 966 A2d 367, 369 [DC 2009, as amended on reh May 14, 2009] ["race is an impermissible factor, even if a minor one, in exercising peremptory strikes"], quoting Tursio v Unit

2017As Dr. Recht put it at the conclusion of his deposition, “If I use that revenue [from reading film] in Bucket A, I have less revenue for Bucket B”—“Bucket A” being “general radiology” and “Bucket B” being “a subspecialty-trained radiologist who is doing academic work.” Upon NYU’s submission of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision not to renew plaintiff’s contract, the burden shifted back to plaintiff to come forward with evidence raising a triable issue as to whether, under McDonnell Douglas, NYU’s explanation was a false pretext masking discriminatory intent (see Forrest, 3

2017As Dr. Recht put it at the conclusion of his deposition, “If I use that revenue [from reading film] in Bucket A, I have less revenue for Bucket B”—“Bucket A” being “general radiology” and “Bucket B” being “a subspecialty-trained radiologist who is doing academic work.” Upon NYU’s submission of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision not to renew plaintiff’s contract, the burden shifted back to plaintiff to come forward with evidence raising a triable issue as to whether, under McDonnell Douglas, NYU’s explanation was a false pretext masking discriminatory intent (see Forrest, 3

2005Because it is reasonable to require counsel to object, for example, to a court’s failure to mark a note as an exhibit or even to its failure to share with counsel its intended response or to afford counsel an adequate opportunity to be heard, most departures from the O’Rama procedures are subject to the usual rules of preservation (see People v Starling, 85 NY2d 509 [1995]; People v DeRosario, 81 NY2d 801, 803 [1993]; People v Battle, supra; People v Mitchell, 2 AD3d 145 [2003]; People v Tolbert, 283 AD2d 930 [2001]; People v Cintron, 273 AD2d 84 [2000]; People v Wheeler, 271 AD2d 257 [2000]).

2005Because it is reasonable to require counsel to object, for example, to a court’s failure to mark a note as an exhibit or even to its failure to share with counsel its intended response or to afford counsel an adequate opportunity to be heard, most departures from the O’Rama procedures are subject to the usual rules of preservation (see People v Starling, 85 NY2d 509 [1995]; People v DeRosario, 81 NY2d 801, 803 [1993]; People v Battle, supra; People v Mitchell, 2 AD3d 145 [2003]; People v Tolbert, 283 AD2d 930 [2001]; People v Cintron, 273 AD2d 84 [2000]; People v Wheeler, 271 AD2d 257 [2000]).

2005Because it is reasonable to require counsel to object, for example, to a court’s failure to mark a note as an exhibit or even to its failure to share with counsel its intended response or to afford counsel an adequate opportunity to be heard, most departures from the O’Rama procedures are subject to the usual rules of preservation (see People v Starling, 85 NY2d 509 [1995]; People v DeRosario, 81 NY2d 801, 803 [1993]; People v Battle, supra; People v Mitchell, 2 AD3d 145 [2003]; People v Tolbert, 283 AD2d 930 [2001]; People v Cintron, 273 AD2d 84 [2000]; People v Wheeler, 271 AD2d 257 [2000]).

2005Because it is reasonable to require counsel to object, for example, to a court’s failure to mark a note as an exhibit or even to its failure to share with counsel its intended response or to afford counsel an adequate opportunity to be heard, most departures from the O’Rama procedures are subject to the usual rules of preservation (see People v Starling, 85 NY2d 509 [1995]; People v DeRosario, 81 NY2d 801, 803 [1993]; People v Battle, supra; People v Mitchell, 2 AD3d 145 [2003]; People v Tolbert, 283 AD2d 930 [2001]; People v Cintron, 273 AD2d 84 [2000]; People v Wheeler, 271 AD2d 257 [2000]).

2005Because it is reasonable to require counsel to object, for example, to a court’s failure to mark a note as an exhibit or even to its failure to share with counsel its intended response or to afford counsel an adequate opportunity to be heard, most departures from the O’Rama procedures are subject to the usual rules of preservation (see People v Starling, 85 NY2d 509 [1995]; People v DeRosario, 81 NY2d 801, 803 [1993]; People v Battle, supra; People v Mitchell, 2 AD3d 145 [2003]; People v Tolbert, 283 AD2d 930 [2001]; People v Cintron, 273 AD2d 84 [2000]; People v Wheeler, 271 AD2d 257 [2000]).

2004Defendant also challenges the portion of the court’s insanity charge that distinguished between cognitive and volitional tests; this challenge requires preservation as well (see People v Robinson, supra), and we also decline to review this unpreserved claim in the interest of justice.

2004Were we to review it, we would find that the error in question appears to be a transcription error (People v Acosta, 309 AD2d 521 [2003], lv denied 1 NY3d 624 [2004]; People v Fernandez, 287 AD2d 347 , 348 [2001], lv denied 97 NY2d 704 [2002]; People v Valdes, 283 AD2d 187 [2001], lv denied 97 NY2d 688 [2001]), since the defense did not object when the charge was given, since in the other numerous instances where the standard was stated, it was stated correctly, since the error consisted of the inclusion of a single word— “not”—which, if removed, would render the charge entirely correct, and s

2004Were we to review it, we would find that the error in question appears to be a transcription error (People v Acosta, 309 AD2d 521 [2003], lv denied 1 NY3d 624 [2004]; People v Fernandez, 287 AD2d 347 , 348 [2001], lv denied 97 NY2d 704 [2002]; People v Valdes, 283 AD2d 187 [2001], lv denied 97 NY2d 688 [2001]), since the defense did not object when the charge was given, since in the other numerous instances where the standard was stated, it was stated correctly, since the error consisted of the inclusion of a single word— “not”—which, if removed, would render the charge entirely correct, and s

2002Children, 267 AD2d 307, 308 ), and in the instant case, the gaps in the transcription of the hearing tape do not preclude meaningful review.

2001In any event, even if the purported error actually occurred, it could not have misled the jury given the correct statement of the reasonable doubt standard in the remainder of the preliminary charge, as well as in the final charge (see, People v Simon, 224 AD2d 458 , lv denied 88 NY2d 885 ).

2001Likewise, we are unpersuaded that the gaps in the transcription of the hearing tape were so significant as to preclude meaningful review (see, Matter of Gonzalez v New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs., 277 AD2d 539 ).

2001Petitioner’s remaining arguments are unpreserved for our review (see, Mat ter of Kross v Goord, 278 AD2d 637 ) and, in any event, are without merit.

1993There is no support for defendant’s present claim that his attorney at the plea proceeding did not understand the bargained for sentence, or that defendant was mistaken as to the term to be imposed (see, e.g., People v Davis, 172 AD2d 683 , lv denied 78 NY2d 964 ; People v Curet, 176 AD2d 160 , lv denied 78 NY2d 1127 ).