intrusive blood test in Pennsylvania

2026There, the Supreme Court held it is unreasonable to impose criminal penalties on a driver who refuses an intrusive blood test, concluding “[t]here must be a limit to the consequences to which motorists may be deemed to have consented by virtue of a decision to drive on public roads.” Id. at 477 .

2025Petitioners do not question the constitutionality of those laws, and nothing we say here should be read to cast doubt on them. 100 Birchfield, 579 U.S. at 475. 101 Id. at 476. 102 Id. at 454. 103 Id. at 476 (citing Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 218 ; Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 8 (2013); Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 313 (1978)). [J-43-2024] - 30 It is another matter, however, for a State not only to insist upon an intrusive blood test, but also to impose criminal penalties on the refusal to submit to such a test.

2026See also Commonwealth v. Giron, 155 A.3d 635, 640 (Pa. Super. 2017) (“We hold that, pursuant to Birchfield, in the absence of a warrant or exigent circumstances justifying a search, a defendant who refuses to provide a blood sample when requested by police is not subject to the enhanced penalties provided in 75 Pa.C.S.[] §§ 3803-3804.”) (footnote omitted).

2025Petitioners do not question the constitutionality of those laws, and nothing we say here should be read to cast doubt on them. 100 Birchfield, 579 U.S. at 475. 101 Id. at 476. 102 Id. at 454. 103 Id. at 476 (citing Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 218 ; Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 8 (2013); Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 313 (1978)). [J-43-2024] - 30 It is another matter, however, for a State not only to insist upon an intrusive blood test, but also to impose criminal penalties on the refusal to submit to such a test.

2025Petitioners do not question the constitutionality of those laws, and nothing we say here should be read to cast doubt on them. 100 Birchfield, 579 U.S. at 475. 101 Id. at 476. 102 Id. at 454. 103 Id. at 476 (citing Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 218 ; Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 8 (2013); Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 313 (1978)). [J-43-2024] - 30 It is another matter, however, for a State not only to insist upon an intrusive blood test, but also to impose criminal penalties on the refusal to submit to such a test.

2022Among the things that exceed those limits are “a State[’s] . . . insist[ence] upon an intrusive blood test,” and the “impos[ition] of criminal penalties on the refusal to submit to such a test.” Id.; see also Bell, 211 A.3d at 792 (Wecht, J., dissenting) (“[E]very time that the Birchfield Court spoke [J-41-2022] [MO: Mundy, J.] - 23 of ‘implied consent,’ it referred to these statutory consequences of refusal, not to an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.

2017There must be a limit to the consequences to which motorists may be deemed to have consented by virtue of a decision to drive on public roads. . . . [M]otorists cannot be deemed to have consented to submit to a blood test on pain of committing a criminal offense.”).3 I realize that Birchfield’s application to situations involving unconscious motorists is not straightforward, given that criminal penalties attaching to a refusal may be viewed as of no import in a circumstance in which a person is unconscious and incapable of (…continued) Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 560 , 103 S. Ct. 916, 920-21 (1983)

2017There must be a limit to the consequences to which motorists may be deemed to have consented by virtue of a decision to drive on public roads. . . . [M]otorists cannot be deemed to have consented to submit to a blood test on pain of committing a criminal offense.”).3 I realize that Birchfield’s application to situations involving unconscious motorists is not straightforward, given that criminal penalties attaching to a refusal may be viewed as of no import in a circumstance in which a person is unconscious and incapable of (…continued) Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 560 , 103 S. Ct. 916, 920-21 (1983)