dependency adjudication hearing in Arizona

2023Decision of the Court ¶10 “The juvenile court must consider the circumstances as they exist at the time of the dependency adjudication hearing in determining whether a child is a dependent child.” Shella H. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 239 Ariz. 47 , 48 ¶ 1 (App. 2016).

2023“Neglect” means a parent’s “inability or unwillingness . . . to provide [a] child with supervision, food, clothing, shelter or medical care if that inability or unwillingness causes substantial risk of harm to the child’s health or welfare.” A.R.S. § 8-201(25)(a). ¶21 “[T]he juvenile court must consider the circumstances as they exist at the time of the dependency adjudication hearing in determining whether a child is a dependent child.” Shella H. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 239 Ariz. 47, 48, ¶ 1 (App. 2016).

2023The superior court must find a child dependent by a preponderance of the evidence and "must consider the circumstances as they exist at the time of the dependency adjudication hearing in determining whether a child is a dependent child." Shella H. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 239 Ariz. 47, 48, ¶ 1 (App. 2016); Louis C., 237 Ariz. at 490, ¶ 23 . 3 IN RE DEPENDENCY AS TO A.Y. and G.Y.

2020The superior court must find a child dependent by a preponderance of the evidence and "must consider the circumstances as they exist at the time of the dependency adjudication hearing in determining whether a child is a dependent child." Shella H. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 239 Ariz. 47, 48, ¶ 1 (App. 2016); Louis C., 237 Ariz. at 490, ¶ 23 . ¶9 A dependent child is one who is adjudicated to be "in need of proper and effective parental care and control and who has no parent . . . willing to exercise or capable of exercising such care and control" or one "whose home is unfit by reason of abuse [

2006Thomas v. Blakey, 211 Ariz. 124, ¶ 10 , 118 P.3d 639, 641 (App.2005). ¶ 14 Although the department argues that no authority expressly establishes a parent’s “absolute right” to attend a dependency disposition hearing, the rules of procedure for the juvenile court clearly contemplate the presence of “the parent, guardian or Indian custodian” of a dependent child at a disposition hearing, Rule 56(E)(5), as well as a preliminary protective hearing, Rule 50(C)(5); an initial dependency hearing, Rule 52(C)(4), (D)(8); a settlement conference, Rule 53(D)(4); a pretrial conference, Rule 54(C)(2)(b);

2006Thomas v. Blakey, 211 Ariz. 124, ¶ 10 , 118 P.3d 639, 641 (App.2005). ¶ 14 Although the department argues that no authority expressly establishes a parent’s “absolute right” to attend a dependency disposition hearing, the rules of procedure for the juvenile court clearly contemplate the presence of “the parent, guardian or Indian custodian” of a dependent child at a disposition hearing, Rule 56(E)(5), as well as a preliminary protective hearing, Rule 50(C)(5); an initial dependency hearing, Rule 52(C)(4), (D)(8); a settlement conference, Rule 53(D)(4); a pretrial conference, Rule 54(C)(2)(b);

2020See Christina G. v. ADES, 227 Ariz. 231, 235, ¶ 14, n.6 (App. 2011) (failure to develop argument usually results in abandonment and waiver of issue).

2015The time limit for completing the dependency adjudication hearing may be extended for up to thirty days if the court finds good cause or in extraordinary cases as prescribed by the supreme court by rule. ¶14 In Joshua J. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security, 230 Ariz. 417 (App. 2012), this court held that a dependency adjudication made beyond the time limit specified in § 8-842(C) is not automatically void, and affirmed a dependency order made after the statutory time limit because the parent was not prejudiced by the delay. 230 Ariz. at 423, ¶ 20, 423-24, ¶¶ 22-26 ; see also Ugalde v. B

2015The time limit for completing the dependency adjudication hearing may be extended for up to thirty days if the court finds good cause or in extraordinary cases as prescribed by the supreme court by rule. ¶14 In Joshua J. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security, 230 Ariz. 417 (App. 2012), this court held that a dependency adjudication made beyond the time limit specified in § 8-842(C) is not automatically void, and affirmed a dependency order made after the statutory time limit because the parent was not prejudiced by the delay. 230 Ariz. at 423, ¶ 20, 423-24, ¶¶ 22-26 ; see also Ugalde v. B

2015The time limit for completing the dependency adjudication hearing may be extended for up to thirty days if the court finds good cause or in extraordinary cases as prescribed by the supreme court by rule. ¶14 In Joshua J. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security, 230 Ariz. 417 (App. 2012), this court held that a dependency adjudication made beyond the time limit specified in § 8-842(C) is not automatically void, and affirmed a dependency order made after the statutory time limit because the parent was not prejudiced by the delay. 230 Ariz. at 423, ¶ 20, 423-24, ¶¶ 22-26 ; see also Ugalde v. B

2015The time limit for completing the dependency adjudication hearing may be extended for up to thirty days if the court finds good cause or in extraordinary cases as prescribed by the supreme court by rule. ¶14 In Joshua J. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security, 230 Ariz. 417 (App. 2012), this court held that a dependency adjudication made beyond the time limit specified in § 8-842(C) is not automatically void, and affirmed a dependency order made after the statutory time limit because the parent was not prejudiced by the delay. 230 Ariz. at 423, ¶ 20, 423-24, ¶¶ 22-26 ; see also Ugalde v. B

2013Cf Davis v. Puckett, 857 F.2d 1035, 1040-41 (5th Cir.1988) (no denial of constitutional speedy trial rights when delay caused in part by “shortage of prosecutorial staff’); United States v. Heard, 443 F.2d 856, 858 (6th Cir.1971) (delay in criminal prosecution caused by attorney shortage does not violate constitutional speedy trial right absent prejudice).

2013Cf Davis v. Puckett, 857 F.2d 1035, 1040-41 (5th Cir.1988) (no denial of constitutional speedy trial rights when delay caused in part by “shortage of prosecutorial staff’); United States v. Heard, 443 F.2d 856, 858 (6th Cir.1971) (delay in criminal prosecution caused by attorney shortage does not violate constitutional speedy trial right absent prejudice).