choice of evils defense in Colorado

2014See People v. Strock, 623 P.2d 42, 44 (Colo.1981) ("Before the choice of evils defense may be invoked, it must first be shown that the defendant's conduct was necessitated by a specific and imminent threat of injury to his person under cireumstances which left him no reasonable and viable alternative other than violation of the law.").

1990See People v. Strock, 623 P.2d 42, 45 (evidence was admissible to show duress but not choice of evils pursuant to section 18-1-702, since a foundation for the choice of evils defense was not laid).

2025Andrews v. People, 800 P.2d 607, 610 (Colo. 1990) (footnotes omitted). ¶ 45 “[I]f a reasonable legal alternative was available to defendants as a means to avoid the threatened injury, they properly may be foreclosed from asserting a choice of evils defense.” People v. Brandyberry, 812 P.2d 674, 679 (Colo. App. 1990). 23 4.

2009From these definitions, the division concluded that the availability of the choice of evils defense is limited to those instances where the defendant’s conduct is “necessary because of the sudden and unforeseen emergence of a situation requiring the actor’s immediate action to prevent *210 the occurrence of an imminently impending injury.” Id. at 678-79 .

2025The prosecutor said she believed that Ragsdal predicated his theory of defense solely on the fact that it was cold on the day in question and that, under Andrews v. People, 800 P.2d 607, 610 (Colo. 1990), Ragsdal needed to also proffer that “all other potentially viable and reasonable alternative actions were pursued, or shown to be futile” before the jury could be instructed on the choice-of-evils defense.

2025Cannon doesn’t explain — and we don’t see — how his claim that he committed the crime for the purposes of obtaining legal representation in an unrelated civil property dispute could possibly satisfy these elements of the choice of evils defense. 17 counsel to a defendant in the situation where existing counsel’s actions so undermine the defendant’s ability to testify that the right is “reduce[d] . . . to a nullity.” Id. at 702 . ¶ 31 But here, at the conclusion of the prosecution’s case, Cannon was provided with a written advisement form regarding his right to testify, consistent with People v

2009See People v. Handy, 198 Colo. 556, 559 , 603 P.2d 941, 943 (1979) (“The threats must be shown to be definite, specific, and imminent; mere speculation is not enough.”); Brandyberry, 812 P.2d at 679 (“Evidence of a generalized fear of future injury is not sufficient to warrant the invocation of a choice of evils defense.”).

2009See People v. Handy, 198 Colo. 556, 559 , 603 P.2d 941, 943 (1979) (“The threats must be shown to be definite, specific, and imminent; mere speculation is not enough.”); Brandyberry, 812 P.2d at 679 (“Evidence of a generalized fear of future injury is not sufficient to warrant the invocation of a choice of evils defense.”).

2003See State v. Moe, 174 Wash. 303 , 24 P.2d 638 (1933)(unemployed workers who marched on a commissary and stole groceries could not raise the defense of economic necessity); see also People v. McKnight, 626 P.2d 678 (Colo.1981)(to rely on the choice of evils defense, defendant must show that he or she had no reasonable alternative except to commit the crime charged).

1990People v. McKnight, 626 P.2d 678, 681 (Colo.1981). [4] III Before a defendant can present a choice of evils defense to the jury, section 18-1-702 requires that the trial court make an initial determination of whether the allegations of facts by the defendant, if proved, would constitute legal justification for the prohibited conduct.

2011See People v. McKnight, 626 P.2d 678, 681 (Colo.1981); People v. Strock, 628 P.2d 42, 44 (Colo.1981).

2001In People v. Strock, 628 P.2d 42, 45 (Colo.1981), the supreme court noted that the "failure of the trial court to give an instruction on the choice of evils resulted from the election of defense counsel not to lay the foundation required by the statute." Because, at the very least, defendant here made a tactical decision to bypass use of a choice of evils defense, we cannot find error, much less plain error, in the trial court's failure to *697 instruct upon that defense.

1990People v. Strock, 623 P.2d 42, 44 (Colo.1981); People v. Robertson, 36 Colo.App. 367 , 543 P.2d 533 (1975). [2] The choice of evils defense thus does not arise from a "choice" of several courses of action, but rather is based on a real emergency involving specific and imminent grave injury that presents the defendant with no alternatives other than the one taken. [3] Strock, 623 P.2d at 44 ; Robertson, 36 Colo.App. at 367 , 543 P.2d at 533 ; see also United States v. Dorrell, 758 F.2d 427, 431 (9th Cir.1985); United States v. Seward, 687 F.2d 1270, 1275-76 (10th Cir.1982).

1990People v. Strock, 623 P.2d 42, 44 (Colo.1981); People v. Robertson, 36 Colo.App. 367 , 543 P.2d 533 (1975). [2] The choice of evils defense thus does not arise from a "choice" of several courses of action, but rather is based on a real emergency involving specific and imminent grave injury that presents the defendant with no alternatives other than the one taken. [3] Strock, 623 P.2d at 44 ; Robertson, 36 Colo.App. at 367 , 543 P.2d at 533 ; see also United States v. Dorrell, 758 F.2d 427, 431 (9th Cir.1985); United States v. Seward, 687 F.2d 1270, 1275-76 (10th Cir.1982).

2025Cannon doesn’t explain — and we don’t see — how his claim that he committed the crime for the purposes of obtaining legal representation in an unrelated civil property dispute could possibly satisfy these elements of the choice of evils defense. 17 counsel to a defendant in the situation where existing counsel’s actions so undermine the defendant’s ability to testify that the right is “reduce[d] . . . to a nullity.” Id. at 702 . ¶ 31 But here, at the conclusion of the prosecution’s case, Cannon was provided with a written advisement form regarding his right to testify, consistent with People v

2025Cf. People v. Linares-Guzman, 195 P.3d 1130, 1134-35 (Colo. App. 2008) (looking to jury’s verdict on a separate charge to conclude that any instructional error was not plain error because there was no reasonable possibility that such error contributed to the defendant’s conviction). ¶ 57 Based on the totality of the jury’s verdict for all the sexual exploitation of a child charges, we know that the jury rejected, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Berumen was operating under a 28 mistake of age at the time he made the videos and up until Detective Hiatt told him K.D.’s age.

2006See People v. Brandyberry, 812 P.2d 674, 678 (Colo.App.1990) ("Under the plain language of the statute, evidence in support of the defense must first be proffered or presented to the trial court."); People v. Weiser, 789 P.2d 454, 456 (Colo.App.1989) (offer of proof made at motion in limine hearing). ~As noted earlier, the trial court here offered defendant two separate opportunities to make an offer of proof to support his request for a choice of evils instruction before the evidence was admitted, and defen *832 dant declined to do so.

2003See State v. Moe, 174 Wash. 303 , 24 P.2d 638 (1933)(unemployed workers who marched on a commissary and stole groceries could not raise the defense of economic necessity); see also People v. McKnight, 626 P.2d 678 (Colo.1981)(to rely on the choice of evils defense, defendant must show that he or she had no reasonable alternative except to commit the crime charged).

2003See State v. Moe, 174 Wash. 303 , 24 P.2d 638 (1933)(unemployed workers who marched on a commissary and stole groceries could not raise the defense of economic necessity); see also People v. McKnight, 626 P.2d 678 (Colo.1981)(to rely on the choice of evils defense, defendant must show that he or she had no reasonable alternative except to commit the crime charged).

2001See People v. Strock, supra; People v. Patrick, 541 P.2d 320, 322 (Colo. selected for official publication)(choice of evils defense could not be properly presented to a jury where defendant never obtained the ruling required by § 18-1-702(2)).

1990See People v. Strock, supra; see also People v. DeHerrera, 697 P.2d 734 (Colo.1985) (particular statute defining offense is controlling over statute applicable to offenses in general).

1990See People v. Strock, supra ; see also People v. DeHerrera, 697 P.2d 734 (Colo.1985) (particular statute defining offense is controlling over statute applicable to offenses in general).

1990People v. Strock, 623 P.2d 42, 44 (Colo.1981); People v. Robertson, 36 Colo.App. 367 , 543 P.2d 533 (1975). [2] The choice of evils defense thus does not arise from a "choice" of several courses of action, but rather is based on a real emergency involving specific and imminent grave injury that presents the defendant with no alternatives other than the one taken. [3] Strock, 623 P.2d at 44 ; Robertson, 36 Colo.App. at 367 , 543 P.2d at 533 ; see also United States v. Dorrell, 758 F.2d 427, 431 (9th Cir.1985); United States v. Seward, 687 F.2d 1270, 1275-76 (10th Cir.1982).

1990People v. Strock, 623 P.2d 42, 44 (Colo.1981); People v. Robertson, 36 Colo.App. 367 , 543 P.2d 533 (1975). 2 The choice of evils defense thus does not arise from a “choice” of several courses of action, but rather is based on a real emergency involving specific and imminent grave injury that presents the defendant with no alternatives other than the one taken. 3 Strock, 623 P.2d at 44 ; Robertson , 36 Colo.App, at 367, 543 P.2d at 533 ; see also United States v. Dorrell, 758 F.2d 427, 431 (9th Cir.1985); United States v. Seward, 687 F.2d 1270, 1275-76 (10th Cir.1982).

1990People v. Strock, 623 P.2d 42, 44 (Colo.1981); People v. Robertson, 36 Colo.App. 367 , 543 P.2d 533 (1975). [2] The choice of evils defense thus does not arise from a "choice" of several courses of action, but rather is based on a real emergency involving specific and imminent grave injury that presents the defendant with no alternatives other than the one taken. [3] Strock, 623 P.2d at 44 ; Robertson, 36 Colo.App. at 367 , 543 P.2d at 533 ; see also United States v. Dorrell, 758 F.2d 427, 431 (9th Cir.1985); United States v. Seward, 687 F.2d 1270, 1275-76 (10th Cir.1982).

1990People v. Strock, 623 P.2d 42, 44 (Colo.1981); People v. Robertson, 36 Colo.App. 367 , 543 P.2d 533 (1975). 2 The choice of evils defense thus does not arise from a “choice” of several courses of action, but rather is based on a real emergency involving specific and imminent grave injury that presents the defendant with no alternatives other than the one taken. 3 Strock, 623 P.2d at 44 ; Robertson , 36 Colo.App, at 367, 543 P.2d at 533 ; see also United States v. Dorrell, 758 F.2d 427, 431 (9th Cir.1985); United States v. Seward, 687 F.2d 1270, 1275-76 (10th Cir.1982).

1990People v. Dover, 790 P.2d 834, 836 (Colo.1990); Strock, 623 P.2d at 46 ; United States v. Cullen, 454 F.2d 386, 390 (7th Cir.1971).

1990People v. Dover, 790 P.2d 834, 836 (Colo.1990); Strock, 623 P.2d at 46 ; United States v. Cullen, 454 F.2d 386, 390 (7th Cir.1971).

1990People v. Dover, 790 P.2d 834, 836 (Colo.1990); Strock, 623 P.2d at 46 ; United States v. Cullen, 454 F.2d 386, 390 (7th Cir.1971).

1990People v. Dover, 790 P.2d 834, 836 (Colo.1990); Strock, 623 P.2d at 46 ; United States v. Cullen, 454 F.2d 386, 390 (7th Cir.1971).

1990See U.S. v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 , 100 S.Ct. 624 , 62 L.Ed.2d 575 (1980); People v. Hocquard, 64 Mich.App. 331 , 236 N.W.2d 72 (1975).

1990See U.S. v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 , 100 S.Ct. 624 , 62 L.Ed.2d 575 (1980); People v. Hocquard, 64 Mich.App. 331 , 236 N.W.2d 72 (1975).