fast writ error in Georgia

1920Civil Code, § 6153; Kaufman v. Ferst, 55 Ga. 350 ; Bleyer v. Old Hickory Distillery Co., 70 Ga. 724, 725 (2); Bacon v. Capital City Bank, 105 Ga. 700 ( 31 S. E. 588 ); Stubbs v. McConnell, 119 Ga. 21 ( 45 S. E. 710 ); Harris v. Sparta, 130 Ga. 60 ( 60 S. E. 192 ); Berry v. Parker, 130 Ga. 741 ( 61 S. E. 541 ). 2.

1920Civil Code, § 6153; Kaufman v. Ferst, 55 Ga. 350 ; Bleyer v. Old Hickory Distillery Co., 70 Ga. 724, 725 (2); Bacon v. Capital City Bank, 105 Ga. 700 ( 31 S. E. 588 ); Stubbs v. McConnell, 119 Ga. 21 ( 45 S. E. 710 ); Harris v. Sparta, 130 Ga. 60 ( 60 S. E. 192 ); Berry v. Parker, 130 Ga. 741 ( 61 S. E. 541 ). 2.

2017Important for our analysis here, this Court held in 1875 that a writ of error “is confined to granting or refusing injunction and does not extend to dissolving, vacating, or setting aside what has already been granted.” Kaufman, 55 Ga. at 353 ; see also Bacon v. Capital City Bank, 105 Ga. 700, 700 ( 31 SE 588 ) (1898) (order modifying previously granted order for injunction and appointment of receiver is not subject to a fast bill of exception); Harris v. City of Sparta, 130 Ga. 60, 60 ( 60 SE 192 ) (1908) (“[T]his court cannot, on a fast writ of error, review an order granting or refusing a t

2017Important for our analysis here, this Court held in 1875 that a writ of error “is confined to granting or refusing injunction... and does not extend to dissolving, vacating or setting aside what has been already granted.” Kaufman, 55 Ga. at 353 ; see also Bacon & Co. v. Capital City Bank, 105 Ga. 700, 700 ( 31 SE 588 ) (1898) (order modifying previously granted order for injunction and appointment of receiver is not subject to a fast bill of exception); Harris v. City of Sparta, 130 Ga. 60, 61 ( 60 SE 192 ) (1908) (“[Tjhis court cannot, on a fast writ of error, review an order granting or refu

1934Bradley v. Lithonia & Arabia Mountain Railroad Co., 141 Ga. 741 ( 82 S. E. 138 ); Foster v. Case, 126 Ga. 714 ( 55 S. E. 921 ); Moody v. Cleveland Woolen Mills, 133 Ga. 741 ( 66 S. E. 908 ).

1934Bradley v. Lithonia & Arabia Mountain Railroad Co., 141 Ga. 741 ( 82 S. E. 138 ); Foster v. Case, 126 Ga. 714 ( 55 S. E. 921 ); Moody v. Cleveland Woolen Mills, 133 Ga. 741 ( 66 S. E. 908 ).

1927On the converse of the proposition here involved, that a fast writ of error will not lie to a refusal to dissolve an injunction, the cases of Smith v. Willis, 107 Ga. 794 ( 33 S. E. 667 ), Hanson v. Stephens, 116 Ga. 722 ( 42 S. E. 1028 ), Loyd v. Webster, 116 Ga. 728 ( 42 S. E. 1013 ), and Berry v. Parker, 130 Ga. 741 ( 61 S. E. 541 ), are in point.

1927On the converse of the proposition here involved, that a fast writ of error will not lie to a refusal to dissolve an injunction, the cases of Smith v. Willis, 107 Ga. 794 ( 33 S. E. 667 ), Hanson v. Stephens, 116 Ga. 722 ( 42 S. E. 1028 ), Loyd v. Webster, 116 Ga. 728 ( 42 S. E. 1013 ), and Berry v. Parker, 130 Ga. 741 ( 61 S. E. 541 ), are in point.

2017Rural Electrification Corp., 184 Ga. 527, 527 ( 192 SE 15 ) (1937) (this Court lacked jurisdiction to hear a fast writ of exception from an order dissolving or modifying a temporary restraining order even though the issue was decided after a hearing); Aker Motor Lines v. Cook, 211 Ga. 23, 24 (1) ( 83 SE2d 586 ) (1954) (acknowledging that fast bill of exceptions will lie from cases granting or refusing applications for injunction but not from an order dissolving, vacating, or modifying a temporary restraining order).10 10 In Moore v. Selman, 219 Ga. 865 ( 136 SE2d 329 ) (1964), this Court held

2017Eagle Publishing Co. v. Mercer, 154 Ga. 246 ( 114 SE 26 ) (1922) (acknowledging that the refusal to vacate or modify an interlocutory injunction is not a final adjudication which will support a writ of error); Johnson v. Troup County Rural Electrification Corp., 184 Ga. 527, 527 ( 192 SE 15 ) (1937) (this Court lacked jurisdiction to hear a fast writ of exception from an order dissolving or modifying a temporary restraining order even though the issue was decided after a hearing); Akers Motor Lines v. Cook, 211 Ga. 23, 24 (1) ( 83 SE2d 586 ) (1954) (acknowledging that fast bill of exceptions w

1939Hollinshead v. Lincolnton, 84 Ga. 590, 592 (10 S. E. 1094); Mayor &c. of Savannah v. Grayson, 104 Ga. 105, 108 ( 30 S. E. 693 ); Crider v. Holbrook, 169 Ga. 765 (151 S. E. 505); Dorminey v. Moore, 144 Ga. 207 ( 86 S. E. 536 ); Ivey v. Rome, 126 Ga. 806 ( 55 S. E. 1034 ).

1939Hollinshead v. Lincolnton, 84 Ga. 590, 592 (10 S. E. 1094); Mayor &c. of Savannah v. Grayson, 104 Ga. 105, 108 ( 30 S. E. 693 ); Crider v. Holbrook, 169 Ga. 765 (151 S. E. 505); Dorminey v. Moore, 144 Ga. 207 ( 86 S. E. 536 ); Ivey v. Rome, 126 Ga. 806 ( 55 S. E. 1034 ).

1912But a fast writ of error lies to any reviewable judgment in a habeas-corpus case, and is not limited by the statute to the grant or refusal of the writ as in cases of injunction. • An apparently contrary intimation vas made in Thompson v. Thompson, 124 Ga. 874 ( 53 S. E. 507 ); but as the judgment under review in that case was an order allowing temporary alimony and providing for the custody of children of the marriage, made in an action for divorce, what was said is not controlling on the question.

1912But a fast writ of error lies to any reviewable judgment in a habeas-corpus case, and is not limited by the statute to the grant or refusal of the writ as in cases of injunction. • An apparently contrary intimation vas made in Thompson v. Thompson, 124 Ga. 874 ( 53 S. E. 507 ); but as the judgment under review in that case was an order allowing temporary alimony and providing for the custody of children of the marriage, made in an action for divorce, what was said is not controlling on the question.

1920Young v. Harris, 146 Ga. 338 ( 91 S. E. 39 ) ; Akins v. Mull, 150 Ga. 459 ( 104 S. E. 209 ), and cases cited.

1917Stubbs v. McConnell, 119 Ga. 21 ( 45 S. E. 710 ) ; Berry v. Parker, 130 Ga. 741 ( 61 S. E. 541 ); Young v. Harris, 146 Ga. 338 ( 91 S. E. 39 ). .

1920Young v. Harris, 146 Ga. 338 ( 91 S. E. 39 ) ; Akins v. Mull, 150 Ga. 459 ( 104 S. E. 209 ), and cases cited.

1917Stubbs v. McConnell, 119 Ga. 21 ( 45 S. E. 710 ) ; Berry v. Parker, 130 Ga. 741 ( 61 S. E. 541 ); Young v. Harris, 146 Ga. 338 ( 91 S. E. 39 ). .

2017Eagle Publishing Co. v. Mercer, 154 Ga. 246 ( 114 SE 26 ) (1922) (acknowledging that the refusal to vacate or modify an interlocutory injunction is not a final adjudication which will support a writ of error); Johnson v. Troup County Rural Electrification Corp., 184 Ga. 527, 527 ( 192 SE 15 ) (1937) (this Court lacked jurisdiction to hear a fast writ of exception from an order dissolving or modifying a temporary restraining order even though the issue was decided after a hearing); Akers Motor Lines v. Cook, 211 Ga. 23, 24 (1) ( 83 SE2d 586 ) (1954) (acknowledging that fast bill of exceptions w

2017Eagle Publishing Co. v. Mercer, 154 Ga. 246 ( 114 SE 26 ) (1922) (acknowledging that the refusal to vacate or modify an interlocutory injunction is not a final adjudication which will support a writ of error); Johnson v. Troup County Rural Electrification Corp., 184 Ga. 527, 527 ( 192 SE 15 ) (1937) (this Court lacked jurisdiction to hear a fast writ of exception from an order dissolving or modifying a temporary restraining order even though the issue was decided after a hearing); Akers Motor Lines v. Cook, 211 Ga. 23, 24 (1) ( 83 SE2d 586 ) (1954) (acknowledging that fast bill of exceptions w

2017Rural Electrification Corp., 184 Ga. 527, 527 ( 192 SE 15 ) (1937) (this Court lacked jurisdiction to hear a fast writ of exception from an order dissolving or modifying a temporary restraining order even though the issue was decided after a hearing); Aker Motor Lines v. Cook, 211 Ga. 23, 24 (1) ( 83 SE2d 586 ) (1954) (acknowledging that fast bill of exceptions will lie from cases granting or refusing applications for injunction but not from an order dissolving, vacating, or modifying a temporary restraining order).10 10 In Moore v. Selman, 219 Ga. 865 ( 136 SE2d 329 ) (1964), this Court held

2017Rural Electrification Corp., 184 Ga. 527, 527 ( 192 SE 15 ) (1937) (this Court lacked jurisdiction to hear a fast writ of exception from an order dissolving or modifying a temporary restraining order even though the issue was decided after a hearing); Aker Motor Lines v. Cook, 211 Ga. 23, 24 (1) ( 83 SE2d 586 ) (1954) (acknowledging that fast bill of exceptions will lie from cases granting or refusing applications for injunction but not from an order dissolving, vacating, or modifying a temporary restraining order).10 10 In Moore v. Selman, 219 Ga. 865 ( 136 SE2d 329 ) (1964), this Court held

1964And this is true even though the judge under such circumstances may have used the words ‘temporary restraining order’ instead of the more appropriate term, ‘interlocutory injunction.’ See Shaw v. Goodman, 135 Ga. 230 ( 69 SE 173 ).

1964And this is true even though the judge under such circumstances may have used the words ‘temporary restraining order’ instead of the more appropriate term, ‘interlocutory injunction.’ See Shaw v. Goodman, 135 Ga. 230 ( 69 SE 173 ).

1939Hollinshead v. Lincolnton, 84 Ga. 590, 592 (10 S. E. 1094); Mayor &c. of Savannah v. Grayson, 104 Ga. 105, 108 ( 30 S. E. 693 ); Crider v. Holbrook, 169 Ga. 765 (151 S. E. 505); Dorminey v. Moore, 144 Ga. 207 ( 86 S. E. 536 ); Ivey v. Rome, 126 Ga. 806 ( 55 S. E. 1034 ).

1939While a fast writ of error will lie from an order at the interlocutory hearing, granting or refusing an injunction (Code, § 6-903; Temple Baptist Church v. Georgia Terminal Co., 128 Ga. 669, 674 , 58 S. E. 157 ; Davison-Nicholson Co. v. Pound, 147 Ga. 447 , 94 S. E. 560 ), the mere grant or refusal of an ex parte restraining order in advance of the time set for the hearing of the application for temporary injunction is not reviewable.

1939While a fast writ of error will lie from an order at the interlocutory hearing, granting or refusing an injunction (Code, § 6-903; Temple Baptist Church v. Georgia Terminal Co., 128 Ga. 669, 674 , 58 S. E. 157 ; Davison-Nicholson Co. v. Pound, 147 Ga. 447 , 94 S. E. 560 ), the mere grant or refusal of an ex parte restraining order in advance of the time set for the hearing of the application for temporary injunction is not reviewable.

1939Hollinshead v. Lincolnton, 84 Ga. 590, 592 (10 S. E. 1094); Mayor &c. of Savannah v. Grayson, 104 Ga. 105, 108 ( 30 S. E. 693 ); Crider v. Holbrook, 169 Ga. 765 (151 S. E. 505); Dorminey v. Moore, 144 Ga. 207 ( 86 S. E. 536 ); Ivey v. Rome, 126 Ga. 806 ( 55 S. E. 1034 ).

1939Hollinshead v. Lincolnton, 84 Ga. 590, 592 (10 S. E. 1094); Mayor &c. of Savannah v. Grayson, 104 Ga. 105, 108 ( 30 S. E. 693 ); Crider v. Holbrook, 169 Ga. 765 (151 S. E. 505); Dorminey v. Moore, 144 Ga. 207 ( 86 S. E. 536 ); Ivey v. Rome, 126 Ga. 806 ( 55 S. E. 1034 ).

1939While a fast writ of error will lie from an order at the interlocutory hearing, granting or refusing an injunction (Code, § 6-903; Temple Baptist Church v. Georgia Terminal Co., 128 Ga. 669, 674 , 58 S. E. 157 ; Davison-Nicholson Co. v. Pound, 147 Ga. 447 , 94 S. E. 560 ), the mere grant or refusal of an ex parte restraining order in advance of the time set for the hearing of the application for temporary injunction is not reviewable.

1939While a fast writ of error will lie from an order at the interlocutory hearing, granting or refusing an injunction (Code, § 6-903; Temple Baptist Church v. Georgia Terminal Co., 128 Ga. 669, 674 , 58 S. E. 157 ; Davison-Nicholson Co. v. Pound, 147 Ga. 447 , 94 S. E. 560 ), the mere grant or refusal of an ex parte restraining order in advance of the time set for the hearing of the application for temporary injunction is not reviewable.

1939Hollinshead v. Lincolnton, 84 Ga. 590, 592 (10 S. E. 1094); Mayor &c. of Savannah v. Grayson, 104 Ga. 105, 108 ( 30 S. E. 693 ); Crider v. Holbrook, 169 Ga. 765 (151 S. E. 505); Dorminey v. Moore, 144 Ga. 207 ( 86 S. E. 536 ); Ivey v. Rome, 126 Ga. 806 ( 55 S. E. 1034 ).

1939Hollinshead v. Lincolnton, 84 Ga. 590, 592 (10 S. E. 1094); Mayor &c. of Savannah v. Grayson, 104 Ga. 105, 108 ( 30 S. E. 693 ); Crider v. Holbrook, 169 Ga. 765 (151 S. E. 505); Dorminey v. Moore, 144 Ga. 207 ( 86 S. E. 536 ); Ivey v. Rome, 126 Ga. 806 ( 55 S. E. 1034 ).

1939Under the Code, § 81-110, “petitions for a restraining order, injunction, receiver, or other extraordinary relief shall be verified positively by the petitioner or supported by other satisfactory proof.” Byrd v. Prudential Insurance Co., 182 Ga. 800 ( 187 S. E. 1 ).

1939Under the Code, § 81-110, “petitions for a restraining order, injunction, receiver, or other extraordinary relief shall be verified positively by the petitioner or supported by other satisfactory proof.” Byrd v. Prudential Insurance Co., 182 Ga. 800 ( 187 S. E. 1 ).

1938Wright v. Thompson, 147 Ga. 500 ( 94 S. E. 767 ).

1938Wright v. Thompson, 147 Ga. 500 ( 94 S. E. 767 ).

1934Bradley v. Lithonia & Arabia Mountain Railroad Co., 141 Ga. 741 ( 82 S. E. 138 ); Foster v. Case, 126 Ga. 714 ( 55 S. E. 921 ); Moody v. Cleveland Woolen Mills, 133 Ga. 741 ( 66 S. E. 908 ).

1934Bradley v. Lithonia & Arabia Mountain Railroad Co., 141 Ga. 741 ( 82 S. E. 138 ); Foster v. Case, 126 Ga. 714 ( 55 S. E. 921 ); Moody v. Cleveland Woolen Mills, 133 Ga. 741 ( 66 S. E. 908 ).