urine test in Georgia

2025On cross- examination, the defense highlighted that the urine test results were not sent for confirmation testing. 14 introduced.” (cleaned up)). (d) Constitutional Challenge Coleman argues for the first time on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of her initial refusal to submit to drug testing under Awad v. State, 313 Ga. 99, 103 (3) ( 868 SE2d 219 ) (2022) (holding that the right against compelled self- incrimination protected by Article I, Section I, Paragraph XVI of the Georgia Constitution prohibits the State from admitting into evidence a defendant’s

2025On cross- examination, the defense highlighted that the urine test results were not sent for confirmation testing. 14 introduced.” (cleaned up)). (d) Constitutional Challenge Coleman argues for the first time on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of her initial refusal to submit to drug testing under Awad v. State, 313 Ga. 99, 103 (3) ( 868 SE2d 219 ) (2022) (holding that the right against compelled self- incrimination protected by Article I, Section I, Paragraph XVI of the Georgia Constitution prohibits the State from admitting into evidence a defendant’s

2014S., 319 Ga. App. at 145 (1), given the evidence that the father admitted using marijuana at the time of the 8 deprivation hearing in July 2011; that he tested positive for the presence of cocaine in May 2012, the month after his legitimation petition was granted; that he missed a urine test in January 2013, which was considered to be a positive test; and that in June 2013, he tested positive twice for the presence of alcohol and admitted that he had been drinking for a month and a half. (b) Finding that continued deprivation would harm the child and that the best interest of the child would be

2014S., 319 Ga. App. at 145 (1), given the evidence that the father admitted using marijuana at the time of the deprivation hearing in July 2011; that he tested positive for the presence of cocaine in May 2012, the month after his legitimation petition was granted; that he missed a urine test in January 2013, which was considered to be a positive test; and that in June 2013, he tested positive twice for the presence of alcohol and admitted that he had been drinking for a month and a half. (b) Finding that continued deprivation would harm the child and that the best interest of the child would be s

2019Similarly, in Johnson , the defendant, upon being asked for a breath test, replied, "I'll take a urine test." Johnson , 261 Ga. App. at 634 , 583 S.E.2d 489 .

2019Similarly, in Johnson , the defendant, upon being asked for a breath test, replied, "I'll take a urine test." Johnson , 261 Ga. App. at 634 , 583 S.E.2d 489 .

2025See Wilson v. State, 315 Ga. 728, 740 (8) (a) (883 SE2d 802) (2023) (although evidence may have cast defendant “in an unflattering light, it did not do so unfairly” (emphasis in original)); Whited v. State, 315 Ga. 598, 605 (3) (883 SE2d 342) (2023) (evidence of defendant’s perceived disregard for his daughter’s well-being was relevant to the question of his intent toward her on the day she sustained her fatal injuries and not unfairly prejudicial). 13 (c) Reliability Challenge Coleman also argues that the result of the urine test was inadmissible without expert testimony establishing the scie

2025See Wilson v. State, 315 Ga. 728, 740 (8) (a) ( 883 SE2d 802 ) (2023) (although evidence may have cast defendant “in an unflattering light, it did not do so unfairly” (emphasis in original)); Whited v. State, 315 Ga. 598, 605 (3) ( 883 SE2d 342 ) (2023) (evidence of defendant’s perceived disregard for his daughter’s well-being was relevant to the question of his intent toward her on the day she sustained her fatal injuries and not unfairly prejudicial). 13 (c) Reliability Challenge Coleman also argues that the result of the urine test was inadmissible without expert testimony establishing the

2025See Haufler v. State, 315 Ga. 712, 722 (2) n.14 ( 884 SE2d 310 ) (2023) (conducting cumulative-error review even though appellant did not argue cumulative error and concluding that appellant failed to establish that the combined prejudicial effect of the errors required a new trial).

2025See Haufler v. State, 315 Ga. 712, 722 (2) n.14 ( 884 SE2d 310 ) (2023) (conducting cumulative-error review even though appellant did not argue cumulative error and concluding that appellant failed to establish that the combined prejudicial effect of the errors required a new trial).

2025See Wilson v. State, 315 Ga. 728, 740 (8) (a) ( 883 SE2d 802 ) (2023) (although evidence may have cast defendant “in an unflattering light, it did not do so unfairly” (emphasis in original)); Whited v. State, 315 Ga. 598, 605 (3) ( 883 SE2d 342 ) (2023) (evidence of defendant’s perceived disregard for his daughter’s well-being was relevant to the question of his intent toward her on the day she sustained her fatal injuries and not unfairly prejudicial). 13 (c) Reliability Challenge Coleman also argues that the result of the urine test was inadmissible without expert testimony establishing the

2025See Wilson v. State, 315 Ga. 728, 740 (8) (a) ( 883 SE2d 802 ) (2023) (although evidence may have cast defendant “in an unflattering light, it did not do so unfairly” (emphasis in original)); Whited v. State, 315 Ga. 598, 605 (3) ( 883 SE2d 342 ) (2023) (evidence of defendant’s perceived disregard for his daughter’s well-being was relevant to the question of his intent toward her on the day she sustained her fatal injuries and not unfairly prejudicial). 13 (c) Reliability Challenge Coleman also argues that the result of the urine test was inadmissible without expert testimony establishing the

2022See Robinson, 180 Ga. App. at 50-51 (3).

2022See Robinson, 180 Ga. App. at 50-51 (3).

2022See Awad v. State, 313 Ga. 99, 103 (3) (868 SE2d 219) (2022) (“Under Olevik and Elliott, the right against compelled self-incrimination 4We went on to note in Olevik that although Paragraph XVI refers only to testimony, its protection against compelled self-incrimination was long ago construed to also cover incriminating acts and, thus, is more extensive than the Supreme Court of the United States’s interpretation of the right against compelled self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. 302 Ga. at 240 (2) (b) (ii). 9 protected by Paragraph XVI prohibits the State from admitting into

2022See Awad v. State, 313 Ga. 99, 103 (3) ( 868 SE2d 219 ) (2022) (“Under Olevik and Elliott, the right against compelled self-incrimination protected by Paragraph XVI prohibits the State from admitting into 4 We went on to note in Olevik that although Paragraph XVI refers only to testimony, its protection against compelled self-incrimination was long ago construed to also cover incriminating acts and, thus, is more extensive than the Supreme Court of the United States’s interpretation of the right against compelled self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. 302 Ga. at 240 (2) (c) (ii)

2022See Quarterman v. State, 282 Ga. 383, 386 (4) (651 SE2d 32) (2007) (holding that a statute requiring incarcerated felons to provide a DNA sample “does not force a convicted felon to remove incriminating evidence but only to submit his or her body for the purpose of having the evidence removed”); Strong v. State, 231 Ga. 514, 514, 518 (202 SE2d 428) 10 4.

2022See Quarterman v. State, 282 Ga. 383, 386 (4) (651 SE2d 32) (2007) (holding that a statute requiring incarcerated felons to provide a DNA sample “does not force a convicted felon to remove incriminating evidence but only to submit his or her body for the purpose of having the evidence removed”); Strong v. State, 231 Ga. 514, 514, 518 (202 SE2d 428) 10 4.

2022See, e.g., Creamer v. State, 229 Ga. 511, 515, 517-518 (3) (192 SE2d 350) (1972) (concluding that the removal of a bullet from the defendant’s body did not violate his right against compelled self- incrimination). 11 Green, 260 Ga. at 626-627 (2).

2022See, e.g., Creamer v. State, 229 Ga. 511, 515, 517-518 (3) (192 SE2d 350) (1972) (concluding that the removal of a bullet from the defendant’s body did not violate his right against compelled self- incrimination). 11 Green, 260 Ga. at 626-627 (2).

2022See Quarterman v. State, 282 Ga. 383, 386 (4) (651 SE2d 32) (2007) (holding that a statute requiring incarcerated felons to provide a DNA sample “does not force a convicted felon to remove incriminating evidence but only to submit his or her body for the purpose of having the evidence removed”); Strong v. State, 231 Ga. 514, 514, 518 (202 SE2d 428) 10 4.

2022See Quarterman v. State, 282 Ga. 383, 386 (4) (651 SE2d 32) (2007) (holding that a statute requiring incarcerated felons to provide a DNA sample “does not force a convicted felon to remove incriminating evidence but only to submit his or her body for the purpose of having the evidence removed”); Strong v. State, 231 Ga. 514, 514, 518 (202 SE2d 428) 10 4.

2022See, e.g., Creamer v. State, 229 Ga. 511, 515, 517-518 (3) (192 SE2d 350) (1972) (concluding that the removal of a bullet from the defendant’s body did not violate his right against compelled self- incrimination). 11 Green, 260 Ga. at 626-627 (2).

2022See, e.g., Creamer v. State, 229 Ga. 511, 515, 517-518 (3) ( 192 SE2d 350 ) (1972) (concluding that the removal of a bullet from the defendant’s body did not violate his right against compelled self- incrimination). 10 decision in Green v. State, 260 Ga. 625 ( 398 SE2d 360 ) (1990) — a case involving a probationer — established that the State’s obtaining a urine sample does not implicate the right against compelled self-incrimination because providing a urine sample does not require an act on the part of the defendant.

2016See Brooks v. State, 285 Ga. App. 624, 627 ( 647 SE2d 328 ) (2007).

2016See Brooks v. State, 285 Ga. App. 624, 627 ( 647 SE2d 328 ) (2007).

2016See Anderton v. State, 283 Ga. App. 493, 494-495 (1) ( 642 SE2d 137 ) (2007) (defendant’s statement that “I will take a blood test” was a request that the officer designate a blood test, not a request for an independent test); England v. State, 302 Ga. App. 12, 15 (1) ( 689 SE2d 833 ) (2009) (defendant’s statement that he had *682 concerns about accuracy of breath test and would rather submit to a blood test was a request for a designated blood test, not a request for an independent test).

2016See Anderton v. State, 283 Ga. App. 493, 494-495 (1) ( 642 SE2d 137 ) (2007) (defendant’s statement that “I will take a blood test” was a request that the officer designate a blood test, not a request for an independent test); England v. State, 302 Ga. App. 12, 15 (1) ( 689 SE2d 833 ) (2009) (defendant’s statement that he had *682 concerns about accuracy of breath test and would rather submit to a blood test was a request for a designated blood test, not a request for an independent test).

2016See Anderton v. State, 283 Ga. App. 493, 494-495 (1) ( 642 SE2d 137 ) (2007) (defendant’s statement that “I will take a blood test” was a request that the officer designate a blood test, not a request for an independent test); England v. State, 302 Ga. App. 12, 15 (1) ( 689 SE2d 833 ) (2009) (defendant’s statement that he had *682 concerns about accuracy of breath test and would rather submit to a blood test was a request for a designated blood test, not a request for an independent test).

2016See Anderton v. State, 283 Ga. App. 493, 494-495 (1) ( 642 SE2d 137 ) (2007) (defendant’s statement that “I will take a blood test” was a request that the officer designate a blood test, not a request for an independent test); England v. State, 302 Ga. App. 12, 15 (1) ( 689 SE2d 833 ) (2009) (defendant’s statement that he had *682 concerns about accuracy of breath test and would rather submit to a blood test was a request for a designated blood test, not a request for an independent test).

2013In Coe , this Court ruled that, under a former version of OCGA § 40-5-67.1 (a), which provided that “the requesting officer shall designate which test shall be administered... [and] shall require a breath test or a blood test and may require a urine test,” there “was certainly no statutory requirement that the requesting officer designate all tests to he requested before the initial test is taken[.] [F]ormerOCGA § 40-5-67.1 (a) clearly authorized a subsequent urine test if the requesting officer deemed it necessary or useful after seeing the results of the required breath or blood test.” (Emph

2013Cf. Howell v. State, 266 Ga. App. 480,482 (1) (a) ( 597 SE2d 546 ) (2004) (“[U ponbeingread implied consent warnings by one of the arresting officers, Howell unequivocally revoked his implied consent.

2013Cf. Howell v. State, 266 Ga. App. 480,482 (1) (a) ( 597 SE2d 546 ) (2004) (“[U ponbeingread implied consent warnings by one of the arresting officers, Howell unequivocally revoked his implied consent.

2010See Johnson v. State, 271 Ga. 375, 382 (13) ( 519 SE2d 221 ) (1999) (“When blood samples are handled in a routine manner and nothing in the record raises a suspicion that the blood sought to be admitted is not the blood tested, the blood is *234 admissible and the circumstances of each case need only establish reasonable assurance of the identity of the sample.”) It follows that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the State laid the proper foundation for admitting the results of Herrera’s urine test. 4.

2010See Johnson v. State, 271 Ga. 375, 382 (13) ( 519 SE2d 221 ) (1999) (“When blood samples are handled in a routine manner and nothing in the record raises a suspicion that the blood sought to be admitted is not the blood tested, the blood is *234 admissible and the circumstances of each case need only establish reasonable assurance of the identity of the sample.”) It follows that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the State laid the proper foundation for admitting the results of Herrera’s urine test. 4.

1999See Rayburn v. State, 234 Ga. App. 482 ( 506 SE2d 876 ) (1998); Brooks v. State, 187 Ga. App. 194, 195 (1) ( 369 SE2d 801 ) (1988).

1999See Rayburn v. State, 234 Ga. App. 482 ( 506 SE2d 876 ) (1998); Brooks v. State, 187 Ga. App. 194, 195 (1) ( 369 SE2d 801 ) (1988).

1999See Rayburn v. State, 234 Ga. App. 482 ( 506 SE2d 876 ) (1998); Brooks v. State, 187 Ga. App. 194, 195 (1) ( 369 SE2d 801 ) (1988).

1999See Rayburn v. State, 234 Ga. App. 482 ( 506 SE2d 876 ) (1998); Brooks v. State, 187 Ga. App. 194, 195 (1) ( 369 SE2d 801 ) (1988).

1996City of Jesup v. Bennett, 226 Ga. 606, 609 ( 176 SE2d 81 ) (1970).

1996City of Jesup v. Bennett, 226 Ga. 606, 609 ( 176 SE2d 81 ) (1970).

1994OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (5); Kerr v. State, 205 Ga. App. 624, 626-627 ( 423 SE2d 276 ). 4.

1994OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (5); Kerr v. State, 205 Ga. App. 624, 626-627 ( 423 SE2d 276 ). 4.

1991In Cunningham v. State, 248 Ga. 558 ( 284 SE2d 390 ) (1981), the Supreme Court ruled that there was no error where the State failed to produce the defendant’s own allegedly exculpatory statements because “ ‘Brady applies to’ the discovery, after trial, of information which had been known to the prosecution but unknown to the defense. [Cits.]” Cunningham, supra at 561 ; see also Pridgett v. State, 173 Ga. App. 409 ( 326 SE2d 581 ) (1985).

1991In Cunningham v. State, 248 Ga. 558 ( 284 SE2d 390 ) (1981), the Supreme Court ruled that there was no error where the State failed to produce the defendant’s own allegedly exculpatory statements because “ ‘Brady applies to’ the discovery, after trial, of information which had been known to the prosecution but unknown to the defense. [Cits.]” Cunningham, supra at 561 ; see also Pridgett v. State, 173 Ga. App. 409 ( 326 SE2d 581 ) (1985).

1990See Allen v. State, 172 Ga. App. 323 ( 323 SE2d 242 ).

1990See Allen v. State, 172 Ga. App. 323 ( 323 SE2d 242 ).