urine test in Minnesota

2016Our state supreme court recently quoted this language from Lewis when it intimated that this court should have relied on the Fourth Amendment instead of the Due Process Clause when we decided in State v. Thompson, 873 N.W.2d 873, 880 (Minn. App. 2015), that the state may not constitutionally punish a suspected drunk driver for refusing to submit to a urine test.

2016However, in State v. Thompson, this court held that the criminal test-refusal statute violates substantive due process, as applied, where it criminalizes refusal to submit to a urine test that would have been unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment. 873 N.W.2d 873 , (Minn.App.2015), aff'd, 886 N.W.2d 224 (Minn.2016).

2015Poeschel argues that her consent was involuntary because she told the officers “she would take the urine test .only because she was required to do so by law.” But in Brooks , the supreme court rejected the argument that consent is per se involuntary because of the attendant threat of a criminal'charge for test refusal, concluding that “a driver’s decision to agree to take a test is not coerced simply because Minnesota has attached the penalty of making it a crime to refuse the test.” Id. at 570 .

2015As with many who face a choice under the implied-consent law, Scheffler faced an “uncomfortable” decision, Brooks, 838 N.W.2d. at 569 , but it was his choice to submit to the urine test rather than refuse.

2018The supreme court noted that a urine test might allow law enforcement "to extract information beyond a simple [alcohol concentration] reading," id. at 231 (alteration in original) (quoting Birchfield , 136 S.Ct. at 2178 ), and that "urine testing implicates weighty privacy concerns" because it requires a person to "perform[ ] a personal and private bodily function 'in full view' before law enforcement," id. at 232.

2016However, in State v. Thompson, this court held that the criminal test-refusal statute violates substantive due process, as applied, where it criminalizes refusal to submit to a urine test that would have been unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment. 873 N.W.2d 873 , (Minn.App.2015), aff'd, 886 N.W.2d 224 (Minn.2016).

2017Stevens involved a challenge to the revocation of a driver’s license under the implied-consent law for refusing to submit to a urine test. 850 N.W.2d at 720-21 .

2017The driver argued “that Minnesota’s implied-consent statute violates the unconstitutional- conditions doctrine because it imposes on a driver a choice between, on the one hand, relinquishing the Fourth Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable search and, on the other hand, relinquishing a license to drive a motor vehicle.” Id. at 723 .

2016The State argues that although the breath test upheld in Birchfield as a search incident to a valid arrest involved a “negligible” physical intrusion into an arrestee’s bodily integrity, a urine test “need not involve any physical intrusion.” Such a test neither ‘“require[s] piercing the skin’ ” nor “extract[ing] a part of the subject’s body.” Birchfield , — U.S. at -, 136 S.Ct. at 2178 (quoting Skinner, 489 U.S. at 625 , 109 S.Ct. 1402 ).

2016The State argues that although the breath test upheld in Birchfield as a search incident to a valid arrest involved a “negligible” physical intrusion into an arrestee’s bodily integrity, a urine test “need not involve any physical intrusion.” Such a test neither ‘“require[s] piercing the skin’ ” nor “extract[ing] a part of the subject’s body.” Birchfield , — U.S. at -, 136 S.Ct. at 2178 (quoting Skinner, 489 U.S. at 625 , 109 S.Ct. 1402 ).

2024The state and the district court relied on reasoning from two other cases from this court, State v. Urban, No. A08-1316, 2009 WL 2151130 (Minn. App. July 21, 2009), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 20, 2009), and State v. Hagen, 529 N.W.2d 712 (Minn. App. 1995).

2015Regarding appellant’s first argument, Minn. Stat. § 169A.51, subd. 3 (2010) provides, “[A]ction may be taken against a person who refuses to take a urine test only if an alternative test was offered.” Id.; see also State v. Hagen, 529 N.W.2d 712 , 714 10 (Minn. App. 1995) (holding that the officer complied with the statute by offering Hagen the choice of taking either a blood or urine test).

2018The supreme court noted that a urine test might allow law enforcement "to extract information beyond a simple [alcohol concentration] reading," id. at 231 (alteration in original) (quoting Birchfield , 136 S.Ct. at 2178 ), and that "urine testing implicates weighty privacy concerns" because it requires a person to "perform[ ] a personal and private bodily function 'in full view' before law enforcement," id. at 232.

2016The State argues that although the breath test upheld in Birchfield as a search incident to a valid arrest involved a “negligible” physical intrusion into an arrestee’s bodily integrity, a urine test “need not involve any physical intrusion.” Such a test neither ‘“require[s] piercing the skin’ ” nor “extract[ing] a part of the subject’s body.” Birchfield , — U.S. at -, 136 S.Ct. at 2178 (quoting Skinner, 489 U.S. at 625 , 109 S.Ct. 1402 ).

2014Id. at 438 .

1995See Minn.Stat. § 169.123, subd. 2(c), Mahanke, 395 N.W.2d at 438 (“If an officer directs that the test be of blood or urine, a driver has three choices: a blood test, a urine test, or refusing to take a test”).

2016Safety, 703 N.W.2d 557, 558 (Minn.App.2005) (considering whether an-advisory violated due process where it did not inform driver that driving with an alcohol concentration of O.20 or more was an aggravating factor that could enhance a DWI charge); Moe v. Comm’r of Pub.

2016The state charged Bergeron with three criminal offenses: DWI, obstruction of legal process, and fleeing a peace officer. 1 This statute was declared unconstitutional as applied to a juvenile in Jackson v. State, ___ N.W.2d ___, 2016 WL 4126394, *5-8 (Minn. Aug. 3, 2016).

2015See Bernard, 859 N.W.2d at 772 (breath); State v. Bonner, 275 Minn. 280, 287 , 146 N.W.2d 770, 775 (1966) (photographs and fingerprints); Emerson, 266 Minn. at 221 , 123 N.W.2d at 385 (photographs, X-rays, and medical examination); see also King, 133 S.Ct. at 1980 (buccal swab of cheek for identification under reasonableness-in-the-circumstances standard).

2015See Bernard, 859 N.W.2d at 772 (breath); State v. Bonner, 275 Minn. 280, 287 , 146 N.W.2d 770, 775 (1966) (photographs and fingerprints); Emerson, 266 Minn. at 221 , 123 N.W.2d at 385 (photographs, X-rays, and medical examination); see also King, 133 S.Ct. at 1980 (buccal swab of cheek for identification under reasonableness-in-the-circumstances standard).

2015See Bernard, 859 N.W.2d at 772 (breath); State v. Bonner, 275 Minn. 280, 287 , 146 N.W.2d 770, 775 (1966) (photographs and fingerprints); Emerson, 266 Minn. at 221 , 123 N.W.2d at 385 (photographs, X-rays, and medical examination); see also King, 133 S.Ct. at 1980 (buccal swab of cheek for identification under reasonableness-in-the-circumstances standard).

2015See Coker v. Jesson, 831 N.W.2d 483, 492 (Minn. 2013) (reversing a decision based on the application of the wrong burden and remanding for the application of the correct burden).

2015We analyze the district court’s finding that consent to search was voluntary for clear error, which occurs when “we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake occurred.” State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 846-47 (Minn. 2011).

2015The “election of one of the alternative chemical tests . . . presupposes the driver’s ability to supply, within a reasonable time, a sample essential to that test,” and an officer need not “await the driver’s convenience of a different time or place.” State, Dep’t of Highways v. Lauseng, 289 Minn. 344, 345 , 183 N.W.2d 926, 927 (1971); see also Stevens, 850 N.W.2d at 722 (citing Lauseng and stating that “neither the implied-consent statute nor the caselaw requires the commissioner to prove that a driver had any particular amount of time in which to provide a sample”).

2015The “election of one of the alternative chemical tests . . . presupposes the driver’s ability to supply, within a reasonable time, a sample essential to that test,” and an officer need not “await the driver’s convenience of a different time or place.” State, Dep’t of Highways v. Lauseng, 289 Minn. 344, 345 , 183 N.W.2d 926, 927 (1971); see also Stevens, 850 N.W.2d at 722 (citing Lauseng and stating that “neither the implied-consent statute nor the caselaw requires the commissioner to prove that a driver had any particular amount of time in which to provide a sample”).

2015Safety, 773 N.W.2d 134, 138 (Minn. App. 2009).

2015See Bernard, 859 N.W.2d at 772 (breath); State v. Bonner, 275 Minn. 280, 287 , 146 N.W.2d 770, 775 (1966) (photographs and fingerprints); Emerson, 266 Minn. at 221 , 123 N.W.2d at 385 (photographs, X-rays, and medical examination); see also King, 133 S.Ct. at 1980 (buccal swab of cheek for identification under reasonableness-in-the-circumstances standard).

2015See Bernard, 859 N.W.2d at 772 (breath); State v. Bonner, 275 Minn. 280, 287 , 146 N.W.2d 770, 775 (1966) (photographs and fingerprints); Emerson, 266 Minn. at 221 , 123 N.W.2d at 385 (photographs, X-rays, and medical examination); see also King, 133 S.Ct. at 1980 (buccal swab of cheek for identification under reasonableness-in-the-circumstances standard).