34 California opinions name it 4 courts 1972–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Quesada v. Orrgreen2 sentences2017(Cf. White v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 794 , 798-800, 126 Cal.Rptr.3d 774 [motorist's refusal to submit to a breath test, after she agreed to submit to a blood test but the attempt to take her blood proved unsuccessful, constituted refusal to submit to a chemical test]; Quesada v. Orr (1971) 14 Cal.App.3d 866 , 870-871, 92 Cal.Rptr. 640 [when a motorist chose to submit to a urine test under § 13353 but was unable to produce a sample, he was required to complete either a blood or breath test and his failure to do so constituted a refusal].) Under the implied consent l 2017(Cf. White v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 794 , 798-800, 126 Cal.Rptr.3d 774 [motorist's refusal to submit to a breath test, after she agreed to submit to a blood test but the attempt to take her blood proved unsuccessful, constituted refusal to submit to a chemical test]; Quesada v. Orr (1971) 14 Cal.App.3d 866 , 870-871, 92 Cal.Rptr. 640 [when a motorist chose to submit to a urine test under § 13353 but was unable to produce a sample, he was required to complete either a blood or breath test and his failure to do so constituted a refusal].) Under the implied consent l | 2 | 4 |
White v. Department of Motor Vehiclesgreen2 sentences2017(Cf. White v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 794 , 798-800, 126 Cal.Rptr.3d 774 [motorist's refusal to submit to a breath test, after she agreed to submit to a blood test but the attempt to take her blood proved unsuccessful, constituted refusal to submit to a chemical test]; Quesada v. Orr (1971) 14 Cal.App.3d 866 , 870-871, 92 Cal.Rptr. 640 [when a motorist chose to submit to a urine test under § 13353 but was unable to produce a sample, he was required to complete either a blood or breath test and his failure to do so constituted a refusal].) Under the implied consent l 2017(Cf. White v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 794 , 798-800, 126 Cal.Rptr.3d 774 [motorist's refusal to submit to a breath test, after she agreed to submit to a blood test but the attempt to take her blood proved unsuccessful, constituted refusal to submit to a chemical test]; Quesada v. Orr (1971) 14 Cal.App.3d 866 , 870-871, 92 Cal.Rptr. 640 [when a motorist chose to submit to a urine test under § 13353 but was unable to produce a sample, he was required to complete either a blood or breath test and his failure to do so constituted a refusal].) Under the implied consent l | 2 | 3 |
Morphew v. Department of Motor Vehiclesgreen2 sentences2018He was warned "that the urine test would have to be given at the jail, but that the blood test and breath test could only be given at the Medical *850 Center, and if appellant was transported to the jail for the urine test and failed to complete that test, he would not have another opportunity to take the blood test or the breath test." ( Id. at pp. 448-449, 178 Cal.Rptr. 5 .) Once they arrived at the jail, Noli reported that he was unable to urinate and no urine sample was ever produced. ( Id. at p. 449, 178 Cal.Rptr. 5 .) The Court of Appeal affirmed Noli's license suspension, reasoning that 2018He was warned "that the urine test would have to be given at the jail, but that the blood test and breath test could only be given at the Medical *850 Center, and if appellant was transported to the jail for the urine test and failed to complete that test, he would not have another opportunity to take the blood test or the breath test." ( Id. at pp. 448-449, 178 Cal.Rptr. 5 .) Once they arrived at the jail, Noli reported that he was unable to urinate and no urine sample was ever produced. ( Id. at p. 449, 178 Cal.Rptr. 5 .) The Court of Appeal affirmed Noli's license suspension, reasoning that | 1 | 3 |
Cahall v. Department of Motor Vehiclesgreen2 sentences2010In Cahall, supra, 16 Cal.App.3d 491 , the defendant consented to a urine test and was informed that two samples of urine would be required to constitute a complete test. 1988(See Cahall v. Department of Motor Vehicles, supra, 16 Cal.App.3d at p. 497 ; Goodman v. Orr, supra, 19 Cal.App.3d at p. 857 ; Wethern v. Orr (1969) 271 Cal.App.2d 813, 815 [ 76 Cal.Rptr. 807 ].) Further, any claim of confusion is belied by plaintiff’s agreement to perform a urine test for drug content after the officer gave him the drug admonitions. | 1 | 3 |
MacDonald v. Gutierrezgreen2 sentences2017"The procedure is called 'administrative per se' because it does not impose criminal penalties, but simply suspends a person's driver's license as an administrative matter upon a showing the person was arrested for driving with a certain blood-alcohol concentration, without additional evidence of impairment. [Citation.] The express legislative purposes of the administrative suspension procedure are: (1) to provide safety to persons using the highways by quickly suspending the driving privilege of persons who drive with excessive blood-alcohol levels; (2) to guard against erroneous deprivation 2017"The procedure is called 'administrative per se' because it does not impose criminal penalties, but simply suspends a person's driver's license as an administrative matter upon a showing the person was arrested for driving with a certain blood-alcohol concentration, without additional evidence of impairment. [Citation.] The express legislative purposes of the administrative suspension procedure are: (1) to provide safety to persons using the highways by quickly suspending the driving privilege of persons who drive with excessive blood-alcohol levels; (2) to guard against erroneous deprivation | 1 | 2 |
People v. Lawlergreen2 sentences2014(People v. Lawler (1973) 9 Cal.3d 156, 163 [ 107 Cal.Rptr. 13 , 507 P.2d 621 ]; People v. Challoner (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 779, 781 [ 186 Cal.Rptr. 458 ].) Even so, consent is not invalid under the Fourth Amendment simply because it was given in advance and in exchange for a related benefit, and this is all the implied consent law accomplishes. 2014(People v. Lawler (1973) 9 Cal.3d 156, 163 [ 107 Cal.Rptr. 13 , 507 P.2d 621 ]; People v. Challoner (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 779, 781 [ 186 Cal.Rptr. 458 ].) Even so, consent is not invalid under the Fourth Amendment simply because it was given in advance and in exchange for a related benefit, and this is all the implied consent law accomplishes. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Challonergreen2 sentences2014(People v. Lawler (1973) 9 Cal.3d 156, 163 [ 107 Cal.Rptr. 13 , 507 P.2d 621 ]; People v. Challoner (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 779, 781 [ 186 Cal.Rptr. 458 ].) Even so, consent is not invalid under the Fourth Amendment simply because it was given in advance and in exchange for a related benefit, and this is all the implied consent law accomplishes. 2014(People v. Lawler (1973) 9 Cal.3d 156, 163 [ 107 Cal.Rptr. 13 , 507 P.2d 621 ]; People v. Challoner (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 779, 781 [ 186 Cal.Rptr. 458 ].) Even so, consent is not invalid under the Fourth Amendment simply because it was given in advance and in exchange for a related benefit, and this is all the implied consent law accomplishes. | 1 | 2 |
Miles v. Alexisgreen2 sentences1992As the Court of Appeal states in Miles v. Alexis (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 555 , [559] [ 173 Cal.Rptr. 473 ], ‘. . . it is clearly necessary under this procedure to urinate twice.’ ” Consistent with the view that “first voiding the bladder” necessitated some demonstrable urination by petitioner, the trial court concluded, “Petitioner’s inability to void his bladder within a reasonable time after being instructed to do so rendered him incapable of completing the urine test, and required him to select and complete one of the remaining two chemical tests. 1986Code, tit. 17, § 1219.2; Miles v. Alexis (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 555, 559 [ 173 Cal.Rptr. 473 ].) In light of Smith’s undiagnosed injuries, the officer was in no position to offer Smith a urine test. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Stansburygreen1 sentence2025“A motion in limine to exclude evidence is sufficient to preserve an objection if the motion (1) is directed to a particular, identifiable body of evidence; (2) states a specific legal ground for exclusion that is subsequently raised on appeal; and (3) is made at a time before or during trial when the trial court can determine the evidentiary issue in its appropriate context. [Citation.] ‘When such a motion is made and denied, the issue is preserved for appeal.’” (Crouch, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 1021.) As the California Supreme Court has explained, “[e]vents in the trial may change the con | 1 | 1 |
Espinoza v. Shiomotogreen2 sentences2021If the person arrested either is incapable, or states that he or she is incapable, of completing the chosen test, the person shall submit to the remaining test.’ [Citation.] If both blood and breath tests are unavailable, the motorist must submit to a urine test.” ( Espinoza, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at pp. 97-98.) If a motorist refuses to submit to or fails to complete a chemical test, the arresting officer submits a sworn statement to the department that the officer had reasonable cause to believe the person had been driving a motor vehicle in violation of sections 23140, 23152, or 23153, and t 2021If the person arrested either is incapable, or states that he or she is incapable, of completing the chosen test, the person shall submit to the remaining test.’ [Citation.] If both blood and breath tests are unavailable, the motorist must submit to a urine test.” ( Espinoza, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at pp. 97-98.) If a motorist refuses to submit to or fails to complete a chemical test, the arresting officer submits a sworn statement to the department that the officer had reasonable cause to believe the person had been driving a motor vehicle in violation of sections 23140, 23152, or 23153, and t | 1 | 1 |
People v. Roachgreen2 sentences2001(See People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1235 , 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 702 , 842 P.2d 1 , citing People v. Roach (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 891, 893-894 , 166 Cal.Rptr. 801 [proper to instruct that refusing to take a urine test is evidence of consciousness of guilt]; ante, 104 Cal. Rptr.2d p. 584, 18 P.3d p. 13 [knowledge of substance's restricted-dangerous-drug character].) Had the prosecutor commented specifically on defendant's refusal to take the urine test, the question before us would be easier to resolve. 2001(See People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1235 , 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 702 , 842 P.2d 1 , citing People v. Roach (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 891, 893-894 , 166 Cal.Rptr. 801 [proper to instruct that refusing to take a urine test is evidence of consciousness of guilt]; ante, 104 Cal. Rptr.2d p. 584, 18 P.3d p. 13 [knowledge of substance's restricted-dangerous-drug character].) Had the prosecutor commented specifically on defendant's refusal to take the urine test, the question before us would be easier to resolve. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2001(See People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1235 , 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 702 , 842 P.2d 1 , citing People v. Roach (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 891, 893-894 , 166 Cal.Rptr. 801 [proper to instruct that refusing to take a urine test is evidence of consciousness of guilt]; ante, 104 Cal. Rptr.2d p. 584, 18 P.3d p. 13 [knowledge of substance's restricted-dangerous-drug character].) Had the prosecutor commented specifically on defendant's refusal to take the urine test, the question before us would be easier to resolve. 2001(See People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1235 , 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 702 , 842 P.2d 1 , citing People v. Roach (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 891, 893-894 , 166 Cal.Rptr. 801 [proper to instruct that refusing to take a urine test is evidence of consciousness of guilt]; ante, 104 Cal. Rptr.2d p. 584, 18 P.3d p. 13 [knowledge of substance's restricted-dangerous-drug character].) Had the prosecutor commented specifically on defendant's refusal to take the urine test, the question before us would be easier to resolve. | 1 | 1 |
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raabgreen2 sentences1997Concluding that it was appropriate to remand the case to the lower courts for such proceedings as might be necessary to clarify the scope of this category of employees subject to testing, the court directed that, on remand, the lower courts “should examine the criteria used by the Service in determining what materials are classified and in deciding whom to test under this rubric.” (Von Raab, supra, 489 U.S. at p. 678 [ 103 L.Ed.2d at p. 710 ].) The high court additionally specified that “[i]n assessing the reasonableness of requiring tests of these employees, the court should also consider per 1997Concluding that it was appropriate to remand the case to the lower courts for such proceedings as might be necessary to clarify the scope of this category of employees subject to testing, the court directed that, on remand, the lower courts “should examine the criteria used by the Service in determining what materials are classified and in deciding whom to test under this rubric.” (Von Raab, supra, 489 U.S. at p. 678 [ 103 L.Ed.2d at p. 710 ].) The high court additionally specified that “[i]n assessing the reasonableness of requiring tests of these employees, the court should also consider per | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Deltorogreen | 1 | 1 |
Hernandez v. Department of Motor Vehiclesgreen2 sentences1991(Hernandez v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1981) 30 Cal.3d 70, 77 [ 177 Cal.Rptr. 566 , 634 P.2d 917 ].) 6 Thus, having already obtained one sample from Fiscalini with his consent, the government did not demonstrate any need to force him to undergo a second intrusion. 1991(Hernandez v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1981) 30 Cal.3d 70, 77 [ 177 Cal.Rptr. 566 , 634 P.2d 917 ].) 6 Thus, having already obtained one sample from Fiscalini with his consent, the government did not demonstrate any need to force him to undergo a second intrusion. | 1 | 1 |
| Wethern v. Orrgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Conternogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gobin v. Alexisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Santosgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Leegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Crumpler v. Board of Administrationgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn.
green
2 sentences2014The Supreme Court has observed “that the intrusion occasioned by a blood test is not significant, since 9 such ‘tests are … commonplace in these days of periodic physical examinations and experience with them teaches that the quantity of blood extracted is minimal, and that for most people the procedure involves virtually no risk, trauma, or pain.’” (Skinner, supra, 489 U.S. at p. 625 .) The procedures for taking a urine test, on the other hand, which require the subject “to perform an excretory function traditionally shielded by great privacy, raise concerns not implicated by blood or breath 2013The Supreme Court has observed “that the intrusion occasioned by a blood test is not significant, since such ‘tests are commonplace in these days of 9. periodic physical examinations and experience with them teaches that the quantity of blood extracted is minimal, and that for most people the procedure involves virtually no risk, trauma, or pain.’” (Skinner, supra, 489 U.S. at p. 625 .) The procedures for taking a urine test, on the other hand, require the subject “to perform an excretory function traditionally shielded by great privacy, raise concerns not implicated by blood or breath tests.” | 3 | 1989–2014 |
P. v. Cuevas CA1/1
green
2 sentences2014In Fiscalini, supra, 228 Cal.App.3d at pages 1641, 1645, Division One of the Fourth District Court of Appeal construed the defendant’s choice of a urine test under the version of the implied consent law then in effect as resulting in a urine sample “obtained . . . with his consent.” More recently, in People v. Cuevas (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1278 , 1286 and footnote 3 [ 160 Cal.Rptr.3d 773 ] (Cuevas), Division One of the First District Court of Appeal spoke of defendants who chose blood tests has having given “consent under California’s implied consent law.” This view also comports with the Legi 2014In Fiscalini, supra, 228 Cal.App.3d at pages 1641, 1645, Division One of the Fourth District Court of Appeal construed the defendant’s choice of a urine test under the version of the implied consent law then in effect as resulting in a urine sample “obtained . . . with his consent.” More recently, in People v. Cuevas (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1278 , 1286 and footnote 3 [ 160 Cal.Rptr.3d 773 ] (Cuevas), Division One of the First District Court of Appeal spoke of defendants who chose blood tests has having given “consent under California’s implied consent law.” This view also comports with the Legi | 2 | 2014–2014 |
Skinner v. Sillas
green
2 sentences2010(Id. at p. 594.) The reviewing court rejected the arrestee’s argument that he complied with the implied consent law (§ 13353) because he did in fact perform a urine test. ( 58 Cal.App.3d at p. 597 .) The court observed: “If the driver elects to take one of the three tests, he must complete the test or he will be deemed to have refused and failed to take it. [Citations.] And, too, once the suspect refuses to take one of the three tests, blood, urine, *85 or breath, there is no requirement that the officers thereafter give him a test when he decides he is ready. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 598.) The 2010(Id. at pp. 869-870.) The court reasoned: “It would be inconsistent with the purpose of the statute to hold that either [the arresting officer], or the officers on duty at the police station, were required to turn aside from their other responsibilities and arrange for administration of a belated test when once appellant had refused to submit after fair warning of the consequences.” (Id. at p. 870.) In Skinner v. Sillas, supra, 58 Cal.App.3d 591 (Skinner), the arrestee initially elected to take a urine test, but then told the arresting officer to “[t]ake [his] fucking bottle and shove it” when | 2 | 1988–2010 |
People v. Morris
green
1 sentence2025“A motion in limine to exclude evidence is sufficient to preserve an objection if the motion (1) is directed to a particular, identifiable body of evidence; (2) states a specific legal ground for exclusion that is subsequently raised on appeal; and (3) is made at a time before or during trial when the trial court can determine the evidentiary issue in its appropriate context. [Citation.] ‘When such a motion is made and denied, the issue is preserved for appeal.’” (Crouch, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 1021.) As the California Supreme Court has explained, “[e]vents in the trial may change the con | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Gutierrez
neutral
1 sentence2019As the First District stated in People v. Gutierrez (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 1155 , review granted January 2, 2019, S252532 (Gutierrez), just because “the state cannot compel a warrantless blood test does not mean that it cannot offer one as an alternative to the breath test that it clearly 1 The former implied consent law stated that a motorist is deemed to have consented to a urine test on suspicion of driving under the influence of alcohol only if blood or breath testing is unavailable. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Noli v. Department of Motor Vehicles
green
2 sentences2018In Noli v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 446 , 178 Cal.Rptr. 5 ( Noli ), Noli was arrested on suspicion of drunk driving and taken to a medical center where an officer properly admonished him about the consequences of refusing chemical testing. ( Id. at p. 448, 178 Cal.Rptr. 5 .) Noli refused a blood or breath test, but agreed to a urine test. 2018In Noli v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 446 , 178 Cal.Rptr. 5 ( Noli ), Noli was arrested on suspicion of drunk driving and taken to a medical center where an officer properly admonished him about the consequences of refusing chemical testing. ( Id. at p. 448, 178 Cal.Rptr. 5 .) Noli refused a blood or breath test, but agreed to a urine test. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Minor
green
1 sentence2018The jury in Minor was instructed that "the elements of section 23153, subdivision (a), are as follows: (1) driving a vehicle while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage or drug; (2) when so driving, committing some act which violates the law or is a failure to perform some duty required by law; and (3) as a proximate result of such violation of law or failure to perform a duty, another person was injured." ( Minor, supra, 28 Cal.App.4th at pp. 437-438, 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 641 .) See footnote *, ante .) | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Diaz
red
1 sentence2015Regarding investigatory testing, section 23612, subdivision (h) states that a preliminary alcohol screening test based on a breath sample that is used to establish reasonable cause that the person was driving under the influence "is a field sobriety test and may be used by an officer as a further investigative tool." Section 23612, subdivision (i) sets forth the advisements the officer must provide concerning the preliminary alcohol screening test, including that the officer is requesting the screening to assist in determining if the person is under the influence; the person has the right to r | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Humphreys
green
1 sentence2015Regarding investigatory testing, section 23612, subdivision (h) states that a preliminary alcohol screening test based on a breath sample that is used to establish reasonable cause that the person was driving under the influence "is a field sobriety test and may be used by an officer as a further investigative tool." Section 23612, subdivision (i) sets forth the advisements the officer must provide concerning the preliminary alcohol screening test, including that the officer is requesting the screening to assist in determining if the person is under the influence; the person has the right to r | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Wilson
green
1 sentence2015Regarding investigatory testing, section 23612, subdivision (h) states that a preliminary alcohol screening test based on a breath sample that is used to establish reasonable cause that the person was driving under the influence "is a field sobriety test and may be used by an officer as a further investigative tool." Section 23612, subdivision (i) sets forth the advisements the officer must provide concerning the preliminary alcohol screening test, including that the officer is requesting the screening to assist in determining if the person is under the influence; the person has the right to r | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Fiscalini
green
1 sentence2014In Fiscalini, supra, 228 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1641, 1645, Division One of the Fourth District Court of Appeal construed the defendant's choice of a urine test under the version of the implied consent law then in effect as resulting in a urine sample "obtained ... with his consent." More recently, in People v. Cuevas (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1278 , 1286 & fu. 3 (Cuevas), Division One of the First District Court of Appeal spoke of defendants who chose blood tests has having given "consent under California's implied consent law." This view also comports with the Legislature's apparent view as to the n | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Lake v. Reed
green
1 sentence2014(Lake v. Reed, supra, 16 Cal.4th at pp. 452-453, 468 [substantial evidence supports finding that licensee was driving with more than 0.08 percent blood alcohol concentration where the officer observed objective manifestations of intoxication and a urine test showed the 18 licensee had 0.19 percent BAC].) Zehnder’s testimony was insufficient to rebut the presumption that DMV’s evidence was reliable and that Chantry had the proscribed BAC at the time of driving. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Williams
green
1 sentence2014Further, we assume for purposes of this decision that the People suppressed this 23 evidence.16 However, we think it is clear that the evidence at issue was not material under Brady, in that there is not a " ' "reasonable probability" ' of a different result" (Williams, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 256 ), if the urine test and blood test had been disclosed earlier. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Buchanan v. Department of Motor Vehicles
green
1 sentence2010(Ibid.) On appeal, the reviewing court noted that only certain statutorily enumerated persons can withdraw blood, 9 “and they are to be found in a hospital, not at a police station.” (Buchanan, supra, 100 Cal.App.3d at p. 298 .) The court also emphasized that “the efficacy of a blood test depends on its being made as soon as possible after the time of the offense . . . .” (Ibid.) Accordingly, the court concluded that the arresting officer had the authority to require the arrestee to choose a blood test before reaching the hospital and to limit the arrestee’s choices at the station to a breath | 1 | 2010–2010 |
People v. Bransford
green
1 sentence2001(People v. Bransford, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 893 .) Defendant here took a urine test. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
People v. Trotman
green
2 sentences1991And it seems to me that the officers have a right to take the blood sample if they wish and the fact that he was given a urine test earlier doesn’t rob them of that right.” 2 In People v. Deltoro (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1417, 1425 [ 263 Cal.Rptr. 305 ], the appellate court stated: “[I]f there is probable cause to believe that a person committed driving under the influence of alcohol, the taking of such person’s blood is valid regardless of whether that person is first formally placed under arrest.” 3 In People v. Trotman (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 430 [ 262 Cal.Rptr. 640 ], the court characterized Sc 1991And it seems to me that the officers have a right to take the blood sample if they wish and the fact that he was given a urine test earlier doesn’t rob them of that right.” 2 In People v. Deltoro (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1417, 1425 [ 263 Cal.Rptr. 305 ], the appellate court stated: “[I]f there is probable cause to believe that a person committed driving under the influence of alcohol, the taking of such person’s blood is valid regardless of whether that person is first formally placed under arrest.” 3 In People v. Trotman (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 430 [ 262 Cal.Rptr. 640 ], the court characterized Sc | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Carleton v. Superior Court green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Goodman v. Orr green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Frye v. United States red | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| People v. Kelly red | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| McConville v. Alexis green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Hasiwar v. Sillas neutral | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Decker v. Department of Motor Vehicles green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Giomi v. Department of Motor Vehicles green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| People v. Superior Court green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Zidell v. Bright green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.