knowing and understanding waiver in Illinois

1984Notably, the Murrell court stated that its Rule 402 “only requires an affirmative showing on the record of a knowing and understanding waiver as to pleas of guilty” and that “[njeither our rule nor Boykin [Boykin v. Alabama (1969), 395 U.S. 238 , 23 L.

1984Notably, the Murrell court stated that its Rule 402 “only requires an affirmative showing on the record of a knowing and understanding waiver as to pleas of guilty” and that “[njeither our rule nor Boykin [Boykin v. Alabama (1969), 395 U.S. 238 , 23 L.

2021The court then found that an examination of the record demonstrated that “it fails to show a knowing and understanding waiver of counsel.” Barker, 62 Ill. 2d at 59 . ¶ 59 As in Barker, an examination of the record fails to show a knowing and understanding waiver of counsel, because defendant was not informed of the nature of the alleged violation of probation and was not informed of the minimum and maximum sentence that he faced if he was found to have violated his probation.

2021However, in Barker, our supreme court found that “[g]ood practice requires that there be a definitive standard by which a knowing and understanding waiver of counsel in a probation revocation proceeding may be determined.” Barker, 62 Ill. 2d at 59 .

2017Consequently, although defendant was silent at the commencement of his combined bench trial, his silent acquiescence was insufficient to support a knowing and understanding waiver of his right to a jury trial in case number 14 CR 4615. ¶ 28 Nevertheless, the State argues the situation in People v. Frey, 103 Ill. 2d 327 (1984), is more instructive to the resolution of this appeal than the one in Bracey.

2017Consequently, although defendant was silent at the commencement of his combined bench trial, his silent acquiescence was insufficient to support a knowing and understanding waiver of his right to a jury trial in case No. 14 CR 4615. ¶ 28 Nevertheless, the State argues the situation in People v. Frey, 103 Ill. 2d 327 (1984), is more instructive to the resolution of this appeal than the one in Bracey.

2004Scott, 186 Ill. 2d at 284 .

2004Scott, 186 Ill.2d at 284 , 238 Ill.Dec. 36 , 710 N.E.2d 833 .

1981People v. Richardson (1965), 32 Ill.2d 497 , 207 N.E.2d 453 ; People v. Sakalas (1980), 85 Ill.

1981People v. Richardson (1965), 32 Ill.2d 497 , 207 N.E.2d 453 ; People v. Sakalas (1980), 85 Ill.

2021Id. at 335 .

1986Ed. 1461 , 58 S. Ct. 1019 , providing that counsel in a criminal case cannot be dispensed with in the absence of a knowing and understanding waiver was limited by the language of the opinion to cases where the life or liberty of the defendant is involved.

1984Ed. 2d 274 , 89 S. Ct. 1709 ] contains a similar requirement concerning the waiver of the right to jury trial.” (People v. Murrell (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 287, 290 .) Importantly, there, as here, the defendants made no contention that the waiver was not voluntary, that either of the defendants wanted or was deprived of a jury trial, or was in any way prejudiced by counsel’s waiver on their behalf.

1983(See People v. Montgomery (1981), 96 Ill.

1983App. 3d 126 , the appellate court quoted Barker and stated that “the [circuit] court did not directly advise defendant as to the minimum and maximum sentence which could be imposed,” and concluded that, “[b]ecause the record does not show that defendant knew and understood the minimum and maximum sentence which could be imposed if probation were revoked, it fails to show a knowing and understanding waiver of counsel.” ( 56 Ill.

1983(People v. Brownstein (1982), 105 Ill.

1982(People v. Walton (1979), 77 Ill.

1981Unquestionably the issue before us is one affecting substantial rights fully applicable to a misdemeanor case (People v. Murff (1979), 69 Ill.

1981Ed. 2d 274 , 89 S. Ct. 1709 .) Considering the record as a whole (People v. Williams (1963), 27 Ill. 2d 327, 329 , 189 N.E.2d 314 ), we cannot find that defendant made a knowing and understanding waiver of his right to a jury trial.

1981Ed. 2d 274 , 89 S. Ct. 1709 .) Considering the record as a whole (People v. Williams (1963), 27 Ill. 2d 327, 329 , 189 N.E.2d 314 ), we cannot find that defendant made a knowing and understanding waiver of his right to a jury trial.

1981People v. Richardson (1965), 32 Ill.2d 497 , 207 N.E.2d 453 ; People v. Sakalas (1980), 85 Ill.

1980(People v. Richardson (1965), 32 Ill. 2d 497 , 207 N.E.2d 453 ; People v. Webb (1976), 38 Ill.

1980App. 3d 701 , 288 N.E.2d 530 .) Mere consent to representation by counsel or an expression of satisfaction with counsel are not the equivalent of a knowing and understanding waiver of a possible conflict of interest.

1977The circuit court should not permit the offender to waive counsel unless it determines, by addressing him in open court, that the offender understands: (1) the purpose of the revocation proceeding and the nature of the violation of the condition of probation upon which it is based; (2) that he has the right of confrontation, cross-examination and representation by counsel and that if he is indigent he has the right to appointed counsel; (3) the minimum and maximum sentence which may be imposed if the probation is revoked.” ( 62 Ill. 2d 57, 59 , 338 N.E.2d 385, 387 .) The supreme court in Peopl

1973Defendant contends that the court erred by not advising him of his right to a jury trial until after a few questions had already been asked of the first witness and that he did not knowingly and understandingly waive his right to a jury trial and cites People v. Rambo, 23 Ill.App.2d 299 , 260 N.E.2d 119 , in support of his contention.

1973Defendant contends that the court erred by not advising him of his right to a jury trial until after a few questions had already been asked of the first witness and that he did not knowingly and understandingly waive his right to a jury trial and cites People v. Rambo, 23 Ill.App.2d 299 , 260 N.E.2d 119 , in support of his contention.

1971In People v. Alexander, 45 Ill.2d 53 , 256 N.E.2d 785 , the court held that a defendant was adequately admonished and that he knowingly and understandingly waived his right to a trial by jury when the admonition consisted of the trial judge informing him that "you have a right to a jury trial if you so desire." Such admonition obviously would not include that which the defendant characterizes as an essential ingredient or component of a jury trial — an understanding of which is a necessary condition precedent to a knowing and understanding waiver.

1971In People v. Alexander, 45 Ill.2d 53 , 256 N.E.2d 785 , the court held that a defendant was adequately admonished and that he knowingly and understandingly waived his right to a trial by jury when the admonition consisted of the trial judge informing him that "you have a right to a jury trial if you so desire." Such admonition obviously would not include that which the defendant characterizes as an essential ingredient or component of a jury trial — an understanding of which is a necessary condition precedent to a knowing and understanding waiver.