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22 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1994–2021 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Kruegergreen2 sentences2021Our supreme court declined to follow the holding in Krull because the Krull good-faith exception “does not comport with article I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970.” Krueger, 175 Ill. 2d at 70, 74 (rejecting the Krull good-faith rule as creating a “grace period for unconstitutional search and seizure legislation,” during which constitutional rights of Illinois citizens could be violated with impunity, and holding the exclusionary rule arising out of our state constitution “continues to afford the protection abrogated by Krull”). 2021Our supreme court declined to follow the holding in Krull because the Krull good-faith exception “does not comport with article I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970.” Krueger, 175 Ill. 2d at 70, 74 (rejecting the Krull good-faith rule as creating a “grace period for unconstitutional search and seizure legislation,” during which constitutional rights of Illinois citizens could be violated with impunity, and holding the exclusionary rule arising out of our state constitution “continues to afford the protection abrogated by Krull”). | 8 | 12 |
Illinois v. Krullgreen2 sentences2015As Justice O’Connor noted, “the lack of a remedy leaves no incentive for the aggrieved defendant to challenge the statute as unconstitutional.” Id. (citing Krull, 480 U.S. at 369 (O’Connor, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, Marshall and Stevens, JJ.)). ¶ 93 The same flaws identified by this court in Krueger with respect to the Krull good-faith exception are inherent in the good-faith exception for police searches “conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent” (Davis, 564 U.S. at ___ , 131 S. Ct. at 2423-24 ), applied by the majority in the case at bar. 2015As Justice O’Connor noted, “the lack of a remedy leaves no incentive for the aggrieved defendant to challenge the statute as unconstitutional.” Id. (citing Krull, 480 U.S. at 369 (O’Connor, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, Marshall and Stevens, JJ.)). ¶ 93 The same flaws identified by this court in Krueger with respect to the Krull good-faith exception are inherent in the good-faith exception for police searches “conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent” (Davis, 564 U.S. at ___ , 131 S. Ct. at 2423-24 ), applied by the majority in the case at bar. | 6 | 7 |
ANTHONY FERRARI v. STATE OF FLORIDAgreen2 sentences2021See id. (citing Krull, 480 U.S. 340 ). 2021See id. (citing Krull, 480 U.S. 340 ). | 3 | 3 |
Michigan v. DeFillippogreen2 sentences2017See Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 38-39 (1979). ¶ 34 However, in People v. Krueger, 175 Ill. 2d 60, 61 (1996), our supreme court declined to adopt the Krull good-faith exception after finding that the Illinois Constitution barred its application. 2016See Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 38-9 , 99 S.Ct. 2627 , 61 L.Ed.2d 343 (1979). ¶ 34 However, in People v. Krueger, 175 Ill. 2d 60, 61 (1996), our supreme court declined to adopt the Krull good-faith exception after finding that the Illinois Constitution barred its application. | 2 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Caballes
green
2 sentences2018Because the majority declines to overrule those precedents directly, it is apparently content to disavow them sub silentio. ¶ 64 The opinion is also surprisingly inconsistent with our statements in People v. Caballes: “Noting this state’s history of applying the exclusionary rule under the state constitution as well as a long-standing tradition of barring evidence gathered under the authority of an unconstitutional statute, this court rejected the Krull good-faith rule as creating a ‘grace period for unconstitutional search and seizure legislation,’ *** [and] ‘knowingly depart[ed]’ from the lo 2017Because the majority declines to overrule those precedents directly, it is apparently content to disavow them sub silentio . ¶ 64 The opinion is also surprisingly inconsistent with our statements in People v. Caballes : "Noting this state's history of applying the exclusionary rule under the state constitution as well as a long-standing tradition of barring evidence gathered under the authority of an unconstitutional statute, this court rejected the Krull good-faith rule as creating a 'grace period for unconstitutional search and seizure legislation,' *** [and] 'knowingly depart [ed]' from the | 2 | 2017–2018 |
Davis v. United States
green
2 sentences2015As Justice O’Connor noted, “the lack of a remedy leaves no incentive for the aggrieved defendant to challenge the statute as unconstitutional.” Id. (citing Krull, 480 U.S. at 369 (O’Connor, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, Marshall and Stevens, JJ.)). ¶ 93 The same flaws identified by this court in Krueger with respect to the Krull good-faith exception are inherent in the good-faith exception for police searches “conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent” (Davis, 564 U.S. at ___ , 131 S. Ct. at 2423-24 ), applied by the majority in the case at bar. 2015As Justice O’Connor noted, “the lack of a remedy leaves no incentive for the aggrieved defendant to challenge the statute as unconstitutional.” Id. (citing Krull, 480 U.S. at 369 (O’Connor, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, Marshall and Stevens, JJ.)). ¶ 93 The same flaws identified by this court in Krueger with respect to the Krull good-faith exception are inherent in the good-faith exception for police searches “conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent” (Davis, 564 U.S. at ___ , 131 S. Ct. at 2423-24 ), applied by the majority in the case at bar. | 2 | 2015–2015 |
United States v. Leon
green
2 sentences1996In Krull, a bare majority of the United States Supreme Court extended the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule first established in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 , 82 L. 1996In Krull, a bare majority of the United States Supreme Court extended the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule first established in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 , 82 L. | 2 | 1996–1996 |
People v. McGee
green
2 sentences1996People v. McGee, 268 Ill. 1996People v. McGee, 268 Ill.App.3d 32 , 205 Ill.Dec. 883 , 644 N.E.2d 439 (1994). | 2 | 1996–1996 |
King v. Ryan
green
2 sentences1994(See King, 153 Ill. 2d at 462-65 .) We believe any further expansion of the Krull good-faith exception would emasculate the judicially created exclusionary rule independently applied in Illinois for more than 70 years to remedy violations of our citizens’ right to privacy and freedom from unlawful searches and seizures guaranteed by the Illinois Constitution. 1994(See King, 153 Ill.2d at 462-65 , 180 Ill.Dec. 260 , 607 N.E.2d 154 .) We believe any further expansion of the Krull good-faith exception would emasculate the judicially created exclusionary rule independently applied in Illinois for more than 70 years to remedy violations of our citizens' right to privacy and freedom from unlawful searches and seizures guaranteed by the Illinois Constitution. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Mapp v. Ohio
green
2 sentences1994The rule was adopted in Illinois by our supreme court long before Mapp v. Ohio (1961), 367 U.S. 643 , 6 L. 1994The rule was adopted in Illinois by our supreme court long before Mapp v. Ohio (1961), 367 U.S. 643 , 6 L. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
People v. Layton
green
2 sentences1994(See, e.g., Madison, 121 Ill. 2d 195 ; People v. Layton (1990), 196 Ill. 1994(See, e.g., Madison, 121 Ill.2d 195 , 117 Ill.Dec. 213 , 520 N.E.2d 374 ; People v. Layton (1990), 196 Ill.App.3d 78 , 142 Ill.Dec. 539 , 552 N.E.2d 1280 ; Bessler, 191 Ill.App.3d 374 , 138 Ill.Dec. 822 , 548 N.E.2d 52 .) We believe that the exclusionary rule applies in this case and is mandated under our State Constitution irrespective of any application of the tests suggested by the United States Supreme Court in Krull. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
People v. Bessler
green
2 sentences1994We decline to overrule or limit Bessler. ( People v. Bessler (1989), 191 Ill.App.3d 374 , 138 Ill.Dec. 822 , 548 N.E.2d 52 .) This court will not extend or apply the Krull good-faith exception to the State's 70-year application of the exclusionary rule. 1994We decline to overrule or limit Bessler. ( People v. Bessler (1989), 191 Ill.App.3d 374 , 138 Ill.Dec. 822 , 548 N.E.2d 52 .) This court will not extend or apply the Krull good-faith exception to the State's 70-year application of the exclusionary rule. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
People v. Madison
green
2 sentences1994(See, e.g., Madison, 121 Ill. 2d 195 ; People v. Layton (1990), 196 Ill. 1994(See, e.g., Madison, 121 Ill.2d 195 , 117 Ill.Dec. 213 , 520 N.E.2d 374 ; People v. Layton (1990), 196 Ill.App.3d 78 , 142 Ill.Dec. 539 , 552 N.E.2d 1280 ; Bessler, 191 Ill.App.3d 374 , 138 Ill.Dec. 822 , 548 N.E.2d 52 .) We believe that the exclusionary rule applies in this case and is mandated under our State Constitution irrespective of any application of the tests suggested by the United States Supreme Court in Krull. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.