third assignment error in Tennessee

1943In other words, the exceptions to the rule attract attention and make such impressions as that those who are called on to give reasons for noting the exceptions can give them.” This case is quoted with approval of Chief Justice Green in the ease of Davis v. State, in 161 Tenn. 23 , on page 36, 28 S. W. (2d) 993 , on page 997, where the court said: “The third assignment of error criticizes an instruction of the trial judge to the effect that a nonexpert witness might not testify to the insanity of another without giving the facts on which the opinion was based, but that such a witness might tes

1943In other words, the exceptions to the rule attract attention and make such impressions as that those who are called on to give reasons for noting the exceptions can give them.” This case is quoted with approval of Chief Justice Green in the ease of Davis v. State, in 161 Tenn. 23 , on page 36, 28 S. W. (2d) 993 , on page 997, where the court said: “The third assignment of error criticizes an instruction of the trial judge to the effect that a nonexpert witness might not testify to the insanity of another without giving the facts on which the opinion was based, but that such a witness might tes

1978Unlike Blankenship v. State, 1 Tenn.Cr.App. 178, 432 S.W.2d 679 (1967), in that authority the objectionable identification was not in the presence of the appellant as was here.

1976Bluff City Buick Co. v. Davis, 204 Tenn. 593 , 323 S.W.2d 1 (1959).

1976Bluff City Buick Co. v. Davis, 204 Tenn. 593 , 323 S.W.2d 1 (1959).

1975The third assignment of error, also commonly assigned by all three, complains of the admission into evidence of the incul- patory statements, on the ground that this was a violation of the rule of Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 , 88 S.Ct. 1620 , 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1969).

1975The third assignment of error, also commonly assigned by all three, complains of the admission into evidence of the incul- patory statements, on the ground that this was a violation of the rule of Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 , 88 S.Ct. 1620 , 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1969).

1974The third assignment of error is as follows: “THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT AND VERDICT OF THE JURY WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE PROOF.” In support of this assignment, defendant insists that there was no evidence of proper demand or waiver of demand of the rent due, citing Smith v. Holt, 29 Tenn.App. 31 , 193 S.W.2d 100 (1945).

1974The third assignment of error is as follows: “THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT AND VERDICT OF THE JURY WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE PROOF.” In support of this assignment, defendant insists that there was no evidence of proper demand or waiver of demand of the rent due, citing Smith v. Holt, 29 Tenn.App. 31 , 193 S.W.2d 100 (1945).

1973Greer v. Underwood, 62 Tenn.App. 225 , 461 S.W.2d 35 *383 (1970); Rogers v. Murfreesboro Housing Authority, 51 Tenn.App. 163 , 365 S.W.2d 441 (1962) ; Lyman v. American Nat’l.

1973Greer v. Underwood, 62 Tenn.App. 225 , 461 S.W.2d 35 *383 (1970); Rogers v. Murfreesboro Housing Authority, 51 Tenn.App. 163 , 365 S.W.2d 441 (1962) ; Lyman v. American Nat’l.

1971Cooper v. State, 123 Tenn. 37 , 138 S.W. 826 ; Marino v. U. S., (CCA 9th) 91 F.2d 691 , 113 A.L.R. 975 , cert. denied, 302 U.S. 764 , 58 S.Ct. 410 , 82 L.Ed. 593 .

1971Cooper v. State, 123 Tenn. 37 , 138 S.W. 826 ; Marino v. U. S., (CCA 9th) 91 F.2d 691 , 113 A.L.R. 975 , cert. denied, 302 U.S. 764 , 58 S.Ct. 410 , 82 L.Ed. 593 .

1971Cooper v. State, 123 Tenn. 37 , 138 S.W. 826 ; Marino v. U. S., (CCA 9th) 91 F.2d 691 , 113 A.L.R. 975 , cert. denied, 302 U.S. 764 , 58 S.Ct. 410 , 82 L.Ed. 593 .

1971Cooper v. State, 123 Tenn. 37 , 138 S.W. 826 ; Marino v. U. S., (CCA 9th) 91 F.2d 691 , 113 A.L.R. 975 , cert. denied, 302 U.S. 764 , 58 S.Ct. 410 , 82 L.Ed. 593 .

1971On the authority of Solomon v. State, 203 Tenn. 583 , 315 S.W.2d 99 , supra; O’Brien v. State, 205 Tenn. 405 , 326 S.W.2d 759 ; and Garner v. State, 220 Tenn. 680 , 423 S.W.2d 480 , supra. The defendant’s third assignment of error is that the court erred in refusing to exclude all evidence seized under the search warrant because the search warrant failed to comply with T.C.A. 40-518, requiring a copy be given to the person searched.

1971On the authority of Solomon v. State, 203 Tenn. 583 , 315 S.W.2d 99 , supra; O’Brien v. State, 205 Tenn. 405 , 326 S.W.2d 759 ; and Garner v. State, 220 Tenn. 680 , 423 S.W.2d 480 , supra. The defendant’s third assignment of error is that the court erred in refusing to exclude all evidence seized under the search warrant because the search warrant failed to comply with T.C.A. 40-518, requiring a copy be given to the person searched.

1971On the authority of Solomon v. State, 203 Tenn. 583 , 315 S.W.2d 99 , supra; O’Brien v. State, 205 Tenn. 405 , 326 S.W.2d 759 ; and Garner v. State, 220 Tenn. 680 , 423 S.W.2d 480 , supra. The defendant’s third assignment of error is that the court erred in refusing to exclude all evidence seized under the search warrant because the search warrant failed to comply with T.C.A. 40-518, requiring a copy be given to the person searched.

1971On the authority of Solomon v. State, 203 Tenn. 583 , 315 S.W.2d 99 , supra; O’Brien v. State, 205 Tenn. 405 , 326 S.W.2d 759 ; and Garner v. State, 220 Tenn. 680 , 423 S.W.2d 480 , supra. The defendant’s third assignment of error is that the court erred in refusing to exclude all evidence seized under the search warrant because the search warrant failed to comply with T.C.A. 40-518, requiring a copy be given to the person searched.

1971On the authority of Solomon v. State, 203 Tenn. 583 , 315 S.W.2d 99 , supra; O’Brien v. State, 205 Tenn. 405 , 326 S.W.2d 759 ; and Garner v. State, 220 Tenn. 680 , 423 S.W.2d 480 , supra. The defendant’s third assignment of error is that the court erred in refusing to exclude all evidence seized under the search warrant because the search warrant failed to comply with T.C.A. 40-518, requiring a copy be given to the person searched.

1971On the authority of Solomon v. State, 203 Tenn. 583 , 315 S.W.2d 99 , supra; O’Brien v. State, 205 Tenn. 405 , 326 S.W.2d 759 ; and Garner v. State, 220 Tenn. 680 , 423 S.W.2d 480 , supra. The defendant’s third assignment of error is that the court erred in refusing to exclude all evidence seized under the search warrant because the search warrant failed to comply with T.C.A. 40-518, requiring a copy be given to the person searched.

1971Cooper v. State, 123 Tenn. 37 , 138 S.W. 826 ; Marino v. U. S., (CCA 9th) 91 F.2d 691 , 113 A.L.R. 975 , cert. denied, 302 U.S. 764 , 58 S.Ct. 410 , 82 L.Ed. 593 .

1967Defendant cites the case of Escobedo v. State of Illi nois, 378 U.S. 478 , 84 S.Ct. 1758 , 12 L.Ed.2d 977 .

1967Defendant cites the case of Escobedo v. State of Illi nois, 378 U.S. 478 , 84 S.Ct. 1758 , 12 L.Ed.2d 977 .

1960Moreover, with reference to both subsecs, (a) and (b), in Epperson v. White, 156 Tenn. 155, 166 , 299 S.W. 812, 815 , 57 A.L.R. 601 , it is said: “The power to dispose of property by the will, or real estate at least, depends entirely upon statute.

1960Moreover, with reference to both subsecs, (a) and (b), in Epperson v. White, 156 Tenn. 155, 166 , 299 S.W. 812, 815 , 57 A.L.R. 601 , it is said: “The power to dispose of property by the will, or real estate at least, depends entirely upon statute.

1956The third assignment of error is an attempt to apply by analogy the case of Gray v. State, 191 Tenn. 526 , 235 S.W.2d 20 , in which this Court condemned as erroneous the argument of the District Attorney General in a homicide case that the jury’s verdict, whatever it might be, was subject to review by the Supreme Court which would correct any mistakes, it being said by this Court that it tended to invite the trial jury to shirk certain of its responsibilities.

1956The third assignment of error is an attempt to apply by analogy the case of Gray v. State, 191 Tenn. 526 , 235 S.W.2d 20 , in which this Court condemned as erroneous the argument of the District Attorney General in a homicide case that the jury’s verdict, whatever it might be, was subject to review by the Supreme Court which would correct any mistakes, it being said by this Court that it tended to invite the trial jury to shirk certain of its responsibilities.

1956Giles v. State, 185 Tenn. 429 , 206 S.W.2d 412 , was where a confession was ruled inadmissible in evidence because the accused had been questioned by a magistrate whom he considered to be questioning him simply as his friend, and he answered the questions that the magistrate asked him.

1956Giles v. State, 185 Tenn. 429 , 206 S.W.2d 412 , was where a confession was ruled inadmissible in evidence because the accused had been questioned by a magistrate whom he considered to be questioning him simply as his friend, and he answered the questions that the magistrate asked him.

1953Sheegog v. Perkins, 63 Tenn. 273 .

1953The third assignment of error is as follows: “The Court erred in holding that the intended gift was not invalidated by reason of the fact that the attempt was made by the decedent in contemplation of suicide.” In the case of Dietzen v. American Trust & Banking Co., 175 Tenn. 49 , 131 S. W. (2d) 69, 71 , after referring with approval to the case of Scott v. Union & Planters Bank, supra, many other cases of different courts and texts on the subject, our Supreme Court said: “A donatio causa mortis differs from a gift inter vivos because it is ambulatory and revocable during the donor’s life.

1953The third assignment of error is as follows: “The Court erred in holding that the intended gift was not invalidated by reason of the fact that the attempt was made by the decedent in contemplation of suicide.” In the case of Dietzen v. American Trust & Banking Co., 175 Tenn. 49 , 131 S. W. (2d) 69, 71 , after referring with approval to the case of Scott v. Union & Planters Bank, supra, many other cases of different courts and texts on the subject, our Supreme Court said: “A donatio causa mortis differs from a gift inter vivos because it is ambulatory and revocable during the donor’s life.

1941The rule is as said by Judge Felts in Anderson v. Peters et al., 22 Tenn. App., 563 on page 570, 124 S. W. (2d), 717 , on page 722, after referring to many cases: “The distinguishing feature in all these cases is that the piles of lumber or timber or the instrumentalities causing the injury were upon a public street or sidewalk where children had a right to be and where their presence should have been anticipated and precautions taken to protect them from injury.” The third assignment of error is that the verdict as reduced is excessive.

1941The rule is as said by Judge Felts in Anderson v. Peters et al., 22 Tenn. App., 563 on page 570, 124 S. W. (2d), 717 , on page 722, after referring to many cases: “The distinguishing feature in all these cases is that the piles of lumber or timber or the instrumentalities causing the injury were upon a public street or sidewalk where children had a right to be and where their presence should have been anticipated and precautions taken to protect them from injury.” The third assignment of error is that the verdict as reduced is excessive.

1939“The Supreme Court says, in its opinion filed July 3, 1937 [171 Tenn., at] page 651 (9) [ 107 S. W. (2d), at page 222 ] : “ ‘Under the third assignment of error it is contended that the decree appealed from invades the jurisdiction of the county court of Overton county, in that it prevents the executors from making settlement of the estate in their hands in the county court and removes the administration so far as Vaughn is concerned, from the county court to the chancery court.

1934Through his fourth assignment, defendant Caldwell says that the trial court erred in charging the jury as follows: “It was Caldwell’s duty to drive his car at such a rate of speed that he could stop it within the distance his lights would carry or *366 reveal an object ahead and to keep said ear under reasonable control.” And .(in the same connection) in refusing defendant’s sixteenth special request, which was as follows: “The general rule that it is the duty of a traveler on the highway at night to drive his car at such /a rate of speed that he can stop within the distance that his lights wi

1933In Creed v. White, 11 Humph., 549 , 552, the court said: “We have held, and such is now the settled law of this court, that the party to be prejudiced by the admission of illegal testimony, not objected to when offered, may insist upon the exclusion of such evidence from the jury, at any time before their retirement from the bar, unless there has been an explicit waiver of the objection to the evidence.” The rule thus announced in Creed v. White, supra, was reaffirmed in Moon v. State, 146 Tenn., 319, 368 , 242 S. W., 39 .

1932The third assignment of error is that “The court erred in refusing to submit the following special issues of fact to the jury: “ ‘(1) Was the bus that was involved in this accident and in which the plaintiffs were riding at the time of the accident being operated at an unreasonable or unsafe rate of speed or in excess of forty miles an hour; “ ‘(2) Was the accident due to a latent defect of the bus itself, which a reasonable inspection would not disclose; “ '(3) Was there any contributing cause to the accident except a latent mechanical defect which by reasonable inspection would not be disclo

1932The third assignment of error is that “The court erred in refusing to submit the following special issues of fact to the jury: “ ‘(1) Was the bus that was involved in this accident and in which the plaintiffs were riding at the time of the accident being operated at an unreasonable or unsafe rate of speed or in excess of forty miles an hour; “ ‘(2) Was the accident due to a latent defect of the bus itself, which a reasonable inspection would not disclose; “ '(3) Was there any contributing cause to the accident except a latent mechanical defect which by reasonable inspection would not be disclo

1929The third assignment of error, that “the Chancellor erred in sustaining various exceptions made by appellees to appellant’s proof” is not well made for two reasons, first, because it does not point out the exceptions or rulings of the court, is too indefinite and gives no reasons why the rulings were erroneous, Powers v. McKenzie, 90 Tenn., 167 ; and second, because the assignments raises immaterial propositions.

1928Railroad v. Abernathey, 106 Tenn., 722, 728 , 64 S. W., 3 .

1923Goodyear v. Meux, 143 Tenn., 287 , 228 S. W., 57 ; Warehouse v. Sentelle, (Tenn.), 255 S. W., 589 ; Biddle v. Smith, (Tenn.) 256 S. W., 454 .