third assignment error in Arizona

1967The latest pronouncement by our Supreme Court on this subject is contained in Malanga v. Royal Indemnity Company, 101 Ariz. 588 , 422 P.2d 704 (1967), which states, in part: “In the following language, this Court, in the Fuqua case, in dealing with the term ‘accidental means’ defined the word ‘accidental’, as used in accident insurance policies, and prescribed the test to be followed in order to determine if a result is ‘accidental’, 40 Ariz. 154, 155 , 10 P.2d 958 , 960: ‘The third assignment of error is based upon the theory that the evidence shows conclusively that Fuqua’s death did not res

1967In the following language,. this Court, in the Fuqua case, in dealing with the term “accidental means” defined the word “accidental”, as used in accident insurance policies, and prescribed the test to be followed in order to determine if a result is “accidental”, 40 Ariz. 154, 155 , 10 P.2d 958 , 960: “The third assignment of error is based upon the theory that the evidence shows conclusively that Fuqua’s death did' not result from ‘accidental’ means.

1976VOLUNTARINESS OF CONFESSION The appellant argues that his confession was not voluntary but rather was obtained by a promise of immunity in contravention to Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 , 84 S.Ct. 1489 , 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964).

1976VOLUNTARINESS OF CONFESSION The appellant argues that his confession was not voluntary but rather was obtained by a promise of immunity in contravention to Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 , 84 S.Ct. 1489 , 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964).

1970In People v. Robbins, 225 Cal.App.2d 177 , 37 Cal.Rptr. 244, 246 , cert. denied; 382 U.S. 1017 , 86 S.Ct. 631 , 15 L.Ed.2d 531 (1964), the court states: “It is for the trial court to determine, from the evidence before it, whether a photograph offered is a correct representation of the object or scene in question, and the ruling will be sustained on appeal unless it is apparent that there has been an abuse of discretion.” See also State v. Chambers, 102 Ariz. 234 , 428 P.2d 91 (1967).

1970In People v. Robbins, 225 Cal.App.2d 177 , 37 Cal.Rptr. 244, 246 , cert. denied; 382 U.S. 1017 , 86 S.Ct. 631 , 15 L.Ed.2d 531 (1964), the court states: “It is for the trial court to determine, from the evidence before it, whether a photograph offered is a correct representation of the object or scene in question, and the ruling will be sustained on appeal unless it is apparent that there has been an abuse of discretion.” See also State v. Chambers, 102 Ariz. 234 , 428 P.2d 91 (1967).

1970In People v. Robbins, 225 Cal.App.2d 177 , 37 Cal.Rptr. 244, 246 , cert. denied; 382 U.S. 1017 , 86 S.Ct. 631 , 15 L.Ed.2d 531 (1964), the court states: “It is for the trial court to determine, from the evidence before it, whether a photograph offered is a correct representation of the object or scene in question, and the ruling will be sustained on appeal unless it is apparent that there has been an abuse of discretion.” See also State v. Chambers, 102 Ariz. 234 , 428 P.2d 91 (1967).

1970In People v. Robbins, 225 Cal.App.2d 177 , 37 Cal.Rptr. 244, 246 , cert. denied; 382 U.S. 1017 , 86 S.Ct. 631 , 15 L.Ed.2d 531 (1964), the court states: “It is for the trial court to determine, from the evidence before it, whether a photograph offered is a correct representation of the object or scene in question, and the ruling will be sustained on appeal unless it is apparent that there has been an abuse of discretion.” See also State v. Chambers, 102 Ariz. 234 , 428 P.2d 91 (1967).

1970In People v. Robbins, 225 Cal.App.2d 177 , 37 Cal.Rptr. 244, 246 , cert. denied; 382 U.S. 1017 , 86 S.Ct. 631 , 15 L.Ed.2d 531 (1964), the court states: “It is for the trial court to determine, from the evidence before it, whether a photograph offered is a correct representation of the object or scene in question, and the ruling will be sustained on appeal unless it is apparent that there has been an abuse of discretion.” See also State v. Chambers, 102 Ariz. 234 , 428 P.2d 91 (1967).

1967The latest pronouncement by our Supreme Court on this subject is contained in Malanga v. Royal Indemnity Company, 101 Ariz. 588 , 422 P.2d 704 (1967), which states, in part: “In the following language, this Court, in the Fuqua case, in dealing with the term ‘accidental means’ defined the word ‘accidental’, as used in accident insurance policies, and prescribed the test to be followed in order to determine if a result is ‘accidental’, 40 Ariz. 154, 155 , 10 P.2d 958 , 960: ‘The third assignment of error is based upon the theory that the evidence shows conclusively that Fuqua’s death did not res

1967The latest pronouncement by our Supreme Court on this subject is contained in Malanga v. Royal Indemnity Company, 101 Ariz. 588 , 422 P.2d 704 (1967), which states, in part: “In the following language, this Court, in the Fuqua case, in dealing with the term ‘accidental means’ defined the word ‘accidental’, as used in accident insurance policies, and prescribed the test to be followed in order to determine if a result is ‘accidental’, 40 Ariz. 154, 155 , 10 P.2d 958 , 960: ‘The third assignment of error is based upon the theory that the evidence shows conclusively that Fuqua’s death did not res

1964As to the third assignment of error concerning the trial court’s determination that the father should have the custody *165 of the children, it has been stated by this court on many occasions that the trial court’s judgment as to the best interest of a child cannot be set aside unless it clearly appears that the court abused its discretion, Ward v. Ward, 88 Ariz. 130 , 353 P.2d 895 .

1964As to the third assignment of error concerning the trial court’s determination that the father should have the custody *165 of the children, it has been stated by this court on many occasions that the trial court’s judgment as to the best interest of a child cannot be set aside unless it clearly appears that the court abused its discretion, Ward v. Ward, 88 Ariz. 130 , 353 P.2d 895 .

1963See Douglass v. Boulevard Co., supra. A lender may not disguise additional compensation for the use of money in an ttnreasonable or fictitious charge for services rendered, Williams v. Garrett, 208 Okl. 53 , 254 P.2d 369 (1953); Real Estate Trustee, Inc. v. Rebhan, 153 Md. 624 , 139 A. 351 (1927) ; Douglass v. Boulevard Co., supra. The third assignment of error relates to the 3% “brokerage fee.” Appellants attempt to justify this fee as a reasonable charge for expenses and services rendered in connection with the loans.

1963See Douglass v. Boulevard Co., supra. A lender may not disguise additional compensation for the use of money in an ttnreasonable or fictitious charge for services rendered, Williams v. Garrett, 208 Okl. 53 , 254 P.2d 369 (1953); Real Estate Trustee, Inc. v. Rebhan, 153 Md. 624 , 139 A. 351 (1927) ; Douglass v. Boulevard Co., supra. The third assignment of error relates to the 3% “brokerage fee.” Appellants attempt to justify this fee as a reasonable charge for expenses and services rendered in connection with the loans.

1956The third assignment of error states that the trial court erred “In holding that under our Teacher Tenure Act the decision of a Board of Trustees to dismiss a probationary teacher is subject to review by the courts.” This matter was squarely met in the case of Tempe Union High School Dist. v. Hopkins, 76 Ariz. 228 , 262 P.2d 387, 390 .

1956The third assignment of error states that the trial court erred “In holding that under our Teacher Tenure Act the decision of a Board of Trustees to dismiss a probationary teacher is subject to review by the courts.” This matter was squarely met in the case of Tempe Union High School Dist. v. Hopkins, 76 Ariz. 228 , 262 P.2d 387, 390 .

1956In that case it was pointed out that in the passage of sections 54-1011 and 54 — 1012, 1952 Cum.Supp., A.C.A.1939 [A.R.S. 15-253, 15-254]: “ * * * that the legislative intent was to provide for a hearing and appeal to the courts upon dismissal of a continuing teacher and to deny such right to a probationary teacher. * * ” The court there held that sections 54— 1009 to 54 — 1018 inclusive, supra, and statutes of like character “ * * * creating a special procedure for the protection of personal rights must be strictly followed and the failure of either party to comply therewith loses whatever ri

1956In that case it was pointed out that in the passage of sections 54-1011 and 54 — 1012, 1952 Cum.Supp., A.C.A.1939 [A.R.S. 15-253, 15-254]: “ * * * that the legislative intent was to provide for a hearing and appeal to the courts upon dismissal of a continuing teacher and to deny such right to a probationary teacher. * * ” The court there held that sections 54— 1009 to 54 — 1018 inclusive, supra, and statutes of like character “ * * * creating a special procedure for the protection of personal rights must be strictly followed and the failure of either party to comply therewith loses whatever ri

1953Lewis v. Palmer, 67 Ariz. 189 , 193 P.2d 456 The appellants’ third assignment of error is that the court erred in admitting and considering plaintiffs’ exhibit No. 8 in evidence and the testimony of appraiser Leslie J.

1953Lewis v. Palmer, 67 Ariz. 189 , 193 P.2d 456 The appellants’ third assignment of error is that the court erred in admitting and considering plaintiffs’ exhibit No. 8 in evidence and the testimony of appraiser Leslie J.

1952With reference to the third assignment of error we will only observe that if defendant had plead bad faith on the part of the broker as was done in Haymes v. Rogers, 70 Ariz. 408 , 222 P.2d 789 , 17 A. L.R.2d 896, we would be in a position to consider that question.

1952With reference to the third assignment of error we will only observe that if defendant had plead bad faith on the part of the broker as was done in Haymes v. Rogers, 70 Ariz. 408 , 222 P.2d 789 , 17 A. L.R.2d 896, we would be in a position to consider that question.

1949Griffen v. Cole, 60 Ariz. 83 , 131 P.2d 989 .

1949Griffen v. Cole, 60 Ariz. 83 , 131 P.2d 989 .

1947“There is no rule more decisively settled by this court than that we will not disturb a verdict sustained by competent testimony, on the ground of the weight of the evidence.” Johnson v. State, 33 Ariz. 354 , 264 P. 1083, 1087 . [8/9] We'shall now advert to the third assignment of error wherein it is claimed that the deputy county attorney in his re-' marks to the jury made statements that were prejudicial to the rights of the defendants.

1947“There is no rule more decisively settled by this court than that we will not disturb a verdict sustained by competent testimony, on the ground of the weight of the evidence.” Johnson v. State, 33 Ariz. 354 , 264 P. 1083, 1087 . [8/9] We'shall now advert to the third assignment of error wherein it is claimed that the deputy county attorney in his re-' marks to the jury made statements that were prejudicial to the rights of the defendants.

1944Especially is this true when we consider the case of Sullivan v. State, 47 Ariz. 224 , 55 Pac. (2d) 312 , where the court set forth a test for determining whether or not instructions contained reversible error. *497 The third assignment of error is the complaint of appellants against language of the county attorney used at the trial, and in particular the following words: “ . . .

1944Especially is this true when we consider the case of Sullivan v. State, 47 Ariz. 224 , 55 Pac. (2d) 312 , where the court set forth a test for determining whether or not instructions contained reversible error. *497 The third assignment of error is the complaint of appellants against language of the county attorney used at the trial, and in particular the following words: “ . . .

1929The leading authority in Arizona on the admission of confessions in criminal cases is Kermeen v. State, 17 Ariz. 263, 151 Pac. 738 .

1929The leading authority in Arizona on the admission of confessions in criminal cases is Kermeen v. State, 17 Ariz. 263, 151 Pac. 738 .

1928The third assignment of error i-s that the court erred in giving the following instruction: “You are further instructed that the receipt of stolen property, unless satisfactorily explained, is a circumstance, when taken together with all other evidence in the case, from which you may infer that the possessor is concerned in the theft; and if you further believe, beyond a reasonable doubt, from all of the evidence, that the restaurant of Horn Chee was burglarized as charged in the information, and that moneys were taken therefrom, and if you further believe, from all the evidence in the case, t

1928The third assignment of error i-s that the court erred in giving the following instruction: “You are further instructed that the receipt of stolen property, unless satisfactorily explained, is a circumstance, when taken together with all other evidence in the case, from which you may infer that the possessor is concerned in the theft; and if you further believe, beyond a reasonable doubt, from all of the evidence, that the restaurant of Horn Chee was burglarized as charged in the information, and that moneys were taken therefrom, and if you further believe, from all the evidence in the case, t

1928The third assignment of error i-s that the court erred in giving the following instruction: “You are further instructed that the receipt of stolen property, unless satisfactorily explained, is a circumstance, when taken together with all other evidence in the case, from which you may infer that the possessor is concerned in the theft; and if you further believe, beyond a reasonable doubt, from all of the evidence, that the restaurant of Horn Chee was burglarized as charged in the information, and that moneys were taken therefrom, and if you further believe, from all the evidence in the case, t

1928The third assignment of error i-s that the court erred in giving the following instruction: “You are further instructed that the receipt of stolen property, unless satisfactorily explained, is a circumstance, when taken together with all other evidence in the case, from which you may infer that the possessor is concerned in the theft; and if you further believe, beyond a reasonable doubt, from all of the evidence, that the restaurant of Horn Chee was burglarized as charged in the information, and that moneys were taken therefrom, and if you further believe, from all the evidence in the case, t

1900In Daggs v. Hoskins, 5 Ariz. 300 , 52 Pac. 357, 358 , in discussing the question of the necessity of specific findings of fact, we said: ‘‘A general finding for the plaintiff will not support a judgment in his favor.

1900In Daggs v. Hoskins, 5 Ariz. 300 , 52 Pac. 357, 358 , in discussing the question of the necessity of specific findings of fact, we said: ‘‘A general finding for the plaintiff will not support a judgment in his favor.