third assignment error in Mississippi

1961But under the rule announced in the case of Young v. State, 212 Miss. 460 , 54 So. 2d 671 , it was held that, ‘in order to preserve for review here the point that the verdict was contrary to the great weight of the evidence, a motion for a new trial must be made, particularly assigning that ground.’ Citing Justice, et al v. State, 170 Miss. 96 , 154 So. 265 , and in the Young case the Court further stated, (in regard to the question of whether a reversal can be granted here on the ground that the verdict is against the great weight of the evidence): ‘Inasmuch as no motion for a new trial was m

1961But under the rule announced in the case of Young v. State, 212 Miss. 460 , 54 So. 2d 671 , it was held that, ‘in order to preserve for review here the point that the verdict was contrary to the great weight of the evidence, a motion for a new trial must be made, particularly assigning that ground.’ Citing Justice, et al v. State, 170 Miss. 96 , 154 So. 265 , and in the Young case the Court further stated, (in regard to the question of whether a reversal can be granted here on the ground that the verdict is against the great weight of the evidence): ‘Inasmuch as no motion for a new trial was m

1961But under the rule announced in the case of Young v. State, 212 Miss. 460 , 54 So. 2d 671 , it was held that, ‘in order to preserve for review here the point that the verdict was contrary to the great weight of the evidence, a motion for a new trial must be made, particularly assigning that ground.’ Citing Justice, et al v. State, 170 Miss. 96 , 154 So. 265 , and in the Young case the Court further stated, (in regard to the question of whether a reversal can be granted here on the ground that the verdict is against the great weight of the evidence): ‘Inasmuch as no motion for a new trial was m

1961But under the rule announced in the case of Young v. State, 212 Miss. 460 , 54 So. 2d 671 , it was held that, ‘in order to preserve for review here the point that the verdict was contrary to the great weight of the evidence, a motion for a new trial must be made, particularly assigning that ground.’ Citing Justice, et al v. State, 170 Miss. 96 , 154 So. 265 , and in the Young case the Court further stated, (in regard to the question of whether a reversal can be granted here on the ground that the verdict is against the great weight of the evidence): ‘Inasmuch as no motion for a new trial was m

2000Relying upon Solem v. Helm , 463 U.S. 277 (1983), he insists that this sentence is a violation of his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, which is guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. ¶ 11.

1999The Sullivans argue that "[o]ne whose property has been injured by water, due to the wrongful act or negligence of another, may recover damages for the damages sustained." Lauck v. Gilbert , 252 Miss. 371 , 393, 173 So.2d 626 , 637 (1965).

1999The Sullivans argue that "[o]ne whose property has been injured by water, due to the wrongful act or negligence of another, may recover damages for the damages sustained." Lauck v. Gilbert , 252 Miss. 371 , 393, 173 So.2d 626 , 637 (1965).

1978Gandy v. State, 355 So.2d 1096 (Miss. 1978); Warn v. State, 349 So.2d 1055 (Miss. 1977); Cochran v. State, 278 So.2d 451 (Miss. 1973).

1978Gandy v. State, 355 So.2d 1096 (Miss. 1978); Warn v. State, 349 So.2d 1055 (Miss. 1977); Cochran v. State, 278 So.2d 451 (Miss. 1973).

1978Gandy v. State, 355 So.2d 1096 (Miss. 1978); Warn v. State, 349 So.2d 1055 (Miss. 1977); Cochran v. State, 278 So.2d 451 (Miss. 1973).

1977Cagle, was at home at the time of the appellant's forceful entry, and when she saw appellant she asked him "what are you doing in my house?" This Court said in Taylor v. State, 214 Miss. 263 , 58 So.2d 664 (1952): "This Court has held in several cases that in an indictment for burglary the allegations as to the ownership of the title to the building constitute surplusage, and, insofar as the burglary is concerned, the occupant of the building at the time of the burglary is the owner, and no such particularization of description of the title to the building is required." 214 Miss. at 266 , 58 S

1977Cagle, was at home at the time of the appellant's forceful entry, and when she saw appellant she asked him "what are you doing in my house?" This Court said in Taylor v. State, 214 Miss. 263 , 58 So.2d 664 (1952): "This Court has held in several cases that in an indictment for burglary the allegations as to the ownership of the title to the building constitute surplusage, and, insofar as the burglary is concerned, the occupant of the building at the time of the burglary is the owner, and no such particularization of description of the title to the building is required." 214 Miss. at 266 , 58 S

1973Stokes v. State, 240 Miss. 453 , 128 So.2d 341 (1961); Faust v. State, 221 Miss. 668 , 74 So.2d 817 (1954).

1973Stokes v. State, 240 Miss. 453 , 128 So.2d 341 (1961); Faust v. State, 221 Miss. 668 , 74 So.2d 817 (1954).

1973Stokes v. State, 240 Miss. 453 , 128 So.2d 341 (1961); Faust v. State, 221 Miss. 668 , 74 So.2d 817 (1954).

1973Stokes v. State, 240 Miss. 453 , 128 So.2d 341 (1961); Faust v. State, 221 Miss. 668 , 74 So.2d 817 (1954).

1968The argument under this assignment is based upon the rule in Weathersby v. State, 165 Miss. 207 , 147 So. 481 (1933).

1968The argument under this assignment is based upon the rule in Weathersby v. State, 165 Miss. 207 , 147 So. 481 (1933).

1968See Shinall v. State, 199 So.2d 251 (Miss. 1967); Pendergraft v. State, 191 So.2d 830 (Miss. 1966); State v. Hall, Miss., 187 So.2d 861 (1966); and others.

1968See Shinall v. State, 199 So.2d 251 (Miss. 1967); Pendergraft v. State, 191 So.2d 830 (Miss. 1966); State v. Hall, Miss., 187 So.2d 861 (1966); and others.

1965Generally there should be preliminary proof of the genuineness, authenticity or identity of the document, proof of its execution, and of the verity or correctness of the document, unless such proof is waived, or by rule of law, statutory provision, or admission of the parties such facts are deemed established as to render preliminary proof unnecessary.” See also Smith v. Natchez Steamboat Company, 1 Howard (2 Miss.), 479; Fairly v. Fairly, 38 Miss. 280 ; Memphis Grocery Co. v. Valley Land Co., Ltd., 17 So. 232 . (226 Miss, at 777-778.) We find no reversible error from the appellant’s third ass

1963However, this contention was put at rest in the case of Mississippi Board of Veterinary Examiners, et al. v. Sistrunk, 218 Miss. 342 , 67 So. 2d 378 , where this Court held that neither mandamus nor a writ .of certiorari was an adequate remedy and that a bill in chancery for a mandatory injunction is the only possible method by which appellee could obtain- judicial, review of the Board’s order to ascertain “whether it is supported by substantial evidence, or is arbitrary, capricious, and unlawful.” The third assignment of error is that it is not within the province,, of the courts to disturb t

1963However, this contention was put at rest in the case of Mississippi Board of Veterinary Examiners, et al. v. Sistrunk, 218 Miss. 342 , 67 So. 2d 378 , where this Court held that neither mandamus nor a writ .of certiorari was an adequate remedy and that a bill in chancery for a mandatory injunction is the only possible method by which appellee could obtain- judicial, review of the Board’s order to ascertain “whether it is supported by substantial evidence, or is arbitrary, capricious, and unlawful.” The third assignment of error is that it is not within the province,, of the courts to disturb t

1963That is the rule as announced in Mississippi State Board, etc. v. Watkins, 206 Miss. 330 , 40 So. 2d 153 , and the Sistrunk case, supra. (Hn 2) It is contended that the chancellor made no finding of fact that the ruling of the Board was arbitrary, capricious,' etc. It is true that the decree that was entered contained no such finding of fact.

1963That is the rule as announced in Mississippi State Board, etc. v. Watkins, 206 Miss. 330 , 40 So. 2d 153 , and the Sistrunk case, supra. (Hn 2) It is contended that the chancellor made no finding of fact that the ruling of the Board was arbitrary, capricious,' etc. It is true that the decree that was entered contained no such finding of fact.

1961However, the State raised the point-that this case is not subject to review here due to the absence of a motion for a new trial, and insists that the rule to that effect is in Youngblood v. State, 216 Miss. 202 , 62 So. 2d 218 , which held: “On the third assignment of error, it is to be conceded that if the verdict is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence the defendant would have been entitled to a new trial upon motion duly made in that behalf.

1961However, the State raised the point-that this case is not subject to review here due to the absence of a motion for a new trial, and insists that the rule to that effect is in Youngblood v. State, 216 Miss. 202 , 62 So. 2d 218 , which held: “On the third assignment of error, it is to be conceded that if the verdict is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence the defendant would have been entitled to a new trial upon motion duly made in that behalf.