22 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1909–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Engelman Irrigation District v. Shields Bros., Inc.green2 sentences2021According to the supreme court, “although [the court] defer[s] to the legislature to determine whether the state has waived immunity, ‘sovereign immunity is a common-law creation,’ and the ‘responsibility to define the boundaries of the doctrine’ remains with the judiciary.” Id. (quoting Engelman Irrigation Dist. v. Shields Bros., 514 S.W.3d 746, 753 (Tex. 2017)). 2018See Engelman , 514 S.W.3d at 753 ("[S]overeign immunity is a common-law creation, and it remains the judiciary's responsibility to define the boundaries of the doctrine."); Brown & Gay Eng'g, Inc. v. Olivares , 461 S.W.3d 117 , 122 (Tex. 2015) (noting "the doctrine's judicial origins"); Reata , 197 S.W.3d at 375 ("[I]t remains the judiciary's responsibility to define the boundaries of the common-law doctrine and to determine under what circumstances sovereign immunity exists in the first instance."). | 3 | 5 |
Wasson Interests, Ltd. v. City of Jacksonville, Texasgreen2 sentences2018Code § 101.0215(a)(11), (32) (including "waterworks" and "water and sewer service" among the Tort Claims Act's non-exclusive list of defined "governmental" municipal functions); Wasson Interests, Ltd. v. City of Jacksonville , 489 S.W.3d 427 , 439 (Tex. 2016) ( Wasson I ) (instructing lower courts to look to Section 101.025 in contract-claims context when "determining the boundaries of immunity as it relates to whether a function is proprietary or governmental"); see also Wasson Interests, Ltd. v. City of Jacksonville , --- S.W.3d ----, ----, 2018 WL 2449184 , *4-5, 2018 Tex. LEXIS 514 , at *1 2017"In determining the boundaries of immunity as it relates to whether a function is proprietary or governmental, therefore, courts should be guided ... by the TTCA's treatment of the proprietary-governmental distinction." Id. | 2 | 4 |
General Services Commission v. Little-Tex Insulation Co.green2 sentences2009For example, the mere existence of a contract between the government and a private party does not necessarily confer immunity on the entity for all interactions between those parties: A The existence of a contract is not talismanic, but merely leaves the state = s immunity from suit intact; it does not build an impenetrable wall nullifying the possibility of other waivers of and exceptions to that immunity. @ Id .; see also Little-Tex , 39 S.W.3d at 601 (Abbott, J., concurring) ( A [M]ore than the mere existence of a contract is required to overcome a taking claim[.] @ ). 2009For example, the mere existence of a contract between the government and a private party does not necessarily confer immunity on the entity for all interactions between those parties: “The existence of a contract is not talismanic, but merely leaves the state’s immunity from suit intact; it does not build an impenetrable wall nullifying the possibility of other waivers of and exceptions to that immunity.” Id.; see also Little-Tex, 39 S.W.3d at 601 (Abbott, J., concurring) (“[M]ore than the mere existence of a contract is required to overcome a taking claim[.]”). | 2 | 2 |
Brown & Gay Engineering, Inc. v. Zuleima Olivares, Individually and as the Representative of the Estate of Pedro Olivares, Jr., & Pedro Olivaresgreen2 sentences2018See Engelman, 514 S.W.3d at 753 (“[S]overeign immunity is a common-law creation, and it remains the judiciary’s responsibility to define the boundaries of the doctrine.”); Brown & Gay Eng’g, Inc. v. Olivares, 461 S.W.3d 117, 122 (Tex. 2015) (noting “the doctrine’s judicial origins”); Reata, 197 S.W.3d at 375 (“[I]t remains the judiciary’s responsibility to define the boundaries of the common-law doctrine and to determine under what circumstances sovereign immunity exists in the first instance.”). 2018See Engelman , 514 S.W.3d at 753 ("[S]overeign immunity is a common-law creation, and it remains the judiciary's responsibility to define the boundaries of the doctrine."); Brown & Gay Eng'g, Inc. v. Olivares , 461 S.W.3d 117 , 122 (Tex. 2015) (noting "the doctrine's judicial origins"); Reata , 197 S.W.3d at 375 ("[I]t remains the judiciary's responsibility to define the boundaries of the common-law doctrine and to determine under what circumstances sovereign immunity exists in the first instance."). | 1 | 2 |
City of Dallas v. Albertgreen1 sentence2021The supreme court explained that “[o]ne such boundary is that a governmental entity simply ‘does not have immunity from suit for monetary claims against it that are “germane to, connected with, and properly defensive to” affirmative claims made by the entity,’ to the extent -5- 04-19-00781-CV that the claims against the entity offset the entity’s own claims.” Id. (quoting City of Dallas v. Albert, 354 S.W.3d 368, 372 (Tex. 2011), and Reata, 197 S.W.3d at 378 ). | 1 | 1 |
Arizona v. Gantgreen2 sentences2018If there is no possibility that an arrestee could reach into the area that law enforcement officers seek to search, both justifications for the search- incident-to-arrest exception are absent and the rule does not apply. 556 U.S. 332, 339 , 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1716 (2009) (citations omitted, emphasis added). 2018If there is no possibility that an arrestee could reach into the area that law enforcement officers seek to search, both justifications for the search- incident-to-arrest exception are absent and the rule does not apply. 556 U.S. 332, 339 , 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1716 (2009) (citations omitted, emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
The City of Houston v. Steve Williamsgreen1 sentence2017See, e.g., Carowest Land, Ltd., 432 S.W.3d at 512 (citing City of Hous. v. Williams, 353 S.W.3d 128, 134 (Tex. 2011); Tooke, 197 S.W.3d at 345 ). | 1 | 1 |
City of New Braunfels, Texas v. Carowest Land, Ltd.green1 sentence2017See, e.g., Carowest Land, Ltd., 432 S.W.3d at 512 (citing City of Hous. v. Williams, 353 S.W.3d 128, 134 (Tex. 2011); Tooke, 197 S.W.3d at 345 ). | 1 | 1 |
Chimel v. Californiared1 sentence2015See ibid. (noting that searches incident to arrest are reasonable “in order to remove any weapons [the arrestee] might seek to use” and “in order to prevent [the] concealment or destruction” of evidence (emphasis added)). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Nunley v. Blanton
green
2 sentences1916In the case of Louisiana & Texas Lumber Company v. Stewart, supra, the court sa&: “We think this opinion (referring to the case of Lumber Company v. Kennedy [ 103 Tex. 297 ], 126 S. W. 1110 ) settles the right of a claimant under the ten-year statute of limitation who has been in actual possession of a portion of a large tract of land claiming 160 acres thereof, without any deed or other muniment of title fixing the boundaries of his claim or without having such boundaries otherwise definitely fixed, to acquire title to an undivided 160 acres of such large tract including his improvements, and 1915In Louisiana & Texas Lumber Co. v. Stewart, supra, Mr. Justice Pleasants, in discussing the holding in Louisiana & Texas Lumber Co. v. Kennedy, 103 Tex. 297 , 126 S. W. 1110 , says: “We think this opinion settles the right of a claimant under the 10-year statute of limitation who has been in actual possession of a portion of a large tract of land claiming 160 acres thereof, without any deed or other muniment of title fixing the boundaries of his claim or without having such boundaries otherwise definitely fixed, to acquire title to an undivided 160 acres of such large tract including- his impr | 3 | 1915–1930 |
Louisiana & Texas Lumber Co. v. Kennedy
neutral
2 sentences1916In the case of Louisiana & Texas Lumber Company v. Stewart, supra, the court sa&: “We think this opinion (referring to the case of Lumber Company v. Kennedy [ 103 Tex. 297 ], 126 S. W. 1110 ) settles the right of a claimant under the ten-year statute of limitation who has been in actual possession of a portion of a large tract of land claiming 160 acres thereof, without any deed or other muniment of title fixing the boundaries of his claim or without having such boundaries otherwise definitely fixed, to acquire title to an undivided 160 acres of such large tract including his improvements, and 1915In Louisiana & Texas Lumber Co. v. Stewart, supra, Mr. Justice Pleasants, in discussing the holding in Louisiana & Texas Lumber Co. v. Kennedy, 103 Tex. 297 , 126 S. W. 1110 , says: “We think this opinion settles the right of a claimant under the 10-year statute of limitation who has been in actual possession of a portion of a large tract of land claiming 160 acres thereof, without any deed or other muniment of title fixing the boundaries of his claim or without having such boundaries otherwise definitely fixed, to acquire title to an undivided 160 acres of such large tract including- his impr | 3 | 1915–1930 |
Giddings v. Fischer
green
2 sentences1930They should not have recovered under the following rule announced ⅝ the case of Giddings v. Fischer, 97 Tex. 188 , 77 S. W. 209 , 211: '“When a party is in possession of land, of which he has held adverse possession of 10 years, and 'claims under no muniment of title or color of title which fixes the boundaries of his claim, he may under our statute, assert title to 160 acres without showing actual occupancy of the whole, provided that the tract so claimed embrace the land of which he has had actual possession, and provided further that he describe in his pleading the 160 acres to which he ass 1909In the case of Giddings v. Fischer, 97 Texas, 184 , it was said: “When a party is in possession of land of which he has held adverse possession for ten years, and claims under no muniment of title or color of title which fixes the boundaries of his claim, he may under our statute assert title to 160 acres without showing actual occupancy of the whole, provided that the tract so claimed embrace the land of which he has had actual possession, and provided further, that he describe in his pleading the 160 acres to which he asserts title, and that he prove upon the trial that while occupying a par | 2 | 1909–1930 |
Dr. Behzad Nazari, D.D.S. v. State
green
1 sentence2021According to the supreme court, “although [the court] defer[s] to the legislature to determine whether the state has waived immunity, ‘sovereign immunity is a common-law creation,’ and the ‘responsibility to define the boundaries of the doctrine’ remains with the judiciary.” Id. (quoting Engelman Irrigation Dist. v. Shields Bros., 514 S.W.3d 746, 753 (Tex. 2017)). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Reata Construction Corp. v. City of Dallas
green
1 sentence2021The supreme court explained that “[o]ne such boundary is that a governmental entity simply ‘does not have immunity from suit for monetary claims against it that are “germane to, connected with, and properly defensive to” affirmative claims made by the entity,’ to the extent -5- 04-19-00781-CV that the claims against the entity offset the entity’s own claims.” Id. (quoting City of Dallas v. Albert, 354 S.W.3d 368, 372 (Tex. 2011), and Reata, 197 S.W.3d at 378 ). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Tooke v. City of Mexia
green
2 sentences2017In determining the boundaries of immunity as it relates to whether a function is proprietary or governmental ... courts should be guided ... by the TTCA’s treatment of the proprietary-governmental distinction.” (citing Tooke, 197 S.W.3d at 343-44 )). . 2017See, e.g., Carowest Land, Ltd., 432 S.W.3d at 512 (citing City of Hous. v. Williams, 353 S.W.3d 128, 134 (Tex. 2011); Tooke, 197 S.W.3d at 345 ). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Davis v. Howe
green
1 sentence2008The object of the requirement of a duly registered deed is “to define the boundaries of the claim *818 and give notice to the true owner of such adverse claim.” Davis, 213 S.W. at 610 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Hickman v. Taylor
green
2 sentences1997Leede Oil cites the seminal attorney work product case in explaining the boundaries of the privilege: “Where relevant and non-privileged facts remain hidden in an attorney’s file and where production of those facts is essential to the preparation of one’s case, discovery may properly be had.” Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 , 67 S.Ct. 385, 394 , 91 L.Ed. 451 (1947). 1997Leede Oil cites the seminal attorney work product case in explaining the boundaries of the privilege: “Where relevant and non-privileged facts remain hidden in an attorney’s file and where production of those facts is essential to the preparation of one’s case, discovery may properly be had.” Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 , 67 S.Ct. 385, 394 , 91 L.Ed. 451 (1947). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Goldfinger v. Feintuch
green
2 sentences1949Thus in Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276 N.Y. 281 , 11 N.E.2d 910 , 116 A.L.R. 477 ,’ decided in 1937, the Court of Appeals of New York held that'the striking labor union could picket the employer/manufacturer’s product in the hands of a retail •merchant who had purchased- the product for resale to the public. 1949Thus in Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276 N.Y. 281 , 11 N.E.2d 910 , 116 A.L.R. 477 ,’ decided in 1937, the Court of Appeals of New York held that'the striking labor union could picket the employer/manufacturer’s product in the hands of a retail •merchant who had purchased- the product for resale to the public. | 1 | 1949–1949 |
Schleicher, Admr. v. Gatlin
green
2 sentences1919Dec. 53 ; Schleicher v. Gatlin, 85 Tex. 270 , 20 S. W. 120 . [3] The whole object of'the statute in requiring a deed and its due registration is to define the boundaries of the claim and give notice to the true owner of such adverse claim. 1919Dec. 53 ; Schleicher v. Gatlin, 85 Tex. 270 , 20 S. W. 120 . [3] The whole object of'the statute in requiring a deed and its due registration is to define the boundaries of the claim and give notice to the true owner of such adverse claim. | 1 | 1919–1919 |
Louisiana & Texas Lumber Co. v. Stewart
neutral
1 sentence1915In Louisiana & Texas Lumber Co. v. Stewart, supra, Mr. Justice Pleasants, in discussing the holding in Louisiana & Texas Lumber Co. v. Kennedy, 103 Tex. 297 , 126 S. W. 1110 , says: “We think this opinion settles the right of a claimant under the 10-year statute of limitation who has been in actual possession of a portion of a large tract of land claiming 160 acres thereof, without any deed or other muniment of title fixing the boundaries of his claim or without having such boundaries otherwise definitely fixed, to acquire title to an undivided 160 acres of such large tract including- his impr | 1 | 1915–1915 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.