industrial insurance claim in Washington

2014Regis Paper Co., 60 Wn.2d 484, 485 , 374 P.2d 675 (1962) (“[TJhe rejection of an industrial insurance claim on the ground that the workman was not in the course of his employment, from which no appeal is taken, is res judicata against the employer in a subsequent action by the workman.” (empha sis added)).

2014Regis Paper Co., 60 Wn.2d 484, 485 , 374 P.2d 675 (1962) (“[TJhe rejection of an industrial insurance claim on the ground that the workman was not in the course of his employment, from which no appeal is taken, is res judicata against the employer in a subsequent action by the workman.” (empha sis added)).

2009Rector also argued that his claim should be allowed because, under the common law of torts, his cause of action could not accrue until his injury became apparent. ¶ 15 An industrial insurance claim is "governed by explicit statutory directives and not by the common law." Rector, 61 Wash.App. at 390 , 810 P.2d 1363 .

2009Rector also argued that his claim should be allowed because, under the common law of torts, his cause of action could not accrue until his injury became apparent. ¶15 An industrial insurance claim is “governed by explicit statutory directives and not by the common law.” Rector, 61 Wn.

1962We said in Prince v. Saginaw Logging Co., 197 Wash. 4 , 84 P. (2d) 397 (1938), which was not brought to our attention at the departmental hearing, that the rejection of an industrial insurance claim on the ground that the workman was not in the course of his employment, from which no appeal is taken, is res judicata against the employer in a subsequent action by the workman.

1962We said in Prince v. Saginaw Logging Co., 197 Wash. 4 , 84 P. (2d) 397 (1938), which was not brought to our attention at the departmental hearing, that the rejection of an industrial insurance claim on the ground that the workman was not in the course of his employment, from which no appeal is taken, is res judicata against the employer in a subsequent action by the workman.

2024Id. at 310-11 .

2023But the social security disability determination explanation stating that Paddock became disabled in February 2017, does not trigger judicial estoppel. 20 No. 56466-1-II “‘Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine that precludes a party from asserting one position in a court proceeding and later seeking an advantage by taking a clearly inconsistent position.’” Anfinson v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 174 Wn.2d 851, 861 , 281 P.3d 289 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Arkison v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 160 Wn.2d 535, 538 , 160 P.3d 13 (2007)).

2023But the social security disability determination explanation stating that Paddock became disabled in February 2017, does not trigger judicial estoppel. 20 No. 56466-1-II “‘Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine that precludes a party from asserting one position in a court proceeding and later seeking an advantage by taking a clearly inconsistent position.’” Anfinson v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 174 Wn.2d 851, 861 , 281 P.3d 289 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Arkison v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 160 Wn.2d 535, 538 , 160 P.3d 13 (2007)).

2023But the social security disability determination explanation stating that Paddock became disabled in February 2017, does not trigger judicial estoppel. 20 No. 56466-1-II “‘Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine that precludes a party from asserting one position in a court proceeding and later seeking an advantage by taking a clearly inconsistent position.’” Anfinson v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 174 Wn.2d 851, 861 , 281 P.3d 289 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Arkison v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 160 Wn.2d 535, 538 , 160 P.3d 13 (2007)).

2023But the social security disability determination explanation stating that Paddock became disabled in February 2017, does not trigger judicial estoppel. 20 No. 56466-1-II “‘Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine that precludes a party from asserting one position in a court proceeding and later seeking an advantage by taking a clearly inconsistent position.’” Anfinson v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 174 Wn.2d 851, 861 , 281 P.3d 289 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Arkison v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 160 Wn.2d 535, 538 , 160 P.3d 13 (2007)).

2020RCW 51.52.140; Rowley, 185 Wn.2d at 200 .

2019On appeal of an industrial insurance claim from the superior court, the appellate court reviews the record to determine “whether substantial evidence supports the findings made after the superior court’s de novo review and whether the conclusions of law flow from the findings.” Gorre, 184 Wn.2d at 36 .

2019The appellate court does not examine issues of credibility as “credibility determinations remain solely for the trier of fact in a workers’ compensation claim.” Zavala v. Twin City Foods, 185 Wn.

2016That court reasoned that “[p]roof that an industrial injury occurred during the commission of a felony does not negate any element of an industrial insurance claim.” Id. ¶42 Rowley argues that this analysis was correct.

2015Eastwood v. Dep 't ofLabor & Indus., 152 Wn.

2014Proof that an industrial 14 Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v. Dep't of Labor & Indus.. 145 Wn.

2014App. 52, 61 , 185 P.3d 646 (2008). -8- NO. 71737-5-1/9 injury occurred during the commission of a felony does not negate any element of an industrial insurance claim.

2012Id. at 313 .

1987App. 63 , 715 P.2d 154 (1986), we considered the tort claim of outrage against an employer and a claims adjuster for acts and omissions allegedly committed during adjustment of an industrial insurance claim.

1987App. 63 , 715 P.2d 154 (1986), we considered the tort claim of outrage against an employer and a claims adjuster for acts and omissions allegedly committed during adjustment of an industrial insurance claim.

1963The cases relied upon by the trial court (Phillips v. Department of Labor & Industries, 49 Wn. (2d) 195, 298 P. (2d) 1117 ; Moses v. Department of Labor & Industries, 44 Wn. (2d) 511, 268 P. (2d) 665 ; and Kresoya v. Department of Labor & Industries, 40 Wn. (2d) 40, 240 P. (2d) 257 ), that an industrial insurance claim might not be reopened for a change in conditions upon the testimony of a physician who based his opinion entirely upon subjective symptoms, mean no more than this: A case may not be reopened if the physician’s opinion is based solely upon what the workman related to him.

1963Hastings v. Department of Labor & Industries, 24 Wn. (2d) 1, 163 P. (2d) 142 ; Nelson v. Department of Labor & Industries, 9 Wn. (2d) 621, 115 P. (2d) 1014 ; and Hilding v. Department of Labor & Industries, 162 Wash. 168 , 298 Pac. 321 . [3] The cases relied upon by the trial court ( Phillips v. Department of Labor & Industries, 49 Wn. (2d) 195, 298 P. (2d) 1117 ; Moses v. Department of Labor & Industries, 44 Wn. (2d) 511, 268 P. (2d) 665 ; and Kresoya v. Department of Labor & Industries, 40 Wn. (2d) 40, 240 P. (2d) 257 ), that an industrial insurance claim might not be reopened for a change i

1963The cases relied upon by the trial court (Phillips v. Department of Labor & Industries, 49 Wn. (2d) 195, 298 P. (2d) 1117 ; Moses v. Department of Labor & Industries, 44 Wn. (2d) 511, 268 P. (2d) 665 ; and Kresoya v. Department of Labor & Industries, 40 Wn. (2d) 40, 240 P. (2d) 257 ), that an industrial insurance claim might not be reopened for a change in conditions upon the testimony of a physician who based his opinion entirely upon subjective symptoms, mean no more than this: A case may not be reopened if the physician’s opinion is based solely upon what the workman related to him.

1963Hastings v. Department of Labor & Industries, 24 Wn. (2d) 1, 163 P. (2d) 142 ; Nelson v. Department of Labor & Industries, 9 Wn. (2d) 621, 115 P. (2d) 1014 ; and Hilding v. Department of Labor & Industries, 162 Wash. 168 , 298 Pac. 321 . [3] The cases relied upon by the trial court ( Phillips v. Department of Labor & Industries, 49 Wn. (2d) 195, 298 P. (2d) 1117 ; Moses v. Department of Labor & Industries, 44 Wn. (2d) 511, 268 P. (2d) 665 ; and Kresoya v. Department of Labor & Industries, 40 Wn. (2d) 40, 240 P. (2d) 257 ), that an industrial insurance claim might not be reopened for a change i

1963Hastings v. Department of Labor & Industries, 24 Wn. (2d) 1, 163 P. (2d) 142 ; Nelson v. Department of Labor & Industries, 9 Wn. (2d) 621, 115 P. (2d) 1014 ; and Hilding v. Department of Labor & Industries, 162 Wash. 168 , 298 Pac. 321 . [3] The cases relied upon by the trial court ( Phillips v. Department of Labor & Industries, 49 Wn. (2d) 195, 298 P. (2d) 1117 ; Moses v. Department of Labor & Industries, 44 Wn. (2d) 511, 268 P. (2d) 665 ; and Kresoya v. Department of Labor & Industries, 40 Wn. (2d) 40, 240 P. (2d) 257 ), that an industrial insurance claim might not be reopened for a change i

1963Hastings v. Department of Labor & Industries, 24 Wn. (2d) 1, 163 P. (2d) 142 ; Nelson v. Department of Labor & Industries, 9 Wn. (2d) 621, 115 P. (2d) 1014 ; and Hilding v. Department of Labor & Industries, 162 Wash. 168 , 298 Pac. 321 . [3] The cases relied upon by the trial court ( Phillips v. Department of Labor & Industries, 49 Wn. (2d) 195, 298 P. (2d) 1117 ; Moses v. Department of Labor & Industries, 44 Wn. (2d) 511, 268 P. (2d) 665 ; and Kresoya v. Department of Labor & Industries, 40 Wn. (2d) 40, 240 P. (2d) 257 ), that an industrial insurance claim might not be reopened for a change i

1963Hastings v. Department of Labor & Industries, 24 Wn. (2d) 1, 163 P. (2d) 142 ; Nelson v. Department of Labor & Industries, 9 Wn. (2d) 621, 115 P. (2d) 1014 ; and Hilding v. Department of Labor & Industries, 162 Wash. 168 , 298 Pac. 321 . [3] The cases relied upon by the trial court ( Phillips v. Department of Labor & Industries, 49 Wn. (2d) 195, 298 P. (2d) 1117 ; Moses v. Department of Labor & Industries, 44 Wn. (2d) 511, 268 P. (2d) 665 ; and Kresoya v. Department of Labor & Industries, 40 Wn. (2d) 40, 240 P. (2d) 257 ), that an industrial insurance claim might not be reopened for a change i

1963Hastings v. Department of Labor & Industries, 24 Wn. (2d) 1, 163 P. (2d) 142 ; Nelson v. Department of Labor & Industries, 9 Wn. (2d) 621, 115 P. (2d) 1014 ; and Hilding v. Department of Labor & Industries, 162 Wash. 168 , 298 Pac. 321 . [3] The cases relied upon by the trial court ( Phillips v. Department of Labor & Industries, 49 Wn. (2d) 195, 298 P. (2d) 1117 ; Moses v. Department of Labor & Industries, 44 Wn. (2d) 511, 268 P. (2d) 665 ; and Kresoya v. Department of Labor & Industries, 40 Wn. (2d) 40, 240 P. (2d) 257 ), that an industrial insurance claim might not be reopened for a change i

1963The cases relied upon by the trial court (Phillips v. Department of Labor & Industries, 49 Wn. (2d) 195, 298 P. (2d) 1117 ; Moses v. Department of Labor & Industries, 44 Wn. (2d) 511, 268 P. (2d) 665 ; and Kresoya v. Department of Labor & Industries, 40 Wn. (2d) 40, 240 P. (2d) 257 ), that an industrial insurance claim might not be reopened for a change in conditions upon the testimony of a physician who based his opinion entirely upon subjective symptoms, mean no more than this: A case may not be reopened if the physician’s opinion is based solely upon what the workman related to him.

1963Hastings v. Department of Labor & Industries, 24 Wn. (2d) 1, 163 P. (2d) 142 ; Nelson v. Department of Labor & Industries, 9 Wn. (2d) 621, 115 P. (2d) 1014 ; and Hilding v. Department of Labor & Industries, 162 Wash. 168 , 298 Pac. 321 . [3] The cases relied upon by the trial court ( Phillips v. Department of Labor & Industries, 49 Wn. (2d) 195, 298 P. (2d) 1117 ; Moses v. Department of Labor & Industries, 44 Wn. (2d) 511, 268 P. (2d) 665 ; and Kresoya v. Department of Labor & Industries, 40 Wn. (2d) 40, 240 P. (2d) 257 ), that an industrial insurance claim might not be reopened for a change i

1959Co., 49 Wn. (2d) 581, 303 P. (2d) 1095 (1956), on the first appeal of this case: "Because it is impossible to say from this record what the ultimate disposition of the industrial insurance claim was, the cause must be remanded to the trial court with directions to make a finding upon that matter and, if necessary, to reopen the case for the reception of evidence in that respect.

1959Co., 49 Wn. (2d) 581, 303 P. (2d) 1095 (1956), on the first appeal of this case: “Because it is impossible to say from this record what the ultimate disposition of the industrial insurance claim was, the cause must be remanded to the trial court with directions to make a finding upon that matter and, if necessary, to reopen the case for the reception of evidence in that respect.

1958Those cases are based upon Karniss v. Department of Labor & Industries, 39 Wn. (2d) 898, 239 P. (2d) 555 , which was an appeal from an order refusing to reopen an industrial insurance claim based upon an increase in the disability occurring after the claim was closed which is authorized by Laws of 1911, chapter 74, § 5 (h), p. 356, 360, presently codified as RCW 51.32.160, and, so far as material, is as follows: "If aggravation, diminution, or termination of disability takes place or be discovered after the rate of compensation shall have been established or compensation terminated in any case

1958It is claimed from those cases that a judgment may not stand unless' a physician witness testifies as to the ultimate fact to be determined by the trier of the fact, which here is the percentage of disability. ', Those cases are based upon Karniss v. Department of Labor & Industries, 39 Wn. (2d) 898, 239 P. (2d) 555 , which was an appeal from an order refusing to reopen an industrial insurance claim based upon an increase in the disability occurring after the claim was closed which is authorized by Laws of 1911, chapter 74, § 5 (h), p. 356, 360, presently codified as RCW 51.32.160, and, so. fa

1957That is made manifestly plain by Boone v. Department of Labor & Industries, 174 Wash. 123 , 24 P. (2d) 454 , in which an application to reopen an industrial insurance claim was denied by the department on the ground there had been no increase in the disability since the closing of the claim.

1957That is made manifestly plain by Boone v. Department of Labor & Industries, 174 Wash. 123 , 24 P. (2d) 454 , in which an application to reopen an industrial insurance claim was denied by the department on the ground there had been no increase in the disability since the closing of the claim.