mistake of fact defense in California

2026(People v. Lawson, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 115 ; see id. at p. 118 [“an instruction on the defense of mistake of fact would have served . . . to negate the mental state element of the crime of theft by larceny”].) Whether there was substantial evidence to support a mistake-of-fact instruction on the robbery charge is a close call.

2026The mistake of 7. fact defense disproves criminal intent. (§ 26; People v. Lawson (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 108, 111 [“The mistake-of-fact defense operates to negate the requisite criminal intent or mens rea element of the crime”].) Sections 266h and 266i plainly do not require the defendant to know the victim was a minor. (§§ 266h, subd. (b), 266i, subd. (b).) If the Legislature intended for the mistake of fact defense to be available for these crimes, the Legislature could have added such a knowledge requirement.

2026(Cf. People v. Speck, supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at p. 791 [where the defendant testified he believed the person from whom he borrowed the car was the rightful owner, substantial evidence supported a mistake-of-fact instruction]; People v. Russell (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1430 [defendant’s testimony “he thought the motorcycle was abandoned,” along with corroborating evidence, supported a mistake-of-fact instruction], disapproved on another ground in People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 874, fn. 14 .) In any event, even if substantial evidence supported the instruction, and even if Arias’

2025Cordova relies upon People v. Russell (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1430-1433 , overruled on other grounds by People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 874 (mistake-of-fact instruction where defendant found a rusty motorcycle with an expired registration near a trash bin outside a repair shop). 4 The trial court must instruct regarding the mistake-of-fact defense if defendant requests the instruction and substantial evidence supports it.

2026(People v. Mayberry (1975) 15 Cal.3d 143, 157 .) Thus, a mistake of fact defense instruction was not warranted.

2024(See People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 424 ; People v. Williams (1992) 4 Cal.4th 354 , 360–361 (Williams); People v. Mayberry (1975) 15 Cal.3d 143, 155 (Mayberry).) Nevertheless, Guenther contends that the statutory basis for the mistake of fact defense does not require the defendant’s mistaken belief to be reasonable.

2024But “ ‘[e]rror in failing to instruct on the mistake-of-fact defense is subject to the harmless error test set forth in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 .’ ” (People v. Molano (2019) 7 Cal.5th 620, 670 .) Reversal is required only if it is reasonably probable that in the absence of the error the defendant would have received a more favorable outcome.

2022Under Watson, a reviewing court must reverse if “it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.” (Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836 .) “ ‘ “We have made clear that a ‘probability’ in this context does not mean more likely than not, but merely a reasonable chance, more than an abstract possibility.” ’ ” (Richardson v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1040, 1050 , italics omitted.) The mistake of fact instruction at Hendrix’s trial told the jury that Hendrix lacked the requisite mens rea if his mistaken belief t

2026(Cf. People v. Speck, supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at p. 791 [where the defendant testified he believed the person from whom he borrowed the car was the rightful owner, substantial evidence supported a mistake-of-fact instruction]; People v. Russell (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1430 [defendant’s testimony “he thought the motorcycle was abandoned,” along with corroborating evidence, supported a mistake-of-fact instruction], disapproved on another ground in People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 874, fn. 14 .) In any event, even if substantial evidence supported the instruction, and even if Arias’

2025Cordova relies upon People v. Russell (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1430-1433 , overruled on other grounds by People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 874 (mistake-of-fact instruction where defendant found a rusty motorcycle with an expired registration near a trash bin outside a repair shop). 4 The trial court must instruct regarding the mistake-of-fact defense if defendant requests the instruction and substantial evidence supports it.

2014Where, as here, a defendant does not rely on or request instmction on an affirmative defense, a sua sponte duty to instruct arises only “ ‘if there is substantial evidence supportive of such a defense and the defense is not inconsistent with the defendant’s theory of the case.’ ” (People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 157 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870 , 960 P.2d 1094 ], italics omitted.) No substantial evidence supported a mistake of fact defense.

2014Where, as here, a defendant does not rely on or request instmction on an affirmative defense, a sua sponte duty to instruct arises only “ ‘if there is substantial evidence supportive of such a defense and the defense is not inconsistent with the defendant’s theory of the case.’ ” (People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 157 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870 , 960 P.2d 1094 ], italics omitted.) No substantial evidence supported a mistake of fact defense.

2019"Error in failing to instruct on the mistake-of-fact defense is subject to the harmless error test set forth in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 , 836, 299 P.2d 243 ." ( People v. Russell , supra , 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 1431 , 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 263 ; accord, People v. Watt (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1215 , 1219-1220, 177 Cal.Rptr.3d 871 , and cases cited; People v. Givan (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 335 , 349, 182 Cal.Rptr.3d 592 ; People v. Hanna (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 455 , 462-463, 160 Cal.Rptr.3d 210 ; **890 People v. Sojka , supra , 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 738 , 126 Cal.Rptr.3d 400 .) Under this st

2019"Error in failing to instruct on the mistake-of-fact defense is subject to the harmless error test set forth in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 , 836, 299 P.2d 243 ." ( People v. Russell , supra , 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 1431 , 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 263 ; accord, People v. Watt (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1215 , 1219-1220, 177 Cal.Rptr.3d 871 , and cases cited; People v. Givan (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 335 , 349, 182 Cal.Rptr.3d 592 ; People v. Hanna (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 455 , 462-463, 160 Cal.Rptr.3d 210 ; **890 People v. Sojka , supra , 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 738 , 126 Cal.Rptr.3d 400 .) Under this st

2026However, relying on People v. Hanna (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 455 (Hanna), he takes the position that because the mistake of fact defense applies to “attempts to commit that crime,” it must also apply to kidnapping under section 207, and thus that his professed “belief that M was over 14 was a complete defense.” We find this argument without merit.

2026His reliance on Hanna, supra, 218 8 The People argue Freeman forfeited this claim by failing to request the mistake of fact instruction in the trial court.

2026(People v. Olsen (1984) 36 Cal.3d 638 , 648–649 (Olsen); People v. Magpuso (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 112 , 113–114.) Freeman acknowledges this in his opening brief, conceding that “as a matter of public policy, the mistake of fact defense does not apply to the commission of a lewd act on a child under the age of 14,” and citing Olsen.

2021As the Supreme Court has explained, when the mistake of fact defense regarding a victim’s age is inapplicable, the defendant commits an offense involving a minor “at his or her peril.” (People v. Olsen (1984) 36 Cal.3d 638, 649 (Olsen).) Precluding the defense renders the defendant’s mental state regarding the victim’s minority or majority immaterial.

2022(See People v. Drew (1978) 22 Cal.3d 333, 344 ; see also People v. Gutierrez (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 1076 , 1082–1083 [discussing the reasons for the rule precluding evidence of mental illness as a defense to a general intent crime, or for use in a mistake- of-fact defense].) “The diminished capacity defense, which addressed an accused’s ‘general capacity or ability to form a specific intent or harbor a mental element of an offense,’ was abolished in 1982.” (People v. Reyes (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 975, 982 , fn. omitted (Reyes); § 25, subds. (a), (b).) Consequently, evidence of a defendant’s menta

2015(See People v. Geddes (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 448, 456 [ 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 886 ] [“we question whether a mistake-of-fact defense is appropriately utilized where defendant’s delusions are the product of mental illness and/or voluntary intoxication”]; People v. Gutierrez (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 1076, 1081 [ 225 Cal.Rptr. 885 ] [person who commits a crime while voluntarily drunk should not escape the consequences]; People v. Scott (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 823, 832, fn. 4 [ 194 Cal.Rptr. 633 ] [mistake of fact defense not available if the defendant’s delusions were caused by voluntary intoxication].) Here, de

2026Section 26 states, in pertinent part, that “[a]ll persons are capable of committing crimes” except “[p]ersons who committed the act or made the omission charged under an ignorance or mistake of fact, which disproves any criminal intent.” The mistake of fact defense thus is “an assertion by the defendant that a particular factual error in his perception of the world led him to lack the mens rea required for the crime.” (People v. Hendrix (2022) 13 Cal.5th 933, 940 ; People v. Hernandez (1964) 61 Cal.2d 2 Defendant objected to the pinpoint instruction on the ground that the instruction was unnec

2025Three [persons are not capable of committing crimes if they ‘committed the act . . . under an ignorance or mistake of fact, which disproves any criminal intent’]; Lawson, [supra,] at p. 111 [‘The mistake-of-fact defense operates to negate the requisite criminal intent or mens rea element of the crime’]; People v. Anderson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 989 , 996–998 [same conclusion with respect to similar ‘defense’ of accident]; . . .)” (People v. Hendrix (2022) 13 Cal.5th 933 , 940, fn. omitted (Hendrix).) Mistake of fact “‘requires, at a minimum, an 4 Because the offenses with which Sanchez was charged

2026We address the merits of his argument on appeal as to both counts. 5. 529, 535 (Hernandez) [“ ‘At common law an honest and reasonable belief in the existence of circumstances, which, if true, would make the act for which the person is indicted an innocent act, has always been held to be a good defense.’ ”].) Generally, “a mistake of fact defense is not available unless the mistake disproves an element of the offense.” (In re Jennings (2004) 34 Cal.4th 254, 277 .) The act of pandering is proscribed by section 266i.

2026(See In re Jennings, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 277 ; People v. Richards (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 549, 563 [“[W]hen a mistake concerns only the severity of an offense, and the defendant’s conduct remains unlawful even under the defendant’s mistaken view of the facts, courts have not recognized mistake as a defense.”].) Defendant observes sections 266i and 266h do not prohibit the mistake of fact defense regarding the age of the victim.

2025Three [persons are not capable of committing crimes if they ‘committed the act . . . under an ignorance or mistake of fact, which disproves any criminal intent’]; Lawson, [supra,] at p. 111 [‘The mistake-of-fact defense operates to negate the requisite criminal intent or mens rea element of the crime’]; People v. Anderson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 989 , 996–998 [same conclusion with respect to similar ‘defense’ of accident]; . . .)” (People v. Hendrix (2022) 13 Cal.5th 933 , 940, fn. omitted (Hendrix).) Mistake of fact “‘requires, at a minimum, an 4 Because the offenses with which Sanchez was charged

2023Code, § 26, par. [3] [persons are not capable of committing crimes if they ‘committed the act . . . under an ignorance or mistake of fact, which disproves any criminal intent’]; [People v.] Lawson [(2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 108 ,] 111 [‘The mistake-of-fact defense operates to negate the requisite criminal intent or mens rea element of the crime’]; People v. Anderson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 989, 996-998 [citation] [same conclusion with respect to similar ‘defense’ of accident]; see also, e.g., State v. Sexton (1999) 160 N.J. 93 [ 733 A.2d 1125 , 1128- 1130] [discussing the relationship between mistake o

2019Stringer concedes he could find no case involving a child endangerment charge in which a court has sanctioned a mistake of fact defense regarding a victim's age, but argues such a defense was nevertheless available to him under the principles set forth in People v. Hernandez (1964) 61 Cal.2d 529 (Hernandez).

2019As the Hernandez court explained, the availability of a mistake of fact defense as to a victim's age turns on whether the defendant's mistaken belief, "if true, would [have] ma[de] the act for which the person is indicted an innocent act ...." (Hernandez, supra, 61 Cal.2d at p. 535 , italics added.) Stated differently, the defense is available where the defendant's mistaken view of facts, if correct, "would have precluded a finding of criminal intent or evil design and the defendant's conduct by itself would have been entirely innocent." (People v. Parker (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 818, 822 .) On t

2024(See People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 424 ; People v. Williams (1992) 4 Cal.4th 354 , 360–361 (Williams); People v. Mayberry (1975) 15 Cal.3d 143, 155 (Mayberry).) Nevertheless, Guenther contends that the statutory basis for the mistake of fact defense does not require the defendant’s mistaken belief to be reasonable.

2024But this does not change the fact that there was no substantial evidence of “equivocal conduct [by the victims] that could be reasonably and in good faith relied on to form a mistaken belief of consent.” (Williams, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 364 .) Because the defense neither relied on a mistake-of-fact defense, nor presented any substantial evidence supportive of such a defense, the trial court had no sua sponte duty to give a Mayberry instruction for the oral copulation counts.

2021We agree with the Attorney General’s argument that the jury would have convicted defendant even if a mistake of fact instruction had been given because the jury’s verdict indicates it rejected defendant’s defense that she was not guilty as she did not have the intent to temporarily or permanently deprive Budget of the car. 7 Defendant acknowledges that case law provides that the harmless error standard in this case is that set by People v. Watson, but she requests that this court instead apply the standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 .

2015Watson[, supra,] 46 Cal.2d [at p.] 836”]; People v. Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 868, fn. 16 [an exception to the Watson standard may exist “when the error deprives the defendant of the federal due process right to present a complete defense”]; People v. Russell (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1431 [“[e]rror in failing to instruct on the mistake-of-fact defense is subject to” Watson test].) In an abundance of caution, we apply the more stringent “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 , 24 especially in light of defendant’s argument that his federal con

2021Put another way, people do not act unlawfully if they commit acts based on a reasonable and honest belief that certain facts and circumstances exist which, if true, would render the act lawful. [Citations.]” (People v. Reed (1996) 53 Cal.App.4th 389, 396 .) The mistake of fact defense, as a matter of public policy, does not apply to the commission of a lewd act on a child under the age of 14 years, the crime of which defendant was convicted here.

2019(See People v. Hanna (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 455 , 462, 160 Cal.Rptr.3d 210 ( Hanna ) [because attempt requires specific intent, mistake of fact as to age is an available defense to challenge a conviction for attempted lewd and lascivious conduct with a child under the age of 14]; but see People v. Reed (1996) 53 Cal.App.4th 389 , 397, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 658 ( Reed ) [noting "trend toward abolition of mistake of fact as a defense to attempt crimes"].) Assuming that Hanna was properly decided, the appellate court there affirmed that public policy can bar a mistake-of-fact defense.

2021We need not decide whether the trial court erred because any error was harmless. “ ‘Error in failing to instruct on the mistake-of-fact defense is subject to the harmless error test set forth in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836, 299 [P.2d 243].’ ” (People v. Molano (2019) 7 Cal.5th 620, 670 .)2 “ ‘In determining whether instructional error was harmless, relevant 1 The mistake-of-fact instruction, in its entirety, was: “The defendant is not guilty of Murder if he did not have the intent or mental state required to commit the crime because he reasonably did not know a fact or reasonabl

2021We need not decide whether the trial court erred because any error was harmless. “ ‘Error in failing to instruct on the mistake-of-fact defense is subject to the harmless error test set forth in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836, 299 [P.2d 243].’ ” (People v. Molano (2019) 7 Cal.5th 620, 670 .)2 “ ‘In determining whether instructional error was harmless, relevant 1 The mistake-of-fact instruction, in its entirety, was: “The defendant is not guilty of Murder if he did not have the intent or mental state required to commit the crime because he reasonably did not know a fact or reasonabl

2023(People v. Vogel (1956) 46 Cal.2d 798 [a defendant’s bona fide and reasonable belief that he was divorced is a defense to bigamy]). 9 In Jennings, the defendant was charged with the misdemeanor of violating Business and Professions Code section 25658, subdivision (c), purchasing alcohol for a person under 21 years of age who consumes the alcohol and thereby proximately causes great bodily injury or death to the person or any other person.

1992For example, in People v. Vogel, supra, 46 Cal.2d 798 , we held that a reasonable and good faith belief that a former wife had obtained a divorce was a valid defense to a charge of bigamy arising out of a second marriage when the first marriage had not in fact been terminated. ( Id. at pp. 801, 804-805.) However, the mistake of fact defense would not have been applicable if the first marriage had in fact been terminated.

2003If a person accused of a crime could shield himself behind the defense that he was ignorant of the law which he violated, immunity from punishment would in most cases result.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Snyder (1982) 32 Cal.3d 590, 593-594 [ 186 Cal.Rptr. 485 , 652 P.2d 42 ].) Further, even assuming for the sake of argument that appellant was entitled to a mistake-of-fact instruction, the failure to give such an instruction was harmless.

2003If a person accused of a crime could shield himself behind the defense that he was ignorant of the law which he violated, immunity from punishment would in most cases result.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Snyder (1982) 32 Cal.3d 590, 593-594 [ 186 Cal.Rptr. 485 , 652 P.2d 42 ].) Further, even assuming for the sake of argument that appellant was entitled to a mistake-of-fact instruction, the failure to give such an instruction was harmless.

2024(See People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 424 ; People v. Williams (1992) 4 Cal.4th 354 , 360–361 (Williams); People v. Mayberry (1975) 15 Cal.3d 143, 155 (Mayberry).) Nevertheless, Guenther contends that the statutory basis for the mistake of fact defense does not require the defendant’s mistaken belief to be reasonable.

2014(See People v. Mayberry (1975) 15 Cal.3d 143, 154-155 [a reasonable mistake of fact regarding consent is incompatible with the existence of wrongful intent].) In any sexual assault case in which there is substantial evidence of the victim’s equivocal conduct that could have led a defendant to reasonably and in good faith believe the victim consented to the sexual act, the court must instruct the jury, even absent a request, with a mistake-of-fact instruction akin to the one found in CALCRIM No. 1015 or CALJIC No. 10.65, commonly known as a Mayberry instruction.5 (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.

2020(People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1145 (Barnett); see also People v. Cole (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 452, 484 [“ ‘The threshold is not high.’ ”].) A mistake of fact defense differs based on whether the charged crime requires general intent, specific intent or knowledge of a requisite fact.

2015(People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1145 ; People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 684 ; Russell, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 1427 .) There was no substantial evidence supporting a mistake of fact instruction in this case.

2020(People v. Salas (2006) 37 Cal.4th 967, 982 .) 5 The mistake of fact defense provides a person cannot be convicted of a crime if they acted “under an ignorance of mistake of fact, which disproves any criminal intent.” (§ 26, class Three.) The defense applies, “when the defendant holds a mistaken belief in a fact or set of circumstances, which, if existent or true, would render the 5 CALCRIM No. 3406 states as follows: “The defendant is not guilty of [insert crime[s]] if (he/she) did not have the intent or mental state required to commit the crime because (he/she) [reasonably] did not know a fa

2015Here, as in People v. Salas, supra, even if the more rigorous Chapman standard is applied, any error in failing to give the mistake-of-fact instruction was harmless beyond any reasonable doubt.

2021(People v. Lucero (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 1011, 1016 ; § 26.) “Penal Code section 26 lists classes of persons deemed incapable of committing crimes, including ‘[p]ersons who committed the act . . . charged under an ignorance or mistake of fact, which disproves any criminal intent.’ ” (People v. Givan (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 335, 343 .) “A ‘mistake of fact’ defense negates an element of a charged crime because it disproves criminal intent. [Citations.] However, a mistake of fact jury instruction is not appropriate where the defendant’s mistaken belief does not negate an element of the crime.” (Id.

2021(People v. Lucero (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 1011, 1016 ; § 26.) “Penal Code section 26 lists classes of persons deemed incapable of committing crimes, including ‘[p]ersons who committed the act . . . charged under an ignorance or mistake of fact, which disproves any criminal intent.’ ” (People v. Givan (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 335, 343 .) “A ‘mistake of fact’ defense negates an element of a charged crime because it disproves criminal intent. [Citations.] However, a mistake of fact jury instruction is not appropriate where the defendant’s mistaken belief does not negate an element of the crime.” (Id.

2015(See People v. Rivera (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 736, 743 .) The mistake-of-fact defense is based on Penal Code section 26, paragraph Three, which provides that a person is not criminally liable where he “committed the act or made the omission charged under an ignorance or mistake of fact, which disproves a criminal intent.” “Put another way, people do not act unlawfully if they commit acts based on a reasonable and honest belief that certain facts and circumstances exist which, 4 Defendant contends it is unclear whether the court actually ruled on the mistake of fact instruction.

2015(See People v. Rivera (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 736, 743 .) The mistake-of-fact defense is based on Penal Code section 26, paragraph Three, which provides that a person is not criminally liable where he “committed the act or made the omission charged under an ignorance or mistake of fact, which disproves a criminal intent.” “Put another way, people do not act unlawfully if they commit acts based on a reasonable and honest belief that certain facts and circumstances exist which, 4 Defendant contends it is unclear whether the court actually ruled on the mistake of fact instruction.

2015Even if so, for the reasons discussed below, defendant was mistaken about whether his own conduct was legal. 11 Code, § 11362.5) (CUA). ( Young, supra, at p. 232 .) On appeal, he argued that the trial court erred by failing to give a mistake of fact instruction.

2006(See People v. Hernandez (1964) 61 Cal.2d 529, 535 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 361 , 393 P.2d 673 ] [“ ‘ “At common law an honest and reasonable belief in the existence of circumstances, which, if true, would make the act for which the person is indicted an innocent act, has always been held to be a good defense.” ’ ”]; In re Jennings, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 279 ; People v. Young (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 229, 233 [ 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 726 ].) Our holding is consistent with the recent decision in People v. Salas (2006) 37 Cal.4th 167 [ 38 Cal.Rptr.3d 624 , 127 P.3d 40 ], which held that guilty knowledge was not a

2015(People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1145 ; People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 684 ; Russell, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 1427 .) There was no substantial evidence supporting a mistake of fact instruction in this case.

2015(People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1145 ; People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 684 ; Russell, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 1427 .) There was no substantial evidence supporting a mistake of fact instruction in this case.